FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
April 9, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
JUSTIN J. RUEB #94567, a/k/a
JUSTIN RUEB, a/k/a JUSTIN
JOSEPH RUEB; ALAN MEADS;
GEORGE SHANKLIN; RUDY BALL,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
No. 09-1313
LEROY ARMIJO; CESAR (D.C. No. 1:09-CV-00072-ZLW)
CABRERA, JR.; JORDON BURDEN; (D. Colo.)
RAYMOND CAIN; FRANCISCO
CORDOZA; SHANE CROOK;
ANASTASIA HELOV; ROY
HERNANDEZ; DARYL WAGNER;
VERNON TEMPLEMAN; RAY
MAYNES; GILBERT MONTUR;
LARRY SCOTT; JARED
VILLAREAL; CARLOS
MONDRAGON; BOBBY
VALENZUELA; KHADASI Z.
HORLEN; JACOB OAKLEY; LARRY
UPTON; WAYNE LUOMA;
PATRICK PLACENSIO; SHAWN
SHIELDS; RICKY MAES; DUSTIN
SHERWOOD; JOHNNY J.
QUINTANA; JAMES R.
WASHINGTON,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ARISTEDES ZAVARAS; BROWN
(CAPTAIN); JOHN OR JANE DOE
#3; DENNIS BURBANK;
KATHLEEN BOYD; DANIEL DENT;
JIM GENTILE; CATHIE HOLST;
JOHN OR JANE DOE # 1; C.
McCARTY; CHRISTINE
MOSCHETTI; R. OLIVETT; LARRY
REID; C. ROY; PEGGY STEELE;
RICHARD WREN; D. ZUPAN;
BUCHANAN; EUGENE ATHERTON;
C. BARR; CORTEZ; D. P. DIAZ;
SUE GRISENTI; H. T. HUERTAS;
JOHN DOE # 2; MUNSON; M. N.
McCORMICK; JAMES A. OLSON; J.
ROMERO; KEN SALAZAR; R.
TWILLENER; D. WILLIAMS;
BROWN (SERGEANT); S. OWENS;
BOBBY ALLEN; Y. BROWN; ANNE
DEFUSCO; DANNY FOSTER; M.
HILDEBRAND; CARL HOLDITCH;
J. JIMINEZ; McGREGORY; C. MAY;
PANEK; RODECAPE; JOHN
SUTHERS; G. VENDETTI; H.
WILLIAMS; ANTHONY
DECESARO; R. WILLIAMS;
ROBERT ALLEN; BRANDT; JAMES
DALTON; S. GARCIA; HALSTEAD;
SUSAN JONES; ANGEL MEDINA;
MARTINEZ; DONICE NEAL; J.
PEDRIE; W. RICHTER; JOHN
STONER; H. WILKINS; J. WRIGHT,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
2
Before MURPHY, McKAY, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
This prisoner-civil-rights case was originally filed by forty-eight state
prisoners, all of whom are in Colorado administrative segregation facilities, and
two private persons asserting numerous claims for relief and challenging the
constitutionality of a number of Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC)
policies, including policies regarding marriage by prison inmates, conjugal visits,
family visits, and strip searches. 1 The district court issued an order directing
plaintiffs to file an amended complaint using the proper court form and to provide
addresses for each named plaintiff and each named defendant. The order also
directed each plaintiff, other than Mr. Justin Rueb, to submit a proper 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915 motion and affidavit along with a certified copy of each prisoner’s
trust-fund statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the filing. 2
Although an amended complaint was filed, twenty-nine plaintiffs failed to file
their § 1915 motions and affidavits or to file their certified trust-fund statements.
As a result, the district court issued an order dismissing those plaintiffs from
the suit.
1
Defendants-appellees were not served in the district court and have not
entered an appearance or filed a brief in this appeal.
2
The court had apparently received the proper § 1915 materials from
Mr. Rueb.
3
On June 4, 2009, the district court issued an order denying class
certification, denying plaintiffs’ request for joinder, and concluding that the
parties were misjoined because “[a]llowing Plaintiffs to proceed as a group will
cause unnecessary delay, expense, potential confusion, and burden on the part of
the Court, as well as Defendants, and will undermine the principle of fundamental
fairness implicit in Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(b) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 21.” R. Vol. 3
at 386. Noting that “[p]roceeding in forma pauperis in a civil case is a privilege,
not a right --fundamental or otherwise,” the district court refused to permit
plaintiffs “to continue their abusive tactics clearly intended to burden and
overwhelm the Court and Defendants with unduly complicated litigation.” Id.
The court dismissed all remaining plaintiffs except Mr. Rueb and explained that
the dismissed plaintiffs were free to initiate their own actions. The court also
denied all pending motions, including the motion to appoint counsel.
Mr. Rueb was then given thirty days in which to file an amended complaint
limited to his own claims. The court went to great lengths in its June 4 order to
explain to Mr. Rueb the purposes of a complaint and the requirements of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. On July 16, when Mr. Rueb had failed to file the amended
complaint within the time allowed, the district court dismissed the complaint and
the action without prejudice for failure to comply with the June 4 order and for
failure to prosecute. Judgment was entered the same day in favor of defendants
and against Mr. Rueb. Mr. Rueb and three other inmates appeal.
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Appellants take exception to all of the orders of the district court,
concluding ultimately that dismissal of the entire lawsuit was “abusive.” Opening
Br. at 1. Specifically, they argue that various groups of plaintiffs should not have
been dismissed, that it was an abuse of discretion to “refute[] the plaintiffs’
collective right to share and divide the $350 filing fee equally in this case,” id.
at 2, that the refusal to allow joinder was an abuse of discretion, that it was error
to deny appointment of counsel and class certification, and that “the District
Judge abused her discretion by dismissing this lawsuit to punish plaintiff Rueb for
failing to ‘cure’ ficticious [sic], non-existent inadequacies in the complaint,” id.
The only issue properly before us on appeal, however, is whether the dismissal
for failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and for failure to prosecute was
proper. We conclude that it was, and we affirm.
Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Rule 8 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure requires, among other things, “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
The requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) that allegations in a complaint plausibly suggest
(and not be merely consistent with) illegal conduct by the defendants means that
the Rule’s “plain statement” must have “enough heft” to demonstrate that the
pleader is entitled to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557
(2007).
5
Mr. Rueb’s amended complaint named fifty plaintiffs, covered ninety-five
pages, and listed 124 claims. The amended complaint failed to comply in many
respects with Rule 8. For instance, claims were made without the factual support
to show a plausible claim to relief. See id. at 570. Further, many of the claims
failed to mention a specific time, place, or person involved with the alleged
offenses, thus providing inadequate notice to defendant or defendants. See id. at
565 n.10. It was clear that not all claims applied to all plaintiffs, but no effort
was made to delineate which claims applied to whom.
When the district court dismissed all plaintiffs except Mr. Rueb, it ordered
him to file another amended complaint complying with Rule 8 and limited solely
to his own claims. Mr. Rueb failed, and indeed refused, to comply with that
order. As a result, the district court dismissed the case without prejudice. At that
point, this case was concluded. None of the district court’s other rulings are
before us because Mr. Rueb’s refusal to amend his complaint in order to comply
with Rule 8 ended the matter. Because the dismissal was without prejudice,
however, the substantive issues raised, particularly those concerning class
certification and appointment of counsel, are not foreclosed from being raised in
any subsequent proceeding, subject to any applicable statute of limitations.
Mr. Rueb’s motions to update and supplement issues on appeal are
DENIED. The proposed supplemental material was considered but was found not
to be relevant to the controlling issue in this case which was dismissed for failure
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to comply with the court’s order to file an amended complaint in compliance with
Rule 8. Mr. Rueb’s motion to vacate this court’s October 21, 2009, order
dismissing the majority of the appellants from this appeal for failure to file the
required motion to proceed without prepayment of the filing fees is DENIED.
Appellants’ motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the appellate
filing fees is GRANTED. Appellants are reminded that they are obligated to
continue making partial payments until the entire fee has been paid.
The judgment of the district court dismissing this case without prejudice is
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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