[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 28, 2010
No. 08-10117
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 05-00131-CR-ORL-28JGG
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
C. KEITH LAMONDA,
JESSE W. LAMONDA,
JOHN L. MAYNARD,
Defendants-Appellants.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(June 28, 2010)
Before EDMONDSON, BARKETT and ROTH,* Circuit Judges.
*Honorable Jane R. Roth, United States Circuit Judge for the Third Circuit, sitting by
designation.
PER CURIAM:
Appellants Keith LaMonda, Jesse LaMonda, and John Maynard were
convicted of defrauding and conspiring to defraud investors and life insurance
companies. No reversible error has been shown, so we will affirm their
convictions and sentences.
Because we write primarily for the parties, we assume their familiarity with
the underlying facts. Defendants operated a company that sold viatical settlements,
which are financial instruments created by the inter vivos conveyance of a life
insurance death benefit. During the seven-month trial, the Government presented
evidence that defendants (1) knowingly procured life insurance policies acquired
by fraud for the purpose of selling viatical settlements, (2) lied to investors who
purchased fraud-tainted viatical settlements, (3) secretly misappropriated investor
funds for personal use, and (4) conspired to conceal taxable income from the sale
of viatical settlements.
Defendants, asserting eleven issues for appeal, claim the District Court
committed reversible error. We disagree. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
52(a) precludes conviction reversal based on “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or
variance that does not affect substantial rights.” “[R]eviewing courts must apply
Rule 52(a)’s harmless-error analysis and must disregard errors that are harmless
2
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999) (internal
quotations omitted). The harmless-error rule assures criminal defendants a fair
trial, not a perfect one. See, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681
(1986).
During the course of every long trial, imperfections are bound to arise
because exigencies of live litigation require instantaneous rulings on matters of
which defendants complain (e.g., admissibility of evidence, scope of cross-
examination). Defendants, however, have not shown any error committed by the
District Court, which handled this complex criminal matter admirably. The alleged
trial imperfections, even had they amounted to error (and they do not), were
harmless as to the outcome beyond a reasonable doubt.1
AFFIRMED.
1
We have considered and rejected each argument raised by defendants on appeal. To ensure
completeness of the record, those arguments and their proponents are as follows: (1) the District
Court erred when it denied defendants’ suppression motions (Keith LaMonda), (2) the District
Court erred by restricting defense counsel from objecting during the Government’s rebuttal
closing argument (Keith LaMonda), (3) the District Court erred when it admitted testimony of
Maynard’s disbarment (Keith LaMonda), (4) the District Court erred by unfairly limiting
defendants’ cross-examination of Government witnesses and defendants’ presentation of their
case (Jesse LaMonda), (5) the evidence was insufficient to support Jesse LaMonda’s conviction
(Jesse LaMonda), (6) the Government unfairly criminalized conduct involving merely bad
business judgment (Jesse LaMonda), (7) the District Court improperly admitted evidence of civil
and regulatory violations (Jesse LaMonda), (8) the District Court erred in denying defense
requests for jury instructions, (9) the evidence was insufficient to support Maynard’s conviction
on Count Thirteen (John Maynard), (10) the evidence was insufficient to support Maynard’s
conviction on Count Fourteen (John Maynard), and (11) Maynard’s sentence was unreasonable
because the District Court failed to account for sentencing disparities among co-defendants
(John Maynard).
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