UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4029
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MONELLE TERROD HARRIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., District Judge. (1:08-cr-00330-WO-1)
Submitted: June 24, 2010 Decided: June 30, 2010
Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, William C. Ingram, Jr.,
First Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Michael Francis Joseph, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Monelle Terrod Harris appeals from his conviction and
200-month total sentence imposed following his guilty plea to
conspiracy to distribute cocaine base, possession with intent to
distribute cocaine base, possession of a firearm during and in
relation to a drug trafficking offense, and possession of a
firearm by a person previously convicted of a felony. Harris’
attorney filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), addressing the reasonableness of the sentence,
but stating that, in his opinion, there was no merit to the
appeal. Harris filed a pro se brief challenging the use of the
100-to-1 crack cocaine-to-powder cocaine sentencing ratio, the
consecutive nature of his sentence for the possession of a
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, and the
reasonableness of his ten-year supervised release term. He also
asserts that counsel was ineffective at sentencing. Our review
of the record discloses no reversible error; accordingly, we
affirm Harris’ conviction and sentence.
We find that Harris’ guilty plea was knowingly and
voluntarily entered after a thorough hearing pursuant to Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11. Harris was properly advised of his rights, the
offenses charged, and the mandatory minimum sentences he faced.
The district court also determined that there was an independent
factual basis for the plea and that the plea was not coerced or
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influenced by any promises. See United States v. DeFusco, 949
F.2d 114, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1991).
The court reviews Harris’ sentence for reasonableness
under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. See Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In reviewing a sentence,
this court must first ensure that the district court properly
calculated the defendant’s advisory guidelines range, considered
the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors, analyzed the arguments
presented by the parties, and sufficiently explained the
selected sentence. United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330
(4th Cir. 2009). The court then considers the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence imposed under the totality of the
circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
We find the district court correctly determined that
Harris’ advisory guidelines range was 168 to 210 months on the
drug charges, provided an individualized analysis of the
§ 3553(a) factors as they apply to Harris’ circumstances, and
analyzed the arguments presented by the parties. The district
court granted Harris’ request for a downward variance from the
advisory guidelines range based on the fact that Harris’ offense
level was increased due to his voluntary admission to greater
drug quantities. The court also considered Harris’ argument for
a variance sentence in light of Kimbrough v. United States, 552
U.S. 85 (2007) (holding that district courts may consider the
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crack-to-powder-cocaine guideline sentencing ratio as a possible
basis for variance from the guidelines) and acknowledged its
discretion to impose a variance sentence, but declined to impose
a downward variance from the guidelines range on this basis. We
conclude that the district court properly considered whether
Kimbrough had any mitigating effect and adequately explained its
decision.
We reject Harris’ statutory interpretation argument
that would, if accepted, require us to overturn our prior
decision in United States v. Studifin, 240 F.3d 415 (4th Cir.
2001) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)’s mandatory consecutive
sentencing scheme). It is a well settled part of our
jurisprudence that one panel of this court cannot overrule the
decision of a prior panel. See generally United States v.
Collins, 415 F.3d 304, 311 (4th Cir. 2005).
Harris also challenges the ten-year supervised release
term imposed by the district court, asserting that it was twice
the mandatory term for one of the offenses. We find that the
200-month total sentence and the ten-year supervised release
term imposed were not procedurally or substantively
unreasonable, and therefore not an abuse of discretion. See
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We therefore affirm Harris’ sentence.
Finally, Harris asserts that counsel provided
ineffective assistance at sentencing. Because the record does
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not conclusively demonstrate any deficiency in counsel’s
representation of Harris, we decline to consider these claims on
direct appeal. See United States v. Richardson, 195 F.3d 192,
198 (4th Cir. 1999); United States v. King, 119 F.3d 290, 295
(4th Cir. 1997).
As required by Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm Harris’ convictions and sentence. This court
requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If the client requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may renew his motion for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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