NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 08-4268
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
RONAL MURILLO
a/k/a "ABEJON"
Ronal Murillo,
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 2-05-cv-00700-002)
District Judge: Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 1, 2010
Before: SLOVITER, BARRY and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: July 1, 2010)
OPINION OF THE COURT
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
After Ronal Murillo appealed his judgment of sentence, counsel filed a motion to
withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Although we conclude
that counsel’s Anders brief does not satisfy Third Circuit Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a),
we will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismiss Murillo’s appeal because we lack
jurisdiction.
I.
Because we write solely for the parties, we recount only the essential facts.
Following a jury trial, Murillo was convicted of a single count of conspiring to
transfer false identification documents, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028. On appeal, we
affirmed Murillo’s conviction but vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing.
See United States v. Murillo, 284 F. App’x 982 (3d Cir. 2008) (non-precedential). In
doing so, we noted that “Murillo has served his prison sentence and thus the only
remaining issue is the length of his supervised release term.” Id. at 984.
On remand, the District Court imposed no supervised release term. Though
Murillo had completed term of incarceration, he was held by the Bureau of Immigration
and Customs Enforcement on an immigration detainer. He was later deported to his
native El Salvador, where he remains.
Sometime prior to his removal, Murillo filed this appeal. His counsel then moved
to withdraw pursuant to Anders. The Government also filed a motion to dismiss for lack
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of appellate jurisdiction, arguing that Murillo’s completion of his sentence and
subsequent deportation moots his appeal.1
II.
When counsel finds a criminal appeal to be “wholly frivolous” despite a
“conscientious examination” of the record, he must advise the Court and request
permission to withdraw. Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. Pursuant to Local Appellate Rule
109.2(a), this request must be accompanied by a brief that “(1) . . . satisf[ies] the court
that counsel has thoroughly examined the record in search of appealable issues, and (2) . .
. explain[s] why the issues are frivolous.” United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d
Cir. 2001). Our review of counsel’s Anders brief is limited. We ask only “(1) whether
counsel adequately fulfilled [Rule 109.2(a)’s] requirements; and (2) whether an
independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.” Id.
Here, we are not satisfied that Murillo’s attorney complied with the requirements
of Rule 109.2(a) or Anders. Counsel identifies only two potential issues for appeal. First,
he argues that Murillo’s resentencing comported with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
32. Second, he represents that the District Court followed the sentencing procedure of
United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2006).
However, counsel offers only a conclusory assessment in support of his claim that
these issues are frivolous. Further complicating matters, counsel’s appendix includes
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The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
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only a single page “excerpt” from the resentencing hearing transcript, preventing us from
confirming his cursory evaluation of these claims.
Additionally, counsel’s argument that the District Court complied with Gunter
simply by asking the parties for objections to Murillo’s pre-sentence investigation report
and by hearing argument on “other sentencing factors” indicates a misunderstanding of
the three-step sentencing procedure we established in that case. See 462 F.3d at 247.
Moreover, counsel’s argument that “the appellate waiver contained in the plea agreement
precludes this appeal” overlooks the fact that his client pleaded not guilty and was tried
and convicted by a jury. For these reasons, we conclude that counsel has not “thoroughly
examined the record in search of appealable issues.” Youla, 241 F.3d at 300.
Despite these deficiencies, we retain the discretion to allow withdrawal where the
“frivolousness [of the appeal] is patent.” United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 781 (3d
Cir. 2000). As the Government explains, Murillo has completed his term of active
incarceration and was given no supervised release on re-sentencing. He was later
deported to El Salvador. Because Murillo can no longer show any “actual injury
traceable to the District Court’s decision that can be redressed by a favorable decision
here[,]” his appeal is moot and we lack jurisdiction to consider it. United States v.
Okereke, 307 F.3d 117, 121 (3d Cir. 2002). Accordingly, we will grant the Government’s
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and in a separate order grant counsel’s motion to
withdraw.
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