UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4389
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BILLY JOE COLLINS, a/k/a B.J.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:07-cr-00375-NCT-4)
Submitted: June 8, 2010 Decided: June 25, 2010
Before NIEMEYER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael E. Archenbronn, LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL E. ARCHENBRONN,
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills
Wagoner, United States Attorney, Randall S. Galyon, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Billy Joe Collins of conspiracy to
distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture containing a
detectable amount of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 846 (2006). The district court sentenced him to a 262-month
term of imprisonment. Collins appeals his conviction on the
grounds that the district court erred in admitting certain
testimony and that the evidence did not support his conviction.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Collins challenges as unfairly prejudicial the
district court’s admission of testimony about the search of his
home, which resulted in the seizure of a drug ledger, and of
testimony that he received stolen property in exchange for
methamphetamine. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. We review a district
court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. United
States v. Roe, __ F.3d __, __, 2010 WL 2108488, at *4 (4th Cir.
May 27, 2010) (stating standard of review). A district court
“abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or irrationally,
fails to consider judicially recognized factors constraining its
exercise of discretion or relies on erroneous factual or legal
premises.” United States v. Mallory, 568 F.3d 166, 177 (4th
Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted),
cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1736 (2010).
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Relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403.
“Unfair prejudice speaks to the capacity of some concededly
relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on
a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged.”
United States v. Basham, 561 F.3d 302, 327 (4th Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied,
__ U.S. __, 78 U.S.L.W. 3341 (U.S. June 1, 2010) (No. 09-617).
Thus, “[e]vidence . . . should be excluded under Rule 403 when
there is a genuine risk that the emotions of a jury will be
excited to irrational behavior, and this risk is
disproportionate to the probative value of the offered
evidence.” United States v. Siegel, 536 F.3d 306, 319 (4th
Cir.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert.
denied, 129 S. Ct. 770 (2008).
With these standards in mind, we have reviewed the
record on appeal and conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged testimony.
Assuming, without deciding, that the court erred by admitting
the testimony characterizing the property traded for
methamphetamine as stolen, any error was harmless. See United
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States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 625, 637 (4th Cir. 2009) (providing
standard), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 78 U.S.L.W. 3611 (U.S.
Apr. 19, 2010) (No. 09-9648). Thus, Collins is not entitled to
relief on his evidentiary claims.
Collins also challenges the district court’s denial of
his motion for judgment of acquittal, contending that the
evidence established only buyer-seller relationships and that
there was no evidence that he worked with anyone else or that
the sellers knew he would re-sell the drugs. Collins also
points out that, at trial, he denied any involvement with drugs.
This court reviews de novo the district court’s
decision to deny a motion filed pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29.
United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 367 (4th Cir. 2010).
Where, as here, the motion was based on a claim of insufficient
evidence, “[t]he verdict of a jury must be sustained if there is
substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the
Government, to support it.” Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.
60, 80 (1942). This court confines “reversal [of a conviction]
on grounds of insufficient evidence . . . to cases where the
prosecution’s failure is clear.” Green, 599 F.3d at 367
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Our review of the trial transcript leads us to
conclude that the evidence supported the jury’s verdict. See
id. (setting forth elements of conspiracy offense). Collins
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asserts, however, that he merely engaged in buyer-seller
transactions. We have held that “[e]vidence of a buy-sell
transaction . . . coupled with a substantial quantity of drugs[]
would support a reasonable inference that the parties were
coconspirators.” United States v. Reid, 523 F.3d 310, 317 (4th
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation
omitted). Although Collins also contends that he did not
participate in a conspiracy because the sellers did not know he
planned to re-sell the drugs, coconspirators need not know all
of the details of the conspiracy. Green, 599 F.3d at 367.
Finally, to the extent Collins relies on his testimony that he
did not participate in any drug transactions and he challenges
his coconspirators’ testimony against him on the ground that
they testified in the hope of receiving a reduced sentence, “we
do not weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of
witnesses, but assume that the jury resolved any discrepancies
[in the testimony] in favor of the government.” United States
v. Kelly, 510 F.3d 433, 440 (4th Cir. 2007). Thus, we find that
the district court did not err in denying Collins’ Rule 29
motion.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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