In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Nos. 09-1118 & 09-2245
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
E LIAS M UNOZ and E LIAS M ARQUEZ,
Defendants-Appellants.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:07-CR-00224—Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, Judge.
A RGUED A PRIL 9, 2010—D ECIDED JULY 9, 2010
Before P OSNER, F LAUM, and W ILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
F LAUM, Circuit Judge. This is the consolidated appeal
of two defendants who were convicted of participating
in large document forgery operation known as the Leija-
Sanchez Organization (the “Organization”). This group
provided false green cards, driver’s licenses, and social
security numbers to illegal immigrants. Elias Marquez
was accused of being an “office manager” of sorts for
the Organization and producing fraudulent documents
2 Nos. 09-1118 & 09-2245
himself. Elias Munoz was accused of being a photo-
grapher for the Organization. Both defendants pleaded
guilty and challenge only their sentences. Marquez, who
received an above-guidelines sentence of 60 months
of imprisonment, argues that he should have received a
two-level reduction for a minor role in the offense and
a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
He also challenges the substantive reasonableness of his
sentence. Munoz, who received an above-guidelines
sentence of 48 months of imprisonment, challenges the
substantive reasonableness of his sentence and the
district court’s order that he use his earnings from
the inmate financial responsibility program to pay his
fine. We affirm both sentences, but modify Munoz’s
judgment to make clear that participation in the
inmate financial responsibility program is voluntary.
I. Background
The Leija-Sanchez Organization was a large conspiracy
dealing in fraudulent documents that operated for
over fifteen years in the “Little Village” area of Chicago,
along 26th Street between Albany and St. Louis. The
Organization produced and sold fraudulent docu-
ments including resident alien cards, social security
cards, driver’s licenses, and state identification cards.
The Organization also smuggled illegal aliens to
Chicago to serve as street vendors known as “miqueros.”
Scattered throughout the parking lot at the discount
mall at Albany and 26th Street, these miqueros would
sell false identification documents to passing pedestrians
and motorists.
Nos. 09-1118 & 09-2245 3
When a miquero found a paying customer, he took
that customer to Munoz’s photo shop. Munoz owned
and operated the photo shop since 1994. Munoz would
provide the customer with a blank form printed in
both English and Spanish on which the miquero
would record the name, address, date of birth, and other
identifying information the customer wished to have
appear on the fraudulent document. Munoz then
created identification photographs of the customer
with a background suitable for the type of identifica-
tion document the customer was purchasing. The govern-
ment estimates the revenue derived by Munoz from
these photographs—which sold for $10 to $20 each–as
at least $364,000 per year.
Once a miquero accumulated enough orders from
customers, he would use a “runner” to send the orders
to the facility—the “office”—where the false documents
were made. From at least April 2006, Marquez worked
in “the office,” where he manufactured false documents,
resolved payment disputes, and directed the miquero’s
daily operations.1 At trial, the government introduced
recorded telephone conversations of Marquez engaging
in these activities; for example, inquiring about the
status of a miquero who had been arrested by the police,
1
In fact, Marquez may have played multiple roles in the
conspiracy, starting as a miquero in the early 1990s. Marquez
was arrested in 1995, with five sets of false documents in
his possession, and deported to Mexico. It is unclear if Marquez
was working for the Leija-Sanchez Organization at this time,
but he was involved in selling false documents.
4 Nos. 09-1118 & 09-2245
directing a different miquero to get current on money
he owed the Organization, and explaining which
miqueros would work which shifts on a given day.
Munoz, Marquez, and 21 other individuals were
indicted on July 3, 2007. On July 8, 2008, Munoz
pleaded guilty to conspiracy to produce false identifica-
tion and immigration documents, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 371. On September 10, 2008, the government filed a
superseding information against Marquez, charging him
with one count of conspiracy to unlawfully produce
identification and immigration documents in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and one count of producing identifica-
tion documents in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1028(a)(1)
and (2). Marquez pleaded guilty to the superseding
information the next day.
Following a January 6, 2009, sentencing hearing, the
district court sentenced Munoz to 48 months of imprison-
ment, to be followed by two years of supervised release,
and imposed a $500 fine. Marquez’s sentencing hearing
was held on April 29, 2009; the district court sentenced
him to two 60-month terms of imprisonment, to be
served concurrently, followed by three years of super-
vised release, and imposed a fine of $1,000.
II. Analysis
A. Marquez
We begin with the issues presented by Marquez.
Marquez first argues that the district court erred in
denying him a three-level reduction for a mitigating role
Nos. 09-1118 & 09-2245 5
in the offense. We review a district court’s interpreta-
tion and application of the sentencing guidelines
de novo and its fact-finding for clear error. See United
States v. Haynes, 582 F.3d 686, 708 (7th Cir. 2009). Because
it rests on a finding of fact by the district court, we
review the district court’s denial of a mitigating role
reduction for clear error, and will reverse only if our
review of the evidence leaves us “with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id.
at 709 (quoting United States v. Panaigua-Verdugo, 537
F.3d 722, 724 (7th Cir. 2008)).
The sentencing guidelines provide a detailed system
for weighing a conspirator’s role in the offense. If a defen-
dant was a minimal participant, he is entitled to receive
a four-level decrease. If he was a minor participant, he
is entitled to a two-level decrease. For those whose role
fell between minimal and minor participation, a three-
level decrease is appropriate. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.
Marquez claims that he fell between a minimal and
minor participant because his job was simply to follow
the orders of the leaders of the Organization and, specifi-
cally, an individual by the name of “Bonaficio.” Marquez
argued at sentencing that the recorded phone calls do not
show him directing the miqueros and negotiating with
them over debts owed to the Organization on his
own authority, but instead show him relaying the com-
mands of Bonaficio.
At sentencing, the government argued that Marquez
should have received a three-level enhancement for his
role in the conspiracy. The government maintained that
6 Nos. 09-1118 & 09-2245
the wiretapped conversations showed that Marquez was
a “middle manager” for the conspiracy. The govern-
ment also relied on the fact that more than $200,000 of
the conspiracy’s cash was found in Marquez’s closet.
The district court concluded that Marquez’s telephone
conversations were inconclusive as to his decision-
making responsibility and noted that Marquez had not
recruited anyone into the conspiracy. On the other
hand, it found that Marquez was more involved in the
conspiracy than the miqueros he supervised. The
district court therefore rejected both parties’ arguments
for a role-in-the-offense adjustment.
We find no error in the district court’s decision not
to give Marquez a mitigating-role reduction. Indeed, he
appears to have received the benefit of the doubt
at sentencing, as the district court found the evidence
inconclusive as to whether he was in fact a “middle
manager.” Even if Marquez was not an autonomous
decision-maker, he was still entrusted with sig-
nificant administrative duties and a large quantity of
the Organization’s cash was found in his home. These
two factors alone suggest that his role was at least as
significant as that of a typical member of the conspiracy.
Finally, we note that in calculating his guideline range,
the district court relied only on the quantity of false
documents for which Marquez was personally responsi-
ble. Thus, Marquez is not being unfairly punished for
conduct that was unforeseeable to him based on his role
in the conspiracy.
Marquez raises another challenge to his guidelines
calculation. He argues that he should have received a
Nos. 09-1118 & 09-2245 7
three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
Marquez pleaded guilty. However, a defendant is not
entitled to an acceptance of responsibility reduction
merely because he pleaded guilty. See United States v.
Krasinski, 545 F.3d 546, 554 (7th Cir. 2008). The district
court declined to find that Marquez accepted responsi-
bility because it found that Marquez untruthfully mini-
mized his participation in the conspiracy, was unforth-
coming at his plea hearing, and falsely denied knowing
that his conduct was a crime. We have previously
affirmed district courts who denied a defendant an ac-
ceptance of responsibility reduction after the defendant
attempted to minimize his level of involvement in an
offense. See, e.g., United States v. Fiore, 178 F.3d 917, 925
(7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Jones, 52 F.3d 697, 701
(7th Cir. 1995). Marquez argues that he cannot lose ac-
ceptance of responsibility for making legal arguments
challenging his sentence. See United States v. Purchess,
107 F.3d 1261, 1267 (7th Cir. 1997). But Marquez made
factual claims the district court found untruthful, rather
than legal arguments based on admitted facts. Marquez
has not pointed to any evidence that casts doubt on the
district court’s factual findings (indeed, his previous
deportation for distributing false documents makes
his claim that he did not know he was committing a
crime implausible on its face). Thus, the district court
did not err in denying Marquez an adjustment for accep-
tance of responsibility.
Next, Marquez argues that the district court failed to
provide an adequate statement of the reasons for the
sentence it imposed. Marquez identifies two supposed
8 Nos. 09-1118 & 09-2245
deficiencies in the district court’s explanation: first, he
claims that the district court failed to clearly state what
guideline range it was applying; and second, he claims
that the district court failed to explain why it was
imposing a 60-month sentence on Marquez.
The first alleged error stems from a dispute over the
proper application of Application Note 5 to U.S.S.G.
§ 2L2.1. Section 2L2.1 contains enhancements for
document-trafficking offenses based on the number of
documents involved. The maximum enhancement is 9,
for offenses involving 100 or more documents. Applica-
tion Note 5 states: “If the offenses involved substan-
tially more than 100 documents, an upward departure
may be warranted.”
At Marquez’s sentencing, the district court rejected
Marquez’s argument for an acceptance of responsibility
reduction and decided that no reduction or enhance-
ment for his role in the offense was appropriate. The
district court then clearly stated that it had calculated
an adjusted offense level of 20, with a criminal history
category of 1, for a guidelines sentence of 33 to 41 months
of imprisonment. After stating the guideline range, the
district court turned to the impact the number of docu-
ments should have on the sentence. The government
argued that under § 2L2.1, an additional 12-level increase
was appropriate based on the number of documents,
which would have resulted in a base offense level of 32
Nos. 09-1118 & 09-2245 9
and a guidelines range of 121 to 151 months.2 Marquez
argued that the number of documents should be offset
by the personal characteristics of the defendant and
his work history. Both parties made their arguments
regarding the § 3553(a) factors at this time. After the
district court’s own discussion of the § 3553(a) factors,
it imposed a 60-month term of imprisonment on Marquez.
We find that the district court’s explanation of the
guideline range was satisfactory. Under the advisory
guideline system, “departures” have been rendered
obsolete. See United States v. Blue, 453 F.3d 948, 952 (7th
Cir. 2006). The district court’s duty was to calculate the
advisory guideline range properly, and then come up
with a reasonable sentence under § 3553(a). See Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Rather than ad-
justing Marquez’s advisory guideline range based on
the number of documents involved, the district court
appropriately waited until after the guidelines range
was calculated to determine whether the number of
documents involved, combined with the other aspects of
his offense and his personal characteristics, warranted
a sentence above the advisory guideline range.
2
The government actually advocated for a sentence in the
range of 78 to 97 months, which would have been the guide-
line range if the district court had agreed with the govern-
ment’s position that U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1, rather than § 2L2.1
applies. The government did not cross-appeal, so we assume
without deciding that § 2L2.1 is the correct guideline for
Marquez’s crime.
10 Nos. 09-1118 & 09-2245
Marquez also argues that the district court failed to
give sufficient consideration to the § 3553(a) factors. He
frames this challenge, at least in part, as a failure to
adequately state reasons under § 3553(c). To the extent
he relies on § 3553(c), his argument fails. Section 3553(c)
does not create a statutory duty to make a detailed recita-
tion of the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Rodriguez-
Alvarez, 425 F.3d 1041, 1047 (7th Cir. 2005). The district
court gave a lengthy explanation of the circumstances
of Marquez’s crime, describing him as a significant
player in the Organization and someone in whom the
Organization placed a significant amount of trust. The
district court also noted that Marquez was well-educated
and had been employed in Mexico, and that unlike
many of the miqueros he was not driven by poverty to
participate in the conspiracy. The district court dis-
cussed the impact on the victims and the community
and the number of documents, which struck the court as
far in excess of what the drafters of § 2L2.1 had contem-
plated. This detailed exposition is more than enough
to satisfy the procedural requirement in § 3553(c) that
the district court adequately explain its sentence.
Finally, Marquez argues that his two concurrent 60-
month sentences are substantively unreasonable. In
support of this argument, he claims to have returned
to this country to try to obtain a better life for himself
by earning enough money to support his family, not
with the intent to commit more crimes. He also sug-
gests that his criminal history is minimal, consisting
only of two arrests that were over ten years old. The
government counters by arguing that an above-guide-
Nos. 09-1118 & 09-2245 11
lines sentence was warranted given the nature of the
offense and Marquez’s personal characteristics. They note
that Marquez conceded creating approximately 30,000
documents, and that other circuits have upheld above-
guidelines sentences in cases involving far fewer docu-
ments. See United States v. Vargas, 73 Fed. Appx. 746, 747
(5th Cir. 2003) (upholding two-level upward departure
for 2,700 sets of documents); United States v. Velez, 185
F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming above-
guidelines sentence of 57 months for offense also
involving at least 2,700 immigration files). Finally, the
government argues that the district court properly took
into account the fact that Marquez was educated, had
stable employment, and owned real property in Mexico.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in
imposing an above-guidelines sentence on Marquez. The
sentencing guidelines explicitly contemplate an upward
departure when more than 100 documents are involved
in this type of offense. See Application Note 5, U.S.S.G.
§ 2L2.1. The number of documents for which Marquez
was personally responsible is far in excess of this num-
ber. Without suggesting that sentencing can be reduced
to mathematical formulae, see United States v. Omole, 523
F.3d 691, 698 n.1 (7th Cir. 2008), we note that Marquez
received a sentence that is roughly 50% more than his
advisory guideline range for an offense that involves
300 times as many documents as the largest quantity
contemplated by the guidelines. Moreover, the record
supports the district court’s inference that Marquez
reentered this country for the specific purpose of com-
mitting this crime, not out of poverty or despera-
12 Nos. 09-1118 & 09-2245
tion, after having previously been deported while in
possession of several sets of fraudulent documents. A
sixty-month sentence cannot be considered excessive
when considered in light of § 3553(a) and the specific
characteristics of Marquez and his offense.
B. Munoz
We now turn to the two issues raised by Munoz in
his appeal. Like Marquez, Munoz argues that his sen-
tence was substantively unreasonable. Munoz’s advisory
guideline range was 27 to 33 months. At sentencing,
the district court said that the number of documents
involved called for a statutory maximum sentence of
60 months. The court then imposed a lower sentence, of
48 months, in view of mitigating circumstances that
included Munoz’s “relatively advanced age” (he is in
his 50s) and the near-certainty that he would be
deported after prison and thus separated from his large
family in the United States, most of whom are American
citizens.
Munoz argues that the district court placed too much
weight on the number of documents. He notes that other
courts which have applied Application Note 5 of
U.S.S.G. § 2L2.1 have allowed increases of only two or
three levels. See Velez, 185 F.3d at 1051 (affirming two-
level upward departure because at least 2,700 immigra-
tion files were involved); United States v. Smith, 236 Fed.
Appx. 69, 70-71 (5th Cir. 2007) (affirming two-level in-
crease “because the offense involved substantially more
than 100 documents”); Vargas, 73 Fed. Appx. 746, 747 (5th
Nos. 09-1118 & 09-2245 13
Cir. 2003) (affirming two-level increase in another case
involving 2,700 documents); United States v. Perez, 90
Fed. Appx. 168, 169-71 (7th Cir. 2004) (affirming depar-
ture equivalent to three offense levels for leader of enter-
prise that manufactured and sold at least 500 sets
of documents). To reach an advisory guideline range
encompassing the 60-month sentence Munoz received,
given his criminal history category of II, Munoz’s sen-
tence would have had to have been enhanced by six levels.
The district court did not abuse its discretion when
it sentenced Munoz to 48 months of imprisonment. At
the outset, we note that the question before us is
whether the nature and circumstances of the offense
and the personal characteristics of the defendant, con-
sidered in light of the § 3553(a) factors, justifies the sen-
tence imposed. Once the district court properly cal-
culated the guideline range, it was free to impose a rea-
sonable above-guidelines sentence. See United States v.
Bartlett, 567 F.3d 901, 909 (7th Cir. 2009). Munoz’s daily
participation in the conspiracy lasted well over a decade,
and earned him more than a million dollars in illicit
revenue. Munoz received a sentence, 48-months, lower
than the sentences imposed in the cases cited by Munoz.
See Smith, 236 Fed. Appx. at 69 (51 months); Velez, 185
F.3d at 1048 (57 months); Perez, 90 Fed. Appx. at 169
(96 months). Finally, it is clear that the magnitude of
Munoz’s offense is beyond the contemplation of the
sentencing guidelines, which only included enhance-
ments for up to 100 documents. See Application Note 5
to U.S.S.G. § 2L2.1. All these factors suggest that a sen-
tence fifteen months above the advisory guideline range
14 Nos. 09-1118 & 09-2245
is reasonable. But even if we consider the question as
Munoz has framed it—whether the number of documents
imposed would have warranted a six-level increase—
we do not think the district court erred. The cases on
which Munoz relies involved at most 2,700 documents.
Munoz was responsible for more than 100,000 documents.
Under his logic, Munoz’s sentence reflects an enhance-
ment two or three times larger than similar defendants
have received for a crime involving more than 35 times
as many documents as these other defendants’ crimes.
To the extent this increase may be out of step with
other decisions interpreting Application Note 5, it is in
a direction that is favorable to Munoz. Munoz did not
receive an unreasonably long sentence.
Finally, Munoz argues that the district court erred by
mandating that he participate in the Inmate Financial
Responsibility Program (“IFRP”). At sentencing, the
district court imposed a fine of $500 “to be paid from
prison earnings and thereafter, after Mr. Munoz is
released from custody, at the rate of 10 percent of his
net earnings per month.” The judgment states that
Munoz is “to begin making payments toward the fine
imposed through inmate financial responsibility program
earnings.” Munoz did not object at sentencing, so we
review for plain error. See United States v. Olano, 507
U.S. 725, 731-35 (1993).
Munoz is correct that participation in the IFRP is vol-
untary. United States v. Boyd, ___ F.3d ___, 2010 WL
2330395, at *4 (7th Cir. June 11, 2010). The government
concedes as much, but argues that the district court
Nos. 09-1118 & 09-2245 15
did not actually mandate participation in the program,
but rather implicitly made its order to make payments
“from prison earnings” contingent upon Munoz’s par-
ticipation in the IFRP. In Boyd, we rejected this argu-
ment, concluding that “written instruction that the mone-
tary sanctions are ‘to be paid through’ the IFRP . . . plainly
ordered [the defendant] to participate in the IFRP.” Id. at
*3. In Boyd, as here, the defendant failed to object and
we reviewed for plain error. Id. Thus, the district court’s
order here also amounts to plain error. However, because
the district court did not link participation in the IFRP
to other aspects of the sentence and the sums involved
are modest, remand is unnecessary. Id. at *4. Instead, we
modify the district court’s sentence to clarify that
Munoz’s participation in the IFRP is voluntary.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment
as to Elias Marquez is A FFIRMED and the district court’s
judgment as to Elias Munoz is A FFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
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