UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-5190
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
KENDRICK RAMON BOWDEN,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., District Judge. (1:08-cr-00222-WO-1)
Submitted: June 17, 2010 Decided: June 23, 2010
Before MOTZ and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Donald Cowan, Jr., Heather H. Wright, ELLIS & WINTERS, LLP,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Randall Stuart
Galyon, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Kendrick Ramon Bowden pled guilty to one count of
distribution of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (2006). Under the properly calculated
advisory Sentencing Guidelines, his range of imprisonment was 87
to 108 months. The district court, after giving consideration
to the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) and
the disparity between crack cocaine and powder cocaine
sentencing, varied downward, sentencing Bowden to 72 months’
imprisonment. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), suggesting that
Bowden’s sentence is unreasonable because the district court
declined to impose a sentence based on a 1:1 ratio for crack and
powder cocaine. Although Bowden was informed of his right to
file a pro se supplemental brief, he has not done so. The
Government has declined to file a response. We affirm.
We review a sentence imposed by a district court under
a deferential abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d
155, 161 (4th Cir. 2008). In reviewing a sentence, the
appellate court must “first ensure that the district court
committed no significant procedural error,” such as improperly
calculating the guidelines range, failing to consider the
§ 3553(a) factors, or failing to adequately explain the chosen
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sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If there are no procedural
errors, the appellate court then considers the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence. Id. “When rendering a
sentence, the district court must make an individualized
assessment based on the facts presented” and “state in open
court the particular reasons supporting its chosen sentence.”
United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This requires
the district court to provide a sufficient explanation of the
sentence to satisfy this court that the district court has a
reasoned basis for its decision and has considered the parties’
arguments. Id. Substantive reasonableness of the sentence is
determined by “taking into account the ‘totality of the
circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the
Guidelines range.’” United States v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473
(4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).
We find the district court’s sentence was both
procedurally and substantively reasonable. In Kimbrough v.
United States, 552 U.S. 85, 110 (2007), the Supreme Court
reemphasized that the crack cocaine guidelines are advisory only
and held that “it would not be an abuse of discretion for a
district court to conclude when sentencing a . . . defendant
that the crack/powder disparity yields a sentence ‘greater than
necessary’ to achieve § 3553(a)’s purposes, even in a mine-run
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case.” Subsequently, the Court held “that district courts are
entitled to reject and vary categorically from the crack-cocaine
Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with those
Guidelines.” Spears v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 840, 843-44
(2009). In this case, the district court clearly understood its
discretion to consider Bowden’s disparity arguments in selecting
a sentence; it clearly exercised this discretion in sentencing
Bowden below the advisory Guidelines range based on this
disparity and its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. We
find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
determination of Bowden’s sentence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm Bowden’s conviction and sentence. This
court requires that counsel inform Bowden, in writing, of the
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Bowden requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Bowden. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
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materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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