United States v. Collins

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 09-4389

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

BILLY JOE COLLINS, a/k/a B.J.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:07-cr-00375-NCT-4)

Submitted: June 8, 2010 Decided: June 25, 2010

Before NIEMEYER and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Michael E. Archenbronn, LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL E. ARCHENBRONN,
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills
Wagoner, United States Attorney, Randall S. Galyon, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

A jury convicted Billy Joe Collins of conspiracy to

distribute 500 grams or more of a mixture containing a

detectable amount of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 846 (2006). The district court sentenced him to a 262-month

term of imprisonment. Collins appeals his conviction on the

grounds that the district court erred in admitting certain

testimony and that the evidence did not support his conviction.

Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Collins challenges as unfairly prejudicial the

district court’s admission of testimony about the search of his

home, which resulted in the seizure of a drug ledger, and of

testimony that he received stolen property in exchange for

methamphetamine. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. We review a district

court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. United

States v. Roe, __ F.3d __, __, 2010 WL 2108488, at *4 (4th Cir.

May 27, 2010) (stating standard of review). A district court

“abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or irrationally,

fails to consider judicially recognized factors constraining its

exercise of discretion or relies on erroneous factual or legal

premises.” United States v. Mallory, 568 F.3d 166, 177 (4th

Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted),

cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1736 (2010).

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Relevant evidence “may be excluded if its probative

value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair

prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or

by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless

presentation of cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403.

“Unfair prejudice speaks to the capacity of some concededly

relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on

a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged.”

United States v. Basham, 561 F.3d 302, 327 (4th Cir. 2009)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied,

__ U.S. __, 78 U.S.L.W. 3341 (U.S. June 1, 2010) (No. 09-617).

Thus, “[e]vidence . . . should be excluded under Rule 403 when

there is a genuine risk that the emotions of a jury will be

excited to irrational behavior, and this risk is

disproportionate to the probative value of the offered

evidence.” United States v. Siegel, 536 F.3d 306, 319 (4th

Cir.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert.

denied, 129 S. Ct. 770 (2008).

With these standards in mind, we have reviewed the

record on appeal and conclude that the district court did not

abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged testimony.

Assuming, without deciding, that the court erred by admitting

the testimony characterizing the property traded for

methamphetamine as stolen, any error was harmless. See United

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States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 625, 637 (4th Cir. 2009) (providing

standard), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 78 U.S.L.W. 3611 (U.S.

Apr. 19, 2010) (No. 09-9648). Thus, Collins is not entitled to

relief on his evidentiary claims.

Collins also challenges the district court’s denial of

his motion for judgment of acquittal, contending that the

evidence established only buyer-seller relationships and that

there was no evidence that he worked with anyone else or that

the sellers knew he would re-sell the drugs. Collins also

points out that, at trial, he denied any involvement with drugs.

This court reviews de novo the district court’s

decision to deny a motion filed pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29.

United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 367 (4th Cir. 2010).

Where, as here, the motion was based on a claim of insufficient

evidence, “[t]he verdict of a jury must be sustained if there is

substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the

Government, to support it.” Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S.

60, 80 (1942). This court confines “reversal [of a conviction]

on grounds of insufficient evidence . . . to cases where the

prosecution’s failure is clear.” Green, 599 F.3d at 367

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Our review of the trial transcript leads us to

conclude that the evidence supported the jury’s verdict. See

id. (setting forth elements of conspiracy offense). Collins

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asserts, however, that he merely engaged in buyer-seller

transactions. We have held that “[e]vidence of a buy-sell

transaction . . . coupled with a substantial quantity of drugs[]

would support a reasonable inference that the parties were

coconspirators.” United States v. Reid, 523 F.3d 310, 317 (4th

Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation

omitted). Although Collins also contends that he did not

participate in a conspiracy because the sellers did not know he

planned to re-sell the drugs, coconspirators need not know all

of the details of the conspiracy. Green, 599 F.3d at 367.

Finally, to the extent Collins relies on his testimony that he

did not participate in any drug transactions and he challenges

his coconspirators’ testimony against him on the ground that

they testified in the hope of receiving a reduced sentence, “we

do not weigh the evidence or assess the credibility of

witnesses, but assume that the jury resolved any discrepancies

[in the testimony] in favor of the government.” United States

v. Kelly, 510 F.3d 433, 440 (4th Cir. 2007). Thus, we find that

the district court did not err in denying Collins’ Rule 29

motion.

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED