[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 21, 2010
No. 09-12634
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 06-01201-CV-T-17-MAP
HELEN THOMPSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
OF NORTH AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(June 21, 2010)
EDMONDSON and MARCUS, Circuit Judges, and BARBOUR,* District Judge.
*
Honorable William Henry Barbour, Jr., United States District Judge for the Southern
District of Mississippi, sitting by designation.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant-Plaintiff Helen Thompson’s husband died as a result of an injury
sustained while on a business trip in Florida. He had been drinking and, while
walking, fell in a parking lot, hitting his head. His life insurance policy through
LINA contains an exclusion for accidents caused by or resulting from the insured’s
“intoxication as determined according to the laws of the jurisdiction in which” the
accident occurred. Florida law contains no general definition of legal intoxication.
LINA denied benefits, claiming that the DUI statute establishes 0.08% as the “legal
limit.” ERISA applies to this case. The district court granted Defendant LINA
summary judgment.
After hearing oral argument and looking repeatedly at Florida’s laws, we
regard the only debatable issue in this appeal to be whether the district court was to
determine de novo about the administrator’s denial of benefits or to determine
whether the denial was arbitrary or capricious. But we do not decide that issue. It
is unnecessary.
If a de novo standard applies, we are unanimous in concluding that
Plaintiff’s husband was not intoxicated “as determined according to the laws of”
Florida. If the arbitrary and capricious standard applies, a majority of today’s court
2
concludes that the administrator’s denial of coverage was arbitrary or capricious
given Florida’s laws.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court.
REVERSED.
3