UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4607
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
VINCENT MISSOURI,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. Margaret B. Seymour, District
Judge. (6:00-cr-00498-MBS-1)
Submitted: June 10, 2010 Decided: June 23, 2010
Before WILKINSON and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis H. Lang, CALLISON TIGHE & ROBINSON, LLC, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellant. W. Walter Wilkins, United States
Attorney, David C. Stephens, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Vincent Missouri appeals the thirty-six month sentence
imposed by the district court following revocation of his term
of supervised release. On appeal, Missouri’s sole argument is
that the district court erred in denying his motion to proceed
pro se. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
While the Sixth Amendment grants a defendant the right
to proceed pro se at trial, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,
819 (1975), it does not extend that right to supervised release
revocation proceedings. United States v. Hodges, 460 F.3d 646,
650 (5th Cir. 2006). Instead, Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 32.1(b)(2) governs the defendant’s right to self-
representation, granting a defendant the right to retain counsel
or request appointment of counsel unless that right is knowingly
and voluntarily waived. United States v. Farrell, 393 F.3d 498,
500 (4th Cir. 2005). The district court’s denial of a motion to
proceed pro se is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973) (stating “that the
decision as to the need for counsel must be made on a case-by-
case basis in the exercise of a sound discretion”). Even
assuming, without deciding, that the district court abused its
discretion in denying Missouri’s motion to proceed pro se, we
find that any error was harmless and did not affect Missouri’s
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substantial rights, as the district court allowed both counsel
and Missouri ample opportunity to advance Missouri’s pro se
argument. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) (“Any error, defect,
irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial
rights must be disregarded.”).
Accordingly, we deny Missouri’s motion to file a pro
se supplemental brief and affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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