UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4025
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ORLANDO RAMIREZ-AGUILAR,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Anderson. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (8:09-cr-00791-HMH-1)
Submitted: June 23, 2010 Decided: July 6, 2010
Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Benjamin T. Stepp, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Maxwell B. Cauthen,
III, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Orlando Ramirez-Aguilar pled guilty to illegally
reentering the United States after being deported as an alien
who had been convicted of an aggravated felony, in violation of
8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2) (2006). The district court sentenced
Ramirez-Aguilar to seventy-eight months in prison, the middle of
the advisory guidelines range. On appeal, Ramirez-Aguilar’s
counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), stating that, in his view, there are no
meritorious issues for appeal but questioning whether the
sentence is reasonable. Ramirez-Aguilar filed a supplemental
pro se brief. ∗ Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Although counsel identifies no error in the plea
colloquy, we have reviewed the plea transcript and conclude that
the district court substantially complied with the mandates of
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, in accepting Ramirez-Aguilar’s guilty plea.
Although the district court did not inform Ramirez-Aguilar of
his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, see Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(E), we find that such omission did not affect
∗
In his pro se brief, Ramirez-Aguilar attempts to challenge
the validity of his prior conviction for criminal domestic
violence of a high and aggravated nature and asserts that the
district court punished him twice for the same offense by using
his criminal domestic violence conviction to enhance his federal
sentence for illegal reentry. We find his claims to be without
merit.
2
his decision to plead guilty. See United States v. Martinez,
277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002) (discussing plain error
standard of review); United States v. Goins, 51 F.3d 400, 402
(4th Cir. 1995) (discussing factors courts should consider in
determining whether substantial rights affected in decision to
plead guilty). Moreover, the district court ensured that
Ramirez-Aguilar’s plea was knowing and voluntary and was
supported by a sufficient factual basis. See United States v.
DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1991).
Counsel suggests that Ramirez-Aguilar’s within-
guidelines sentence is unreasonable. An appellate court reviews
a sentence for reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion
standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). This
review requires consideration of both the procedural and
substantive reasonableness of a sentence. Id. This court must
assess whether the district court properly calculated the
advisory guidelines range, considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006) factors, analyzed any arguments presented by the parties,
and sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Gall, 552
U.S. at 49-50; see United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576 (4th
Cir. 2010); United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th
Cir. 2009). If there is no procedural error, the appellate
court reviews the substantive reasonableness of the sentence,
“examin[ing] the totality of the circumstances to see whether
3
the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that
the sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in
§ 3553(a).” United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216
(4th Cir. 2010). With these standards in mind, we have reviewed
Ramirez-Aguilar’s sentence and conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in sentencing him to seventy-eight
months.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
and find no meritorious issues for appeal. Thus, we affirm the
district court’s judgment. This court requires that counsel
inform Ramirez-Aguilar, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If
Ramirez-Aguilar requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Ramirez-Aguilar. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4