NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 09-3041
__________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
RANDY COLEMAN, also known as STEVEN JOHNSON;
also known as STEVEN LEWIS; also known as KHABIR HAFIZ
Randy Coleman,
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D. C. No. 2-01-cr-00038-001)
District Judge: Hon. Paul S. Diamond
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on May 10, 2010
Before: BARRY and ROTH, Circuit Judges
and HILLMAN*, District Judge
(Opinion filed July 6, 2010 )
*Honorable Noel L. Hillman, United States District Judge for the District of New
Jersey, sitting by designation.
OPINION
ROTH, Circuit Judges:
Randy Coleman appeals the denial of his motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)
for a sentence modification based on the retroactive amendments to the crack cocaine
Sentencing Guidelines. The District Court had jurisdiction to consider his motion under
18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We will affirm.
I. Background
Coleman was convicted of, inter alia, possessing crack cocaine with the intent to
distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He received a sentence of 220 months
incarceration. After appealing his conviction and sentence, Coleman filed a § 3582
motion to modify his sentence. That motion was based on Amendment 706 to § 2D1.1 of
the Sentencing Guidelines, which retroactively reduced the base offense level for crack
cocaine convictions. U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 706 (Nov. 1, 2007).
The District Court found that this amendment applied to Coleman and would result
in a sentence reduction; however, it denied Coleman’s motion based on his post-sentence
conduct, including an assault in which he stabbed another inmate eight times. Coleman
argues that it was error for the District Court to consider his post-sentence conduct. He
argues further that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing, as he could have introduced
evidence that he had acted in self defense, that he had three years of good conduct, that he
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had paid his assessments and fines in full, and that he had completed over 1,000 hours in
GED classes.
II. Discussion
Because § 3582(c)(2) provides that a “court may reduce the term of imprisonment,”
we review the District Court’s denial for abuse of discretion. United States v. Styer, 573 F.3d
151, 153 (3d Cir. 2009). Not only does a court have discretion to determine if a modification
is warranted, but it also has discretion to determine if an evidentiary hearing is necessary.
Id.
Section 3582(c)(2) requires courts to consider the applicable factors set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the need “to protect the public from further crimes of the
defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C). In addition, courts may consider post-sentencing
conduct when ruling on a sentence modification motion. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, cmt. n.
1(B)(iii).
Here, the District Court considered the § 3553(a) factors as well as Coleman’s post-
sentence conduct, including not only the assault but also Coleman’s educational courses and
his payment of all fines and assessments. The District Court weighed these factors and
determined that, even crediting Coleman’s assertion that the assault was justified self-
defense, Coleman presented a public safety risk. It therefore denied his modification motion.
In doing so, the District Court weighed the relevant factors. We cannot conclude that the
Court abused its discretion in denying Coleman’s motion.
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We likewise find that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in reaching this
determination without an evidentiary hearing. Coleman did not request a hearing and, even
if he had, Coleman has not identified any information he would have presented that the
District Court did not already consider.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order denying Coleman’s request
for a modified sentence.
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