Collins v. Gaetz

In the

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit

No. 09-2212

JAMES C OLLINS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.

D ONALD G AETZ, Warden,
Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 08 CV 02153—Charles R. Norgle, Sr., Judge.

A RGUED JANUARY 14, 2010—D ECIDED JULY 13, 2010

Before F LAUM, R OVNER, and H AMILTON, Circuit Judges.
H AMILTON , Circuit Judge. James Collins stayed up late
the night of April 30 to May 1, 2001, getting high on
crack cocaine in his Chicago apartment with his girl-
friend, Flora Lanier. Sometime after 6:00 a.m., Collins
and Lanier began fighting, a fight that ended when
Lanier went through the window of Collins’ apartment,
causing fatal wounds to both her arms. Collins, who has
an IQ in the 60s and organic brain damage from an aneu-
2 No. 09-2212

rysm in 1994, spent the next day at a police station
before waiving his Miranda rights and giving a self-incrimi-
nating statement. The statement was admitted over his
objection at trial, contributing to his conviction for first-
degree murder. The Illinois courts have affirmed on direct
appeal and post-conviction review, and the federal
district court has denied Collins’ petition for a writ of
habeas corpus. We now consider Collins’ appeal using
the deferential standard that applies under the Anti-
terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Because the
state courts reasonably applied the correct legal standards
and reasonably determined that Collins intelligently
waived his Miranda rights, we affirm the denial of his
petition.

I. Background
A. Procedural History
Following his statement to police, James Collins was
indicted in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois for
first-degree murder. He filed two pre-trial motions, a
motion to quash his arrest and a motion to suppress
his statement. The trial court denied both of these motions.
Following a bench trial in late 2003, the state trial court
convicted Collins of first-degree murder. The court
found Collins not guilty of “intentional murder” but
guilty of knowing acts that “created a strong proba-
bility of death or great bodily harm,” which also consti-
tutes first-degree murder under Illinois law. See 720 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 5/9-1(a). The trial court sentenced Collins to
No. 09-2212 3

25 years in prison. He appealed his conviction to the
Illinois Appellate Court, claiming, among other things,
that the trial court had erred in denying his motion to
suppress. The Appellate Court affirmed the conviction
on June 19, 2006, and the Illinois Supreme Court denied
leave to appeal on November 29, 2006.
On March 22, 2007, Collins petitioned for state post-
conviction relief based on other, unrelated issues. The
trial court dismissed that petition as frivolous and
Collins took no appeal.
Finally, on April 15, 2008, Collins filed his federal
habeas petition, which the district court denied on
March 26, 2009. The district court granted a certificate of
appealability limited to the claim that Collins did not
knowingly waive his Miranda rights.

B. The Night of April 30 to May 1, 2001
On the night Flora Lanier died, James Collins was
44 years old. Collins has long suffered from severe
mental impairments. A brain aneurysm that he suffered
in 1994 exacerbated those impairments, leaving him
often unable to speak, understand, or think clearly. De-
fense experts calculated his current IQ in the low to mid-
60s, well below the average score. A neurologist testi-
fying for the defense estimated that Collins’ aneurysm
had reduced his score by 10 to 15 points.
Collins began the night of April 30th in the company of
his friend, Benny Price, who was homeless but had ac-
cepted Collins’ invitation to spend the night in his apart-
4 No. 09-2212

ment. Between about 11:30 p.m. and 2:30 a.m., the two
men ate dinner and talked in the apartment. Lanier
showed up between 2:30 and 3:00 a.m. Price testified that
he thought Lanier had been using PCP; she smelled of
ammonia and seemed only periodically aware of her
surroundings. Price had reason to know what a drug
user looks like: the government impeached his testi-
mony with a prior conviction for delivery of a controlled
substance (and two for burglary).
Lanier had also brought rocks of crack cocaine for
herself and Collins to smoke. Collins made clear to
Price that the drugs were not for him, so Price went to
sleep on the floor. Collins and Lanier shared a bed in
the same room where Price was sleeping, with a make-
shift barrier to give them some privacy. After going to
bed, Price overheard Collins telling Lanier to stop taking
people’s money to buy drugs for them and then keeping
the money for herself. At that point Collins was calm,
speaking in a “normal” tone and calling Lanier “baby.”
What happened next was the subject of dispute at trial.
Price testified that he awoke around 6:00 a.m. to the
sound of Collins and Lanier arguing and physically
fighting. According to Price’s testimony, the combat was
mutual, with both Collins and Lanier “wrestling.” Price
testified that both Collins and Lanier were yelling; he
heard Lanier yell, “I’m going to die anyway.” Not wanting
to be around for this fight, Price immediately left the
apartment. On the ground floor, he heard glass break and
saw Lanier go through the third-floor window, then
come back inside “real suddenly.” Lanier then “got on
No. 09-2212 5

the kitchen table in front of the big window, and she hit
it with her fist and leg,” then “stepped outside the win-
dow.” She remained “halfway out” for a moment before
Collins “snatched her back inside.” As Collins pulled
Lanier back in, “all the blood went down the window
like that.”
From her apartment window one floor up, Ethel
Patterson saw a different scene. Patterson testified at
trial that Collins and Lanier were “tussling,” but Collins
was the aggressor, “hitting her in the head with his
fist,” while Lanier was in a purely defensive posture,
with “her hands up over her head . . . trying to block
it.” 1 Eventually Patterson saw Lanier “coming through
the window . . . with both hands forward.” Patterson
denied at trial that Lanier “ran through the window”
herself (though a police detective testified that this
was contrary to what he had taken down from Patterson
at the scene). After calling the police, Patterson saw
Lanier bleeding profusely in the window and saying,
“I am dying,” before Collins “jerked her back in.”
Patterson went down to the third floor and found Lanier
bleeding to death in the hallway; according to her testi-
mony, all the doors were closed and no one was
helping Lanier.

1
A third witness, Jessie Bradley, heard the fight from the
basement of the building and heard someone yelling “help
me,” but she did not testify to seeing anything of note.
6 No. 09-2212

C. Police Investigation and Collins’ Statement
Chicago Police Officer Christopher Dobek and his
partner were among the first law enforcement officers to
arrive on the scene. Dobek testified that they received
a dispatch call at about 6:45 a.m. and responded to Col-
lins’ apartment. They found Lanier covered in blood but
still alive in the hallway outside, and they called for
an ambulance. Their knocking on Collins’ apartment door
pushed the door partly open. The apartment was “in
total disarray,” with “broken glass, blood all over the
place.” Collins was inside, approaching the doorway,
wearing only a pair of black pants, with blood on his
hand and torso.
Paramedics took Lanier to the hospital, where she
was pronounced dead. The medical examiner found
evidence of injury to Lanier’s face, neck, chest, back, and
extremities. Her most serious injuries were two “gaping”
wounds, each three inches long, at the creases of
Lanier’s right and left elbows, and another two-inch-
long wound on her left inner forearm. The medical exam-
iner’s opinion was that Lanier had died “as a result of
multiple sharp force trauma due to an assault” and the
“manner of death was homicide.” Blood testing re-
vealed the presence of a cocaine degradation product,
benzoylecgonine, in Lanier’s system.
Detective John O’Shea and his partner, Detective Joseph
Laskero, arrived on the scene shortly after Lanier
was taken away. O’Shea interviewed several witnesses,
including Patterson and Price. Around the same time,
two other uniformed officers spoke with Collins and
No. 09-2212 7

asked him to come to the station with them for ques-
tioning. Collins agreed, and the officers brought him to a
police station a few blocks away, arriving between 7:30 and
8:00 a.m. Collins waited there until 10:30 a.m., when
O’Shea returned to the station. At that point, O’Shea read
Collins a standard set of Miranda warnings and Collins
agreed that he understood and wanted to speak. During
this brief initial interview, Collins told O’Shea that
Lanier had tried to jump through the window. O’Shea
testified that, because this was inconsistent with what
some of the witnesses had told him, he asked Collins to
submit to a polygraph examination. Collins agreed, but
an examiner was not available until 8:00 p.m. O’Shea left
Collins in an interview room without Collins asking or
O’Shea offering permission to leave.
The police left Collins alone during the nine hours that
they waited for the examiner. He was allowed to leave
the room to go to the bathroom. He was given food. He
may have slept; O’Shea testified that he occasionally
checked on Collins and saw him either on the floor or
with his head down and arms folded on the table as
if sleeping.
Eventually the polygraph examiner, Officer Robert
Bartik, became free as scheduled, and officers took Collins
from the local station to another police facility for the
exam. From 8:00 to approximately 10:00 p.m., Bartik
administered the polygraph. He first gave Collins fresh
Miranda warnings and obtained Collins’ consent to
submit to the exam. He then hooked Collins up and
asked him nine questions, including whether Collins
8 No. 09-2212

had pushed Lanier through the window and whether
Collins had purposefully caused her injuries. Collins
answered “no” to those questions, but the polygraph
indicated that he was lying, and Bartik told him so.
Collins was then taken back to the local station, where
he waited another hour or so until O’Shea returned. After
once again advising Collins of his Miranda rights,
O’Shea confronted him with the results of the poly-
graph. At 11:59 p.m., Collins gave an oral statement
implicating himself in Lanier’s injury.2
The detectives left Collins in the interview room and
called Assistant State’s Attorney Art Heil, who was on
call for the State’s Attorney’s office that night. Heil arrived
at the police station around 2:00 a.m. on May 2nd and
learned the basics of the case from O’Shea and Laskero.
The three of them then went back to Collins’ apartment
building to view the scene and to speak again with
Ethel Patterson, who was apparently willing to give
the investigators an audience even in the middle of the
night. They returned to the station around 6:00 a.m.
Heil then introduced himself to Collins for the first
time, as “a lawyer and prosecutor, and not your lawyer.”

2
We say that Collins implicated himself in Lanier’s “injury”
because the record does not reveal when, if ever, the police
told Collins that Lanier had died. His statement shows no
awareness of her death—he spoke about her in the present
tense—and no witness testified to informing Collins that she
had died.
No. 09-2212 9

He again explained to Collins his Miranda rights. Heil
asked Collins to read a written statement of his Miranda
rights aloud, then sign underneath to signify that he
understood. Having done so, Collins talked with Heil
for 45 minutes to an hour, after which Heil asked the
detectives to leave the room. Outside their presence,
Heil asked Collins if the police had treated him
well and allowed him to eat and use the bathroom.
Collins said that they had. Heil then proposed to mem-
orialize in writing what Collins had told him. Collins
agreed.
Heil began the written statement by asking Collins
basic questions about himself and how he had been
treated by the police, and writing down Collins’ answers.
He proceeded to ask about the events leading to Lanier’s
death. As Heil described it, “I would ask him a question.
He would give me the response. I would write it down
as he gave it to me. If I had questions, I would ask him
questions back. I would prompt him with questions,
asking him what happened next, so forth.”
When they were finished, Heil showed Collins the
handwritten statement and had Collins read the first
paragraph aloud. Then Heil read the rest of the state-
ment aloud with Collins next to him. Collins, Heil, and
one of the detectives signed the bottom of each page as
they went along.
This is the substance of the statement that Heil took
down at 7:00 a.m. on May 2nd and that the state court
admitted over Collins’ objection, with emphases added:
10 No. 09-2212

James Collins states that he is 43 years old and that
his birthday is June 27, 1956.3 James lives at 2910 West
Harrison, number 301.
He has lived there for the past two years. James lives
there with his girlfriend, Flora Lanier, who has lived
with him for the past year and about eight months.
James states that he can read and write English. James
went to Crane High School where he attended
through his senior year but he did not graduate.
James states that on the early morning of May 1, 2001,
he and Flora had been up all night partying together.
James states that they both smoked some crack co-
caine. James states that around six o’clock a.m., he
and Flora got into an argument. James states that
the argument began over Flora not wanting to go to
bed. James states that both he and Flora were yelling
at each other and that Flora was disrespecting him
and called him a bitch.
James states that the argument then became physical
and he was hitting Flora. James states that he began
hitting Flora because she made him so angry that
he went berserk. James states that while they were
fighting, he pushed Flora into the window and the
window broke. James states that he pushed Flora
because he wanted to hurt her and he was angry. James
states that after Flora went into the window the
first time, he continued to fight with her. James states

3
Heil testified at trial that Collins had misstated his own age.
No. 09-2212 11

that he continued to hit Flora because of his anger. James
states that he then pushed Flora back into the
window a second time and she broke the center win-
dow which is the bigger one. James states that he
pushed her the second time because he was still trying to
hurt her. James states that Flora went into the
window and the glass broke. James states that he
then saw Flora was cut and was bleeding. James
states that Flora was bleeding a lot and holding
her arms.
James states that he still continued to struggle with
Flora and she got blood on his pajama bottoms. James
states that Flora broke free from him and ran out
of the apartment.
James states that he did not go out after Flora and
closed the door of the apartment behind her. James
states that he did this because he just didn’t care
about what happened to Flora.
James states that he then washed the blood off his
hands and put on some pants over his bloody pajamas.
James states that he then heard people outside in
the hallway saying that they were going to call the
police and an ambulance. James states that he then
opened the door and saw Flora lying in the hallway
bleeding. James states that he saw other people in
the hallway but does not remember who was out
there or how many. James states that he then said
that Flora tried to jump out of the window herself
but that was not the truth. James states that he
12 No. 09-2212

said that because he knew what he did was wrong
and he didn’t want to get in any trouble.
James states that he stayed inside his apartment
until the police arrived a short time later.

D. Evaluations of Collins and Evidence Presented at the
Suppression Hearing
The state trial court heard testimony from four experts
on Collins’ motion to suppress. Dr. Linda Wetzel, a
clinical neuropsychologist who holds a Ph.D. from the
Chicago Medical School, evaluated Collins on March 16,
2002, at the request of the defense. Dr. Susan Messina, a
clinical psychologist who holds a Psy.D. from the Forest
Institute of Professional Psychology, evaluated Collins
in June, July, and September of 2002, on assignment
from the state court. Dr. Linda Gruenberg, a psychiatrist
whose qualification as an expert was stipulated by the
parties, evaluated Collins on January 6 and February 10,
2003, at the request of the prosecution. Finally, Dr. Daniel
Hier, a neurologist on the faculty of the University of
Illinois, did not evaluate Collins personally but re-
viewed his medical records and expert evaluations
and testified for the defense to interpret that medical
evidence.
Dr. Wetzel, the defense neuropsychologist, testified
that she ran a “standard battery of tests” on Collins and
found that he performed poorly across a wide range
of tests of mental ability. Collins scored 63 (two
standard deviations below average) on the Wechsler
No. 09-2212 13

Adult Intelligence Scale, a common IQ test, and tested at
a third-grade reading level. When Dr. Wetzel gave him
the Trail A and Trail B tests, which are designed to assess
functioning of the part of the brain regulating behavior,
he tested “severely impaired” on Trail A and did so
poorly on Trail B that Dr. Wetzel had to end the
test without obtaining a result. She also tested for malin-
gering and found no evidence that Collins was faking
his impairments.
Dr. Wetzel also tested Collins specifically on his under-
standing of the Miranda warnings. She asked, one by one,
if he knew what it meant that he had the right to
remain silent, that anything he said could be used
against him in court, that he had the right to a lawyer,
and that a lawyer would be provided if he could not
afford one. Asked about the first warning’s meaning, he
said, “I don’t even have to say hello to you.” On the
second, likewise: “I don’t even have to say hello to you.”
On the third and fourth, Collins said, “You have the
right to talk to a lawyer and have a lawyer present
during questioning,” then, “I’m from the old school,
I have morals, they incriminated on me.”
Dr. Wetzel concluded that Collins was unable to under-
stand or waive his Miranda rights. This conclusion, she
testified, was based on his low IQ, the severity of his
past brain injury, his low reading and spelling scores,
and impairment in his “self-regulation and his ability to
really behave in an independent manner and to resist
other people’s urgings and requests that he do things.”
Although Dr. Wetzel conceded that Collins understood
the words of the warnings, she “didn’t feel that he under-
14 No. 09-2212

stood Miranda in the entire concept of Miranda . . . the
purpose of Miranda . . . [or] the consequences of waiving
Miranda.”
Both the government and the court questioned whether
Dr. Wetzel, as a non-medical doctor, was capable of
making an assessment of the effect of Collins’ brain
injury on his mental ability. She conceded that she
was not an M.D., but said that she based her assessment
on “the severity that is mentioned on CAT scans and in
the reports.” The aneurysm that Collins suffered, she
testified, was “an elephant standing in the room” with
regard to what caused his mental defects.
Dr. Messina, the clinical psychologist assigned by the
court, testified that she had reviewed Collins’ police
reports, statements, rap sheet, and psycho-social history
before meeting with him. Like Dr. Wetzel, she ran a
number of tests on Collins. He scored 65 on the Wechsler
IQ test. On the Cognistat, which screens for neuro-cogni-
tive limitations, Collins showed weakness in memory
calculations, verbal-abstract reasoning, and information
processing. Like Dr. Wetzel, Dr. Messina found no evi-
dence of malingering. Dr. Messina testified that Collins
“oftentimes became very tangential and disorganized”
and used a number of “neologisms,” meaning that
Collins often used a strange or incorrect word or com-
bination of words.4

4
To give only a few examples: When Dr. Messina asked Collins
if he was eating, he told her his appetite was “gorgeous.” When
she asked if he drank, he answered that he was “beverage free.”
(continued...)
No. 09-2212 15

Dr. Messina went on to test Collins’ understanding of
the Miranda warnings. On the first warning, he said, “It
means something could be used against me. You don’t say
nothing until your attorney is present.” On the second:
“Whatever I said, it’s best to be the right vocabulary
coming out of the volume. Then in court they can say, ‘You
said this, that, woo, woo, woo.’ It’s always best to have
your lawyer.” On the third, he said simply, “My lawyer.”
And on the fourth: “They gonna give me one,” and “They
didn’t give me one. He Shanghaied me. He didn’t give
me no Miranda, just took me to the lockup.” Dr. Messina
conceded that Collins “understands the meaning” of the
words in the warnings. She concluded, however, based on
her interviews and testing, that Collins would not have
been capable of understanding or appreciating his
Miranda rights when he spoke with police.
Dr. Gruenberg, the psychiatrist for the state, testified
that she had reviewed Dr. Wetzel’s and Dr. Messina’s
reports, as well as the other police and medical reports
in Collins’ record, before evaluating him. Dr. Gruenberg
evaluated Collins’ mental ability by asking him a series
of questions and interpreting the answers that Collins
gave. Dr. Gruenberg testified that she “review[ed] very
carefully” the other experts’ evaluations and the tests
they gave, but “would not be in a position to evaluate

4
(...continued)
When told he was charged with murder, he said, “that’s
what’s so overwhelming to my earlobes.” And when
searching his memory, he said he had to “go back into the
Grand Canyon.”
16 No. 09-2212

the manner in which the tests were given or which they
were read.” Although she had no dispute with the
results of the tests the other experts had given,
Dr. Gruenberg testified that comprehension of the
warnings “is a very specific question that I was able
to determine he is able to do based upon my interview,
regardless of the results of the tests [Dr. Messina and
Dr. Wetzel] performed.”
In her interview with Collins, Dr. Gruenberg asked
what first degree murder was; Collins responded that
that was what he was charged with. Pressed further,
he said that it meant premeditated. Asked what “premedi-
tated” meant, he answered “killing someone and knowing
what you are doing.” Dr. Gruenberg asked what the
police are supposed to say before questioning him, and
Collins responded that “the police are supposed to say
you have a right to remain silent and what you say can
be used against,” which she read as having some under-
standing of the warnings. Asked again later what the
Miranda warnings were, Collins responded: “you have
the right to remain silent, anything you say may be
used against me.” Dr. Gruenberg also testified that
Collins acknowledged that he could stop speaking to
her at any time, and that what he told her would be
presented in court.
Dr. Gruenberg also asked Collins about the meaning
of each specific warning. To the first warning, Collins
said, “zip it, shut up, don’t talk, like a mannequin.
Don’t talk no matter how bad. Don’t have to say.” To
the second: “Even like I explained to you about every-
No. 09-2212 17

thing that I say can be used against you, like you told
me from the state when you first came here.”
Dr. Gruenberg interpreted this response to mean that
Collins was “recalling again that he knew I was from the
state,” and that “he had an understanding that state
was opposing him.” To the third warning, Collins said,
“the consequences of that could be devastating, over-
whelming, but that he did not need an attorney to
answer the questions,” and “no, I didn’t need an attorney
because I didn’t do anything that I needed an attorney
to defend on.” To the fourth, Collins said, “it is clear,”
and “you said it.”
Another line of questions concerned the consequences
of speaking. Asked the meaning of “consequence,” Collins
answered, “regret or semi fortunate or unfortunate,” and
“do nothing or do something,” and “don’t do it, but if
I do, will suffer the consequence and that is on the unfor-
tunate part that this is happening and might regret it.
And might not.” Elaborating, Collins said, “there are
consequences that depend on present time. And the
consequence is whatever happened after I did it.” Asked
specifically about the consequences of giving a state-
ment, Collins said, “just like I did, look what happened
to me.” Dr. Gruenberg believed that this referred to the
fact that he had been arrested and incarcerated.
Unlike Dr. Messina and Dr. Wetzel, Dr. Gruenberg did
not believe Collins was overly compliant to the will or
instruction of others. In support, she testified that she
had asked Collins if he would be concerned about her
feelings if he wanted to terminate the interview. Collins
18 No. 09-2212

responded that he was “not concerned about my feelings
and said that he would be able to say to me nicely that
I don’t want to talk on and then leave.”
Dr. Gruenberg concluded from all of her questioning
that, at the time she interviewed him in January and
February 2003, Collins was able to understand his
Miranda rights and the consequences of waiving those
rights. She would not offer an opinion on his ability to
understand the rights or consequences of waiver when
he gave his statement to police, unless his mental
state was “similar to the state which he had at the time
I evaluated him,” a subject on which she offered
no opinion.
The last doctor in line was Dr. Daniel Hier, the neurolo-
gist who testified for the defense. Dr. Hier did not
evaluate Collins personally, but rather testified from a
medical doctor’s perspective about the likely effects of
the brain aneurysm that Collins suffered in 1994. He
reviewed Collins’ medical records from 1994 up to
May 2001, as well as the reports and testimony of all the
experts who had come before him. Dr. Hier clarified the
medical record, corrected a few factual mistakes, and
answered questions that the earlier experts had felt
unqualified to answer.
Dr. Hier began by explaining that Collins’ brain had
suffered a mycotic aneurysm, which occurs when an
artery is weakened by bacterial infection. This aneurysm
was not, as the court had surmised and Dr. Wetzel had
believed, the kind of aneurysm that can be treated by
“clipping” and isolating it from circulation. Dr. Hier
No. 09-2212 19

went on to explain the procedures that Collins under-
went to treat the aneurysm and the physical damage that
the aneurysm caused. Specifically, he testified to two
kinds of damage: structural damage, namely, a hole in
Collins’ brain that was filled with spinal fluid, along
with large areas of hemorrhage in both frontal lobes of
the brain; and neuropsychological damage flowing from
that structural damage.
Asked how one would measure this neuropsycho-
logical damage, Dr. Hier answered that he would begin
by testing for sensory loss or loss of coordination.
Finding no evidence of that here, he would proceed to
do “detailed neuropsychological evaluation to deter-
mine if there are any neuropsychological problems com-
patible with this hemorrhage.” According to Dr. Hier,
the results of the tests that Dr. Wetzel and Dr. Messina
performed provided evidence of “deficits in neuro-
psychological functioning in Mr. Collins which were
compatible with” the kind of injury that Collins had
suffered. Dr. Hier explained further that the frontal
lobes “play the lead role in what’s called executive func-
tioning,” which he defined as “the ability of the person
to have insight into their own behavior, to plan for the
future, to stay organized, to stay focused on task,” among
other things. The frontal lobes, which bore the brunt of
the aneurysm’s damage, are also important in “memory
and language.”
Dr. Hier testified that he believed Collins’ brain injury
had caused him to suffer from expressive aphasia, a
language disorder consistent with Collins’ odd manner
20 No. 09-2212

of speech. A more difficult question, Dr. Hier acknowl-
edged, was whether Collins also suffered from receptive
aphasia, or a defect in his ability to understand words
spoken by others. Dr. Hier conceded that none of the
experts had performed a test specifically designed to
diagnose that condition. But Collins’ poor performance
on a subtest of the Wechsler IQ test suggested to Dr. Hier
that Collins had at least mild receptive aphasia. This
testing, he said, was “quite good and I believe quite valid.”
Dr. Hier offered no opinion on whether Collins was able
to understand the Miranda warnings. He did offer, in
response to questioning by the trial judge, a few words
of disagreement with Dr. Gruenberg’s interpretation of
Collins’ responses to her questions: “I found his
responses kind of vapid, empty, vacuous and not
reflecting a lot of understanding as to what the Miranda
rights really entailed. She took a different interpretation
to it . . . but again these are two different people inter-
preting the same information.”
The state trial court also considered evidence from
the written report of a fifth doctor, Philip Pan. Dr. Pan, a
psychiatrist, was assigned by the court to evaluate
Collins on October 10, 2002. Dr. Pan concluded that “the
available evidence indicates that the defendant has an
adequate understanding of his rights under Miranda.”
He added, however: “I apologize to the Court that I am
unable to reach an opinion to the requisite degree of
certainty whether defendant was able to understand and
competently waive his rights under Miranda at the time
of his arrest and questioning. His documented cognitive
No. 09-2212 21

deficiencies, the possible effects of drug intoxication
or withdrawal with crack cocaine, and an overwhelmed
and distraught emotional state leads to a murky recon-
struction of the defendant’s likely mental state at that
time.”
The court also heard from Prosecutor Heil, Detective
O’Shea, and Officer Bartik, all of whom testified that they
gave Collins Miranda warnings before each interview
and obtained his agreement that he understood. They
also testified that Collins never seemed confused about
what they were telling or asking him. In addition, the
court heard evidence that Collins had been arrested four
previous times, three times in 1998 and once in 1997,
and each time had been given Miranda warnings.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress in a
written opinion. The court gave a full summary of the
evidence presented at the suppression hearing, including
the testimony of the four experts, Prosecutor Heil, and
the police witnesses. After laying out the legal standard
for intelligent waiver of Miranda rights, the court held
that, although the evidence supported the defense argu-
ment that Collins suffered intellectual deficits, it also
showed that Collins was able to understand his rights
and the warnings he was given to the necessary degree.
In reaching this conclusion, the court considered Col-
lins’ responses to the experts’ questions, the number
of times he was given warnings on this occasion and in
the past, and his initial denial of responsibility for
Lanier’s injuries.
22 No. 09-2212

On appeal, the Illinois Appellate Court recapitulated the
evidence and held that the trial court had not erred in
admitting the statement. The Appellate Court followed
the trial court’s reasoning, holding that the “conflicting
evidence in the record, as well as effective impeachment
of the defense experts,” was sufficient to affirm the
trial court’s decision as reasonably supported by the
evidence.

II. Analysis
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA) governs federal judicial review of a petition
for writ of habeas corpus from a person in custody pursu-
ant to a state court judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Under the AEDPA, a federal court may not issue a writ
of habeas corpus unless the state court’s adjudication of
the petitioner’s claim either “resulted in a decision that
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable applica-
tion of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “resulted
in a decision that was based on an unreasonable deter-
mination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Collins contends that the Illinois state courts’ adjudica-
tion of his claims did both.

A. Contrary to or Unreasonable Application of Federal Law
Collins’ first argument is that his petition should be
granted because the Illinois courts’ decisions were
No. 09-2212 23

contrary to or unreasonable applications of clearly estab-
lished federal law as determined by the United States
Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Supreme
Court has explained that a decision is “contrary to”
federal law when it “contradicts the governing law set
forth in our cases,” or when “the state court confronts
a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from
a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a
result different from our precedent.” Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). A state court decision
involves an “unreasonable application of” federal law
when it “correctly identifies the governing legal rule but
applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular pris-
oner’s case,” id. at 407-08, but not when the state court
merely applies federal law “erroneously or incorrectly,” id.
at 411. In other words, the state court’s application of
federal law must be “well outside the boundaries of
permissible differences of opinion.” Jackson v. Frank,
348 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2003), quoting Hardaway v.
Young, 302 F.3d 757, 762 (7th Cir. 2002) (quotation
marks omitted). Here the state courts’ decision was
neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of
clearly established federal law as determined by the
Supreme Court.
Collins contends that the Illinois courts failed to hold
the government to the “heavy burden” of proving that
he validly waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966). It is true that the Supreme Court
used those words and the Illinois courts did not. But
more than that is required to satisfy the standard
24 No. 09-2212

of § 2254(d)(1). The state courts recited and applied the
well-established requirement that a defendant’s waiver
must be both voluntary, meaning non-coerced, and intelli-
gent, meaning with “a full awareness of both the nature
of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the
decision to abandon it.” See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412, 421 (1986); accord, Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573-
74 (1987); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482-83 (1981);
Tague v. Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469, 471 (1980) (courts may
not presume that waiver was voluntary and knowing;
state must meet “heavy burden” of showing voluntary
and knowing waiver).
The state courts also applied the proper standard for
intelligent waiver. The trial court wrote that the “aware-
ness component does not require knowing and under-
standing every possible consequence of a waiver . . . but
rather simply being cognizant of the State’s intention to
use one’s statement to secure a conviction and of the
fact that one can stand mute and request a lawyer.” The
trial court properly cited Burbine and Oregon v.
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), the Supreme Court’s central
cases on this question. For its part, the Appellate
Court cited only Illinois cases but used the same cor-
rect standard.
Collins also argues that the state court’s decision
was contrary to federal law because it failed to require
the government to show that police took “special care”
in obtaining a voluntary waiver given his limited
mental capacity. We disagree. The Supreme Court has
said that when the police are aware of a suspect’s
No. 09-2212 25

mental defect but persist in questioning him, such
dogged persistence can contribute to a finding that the
waiver was involuntary. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
385, 398-99 (1978) (suspect’s waiver was involuntary
when police officer questioned him while he was “con-
fused and unable to think clearly,” in critical condition
in a hospital bed). The Court has also held that a
suspect’s mental capacity is a factor that a court must
consider in deciding whether a waiver was voluntary.
See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724-25 (1979), citing
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979). The
Court has never held, however, that police can render
a waiver of Miranda rights involuntary simply by
failing to take “special care” that a suspect with a
mental disability understands his rights.
Even if the Supreme Court had clearly established a
“special care” requirement in its precedents, the state
courts’ failure to apply such a requirement here would
not have met the standard imposed by § 2254(d)(1) for
habeas relief. Collins produced no evidence that the
police officers who examined him were aware of his
mental deficiency. Indeed, his trial counsel barely cross-
examined Prosecutor Heil and Detective O’Shea on this
point, and his appellate counsel conceded at oral argu-
ment that she was not claiming the police illegally
coerced Collins into giving a statement.

B. Unreasonable Determination of the Facts
The state courts were right on the legal standard and
applied that legal standard reasonably to the facts that
26 No. 09-2212

they had determined. But Collins has also challenged
whether the state courts were reasonable in finding those
facts. The AEDPA permits a federal court to grant a
petition for writ of habeas corpus if the state court’s
decision is “based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).5
Under this standard, a state court’s factual finding is
never unreasonable “merely because the federal habeas
court would have reached a different conclusion in the
first instance.” Wood v. Allen, 130 S. Ct. 841, 849 (2010).
Rather, the state court’s determination of the facts must

5
Here we assume that the state courts’ determination that
Collins made an intelligent waiver is a “determination of the
facts” subject to challenge under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). That
determination is also subject to deference under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(1), which provides that “a determination of a factual
issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct,”
and must be rebutted “by clear and convincing evidence.”
Although the question of intelligent waiver is more properly
classified as a mixed question of fact and law, we have previ-
ously noted that such an initial classification is of “diminished
importance” under the AEDPA, which puts similar con-
straints on federal review of factual, legal, and mixed questions
alike. See Ward v. Sternes, 334 F.3d 696, 703 (7th Cir. 2003).
Thus we will continue to review challenges to factual deter-
minations under § 2254(d)(2)’s stringent unreasonable error
standard, using § 2254(e)(1)’s clear and convincing evidence
standard as “the mechanism for proving unreasonableness.”
See Ben-Yisrayl v. Buss, 540 F.3d 542, 549 (7th Cir. 2008), citing
Ward, 334 F.3d at 703-04.
No. 09-2212 27

have been an unreasonable error in light of the evidence
presented to that court. Ward v. Sternes, 334 F.3d 696, 703-04
(7th Cir. 2003). Because the Illinois Supreme Court denied
review, we look to the opinion of the Illinois Appellate
Court, as well as to the written opinion of the trial court,
whose reasoning and outcome were followed and
affirmed on appeal.
For a defendant to have validly waived his rights
under Miranda, two distinct facts must be true. First, the
defendant must have waived his rights “voluntarily.”
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). In other
words, the waiver must have been “the product of a free
and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion,
or deception.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986);
accord, Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1987).
Second, the defendant must have waived his rights
“knowingly and intelligently.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
In other words, the “totality of the circumstances sur-
rounding the interrogation” must show that the
defendant had “a full awareness of both the nature of the
right being abandoned and the consequences of the
decision to abandon it.” Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421; accord,
Spring, 479 U.S. at 574.6

6
A recent case from the Sixth Circuit is difficult to reconcile
with this basic principle. In Garner v. Mitchell, 557 F.3d 257 (6th
Cir. 2009) (en banc), that court held that, even when a suspect is
actually unable to understand the meaning of the Miranda
warnings, his waiver of his rights under Miranda is valid as
long as the police had no knowledge of his mental disability
(continued...)
28 No. 09-2212

As we have noted, Collins does not seriously contend
here that his waiver was involuntary. Nor could he,
because there is no evidence that the police sought to
obtain a confession despite his will to remain silent or
to have a lawyer present during questioning. Collins
went voluntarily to the police station. Although he re-
mained in an interview room for nine hours waiting for

6
(...continued)
and did not otherwise illegally coerce him to give up those
rights. See id. at 262-63.
We find Garner’s reasoning unpersuasive. Miranda’s prophy-
lactic rule was intended to combat the “inherently compelling
pressures” of custodial interrogation. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at
467. We take the Supreme Court at its word when it said that
police questioning “in its traditional form” is allowed only as
long as “the suspect clearly understood that, at any time, he
could bring the proceeding to a halt.” See Burbine, 475 U.S.
at 426-27.
Other circuits, including this one, have taken heed of the
Supreme Court’s admonition, reiterated just this Term in
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2261 (2010) (uncoerced
waiver, “standing alone,” is insufficient without the additional
showing that a suspect understood his rights). See United States
v. Cristobal, 293 F.3d 134, 142 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Bradshaw, 935 F.2d 295, 299-300 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Derrick v.
Peterson, 924 F.2d 813, 820-21 (9th Cir. 1990); Perri v. Director,
Dep’t of Corrections, 817 F.2d 448, 452 (7th Cir. 1987). Although
Young v. Walls, 311 F.3d 846 (7th Cir. 2002), and Rice v. Cooper,
148 F.3d 747 (7th Cir. 1998), contain some language questioning
the dual requirement for waiver, we do not read those cases
to repudiate the Supreme Court’s clear command.
No. 09-2212 29

a polygraph examiner to become available, he was
given food and drink, was allowed to use the bathroom,
and was otherwise left alone. He never invoked his right
to remain silent or to see a lawyer. The police gave him
Miranda warnings each time he was questioned and
had him acknowledge his waiver. There is no evidence
that they knew about his mental disability and sought
to take advantage of it.
But even in the absence of intentional coercion, if
Collins had insufficient mental capacity to understand
what the officers and prosecutor were saying to him,
he could not have waived his rights. What level of under-
standing, then, does Miranda require before a defendant
can intelligently waive his rights and give an admissible
statement?
The Supreme Court has offered some limited guidance
on this question, usually by telling lower courts what
the government need not show in order to prove a valid
Miranda waiver. “The Constitution does not require that
a criminal suspect know and understand every possible
consequence of a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege.” Spring, 479 U.S. at 574, citing Burbine, 475 U.S. at
422; Elstad, 470 U.S. at 316-17. A waiver is valid “if the
defendant fully understands the nature of the right and
how it would likely apply in general in the circumstances—
even though the defendant may not know the specific
detailed consequences of invoking it.” United States v.
Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002). For example, a defendant
may waive his right to remain silent even if he “does
not know the specific questions the authorities intend
to ask.” Id. at 629-30.
30 No. 09-2212

The federal Courts of Appeals, including this circuit,
have followed the Supreme Court’s instructions by re-
quiring the government to clear only a relatively low bar
in proving an intelligent waiver. Generally, the courts
will hold that a defendant’s waiver is knowing if he
understands that he can refuse to talk to the people
asking him questions or stop the questioning once it
begins; that the people asking him questions are not
his friends but are police or law enforcement personnel
who are trying to show he is guilty of a crime; that he can
ask for and get a lawyer who will help him; and that he
does not have to pay for that lawyer. See, e.g., Smith v.
Mullin, 379 F.3d 919, 933-34 (10th Cir. 2004) (mentally
disabled defendant gave intelligent waiver where he
understood “the role of police officers and the concept of
a criminal charge,” “comprehended the questions the
officers presented,” and had been arrested and served
time in prison before); Henderson v. DeTella, 97 F.3d 942,
948-49 (7th Cir. 1996) (waiver was intelligent where
defendant had below-average IQ but understood the
nature of the charges, initially declined to speak, and had
been prosecuted as a juvenile); United States v. Frank,
956 F.2d 872, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1991) (no clear error in
admitting statement where a Navajo man who knew
nothing about the American legal system understood
that he could remain silent, that a defense lawyer is
“someone who helps you,” and that a prosecutor
“does not help you”). It is only when the evidence in
the case shows that the defendant could not comprehend
even the most basic concepts underlying the Miranda
warnings that the courts have found an unintelligent
No. 09-2212 31

waiver. One example is a defendant whose command
of English is so poor that the police might as well have
been speaking gibberish. See, e.g., United States v. Alarcon,
95 Fed. Appx. 954, 955-57 (10th Cir. 2004) (defendant
understood only “bits and pieces” of English and often
pretended to understand English out of embarrassment
and a desire to cooperate); United States v. Garibay, 143
F.3d 534, 537-38 (9th Cir. 1998) (no evidence that
defendant spoke enough English to understand warnings,
and several witnesses testified that he spoke only a
few words of English).
The state courts found that Collins understood enough
of the police and prosecutor’s warnings to satisfy
Miranda’s requirements. We cannot say that finding was
unreasonable, although this is by no means an easy case.
As the state courts acknowledged, Collins produced
significant evidence of his limited mental capacity at
the time he gave his statement. The state courts
gave due consideration to that evidence. Our deferential
evaluation of the record leads us to conclude that the
state courts were not unreasonable in determining that
Collins nevertheless understood to the requisite degree
both the Miranda warnings and the consequences of
waiving his rights.
To begin with, the testimony of the expert witnesses
at the suppression hearing does not compel us to find
that Collins was incapable of giving an intelligent
waiver. Dr. Wetzel and Dr. Messina both testified to
that ultimate legal conclusion, but an expert’s testimony
about an ultimate issue is most valuable when it is
32 No. 09-2212

amply supported by the rest of her testimony. See, e.g.,
Huey v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 165 F.3d 1084, 1087
(7th Cir. 1999) (an ultimate conclusion without analysis
is “meaningless”). These experts’ supporting testimony
does not convince us that the state courts were unrea-
sonable in rejecting their final opinions. Dr. Wetzel’s
testimony that Collins “was able to paraphrase each
sentence” of the warnings and understood “that he
doesn’t have to talk,” but was “unable to really elaborate”
on his rights and could not understand “the entire
concept of Miranda” or “the purpose of Miranda,” leads us
to suspect that Dr. Wetzel applied a more rigorous stan-
dard of understanding than the Supreme Court requires.
Likewise, Dr. Messina testified that Collins was able to
tell her, in his own words, what each of the warnings
meant. Though Collins’ manner of speaking sometimes
clouded what he was trying to say, he was able to get
across that “something could be used against me,” that
“you don’t say nothing until your attorney is present,” that
if you speak to police, then “in court they can say, ‘You
said this, that, woo, woo, woo,’ ” and that if he could not
afford a lawyer, “They gonna give me one.” This is not
the kind of utter incomprehension that would compel
a result contrary to the one the state courts reached.
The answers that Collins gave to the state’s psychiatrist,
Dr. Gruenberg, reinforce this conclusion. Collins was
able to understand and explain the meaning of premedi-
tated murder. He understood what a consequence was
and suggested that his current situation was a con-
sequence of waiving his rights. And, as he had
No. 09-2212 33

with Dr. Messina, Collins rephrased each of the Miranda
warnings in a way that gives us confidence that the
state courts were not unreasonable in finding his waiver
was intelligent. He knew the right to remain silent
meant to “zip it, shut up, don’t talk, like a mannequin . . .
don’t have to say”; if he did speak, “everything that
I say can be used against you, like you told me from the
state when you first came here”; he knew he could have
a lawyer, but “I didn’t need an attorney because I didn’t
do anything that I needed an attorney to defend on”;
and the final warning was so “clear” that he could simply
say, “You said it.” Of course, not everything that Collins
said to Dr. Gruenberg was the picture of clarity and
comprehension, and some of the inferences she drew
from his answers were unpersuasive. On the whole,
however, Dr. Gruenberg’s testimony went a long way
toward supporting the reasonableness of the state
courts’ factual determination.
Finally, the testimony of Dr. Hier, though useful in
connecting Collins’ medical history of organic brain
damage to the other experts’ testimony about his mental
disability, did not render the state courts’ determination
unreasonable. Dr. Hier is among the preeminent physi-
cians in his field, and his testimony confirmed that the
aneurysm that Collins suffered made an already weak
mind even weaker. But Dr. Hier offered no definitive
opinion on whether Collins was able to understand the
warnings that the police gave before interrogating him,
or on whether he was able to understand what a waiver
entails. To the extent he disagreed with Dr. Gruen-
berg’s interpretation of the responses Collins gave in
34 No. 09-2212

Dr. Gruenberg’s own interviews, the state courts were not
unreasonable in siding with Dr. Gruenberg. In short,
Dr. Hier’s testimony supports a finding that Collins was
mentally impaired; it does not compel a finding that
Collins was so impaired that he could not have under-
stood his rights.
Our conclusion that the state courts’ determination
was reasonable finds further support in evidence that
Collins was able and willing to deceive or even lie to
investigators. In his first interview with Detective
O’Shea on the morning of May 1st, Collins told O’Shea
that Lanier “ran through the window,” suggesting he
had not pushed her. During the polygraph exam, Collins
again indicated that he was not responsible for Lanier’s
death. It was only when Detective O’Shea confronted
Collins later with the results of the exam—results that
indicated Collins was being deceitful—that Collins
changed his story and implicated himself in causing
Lanier’s injury. It was not unreasonable for the state
courts to infer from Collins’ changing story that he
knew how to deceive and understood the situation that
he was in when the police took him to the station.
It was also reasonable for the state courts to discount
the effect that Collins’ drug use and possible emotional
or physical strain had on his ability to understand the
Miranda warnings and the consequences of waiving
them at the time of the interrogations. We do not know
how much cocaine Collins ingested the night Lanier
died. We do not know how much he slept that night,
or during the day of May 1st while waiting for the poly-
No. 09-2212 35

graph examiner to become free, or on the night of May 1st
to 2nd while the investigators were away. We do not
know what emotional harm, if any, he suffered from the
fight with Lanier and his subsequent detention at the
police station. All of this uncertainty is likely what led
Dr. Pan and Dr. Gruenberg to decline to offer an opinion
on Collins’ mental capacity at the time of his statement.
What we do know is what was said by the law enforce-
ment officials who saw and spoke with Collins at the
time. Detective O’Shea testified that when he spoke to
Collins at 10:30 a.m. on May 1st, Collins’ demeanor was
“calm and cooperative.” Likewise, Officer Bartik, the
polygraph examiner, testified that Collins appeared fine
during the exam. Finally, Prosecutor Heil testified that
Collins “seemed fine” when they spoke at 6:00 a.m. on
May 2nd, just before Collins gave his statement. According
to Heil’s testimony, Collins denied being under the influ-
ence of alcohol or drugs. And although the testimony of
the investigators alone does not present a full picture,
Collins himself never offered any testimony or evidence
that he was so influenced by drugs or by emotional or
physical trauma that he could not have understood the
warnings or the consequences of waiver. In the absence
of any such evidence, it was not unreasonable for the
state courts to discount those possible influences on his
mental capacity.
The Miranda warnings represent a balance between the
desire to obtain truthful confessions and the desire to
protect some of our most fundamental rights. To strike
this balance effectively, we do not require that a crim-
36 No. 09-2212

inal suspect understand every consequence of waiving
his rights or make the decision that is in his best interest.
The Illinois courts understood and reasonably applied
the federal constitutional standard. Viewing the record
through the AEDPA lens, we cannot say that the state
courts’ determination that Collins met that standard was
unreasonable. We therefore A FFIRM the district court’s
denial of Collins’ petition for writ of habeas corpus.

7-13-10