Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc.

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________

Nos. 08-2784/2785/2798/2799/2818/2819/2831/2881
_____________

SHAWN SULLIVAN; ARRIGOTTI FINE
JEWELRY; JAMES WALNUM, on behalf of
themselves and all others similarly situated,

v.

DB INVESTMENTS, INC; DE BEERS S.A.;
DE BEERS CONSOLIDATED MINES, LTD;
DE BEERS A.G.; DIAMOND TRADING COMPANY;
CSO VALUATIONS A.G.; CENTRAL SELLING
ORGANIZATION; DE BEERS CENTENARY A.G.

DAVID T. MURRAY, Appellant in
08-2784
(Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 12(a))

SUSAN M. QUINN, Appellant in
08-2785
(Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 12(a))

MARVIN L. UNION; TIM
HENNING; NEIL FREEDMAN;
KYLIE LUKE; WILLIAM
BENJAMIN COFFEY, Jr.,
Appellants in 08-2798
(Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 12(a))

AARON PETRUS, Appellant in
08-2799
(Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 12(a))

JANET GIDDINGS, Appellant in
08-2818
(Pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 12(a))

FRANK ASCIONE;
ROSAURA BAGOLIE;
MATTHEW DELONG;
SANDEEP GOPALAN;
MANOJ KOLEL-VEETIL;
MATTHEW METZ;
ANITA PAL; DEB K PAL;
JAY PAL; PETER PERERA;
RANGESH K. SHAH;
ED MCKENNA;
THOMAS VAUGHAN,
Appellants in 08-2819
(Pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 12(a))

KRISTEN DISHMAN;
MARGARET MARASCO,
Appellants in 08-2831
(Pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 12(a))

2
 JAMES B. HICKS, Appellant in
08-2881
(Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 12(a))
_______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the New Jersey
(D.C. No. 04-cv-2819)
District Judge: Honorable Stanley R. Chesler
_______________

No. 08-2785 Argued January 28, 2010
Nos. 08-2784/2798/2799/2818/2819/2831/2881 Submitted
Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) January 28, 2010

Before: RENDELL and JORDAN, Circuit Judges, and
AMBROSE*, District Judge.

(Filed July 13, 2010)
_______________

John J. Pentz, III
Class Action Fairness Group
2 Clock Tower Place - Ste. 260G
Maynard, MA 01754
Counsel for Not Party-Appellant

_______________
*Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose, United States District
Court Judge for the Western District of Pennsylvania, sitting
by designation.

3
Howard J. Bashman [ARGUED in No. 08-2785]
2300 Computer Avenue - Ste. G-22
Willow Grove, PA 19090

George M. Plews
Christopher J. Braun
Plews Shadley Racher & Braun LLP
1346 N. Delaware Street
Indianapolis, IN 46202
Counsel for Objector-Appellant Susan M. Quinn

Howard B. Becker
Steven A. Katz
Korein Tillery
505 N. 7 th Street - Ste. 3600
St. Louis, MO 63101

Craig C. Corbitt
Zelle, Hofmann, Voelbel & Mason
44 Montgomery Street - Ste. 3400
San Francisco, CA 94104

Susan G. Kupfer
Glancy, Binkow & Goldberg
One Embarcadero Center - Ste. 760
San Francisco, CA 94111

John A. Maher
450 Springfield Avenue
Summit, NJ 07901

4
Joseph J. Tabacco, Jr. [ARGUED in No. 08-2785]
Berman, DeValerio, Pease, Tabacco, Burt & Pucillo
425 California Street - Ste. 2100
San Francisco, CA 94104

William Bernstein
Eric B. Fastiff
Lieff, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein
275 Battery Street - 30 th Fl.
San Francisco, CA 94111

Joseph D. Cooper
Tracy R. Kirkham
Cooper & Kirkham
357 Tehama Street - 2 nd Fl.
San Francisco, CA 94103
Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees Arrigotti Fine Jewelry
Shawn Sullivan and James Walnum

Jessica Biggio
Francis Ciani-Dausch
Tara S. Emory
Matthew P. Hendrickson
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
4 Times Square
New York, NY 10036

5
Mark J. Sagat
Steven C. Sunshine
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom
1440 New York Ave., N.W. - Rm. 08-08
Washington, DC 10005
Counsel for Defendant-Appellee DeBeers SA

Edward W. Harris, III
Taft, Stettinius & Holister
One Indiana Square - Ste. 3500
Indianapolis, IN 46204

Robert A. Skirnick
Meredity, Cohen, Greenfogel & Skirnick
One Liberty Plaza - 35 th Fl.
New York, NY 10006

Jared Stamell
Stamell & Schager
One Liberty Plaza -35 th Fl.
New York, NY 10006
Counsel for Not Party-Appellees Anco Ind. Diamond
Corp., Amer Diamond Tool & Gauge Inc. and British
Diamond Import Co.

Cecilia L. Gardner
Jewelers Vigilance Committee
25 West 45 th Street - Ste. 1406
New York, NY 10035
Counsel for Not Party-Amicus Appellee Jewelers
Vigilance Comm.

6
Scott W. Browne
Browne & Browne
2380 Eastex Freeway
Beaumont, TX 77703

Kenneth E. Nelson
1100 Main Street - Ste. 2900
Kansas, City, MO 64105

Stuart C. Yoes
P.O. Drawer 7584
Beaumont, TX 77726

Edward F. Siegel
27600 Chagrin Blvd. - Ste. 340
Cleveland, OH 44122
Counsel for Not Party-Appellants William Benjamin
Coffey, Jr., Marvin L. Union, Tim Henning, Neil
Freeman and Kylie Luke

Christpher A. Bandas
Bandas law Firm
500 North Shoreline - Ste. 1020
Corpus Christie, TX 78471
Counsel for Not Party-Appellant Aaron Petrus

Robert E. Margulies
Margulies Wind
3 Second Street
Plaza 10, Ste. 1201
Jersey City, NJ 07311

7
Jeffrey L. Weinstein
518 E. Tyler Street
Athens, TX 75751
Counsel for Not Party-Appellant Janet Giddings

Ricky E. Bagolie
Bagolie Friedman Injury Lawyers
660 Newark Avenue
Jersey City, NJ 07306

Andrea Boggio
Bryant University
1150 Douglas Pike - Ste. F
Smithfield, RI 02917
Counsel for Not Party-Appellants Frank Ascione,
Rosaura Bagolie, Matthew Delong, Sandeep Gopalan,
Manoj Kolel-Veetil, Matthew Metz, Anita Pal, Deb K.
Pal,Jay Pal, Ed McKenna, Peter Perera, Rangesh K.
Shah,and Thomas Vaughan

Kristen Dishman
16 14 th Avenue
Wareham, MA 02571
Pro Se

Margaret Marasco
14 Lakeview Avenue - #85
Lynn, MA 01904
Pro Se

8
James B. Hicks
Hicks Parks
824 Wilshire Blvd. - Ste. 200
Los Angeles, CA 90017
Pro Se
_______________

OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________

JORDAN, Circuit Judge.

For more than one hundred years, De Beers S.A. and
other entities within the De Beers family of companies
(hereinafter collectively “De Beers”) have fixed prices in the
wholesale market for gem-quality diamonds through a web of
pricing and output-purchase agreements with competitors. In
the late 1990s, however, De Beers’s market power began to
wane as new suppliers entered the market and competitors
refused to cooperate with De Beers’s pricing efforts. Amidst
these structural changes to the market, plaintiffs brought the
present claims under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-2, and under the antitrust, consumer protection, and unjust
enrichment laws of all fifty states and the District of Columbia.
Plaintiffs then entered into settlement negotiations with De
Beers, which ultimately resulted in a proposed settlement that
divided the plaintiffs into two putative classes and created a
settlement fund of $295 million. Although several plaintiffs
objected to the settlement, the United States District Court for
the District of New Jersey overruled the objections, certified the
two classes, and approved the settlement agreement. The

9
objectors then filed these appeals. For the reasons that follow,
we will vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand for
further proceedings.

I. Factual Background

Throughout the twentieth century, De Beers fixed prices
in the market for rough gem-quality diamonds by, among other
things, executing output-purchase agreements with competitors,
establishing a market-wide cartel to set production limits, and
restricting wholesalers from reselling diamonds outside of
certain geographic territories. Wholesalers, known as
“sightholders,” were, and continue to be, screened by De Beers
based on various criteria and are required to purchase diamonds
at ten annual distribution events called “sights.” Sightholders
constitute De Beers’s exclusive channel for distribution of its
diamonds, and they resell those diamonds to jewelry
manufacturers and retailers as rough diamonds, or as cut-and-
polished stones, or as components of finished jewelry products.

A. Deterioration Of De Beers’s Market Power

De Beers carried out its cartel activities – including
distribution to sightholders – through the Central Selling
Organization (“CSO”),1 an entity established by De Beers for
the purpose of coordinating its actions with those of its

1
The CSO was originally formed in the mid-1920s and
changed its name to the Diamond Trading Company (“DTC”) in
2000.

10
competitors. Historically, the CSO was responsible for
purchasing diamonds from De Beers’s competitors, establishing
pricing formulas, and setting output restrictions. The CSO’s
network of agreements and De Beers’s status as founder of the
CSO had for many years given De Beers nearly complete control
over the market for rough gem diamonds.

That hold on the diamond industry began to slip,
however, during the latter part of the twentieth century, and, by
the mid-1990s, it was weakening fast. In 1993, Russia’s state-
controlled diamond company, ALROSA, flooded the market
with low-quality gems to earn cash in the face of financial
pressures on the government. In response, De Beers dropped
the price of low-grade stones. That action prompted cartel-
member Rio Tinto, which operates Argyle Diamond Mines of
Australia (“Argyle”), to cease dealing with the CSO in 1996.
Rio Tinto’s Argyle mine, like ALROSA, began selling larger
numbers of low-quality diamonds than De Beers had previously
sold through the CSO.

With the low-end of the market moving beyond its
control, De Beers turned its attention to higher-quality gems. It
initially attempted to retain control over the production and sale
of high-grade diamonds by purchasing its competitors’ output,
as it had done for many decades before. For example, in 1999,
it entered into an output purchase agreement with competitor
BHP Billiton (“BHP”) under which it acquired 35% of BHP’s
total diamond production. That agreement ended in 2002, and
again De Beers’s efforts to maintain dominance began to fade,
as the market for high-quality stones saw the entrance of new
competitors and as old competitors brought new mines into

11
production. By 2006, in the overall market for rough gem
diamonds, state-owned companies in Angola and the
Democratic Republic of Congo collectively controlled 19% of
global production; ALROSA controlled 17%, and De Beers
controlled approximately 45%. Other competitors, including
Rio Tinto, controlled the remaining share of the market.2

B. Present Litigation

The present case dates from 2001, when two price-fixing
lawsuits were filed in the United States District Courts for the
District of New Jersey and the Southern District of New York.
Between 2002 and 2005, five additional lawsuits were filed in
state and federal courts across the country, bringing the total
number of suits against De Beers to seven. Three of the cases
were initiated in state court in Arizona, California, and Illinois.
The Illinois case was removed to federal court and was later
consolidated with the remaining four lawsuits – all of which had
been filed in various federal district courts – in the United States

2
These statistics represent shares of the market for all rough
gem diamonds, without regard to their quality. The parties have
not indicated whether that market can be further segmented
based on stone quality or whether suppliers of rough gem
diamonds exercise similar measures of control in the market for
cut-and-polished stones. A separate market also exists for
industrial-grade diamonds, but that market is not pertinent to
this appeal.

12
District Court for the District of New Jersey.3 While only the
five federal cases are presently before us, all seven cases are
pertinent to this set of appeals because the settlement agreement
that the parties ultimately reached applied to all actions,
including the ones in state court.

1. Identity of the Plaintiffs

The plaintiffs in the seven cases can be divided into two
categories, based on the claims that they assert. The first
category consists of direct purchasers that acquired rough gem
diamonds directly from De Beers or one of its competitors. The
direct purchasers advanced claims of price-fixing and
monopolization, citing §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2, for which they sought damages and injunctive
relief under §§ 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15,
26.4

3
All references to the “District Court” are to the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey.
4
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act do not themselves
create private rights of action. Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton
Act authorize plaintiffs harmed by activity that violates §§ 1 and
2 to bring a suit for damages and injunctive relief. See Port
Dock & Stone Corp. v. Oldcastle Ne., Inc., 507 F.3d 117, 121
(2d Cir. 2007) (“Although [plaintiff’s] substantive claims arise
under section 2 of the Sherman Act ... the private right of action
is provided by section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15.”).

13
 The second category of plaintiffs consists of indirect
purchasers, which are entities or individuals that acquired either
rough or cut-and-polished gem diamonds but did not do so
directly from De Beers or its competitors. Consumers and
jewelry retailers fall into this category, as do middlemen who
acquired diamonds from sightholders or from another indirect
purchaser. The indirect purchasers sought recovery for the same
antitrust injury as did the direct purchasers but brought their
claims under state antitrust, consumer protection, and unjust
enrichment law. These plaintiffs could only rely on state law as
a route to monetary relief because they lack standing to bring a
federal antitrust claim for damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act.
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 735-36 (1977). They
did, however, seek injunctive relief for those antitrust violations
under § 16 of the Clayton Act. See Mid-W. Paper Prods. Co. v.
Cont’l Group, 596 F.2d 573, 594 (3d Cir. 1979) (“Illinois Brick
does not preclude indirect purchasers from suing for injunctive
relief[,] and ... they have standing to sue under § 16 ... .”).

Thus, these two categories of plaintiffs assert claims that
overlap but are also distinct. The direct purchasers’ claims for
damages arise only under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and § 4
of the Clayton Act. The indirect purchasers’ damages claims
implicate only state antitrust, consumer protection, and unjust
enrichment law. Both categories of plaintiffs also assert claims
under § 16 of the Clayton Act for injunctive relief against
continued price-fixing and monopolization by De Beers.

14
 2. De Beers’s Participation in These Actions

De Beers initially refused to appear in the lawsuits
because it asserted that courts in the United States lacked
personal jurisdiction over it and that any judgment entered by
those courts would be a legal nullity. By September 2004,
defaults or default judgments had been entered against De Beers
in six of the seven actions. In May 2005, counsel for De Beers
approached plaintiffs’ counsel to discuss settlement of the
indirect purchasers’ claims. Those discussions produced a
settlement of the indirect purchasers’ claims in four of the cases
(the “indirect purchaser settlement”). Under the indirect
purchaser settlement, De Beers agreed not to contest
certification of a settlement class of indirect purchasers, and
further agreed to establish a settlement fund of $250 million to
be paid to class members. De Beers also agreed to a stipulated
injunction that restrained it from violating U.S. antitrust law,
and it consented to the District Court’s jurisdiction for the
purpose of enforcing the injunction.

On November 30, 2005, the District Court entered an
order (the “November 30 order”) that preliminarily approved the
settlement agreement and conditionally certified a settlement
class of indirect purchasers under Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5 Rule 23(b)(2) allows

5
Prior to 2003, Rule 23 expressly authorized district courts to
conditionally certify a class. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 23(c)(1) (2002)
(providing that a class certification order “may be conditional,
and may be altered or amended before the decision on the

15
a court to certify a class that seeks “final injunctive relief ...
respecting the class as a whole,” F ED. R. C IV. P. 23(b)(2),
whereas Rule 23(b)(3) authorizes certification when “questions
of law or fact common to class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members,” F ED. R. C IV. P.
23(b)(3). Hence, the Court preliminarily approved the class
under Rule 23(b)(2) for the purpose of entering the stipulated
injunction and likewise approved the same class under Rule
23(b)(3) in order to distribute the proceeds of the settlement
fund.

De Beers then entered into settlement negotiations with
the direct purchasers and ultimately reached a settlement
agreement with them in March 2006. That agreement mirrored
the indirect purchaser settlement: De Beers agreed not to
contest certification of a direct purchaser settlement class and to
create a fund of $22.5 million to satisfy class members’
Sherman Act claims. De Beers also agreed to increase the
indirect purchaser class settlement fund by $22.5 million
because the lawsuits filed by the direct purchasers included as
plaintiffs some indirect purchasers who had not participated in

merits.”) In 2003, however, the provision allowing for
conditional certification was removed because “[a] court that is
not satisfied that the requirements of Rule 23 have been met
should refuse certification until they have been met.” F ED. R.
C IV. P. 23 (2010) advisory committee’s note to the 2003
amendments. However, as none of the parties challenge the
District Court’s certification order on the basis of that change,
we will not discuss it further.

16
the earlier settlement. Finally, De Beers agreed to injunctive
relief that was substantively identical to that imposed under the
indirect purchaser settlement.

On March 31, 2006, the District Court amended its
November 30 order to conditionally certify both the direct and
indirect purchaser settlement classes under Rules 23(b)(2) and
23(b)(3), and to preliminarily approve a combined settlement for
both classes. The proposed combined settlement agreement
provided for a fund of $295 million to be paid to both the direct
and indirect purchaser classes. The direct purchasers were to
receive $22.5 million of the fund, while $272.5 million was
allotted to the indirect purchaser claims. The combined
settlement also provided for entry of a stipulated injunction that,
among other things, required De Beers to comply with all
federal and state antitrust laws, limited De Beers’s ability to
purchase diamonds from third-party producers, and prohibited
De Beers from restricting the geographic territory within which
sightholders could resell De Beers diamonds. De Beers also
agreed to subject itself to personal jurisdiction in the United
States for enforcement of the combined settlement agreement.
The parties stipulated that the injunction would take effect in
April 2006 even though, at that time, the Court had not yet
entered a final order certifying the class and approving the
settlement agreement.

C. Class Certification And Settlement Proceedings

After preliminarily approving the new settlement
agreement, the District Court allowed class members to lodge

17
objections to the class certification and the settlement.6 Class
objectors filed a total of thirty-four objections. All objections
pertained to the proposed certification of, and recovery by, the
indirect purchaser class; none of the direct purchasers objected
to the settlement.

The objectors raised two challenges to the propriety of
certifying the two settlement classes. First, they argued that a
nationwide class of indirect purchasers should not have been
certified for the purpose of administering a monetary settlement
of state law claims because antitrust, consumer protection, and
unjust enrichment laws vary widely from state to state.7
According to the objectors, those differences are of such
magnitude that common questions of law or fact do not
predominate with regard to the indirect purchaser class, thus
making certification inappropriate under Rule 23(b)(3). Second,
the objectors asserted that a nationwide class of both direct and

6
The District Court referred the case to a special master for
the purpose of recommending a distribution plan for the indirect
purchaser settlement award and for evaluating a fee request filed
by plaintiffs’ counsel. As we conclude that the Court
improperly certified the indirect purchaser class, see infra Part
III.A, the objections to the distribution plan and fee award are
moot, and we need not recount the special master’s
recommendation on those matters.
7
The objectors did not oppose certification of the direct
purchaser class for the purpose of adjudicating Sherman Act
claims.

18
indirect purchasers should not have been certified for the
purpose of implementing injunctive relief because the market
for rough gem diamonds became competitive during the
pendency of this litigation. That competitive increase, they say,
rendered an injunction to enforce compliance with antitrust
statutes unnecessary and accordingly divested the indirect
purchasers of antitrust standing to seek relief under
Rule 23(b)(2).

The District Court overruled both objections. Regarding
Rule 23(b)(3) certification, the Court concluded that, while
antitrust and consumer protection statutes vary from state to
state, those differences are not so significant that they override
class commonalities. Specifically, the Court held that class
members share common issues of fact regarding whether De
Beers actually fixed the price of rough gem diamonds and
whether such price-fixing caused the plaintiffs to suffer an
antitrust injury. The Court further noted that “De Beers ...
demanded a release of potential damage claims in all 50 states”
as a condition of the settlement and that certification of a
nationwide class was therefore appropriate, even though the law
of many jurisdictions limits or denies the right of indirect
purchasers to recover for antitrust injuries. (App. at 279.) The
Court also observed that the alleged harm was national in scope
and that resolving all federal and state antitrust claims
simultaneously “benefit[ed] all class members by spreading
litigation costs among Plaintiffs.” (App. at 284.)

With respect to the Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive relief, the
Court held, without addressing objectors’ description of
competitive advances in the market, that “all class members will

19
continue to suffer ... harm.” (App. at 285.) The Court rejected
the objectors’ argument that the class lacked antitrust standing,
concluding that De Beers had stipulated as a factual matter that
its conduct caused antitrust injury to all members of the direct
and indirect purchaser classes. Thus, according to the Court, De
Beers’s concession provided a factual basis upon which to
predicate class members’ antitrust standing because “De Beers
has waived the right to demand proof of the substantive
elements of the [antitrust] claims.” (Id.)

Accordingly, on May 22, 2008, the Court entered a final
order certifying the direct and indirect purchaser classes under
Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3). As ultimately certified, the direct
purchaser class includes all sightholders who acquired rough
gem diamonds directly from De Beers between September 20,
1997 and March 31, 2006. The indirect purchaser class includes
all indirect purchasers who acquired gem diamonds between
January 1, 1994 and March 31, 2006, regardless of whether their
stones were supplied by De Beers or by one of its competitors.8
Also on May 22, 2008, the Court entered a previously agreed-
upon injunction. The injunction is framed to remain in effect for
five years from its date of issuance, thus expiring on May 22,
2013. The objectors then filed the present appeals.

8
The parties have not explained, nor does the record reveal,
why the indirect purchaser class reaches back to 1994, but the
direct purchaser class dates only from 1997. Whatever the
reasons may be for this disparity, no one has suggested that they
are pertinent to the present appeals.

20
II. Jurisdiction And Standard Of Review

The District Court possessed federal question jurisdiction
over the direct purchasers’ Sherman Act antitrust claim for
damages pursuant to § 4(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 15(a), and over both the direct and indirect purchasers’ claims
for injunctive relief under § 16 of that Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26.
Original jurisdiction over the federal claims also arose under 28
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337(a). The District Court had
supplemental jurisdiction over the indirect purchasers’ state-law
antitrust, consumer protection, and unjust enrichment claims
under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. We have jurisdiction to review final
orders of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review an order granting class certification for abuse
of discretion. In re Schering Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 589
F.3d 585, 595 (3d Cir. 2009). A district court abuses its
discretion when its class certification decision “rests upon a
clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or
an improper application of law to fact.” Id. (quoting In re
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir.
2008)).

III. Discussion

The appellants are objectors who challenged the District
Court’s order certifying the indirect purchaser class under Rule
23(b)(3) and both classes under Rule 23(b)(2). The appellees

21
are the named representatives of the indirect purchaser class,
who of course support the District Court’s order.9

A district court may certify a lawsuit as a class action if
the suit meets the requirements of Rules 23(a) and 23(b).
Rule 23(a) mandates first, that the class be so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable, second, that the class
share common questions of law or fact, third, that the class
representatives possess claims or defenses that are typical of all
class members, and fourth, that the class representatives be able
to fairly and adequately represent the class interests. F ED. R.
C IV. P. 23(a). If those requirements are satisfied, a district court
may certify the class for one of the purposes enumerated in
Rule 23(b). As previously noted, Rule 23(b)(2) permits class

9
On June 11, 2009, plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal on the grounds that the objectors lack standing to appeal
the Rule 23(b)(2) certification order because the injunction
restrains only De Beers, not the objectors. We reject that
argument. An unnamed class member has standing to appeal a
class certification order provided that the member objected to
the settlement and is bound by the court’s judgment. Devlin v.
Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 7-10 (2002); accord Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Bolger, 2 F.3d 1304, 1307-10 (3d Cir. 1993). In this case, the
objectors contested certification before the District Court. As
class members, they are bound by the Court’s judgment and by
the terms of the settlement agreement, which release De Beers
from antitrust liability. The objectors therefore have standing to
pursue appeals, and we will enter a separate order denying the
motion to dismiss.

22
certification if the defendant “has acted or refused to act on
grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive
relief ... is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” F ED. R.
C IV. P. 23(b)(2). Again, as already noted, Rule 23(b)(3) permits
certification whenever “questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and ... a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.” F ED. R. C IV. P. 23(b)(3). The District Court must
specify which provision of Rule 23(b) supports certification of
the class. In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig.
Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 309 (3d Cir. 1998).

In this case, the objectors challenge the propriety of
certification under either Rule 23(b)(2) or 23(b)(3). Because the
Court’s Rule 23(b)(3) certification order presents a broader
range of issues than its Rule 23(b)(2) counterpart, we address
the certification of the damages class before turning to the class
claims for injunctive relief.

A. Certification Under Rule 23(b)(3)

Because Rule 23(b)(3) allows a district court to certify a
class only if, first, all class members share common questions of
law or fact that predominate over other issues in the case, and,
second, a class action is superior to other methods of
adjudicating the members’ claims, courts have come to refer to
these twin prerequisites for certification as the “predominance”
requirement and the “superiority” requirement. The
predominance requirement is similar to the commonality
requirement in Rule 23(a)(2), which says that the class must

23
share common questions of law or fact. However, the question
of predominance imposes a more stringent obligation on the
reviewing court to ensure that issues common to the class truly
overshadow those pertinent to individuals or to subgroups of
class members. In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d
241, 266 (3d Cir. 2009). It is therefore “appropriate to analyze
the [commonality and predominance] factors together, with
particular focus on the predominance requirement.” Id. (internal
quotation omitted).

A district court must evaluate predominance and
superiority by considering the following four factors enumerated
in Rule 23(b)(3):

(A) the class members’ interests in individually
controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already begun
by or against class members;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of
concentrating the litigation of the claims in
the particular forum; and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class
action.

F ED. R. C IV. P. 23(b)(3). The court may also consider additional
factors pertinent to class certification issues. See Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615-16 (1997)

24
(describing factors listed in Rule 23(b)(3) as “nonexhaustive”).
When presented with a motion to certify a class for settlement
purposes only, as in this case, the court need not consider the
likely difficulties associated with managing the class action
through trial. Id. at 620. Regardless of the purposes for which
class certification is sought, though, the court is not required to
rest its certification order solely upon the pleadings. See In re
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 316 (3d Cir.
2008) (“[T]he requirements set out in Rule 23 are not mere
pleading rules.”). Instead, the court should perform a “rigorous
analysis” that “delve[s] beyond the pleadings to determine
whether the requirements for class certification are satisfied.”
Id. (quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 167 (3d Cir. 2001)).

The only issue under Rule 23(b)(3) that the objectors
challenge on appeal is the District Court’s finding of
predominance with regard to the state law claims against
De Beers. The predominance of an issue depends upon the
value that addressing it will yield for all class members.
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623 (indicating that the “predominance
inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive
to warrant adjudication by representation”). The issue need not
be dispositive of the case, In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate
Antitrust Litig., 202 F.R.D. 12, 29 (D.D.C. 2001), but it must be
significant to every class member’s claim. See 2 A LBA C ONTE
& H ERBERT N EWBERG, N EWBERG ON C LASS A CTIONS, § 4:25,
at 173 (4th ed. 2002) (recounting that courts have described as
predominant those issues which present a “common nucleus of
fact,” an “overriding question,” or an “essential common link
among class members”). Issues are not predominant if they are

25
common to all class members but their resolution does little to
bring the case to conclusion. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)
advisory committee’s note to the 1966 amendment (indicating
that common issues will not predominate if an individualized
assessment of liability is necessary notwithstanding resolution
of them). Thus, the predominance inquiry requires the court to
identify class members’ claims and to ask whether the class can
support any of the elements of those claims through common
proof. Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 672 (7th Cir. 1981); cf. Ins.
Brokerage, 579 F.3d at 269 (affirming class certification
because plaintiffs possessed class-wide proof of antitrust injury,
even though the amount of each members’ damages required
individualized proof).

The District Court found that the shared antitrust harm
sustained by all indirect purchasers predominated over other
issues in the case, making those claims appropriate for class
treatment. Thus, the District Court’s certification order grouped
antitrust claims under the laws of all fifty states and the District
of Columbia into a single class. The objectors challenge the
District Court’s finding of predominance, arguing that
differences in state law prevent the allegedly common harm
associated with De Beers’s price fixing from gaining
predominance over legal issues shared by only limited segments
of the class. More specifically, the objectors say that different
states have very different laws governing whether indirect
purchasers even have an antitrust claim and that those
substantive differences in state law prevent common issues of
law and fact from predominating in this case. They likewise
argue that differences among state consumer protection and
unjust enrichment laws prevent a finding of predominance.

26
Finally, they argue that the District Court’s certification order is
procedurally improper because the order fails to identify the
state law claims that will receive class treatment. We take up
each of those contentions in turn.

1. Predominance of Common Legal and
Factual Questions

The objectors’ primary attack on the class certification
and settlement order asserts that variations in state antitrust
statutes prevent common class issues from gaining
predominance over individual legal issues. We have recognized
that “there may be situations where variations in state laws are
so significant so as to defeat commonality and predominance
even in a settlement class certification.” In re Warfarin Sodium
Antitrust Litig. (Warfarin Sodium II), 391 F.3d 516, 524, 529-30
(3d Cir. 2004) (certifying a class of consumer deception claims
under the law of all fifty states while recognizing that the entire
class also shared a single, common deception claim under the
law of Delaware, where the allegedly deceptive communications
had originated). However, neither we nor our sister courts of
appeals have considered whether variations among state antitrust
statutes are so far-reaching that those differences overshadow
commonalities when a class of indirect purchasers seeks
certification on a nationwide basis. We must therefore consider
for the first time whether a national class of indirect purchaser
claimants under state law is “sufficiently cohesive to warrant
adjudication by representation.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623.

27
 a. State Antitrust Statutes

Under the Sherman Act, to establish antitrust liability for
horizontal price-fixing, a plaintiff must show that (1) a
defendant entered a contract, combination, or conspiracy with at
least one other entity; (2) the agreement constitutes an
unreasonable restraint of trade; (3) the agreement produced
anticompetitive effects in the relevant market; and (4) the
plaintiff was injured as a result. Queen City Pizza, Inc. v.
Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 442 (3d Cir. 1997)
(reiterating elements of proof under § 1 of the Sherman Act). A
claim for monopolization requires the plaintiff to prove that (1)
the defendant possesses “monopoly power in the relevant
market” and (2) the defendant acquired, maintained, or
attempted to acquire or maintain that power through means other
than “growth or development as a consequence of a superior
product, business acumen, or historic accident.” United States
v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (setting forth the
elements of proof under § 2 of the Sherman Act). Many states
have enacted antitrust statutes that proscribe the same conduct
as the Sherman Act. 14 H ERBERT H OVENKAMP, A NTITRUST
L AW ¶ 2401a, at 314 (2d ed. 2006).

While state antitrust statutes frequently track the Sherman
Act in terms of their substantive elements of proof, they vary
significantly with regard to the standing that they extend to
indirect purchasers. The variance is mainly a function of
whether a state has chosen to follow the Sherman Act principles
regarding standing laid down by the Supreme Court in Illinois
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). In that case, the
Court decided that only direct purchasers of a product or service

28
may sue for an antitrust injury. Id. at 734-36. The Supreme
Court’s theory for denying standing to indirect purchasers was
that “the antitrust laws will be more effectively enforced by
concentrating the full recovery for the overcharge in the direct
purchasers rather than by allowing every plaintiff potentially
affected by the overcharge to sue only for the amount it could
show was absorbed by it.” Id. at 735. Hence, the Court viewed
direct purchaser standing as the most efficient way to ensure that
companies or individuals engaging in anticompetitive conduct
were called to account for their actions. Id. at 741.

Some states have elected to follow the Supreme Court’s
lead in Illinois Brick. See, e.g., Wilson v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
921 A.2d 414, 416-17 (N.J. 2007); Johnson v. Microsoft Corp.,
834 N.E.2d 791, 798 (Ohio 2005); Major v. Microsoft Corp., 60
P.3d 511, 513 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002). Other states, however,
have diverged from Illinois Brick and have enacted statutes
known as “Illinois Brick repealers.” Those statutes reject the
rule that antitrust recovery is limited to parties that dealt directly
with the defendant and instead extend antitrust standing to
indirect purchasers, including consumers. See, e.g., C AL. B US.
& P ROF. C ODE § 16750(a); M ICH. C OMP. L AWS § 445.778(2);
N.Y. G EN. B US. L AW § 340(6). Finally, a third set of
jurisdictions allow indirect purchasers to seek antitrust recovery,
but only if the state joins the suit in a parens patriae capacity.
See IDAHO C ODE §§ 48-108(2), -113(1); Siena v. Microsoft
Corp., 796 A.2d 461, 464-65 (R.I. 2002).

Thus, in some states with Illinois Brick repealers, indirect
purchasers may personally advance a claim for antitrust recovery
against a defendant, such as De Beers, that has fixed prices. In

29
other states, however, they may do so only with the assent of the
state attorney general. And in states without a repealer statute,
recovery is usually foreclosed entirely.10 At least twenty-five
states and the District of Columbia have implemented Illinois
Brick repealers or extended antitrust standing to indirect
purchasers through judicial decision; the remaining states have
not.11

10
Standing in those states is ordinarily but not always
foreclosed. The following states lack Illinois Brick repealers but
have extended indirect purchaser standing through judicial
decisions:

Arizona (Bunker’s Glass Co. v. Pilkington PLC, 75 P.3d
99, 109 (Ariz. 2003) (en banc))
Iowa (Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 646 N.W.2d 440,
449-50 (Iowa 2002))
North Carolina (Hyde v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 473 S.E.2d
680, 687 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996))
Tennessee (Sherwood v. Microsoft Corp., No.
M2000-01850-COA-R9-CV, 2003 WL 21780975, *16
(Tenn. Ct. App. July 31, 2003)).
11
The following states and territories have enacted Illinois
Brick repealers that allow indirect purchasers to bring private
suits for damages:

Alabama (A LA. C ODE § 6-5-60(a))
California (C AL. B US. & P ROF. C ODE § 16750(a))

30
 In short, this is not a case in which a class of plaintiffs

District of Columbia (D.C. C ODE § 28-4509(a))
Guam (Guam Code Ann. tit. 9, § 69.30(a))
Hawaii (H AW. R EV. S TAT. § 480-3)
Illinois (740 ILL. C OMP. S TAT. 10/7(2))
Kansas (K AN. S TAT. § 50-161(b))
Maine (M E. R EV. S TAT. tit. 10, § 1104(1))
Michigan (M ICH. C OMP. L AWS § 445.778(2))
Minnesota (M INN. S TAT. § 325D.57)
Mississippi (M ISS. C ODE § 75-21-9)
Nevada (N EV. R EV. S TAT § 598A.210(2))
New Hampshire (N.H. R EV. S TAT. § 356:11(II)).
New Mexico (N.M. S TAT. § 57-1-3(A))
New York (N.Y. G EN. B US. L AW § 340(6))
North Dakota (N.D. C ENT. C ODE § 51-08.1-08(3))
Oregon (O R. R EV. S TAT. §646.780(1)(a))
South Dakota (S.D. C ODIFIED L AWS § 37-1-33)
Utah (U TAH C ODE A NN. § 76-10-919(1)(a))
Vermont (V T. S TAT. tit. 9, § 2465)
Wisconsin (W IS. S TAT. § 133.18(1)(a)).

The following states allow indirect purchaser recovery, but only
in parens patriae suits brought by the state attorney general:

Alaska (A LASKA S TAT. § 45.50.577(b))
Arkansas (A RK. C ODE A NN. § 4-75-315(b))
Idaho (IDAHO C ODE § 48-108(2))
Rhode Island (R.I. G EN. L AWS § 6-36-12(a), (g))
Virginia (V A. C ODE A NN. § 59.1-9.15(d)).

31
possesses numerous disparate claims but shares an overriding
common cause of action under a common body of law. Instead,
all parties agree that the claims within the indirect purchaser
class implicate the law in every jurisdiction in the nation and
that no jurisdiction provides a claim shared by all, or even by a
majority, of the class members. These variations in state
antitrust law are not trivial.12 They represent fundamental policy
differences among the several states, and they are in
consequence as different as it is possible to be, with some states
giving substantive antitrust rights to indirect purchasers, other
states giving more limited rights, and others denying such rights
altogether.

12
Our concurring colleague says we have “attempted to
address the specific nuances of the substantive laws of the fifty
states.” (Concurring at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted).)
That is a misapprehension. We are certainly not saying that
nuanced differences among state laws will prevent the
certification of a class, nor are we suggesting that a state-by-
state cataloguing of differences in state law is necessary every
time a multi-jurisdiction class is certified. We are saying that
the difference between having an antitrust claim under state law
and having none is no mere nuance and cannot be solved by any
reconfiguration of the nationwide class short of changing it from
a nationwide class to one or more classes that exclude those who
have no claim. The concurrence acknowledges this necessity by
saying that, “[i]f ... neither state nor federal law provides a New
Jersey resident with a right to relief, then the class should be
redefined so that it does not include persons whose right to relief
is governed by New Jersey law.” (Id.)

32
 For example, an indirect purchaser located in a state that
has an Illinois Brick repealer, such as New York, may sue and
recover for a price-fixing or monopolization harm, see N.Y.
G EN. B US. L AW § 340(6), but an identical indirect purchaser in
a neighboring state without a repealer, such as New Jersey, may
not, see Sickles v. Cabot Corp., 877 A.2d 267, 276 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2005) (refusing to extend antitrust liability under
the New Jersey Antitrust Act to indirect purchasers). It is hard
to imagine a greater disparity between two class members.
Whereas the New York purchaser may recover for an antitrust
violation if he can prove the existence of a price-fixing
agreement or monopoly market power resulting in higher prices,
the New Jersey purchaser has no legal right to recover – or even
to bring a lawsuit – regardless of whether he can conclusively
prove the existence of a restraint and antitrust impact. Thus,
while both purchasers may have felt the effects of the same
antitrust conduct, the purchasers do not share common legal or
factual issues because the antitrust activity gives rise to a right
of action for only one purchaser. See Ins. Brokerage, 579 F.3d
at 266 (noting that Rule 23 requires that a class possess at least
one issue of law or fact that affects all class members’ claims).
The natural result of those differences is that there can be no
certification of a nationwide class of state indirect purchaser
plaintiffs because there is no common question of law or
material fact. It is improper to certify a nationwide class when
the legal right shared by class members purportedly arises under
the laws of multiple jurisdictions, but only some of those

33
jurisdictions extend standing to class members to enforce that
right.13

Plaintiffs seek to minimize these legal disparities by
characterizing them as little more than impediments to litigation
that would make trial management difficult but that may safely
be ignored for settlement purposes. That argument places
management issues above the more basic question of substantive
law. It is akin to suggesting that a really good cook, by means
of superior kitchen management, can make a cake out of
nothing. The lack of substantive rights cannot be wished away
by the promise of easier litigation management. Proponents of
class certification for any purpose, including settlement, retain
the burden of demonstrating that all class members share

13
Again, we are not suggesting that a district court must
conduct a state-by-state analysis every time there exists some
difference in the state law underlying class members’ claims.
However, when the parties propose to use class certification
mechanisms in a manner that materially changes substantive
rights, the district court has a duty to ensure that such use does
not create a right of recovery where none existed before. See
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 320 (imposing on district courts
the obligation to ensure that the plaintiffs have satisfied their
burden under Rule 23 before certifying a class). Hence, district
courts must remain attuned to the kind of significant variations
in state law at issue here and reject proposed classes that allow
plaintiffs to recover damages through the class certification
procedure when they would be unable to do so in an individual
action.

34
common legal or factual issues and that those issues
predominate over matters requiring individual proof. In re Gen.
Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768, 799 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that nothing in Rule 23
“can be read to authorize separate, liberalized criteria for
settlement classes”). That test presupposes that everyone in the
class at least has a cause of action. The variations in state law
identified by the objectors preclude the requisite finding of
predominance under Rule 23(b)(3) because indirect purchasers
do not have a right to recover in all states, and, therefore, no
question of law or fact regarding their legal rights is uniform
throughout the class. Cf. Prudential, 148 F.3d at 315 (stating
that certification of a nationwide class of state-law claims is
appropriate if the plaintiffs possess similar rights under the laws
of all states such that the court can readily control for
differences among various jurisdictions).

The predominance requirement of Rule 23 is not the only
statutory provision to stand as an obstacle to certification. As
just discussed, the District Court’s certification order extends
antitrust remedies that, in many instances, have no root in state
substantive law. As such, the order contravenes the Rules
Enabling Act, which prohibits a court from interpreting
procedural rules in a manner that creates new substantive rights.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (stating that federal courts may not
interpret procedural rules in a manner that “enlarge[s] ... any
substantive right”); see also Windham v. Am. Brands, Inc., 565
F.2d 59, 65-66 (4th Cir. 1977) (cautioning that each plaintiff in
a federal antitrust action must offer individual proof of damages
and that the failure to require such proof contravenes the Rules
Enabling Act by allowing a plaintiff to recover in the absence of

35
individual harm). By certifying a class, the District Court ran
afoul of the Act because its order effectively granted relief to
individuals to whom De Beers had no antitrust liability.

Nor can these foundational problems be overcome, as
plaintiffs suggest, by relying upon De Beers’s willingness to
stipulate to liability in all fifty states. Plaintiffs argue that
“[w]hen a settlement is reached, the defendant elects not to
contest the allegations of the complaint, and district courts are
entitled to rely on those allegations to demonstrate
commonality.” (Plaintiff-Appellees’ Ans. Br. at 46.) That is
simply incorrect. Independent of any stipulations, district courts
are obligated “to consider carefully all relevant evidence and
make a definitive determination that the requirements of Rule 23
have been met before certifying a class.” Hydrogen Peroxide,
552 F.3d at 320. Were it otherwise, the door would swing wide
to collusive settlements. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620 (requiring
courts to exercise “undiluted, even heightened, attention” to
issues of commonality and predominance in the settlement
context because those inquires are designed “to protect
absentees by blocking unwarranted or overbroad class
definitions”). Thus, plaintiffs and De Beers cannot salvage an
improper certification order by saying that De Beers has
stipulated out of existence defects in the commonality and
predominance of the class claims.

The objections in this case pertain to the predominance
of class claims and to the standing of individual class members
to bring claims under state law. The District Court had to
consider both of those issues, apart from the pleadings and
stipulations, when evaluating the motion to certify a class.

36
Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 316. A defendant’s decision
not to contest the requirements of Rule 23 does not relieve a
district court of its independent obligation to ensure that those
requirements are satisfied. The District Court did not adequately
satisfy that obligation and abused its discretion in finding that
common issues of law or fact predominate so as to warrant
certification of a nationwide class of state antitrust claims.

b. State Consumer Protection and
Unjust Enrichment Law

A similar problem exists with regard to the District
Court’s certification of consumer protection and unjust
enrichment claims for class-wide treatment. Consumer
protection and unjust enrichment laws are no more uniform
among the fifty states than are antitrust statutes. In fact, they are
less so. Some states without Illinois Brick repealers allow
indirect purchasers to invoke consumer protection statutes to
gain antitrust relief. See, e.g., Mack v. Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co., 673 So. 2d 100, 107 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Ciardi v. F.
Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd., 762 N.E.2d 303, 312 (Mass. 2002);
Arthur v. Microsoft Corp., 676 N.W.2d 29, 37-38 (Neb. 2004).
Other states preclude indirect purchasers from doing so because
they have adopted Illinois Brick standing requirements and view
any utilization of consumer protection statutes to recover for
antitrust harm as circumventing that policy decision. See, e.g.,
Sickles, 877 A.2d at 277; Major, 60 P.2d at 517; Vacco v.
Microsoft, 793 A.2d 1048, 1064-66 (Conn. 2002); Blewett v.
Abbott Labs., 938 P.2d 842, 844 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997). A third
group requires indirect purchaser consumer protection actions
to proceed as parens patriae suits. Blewett, 938 P.2d at 847,

37
while other statutes lack such requirements, see, e.g., D.C. C ODE
§ 28-4509(a); M ICH. C OMP. L AWS § 445.778(2); N.D. C ENT.
C ODE § 51-08.1-08(3).

The common law of unjust enrichment likewise varies
among the states, with some jurisdictions mandating proof of
elements not required by others. Evidence of antitrust activity
may provide a basis for an unjust enrichment claim in some
states. See Freeman Indus. LLC v. Eastman Chem. Co., 172
S.W.3d 512, 524-26 (Tenn. 2005) (allowing an indirect
purchaser price-fixing claim to proceed under an unjust
enrichment theory); see also D.R. Ward Constr. Co. v. Rohm &
Haas Co., 470 F. Supp. 2d 485, 507-08 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (same
with respect to Arizona law). Other states preclude recovery for
antitrust injuries on an unjust enrichment theory. Sperry v.
Crompton Corp., 863 N.E.2d 1012, 1018 (N.Y. 2007); cf.
Coastal Envt’l. Specialists, Inc. v. Chem-Lig Int’l, Inc., 818 So.
2d 12, 19 (La. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a plaintiff may not
invoke unjust enrichment principles to obtain a remedy for a
harm that is adequately redressed by other areas of law). With
respect to the substantive elements of unjust enrichment, some
states require plaintiffs to prove that the defendant’s conduct
rises to the level of fraud. See Mantiply v. Mantiply, 951 So.2d
638, 655 (Ala. 2006); Heldenfels Bros., Inc. v. City of Corpus
Christi, 832 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Tex. 1992). Others do not. See
Rhue v. Rhue, 658 S.E.2d 52, 59 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008);
Anderson v. DeLisle, 352 N.W.2d 794, 796 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984). Some allow an unjust enrichment claim only if the
plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law. Harris Group, Inc. v.
Robinson, 209 P.3d 1188, 1205 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009); Harvell
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 164 P.3d 1028, 1035 (Okla.

38
2006). Others lack that requirement. Jones v. Sparks, 297
S.W.3d 73, 78 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009); Williams Twp. Bd. of
Supervisors v. Williams Twp. Emerg. Co., Inc., 986 A.2d 914,
923 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009). In short, “the claim of unjust
enrichment is packed with individual issues” and therefore
precludes a finding of predominance in this nationwide class
action context. Clay v. Am. Tobacco Co., 188 F.R.D. 483, 501
(S.D. Ill. 1999).

Amidst the welter of differing statutes and decisions
across the country on these issues, at least one thing emerges
clearly: evidence of price-fixing and monopolization does not
give rise in every state to an unjust enrichment or consumer
protection claim for indirect purchasers. Thus, while De Beers’s
price-control activity, as a practical matter, may have harmed all
indirect purchasers, that injury cannot provide a basis for the
certification granted here because it does not give rise to a legal
right to recovery in all of the jurisdictions implicated by a
nationwide class. See Chiang v. Veneman, 385 F.3d 256, 273
(3d Cir. 2004) (“In order to predominate, the common issues
must constitute a ‘significant part’ of the individual cases.”
(quoting Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 472 (3d
Cir. 1986))). The District Court therefore abused its discretion
when it found that consumer protection and unjust enrichment
laws were sufficiently similar to warrant certification as a
class.14 Cf. Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 547 F.3d 742,

14
It is inapposite to say, as does our concurring colleague, that
every plaintiff “might have some valid claim” in addition to an
antitrust or consumer protection action and that such claims

39
746-48 (7th Cir. 2008) (reversing class certification order in a
consumer deception case because, while all consumers had
purchased the alleged deceptively marketed product, differences
among state law precluded a finding of common legal issues).

c. Federalism Concerns

It is no mere afterthought to note that, even ignoring the
obstacles posed by Rule 23, principles of federalism counsel
against certifying a class in this matter. The mandate of Erie
Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), prevents a
district court from invoking federal procedural rules to extend
recovery to a state law plaintiff when state courts would not
recognize the plaintiff’s harm as grounds for relief.
Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Pac. Indem. Co., 557 F.2d 51,
56 n.8 (3d Cir. 1977) (“In giving federal courts ‘cognizance’ of
equity suits in cases of diversity jurisdiction, Congress never
gave, nor did the federal courts ever claim[,] the power to deny
substantive rights created by State law or to create substantive
rights denied by State law.”). Thus, a district court abuses its

might be susceptible to common elements of proof.
(Concurrence at 13 (emphasis in original).) That is pure
speculation, for, if such claims exist, the plaintiffs did not bring
them. Every claim alleged in the complaints seeks recovery for
price-fixing and monopolization by De Beers. The claims
themselves are brought under a variety of statutory labels, but at
their core they all seek damages flowing from De Beers’s
antitrust conduct, which is categorically foreclosed to indirect
purchasers in many states without Illinois Brick repealers.

40
discretion when, as happened here, it approves a settlement
based on a supposed state law antitrust violation that the
plaintiff could not have asserted in state court.

Sacrificing the principles of federalism to obtain the
benefits of a settlement is a poor trade. Certain states have
categorically refused to allow indirect purchasers to bring a
price-fixing claim as a matter of substantive law. E.g., Wilson,
921 A.2d at 416-17; Johnson, 834 N.E.2d at 798; Major, 60
P.3d at 513; Abbott Labs., Inc. (Ross Labs. Div.) v. Segura, 907
S.W.2d 503, 507 (Tex. 1995). The policy decisions of those
states are “fundamental aspect[s] of our federal republic and
must not be overridden in a quest to clear the queue in court.”
In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1020 (7th Cir.
2002). By allowing the indirect purchasers to effectuate a
settlement without regard to those policy decisions, the District
Court wrongly allowed the sovereignty of the states to be
subordinated to De Beer’s desire to resolve all indirect purchaser
claims simultaneously.

Our holding today is not a repudiation of all nationwide
class actions based upon state law. In fact, we have previously
approved the use of class litigation as a means of resolving state
law claims, recognizing that in certain cases such certification
may be entirely proper. See Warfarin Sodium II, 391 F.3d at
529-30 (certifying a nationwide class under state consumer
protection statutes on the basis that class members had
uniformly been overcharged for the defendant’s product and had

41
a right to recover under the law of all fifty states).15 Nor are we

15
Plaintiffs argue that Warfarin Sodium II compels us to
uphold the District Court’s certification order, and our
concurring colleague believes that we “dismiss[] out of hand”
the controlling effect of that decision. (Concurring Op. at 1.)
Not so, though we evidently do view that case differently. In
Warfarin Sodium II, a nationwide class of plaintiffs sued
DuPont Pharmaceuticals Company for deceptive advertising
after DuPont claimed that Coumadin, an anticoagulation drug,
produced certain benefits not associated with the generic form
marketed by its competitors. 391 F.3d at 522-24. Plaintiffs,
including indirect purchasers of Coumadin, brought claims for
monopolization under § 2 of the Sherman Act, the consumer
protection laws of all fifty states and the District of Columbia,
and the state antitrust statutes in states with Illinois Brick
repealers. Id. at 524 & n.8. All class members also advanced a
claim under the Delaware Consumer Fraud Act, D EL. C ODE tit.
6, § 2513, on the ground that the allegedly deceptive
communications originated from DuPont’s Delaware-based
headquarters. Warfarin Sodium II, 391 F.3d at 528. The
District Court approved a settlement class, which we upheld on
appeal over the protests of an objector who argued that
variations among state consumer protection statutes defeated
predominance. Id. at 529-30.
Warfarin Sodium II is not controlling because the
plaintiffs in that case shared a common claim under the
Delaware Consumer Fraud Act. Id. at 528. Evidence pertaining
to DuPont’s distribution of deceptive marketing materials was
common to all class members, and all class members suffered a

42
similar harm by purchasing Coumadin under false pretenses. Id.
Thus, unlike the plaintiffs in this case, the plaintiffs in Warfarin
Sodium II shared a single, common claim that gave rise to an
identical right to recovery under a single state statute for every
member of the class. The same evidence used to support this
class-wide claim was also relevant to the consumer protection
claims under the laws of other states, making class issues
predominant over individual ones.
The nationwide consumer protection claims certified in
Warfarin Sodium II are critically different than the antitrust
claims in this case because they were founded upon deceptive
marketing practices, which were properly cognizable under the
laws of all fifty states. See id. at 529-30 (implying that
certification was proper for settlement purposes because the law
in all fifty states provided some form of relief for DuPont’s
deceptive marketing practices). In contrast, many states do not
permit plaintiffs to invoke consumer protection remedies for the
antitrust harms that the indirect purchasers have suffered.
Warfarin Sodium II’s certification of a class for the
purpose of settling indirect purchasers’ antitrust claims is also
distinguishable from this case. Unlike in Warfarin Sodium II,
the District Court here included indirect purchasers from all
states in a single class, even though indirect purchasers in many
states lack standing to bring antitrust claims. Those members
share no common question with the rest of the class because no
amount of factual similarity with other class members will
confer a right to recover upon them. They are categorically
precluded from obtaining antitrust recovery regardless of
whether De Beers’s price-fixing and monopolization activity

43
requiring district courts to undertake rigorous state-by-state
analyses in all cases.16 We hold only that a district court abuses

disadvantaged them. Thus, the certification of this class, unlike
in Warfarin Sodium II, has created a remedy for class members
who have no substantive right to receive it.
Warfarin Sodium II’s certification under state antitrust
statutes is unpersuasive in this context because the class at issue
in that case did not include claims under the laws of states
without Illinois Brick repealers. Thus, we never considered
whether an indirect purchaser in a state without a repealer could
use a class settlement as a means of obtaining recovery that the
purchaser could not receive had he brought the suit in his
individual capacity. We do not construe Warfarin Sodium II as
approving such a result. In fact, we noted in Warfarin Sodium
II that “there may be situations where variations in state laws are
so significant as to defeat commonality and predominance, even
in a settlement class.” Id. at 529.
There can be no greater variation in state law than exists
in the present case, where a plaintiff in one state has access to a
remedy that is foreclosed to an identical plaintiff situated across
state lines. Thus, we have not, as the concurrence suggests,
departed from our holding in Warfarin Sodium II that a class
may include plaintiffs whose claims differ significantly if all
members share at least one common issue. We have instead
recognized that a plaintiff who has no right to relief cannot join
in the same class as a plaintiff who does, and that, if those two
plaintiffs are included in a single proposed class, then the court
may not certify that class because no common issue
predominates with respect to both plaintiffs.
16
In many cases, it will be evident that all class members share
common legal or factual questions, even if the precise elements
of proof for their claims vary among jurisdictions. Under such
circumstances, a district court need not conduct an extensive

44
its discretion when, as in this case, it certifies a nationwide class
of litigants whose claims implicate the laws of multiple
jurisdictions, despite the fact that only some of those
jurisdictions recognize the claims for which recovery is sought.17

inquiry into substantive state law to formally establish
commonalities that are apparent. District courts in their sound
discretion will determine the level of analysis to undertake when
deciding whether variations in state law warrant detailed
examination and a description of similarities and differences. In
a case like this – where the class includes many people who
could not pursue claims in an individual action – that more
searching inquiry was needed, as the plaintiffs have tried to use
class action procedures to create a bridge to recovery where
otherwise none would exist.
17
We briefly note that the indirect purchasers face factual
obstacles to class certification notwithstanding the legal defects
discussed above because competition in the market for rough
gem diamonds waxed and waned during the class period. The
class includes all indirect purchasers who acquired diamonds
between January 1, 1994 and March 31, 2006, regardless of
whether they obtained stones from De Beers or from a
competitor. The record, however, reflects that many of De
Beers’s competitors did not participate in the alleged price-
fixing conspiracy throughout that period.
As a result, some class members purchased diamonds in
a market that was heavily influenced by De Beers while others
did not. Gary French, an expert retained by plaintiffs to
calculate damages and show class-wide antitrust impact,
explained that

during 1999 there was a substantial drop in the
price of imported diamonds. This drop in price
corresponds to a period of time when it is known

45
 that De Beers ... [was] selling off part of the
stockpile of diamonds held in reserve. Thus, the
per-unit value of rough diamonds fell closer to
what may be considered “competitive” levels
during the sell off.

(App. at 435.) French later testified that, in 2001, “De Beers
temporarily allowed the market to set prices which led to a
subsequent drop in polished diamond prices.” (App. at 5020.)

Plaintiffs who purchased diamonds before 2001 may
have different rights to recovery depending on whether their
supplier was actively cooperating with De Beers price-setting
efforts. See Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 207 (3d
Cir. 2005) (indicating that a § 1 plaintiff must prove that the
defendant joined a conspiracy to restrain trade). Similarly, those
who acquired diamonds in 2001, when De Beers allowed market
forces to dictate pricing, likely have no antitrust claim because
they made their purchases in a competitive market. See
Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d 268, 273-74 (3d
Cir. 1999) (requiring plaintiffs to show that they have suffered
an antitrust injury – i.e., an injury to competition – to obtain
standing to bring an antitrust claim).
Thus, the class, as currently defined, includes members
that acquired diamonds in a market controlled by the CSO,
members that purchased diamonds from competitors that were
not participating in the CSO’s price-fixing activities, and
members that have no antitrust injury whatsoever. Hence, class
members have not sustained a uniform injury as the result of De
Beers’s antitrust conduct. Instead, their injuries depend upon
when they purchased their diamonds and from whom they
purchased them, and those injuries can be established only
through individual proof. The class is therefore unworkable as
these factual differences would defeat class certification

46
It may be that the antitrust and consumer protection statutes in
a more limited number of states are sufficiently similar that
common issues of law or fact would predominate with respect
to plaintiffs in those jurisdictions. However, it was improper for
the District Court to certify a nationwide class of plaintiffs based
on state law when many states withhold antitrust standing from
indirect purchasers and where the variability in consumer
protection and unjust enrichment law in a context like this is
extreme. Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s
certification order under Rule 23(b)(3) and remand this case for
further proceedings.

On remand, the District Court should entertain renewed
motions to certify classes that, at least as to state law claims, are
not nationwide in scope, if such motions are made. For
example, to obtain certification of an indirect purchaser class,
plaintiffs would have to show that all class members share a
right to recover for antitrust harms, such that one or more
common issues affect all members’ claims. We express no
opinion regarding whether such a class can be formed or, if it
can, which states’ laws are sufficiently similar that plaintiffs in
those states could be joined as class members. It would,
however, be improper for the District Court to include in an
indirect purchaser class plaintiffs whose claims arise in states
that foreclose indirect purchasers from recovering for price-
fixing or monopolization. Of course, the plaintiffs are not
required to file new class certification motions, and nothing

notwithstanding the legal defects in the District Court’s
certification order that we have discussed above. See Hydrogen
Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 311-12 (“[T]he task for plaintiffs at class
certification is to demonstrate that the element of antitrust
impact is capable of proof at trial through evidence that is
common to the class rather than individual to its members.”).

47
prevents them from prosecuting their claims in an individual
capacity.

2. Failure to Identify Class Claims

If the District Court ultimately determines that
certification of a more limited class of indirect purchasers is
appropriate under Rule 23, any certification order that the Court
issues must contain greater detail than the one currently on
appeal. Under Rule 23(c), each class certification order must
contain “(1) a readily discernible, clear, and precise statement of
the parameters defining the class or classes to be certified, and
(2) a readily discernible, clear, and complete list of the claims,
issues or defenses to be treated on a class basis.” In re Constar
Int’l Inc. Sec. Litig., 585 F.3d 774, 782 (3d Cir. 2009)
(quotations omitted); see also F ED. R. C IV. P. 23(c)(1)(B) (“An
order that certifies a class action must define the class and the
class claims, issues, or defenses ... .”).

As the objectors correctly note, the District Court’s class
certification order does not comport with the second
requirement. The final order of certification adequately
delineates the parameters of the indirect purchaser class,
defining class membership to include purchasers in the United
States who acquired any gem diamond from an entity other than
De Beers or another rough diamond mining or production
company, such as ALROSA, Rio Tinto, or BHP. It also
identifies five legal issues supposedly common to the class.18

18
The five issues are as follows:

(a) Whether [D]efendants combined or conspired
with others to fix, raise, stabilize and maintain the
prices of polished diamonds;
(b) Whether [D]efendants monopolized or combined

48
But the order does not identify what state law claims or defenses
will receive class treatment.

The District Court recognized that the indirect purchasers
were advancing state antitrust, consumer protection, and unjust
enrichment claims, and that “variations exist between the
antitrust and consumer protection laws of different states.”
(App. at 279.) However, the Court never identified pertinent
state antitrust or consumer protection statutes, explained the
relevant state common law of unjust enrichment, or described
how those statutes and the common law affect class-wide rights.
Nor did the Court indicate whether the class antitrust issues that
it actually identified would affect the consumer protection and
unjust enrichment claims. The failure to do so constitutes an
abuse of discretion. Cf. Wachtel ex rel. Jesse v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co. of Am., 453 F.3d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 2006) (concluding
that a district court abuses its discretion when it articulates
general issues of fact common to the class but fails to identify
the particular claims that would be subject to class treatment).

or conspired with others to monopolize the supply
of polished diamonds;
(c) Whether [D]efendants’ conduct caused the prices
of polished diamonds to be maintained at higher
levels than would exist in a competitive market;
(d) Whether [P]laintiffs and the Class[es] are entitled
to injunctive relief; and
(e) Whether [D]efendants’ conduct caused injury to
the business or property of [P]laintiffs and the
other [Class and] Subclass Members and, if so,
the appropriate class-wide measure of damages.

(App. at 1:276 (alterations in original).)

49
 Thus, the District Court’s class certification order is
deficient because the precise claims subject to class treatment
are not “readily discernible from the text” of the order and the
accompanying opinion. Id. On remand, any certification order19
must identify with particularity both the prerequisites for
membership in the class and the issues or claims that will be
resolved on a class-wide basis. This means that the order should
identify class issues and explicitly state whether those issues
apply to the indirect purchasers’ antitrust, consumer protection,
or unjust enrichment claims, or to some combination of the
three. While the District Court need not follow a particular
formula when setting forth class-wide issues, we have
recommended that the format of an enumerated list can bring
clarity to matters subject to class adjudication and facilitates
appellate review of a certification order. Id. at 188 n.10.
Accordingly, we will remand this case both because the indirect
purchaser class as currently defined is overbroad and because
the District Court’s certification order did not sufficiently
identify those claims and issues subject to the class treatment.

B. Certification Under Rule 23(b)(2)

Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a class seeks injunctive
relief. It has no application “to cases in which the appropriate
final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money
damages.” Beck v. Maximus, Inc., 457 F.3d 291, 301 (3d Cir.
2006). The relief sought in a Rule 23(b)(2) action must benefit
the entire class, and the class representatives bear the burden of
demonstrating that “the interests of the class members are so

19
We express no opinion regarding whether a class could
properly be certified following remand and provide guidance
regarding the content of a certification order only to aid the
District Court in disposing of a class certification motion, should
the parties choose to file one.

50
like those of the individual representatives that injustice will not
result from their being bound by such judgment in the
subsequent application of principles of res judicata.” Baby Neal
for and by Kanter v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 59 (3d Cir. 1994).

As with any claim for injunctive relief, the plaintiffs may
not base a demand for an injunction solely upon past harm that
they have suffered. The plaintiffs must demonstrate that,
regardless of their past harm, they are likely to suffer harm in
the future. See In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export
Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 14 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Past exposure
to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or
controversy regarding injunctive relief ... if unaccompanied by
any continuing, present adverse effects.” (alteration in original)
(quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974))). If
the harm against which injunctive relief is sought dissipates
during the course of the litigation, the basis for class
certification likewise dissolves, and the class must be
decertified. Id. at 14-16 (vacating certification of a Rule
23(b)(2) class to enjoin cross-border arbitrage in the market for
new automobiles, because, following commencement of the
action, the exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the
Canadian dollar fell, undercutting the economic viability of
future anticompetitive arbitrage opportunities).

The District Court certified the direct and indirect
purchaser classes under Rule 23(b)(2) for the purpose of
awarding injunctive relief under § 16 of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 26. Unlike in a claim for damages, indirect purchasers
seeking injunctive relief for an antitrust harm under § 16 do
have standing. In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig. (Warfarin
Sodium I), 214 F.3d 395, 399-400 (3d Cir. 2000). Section 16,
however, creates no substantive rights. Mid-W. Paper Prods.
Co. v. Cont’l Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 589-90 (3d Cir. 1979).
But to have standing under § 16, a plaintiff must establish a

51
prospective threat of loss or damage as a result of conduct
prohibited elsewhere in antitrust law. Warfarin Sodium I, 214
F.3d at 400. Here, the proponents of class certification relied
upon De Beers’s alleged price-fixing and monopolization in
violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act to substantiate their
right to injunctive relief.

The objectors argue that all class members lack standing
to seek injunctive relief under § 16 of the Clayton Act because
they have not shown an imminent threat of prospective antitrust
injury. They aver that De Beers’s price-fixing conduct ended in
mid-2006, causing competition within the diamond industry to
increase and rendering the injunction unnecessary.

Plaintiffs offer a two-fold response. They first rely on the
District Court, which held that “the injunction ... is part of a
compromise that De Beers entered into willfully” and that, “as
such, De Beers has waived the right to demand proof of
substantive elements of the claims.” (App. at 285.) They say,
in other words, that De Beers’s willingness to stipulate to
liability is sufficient in and of itself to establish a prospective
threat of antitrust harm. That logic is unpersuasive, however,
because, again, a defendant’s willingness to stipulate to liability
for the purpose of effectuating a class action settlement does not
relieve the Court of its independent obligation to ensure that the
facts of the underlying case adequately establish a basis for
liability. Ins. Brokerage, 579 F.3d at 257 (“Confronted with a
request for settlement-only class certification, ... [the]
specifications of [Rule 23] ... designed to protect absentees by
blocking unwarranted or overbroad class definitions ... demand
undiluted, even heightened, attention ... .” (quoting Amchem,
521 U.S. at 620 (second alteration in original) (internal
quotations omitted))). Thus, De Beers’s decision not to contest
the propriety of the injunction does not provide a basis for
affirming the District Court’s Rule 23(b)(2) certification order.

52
 Plaintiffs and De Beers alternatively argue that the
injunction, which took effect in mid-2006, was itself responsible
for producing the pro-competitive trends in the diamond
industry, and that the injunction is necessary to maintain those
competitive advances. However, such a conclusion is not
supported by the record. Experts retained by both the plaintiffs
and De Beers identified numerous causes of increased
competition in the diamond industry, including:

• The opening of Rio Tinto’s Argyle mine in
Australia in the mid-1980s, which
ultimately became the largest production
mine in the world in terms of carats.
• Argyle’s severance of ties with the CSO in
1996, after which Rio Tinto began
marketing diamonds independently of De
Beers.
• The opening of new mines by competitors
in Canada, beginning in the late 1990s and
running through 2003.
• The exploration and opening of new mines
in Angola in the late 1990s.
• The 2002 cessation of the purchase
agreement between De Beers and BHP,
which marked the end of De Beers’s
ability or willingness to purchase large
quantities of competitors’ diamonds.
• Limitations imposed by the European
Commission in early 2006 on the amount
of ALROSA diamonds that De Beers was
permitted to purchase.

53
 • Increases in global diamond production by
De Beers’s competitors, which caused De
Beers to lose market share.

According to the plaintiffs’ and De Beers’s experts, these factors
appear to have caused De Beers’s market share to fall from
approximately 65% in 2000 to 45% by 2006. Plaintiffs’ own
experts indicated that, following mid-2006, market forces
controlled diamond pricing so pervasively that the price from
that point to the present provides a competitive benchmark
against which to determine the amount of plaintiffs’ damages as
a result of price-fixing during the class period. At no point did
any of the plaintiffs’ or De Beers’s experts mention the
injunction in their damage calculations or conclude that it had
any effect whatsoever on diamond prices. Moreover, neither the
plaintiffs nor De Beers cite any place in the record reflecting
such an effect.

Thus, while mid-2006 increases in competition may have
roughly coincided with the District Court’s issuance of the
injunction, the record cannot support the conclusion that the
injunction played a meaningful role in producing those
competitive gains. Plaintiffs face no significant threat of future
antitrust harm in the absence of the injunction because,
according to their experts, the market has become increasingly
competitive from 2006 onward, and “there is no longer any
guarantee that the prices De Beers sets will hold in the
marketplace.” 20 (App. at 4323.) Plaintiffs therefore lack

20
Our concurring colleague says that we have
mischaracterized the expert testimony by concluding that
plaintiffs face no significant threat of future antitrust harm.
(Concurring Op. at 18.) However, the plaintiffs’ own expert
opined that “De Beers is no longer able to control the quantities
[of diamonds] available to the market as it had been in the past,”

54
antitrust standing under § 16 of the Clayton Act, and we will
vacate the District Court’s order certifying the injunctive class
under Rule 23(b)(2). See New Motor Vehicles, 522 F.3d at 14-
16 (vacating a district court’s Rule 23(b)(2) certification order
because changes in market conditions caused the threat of future
antitrust injury to disappear).21

and that it has therefore lost the ability to set the price of rough
diamonds. (App. at 4321, 4323.) An industry commentator
cited by that expert concluded that, by July 2007, “De Beers
[was] no longer providing the steady hand that controlled supply
and kept prices stable. Prices might now be volatile, subject to
the normal ups and downs of the marketplace.” (Id. at 4318.)
Further, the European Commission has closed an antitrust
investigation against De Beers on the ground that the entry of
new diamond producers “means that there is now more
competition on the rough diamonds market.” (App. at 4319.)
Thus, we have noted only what the experts, including the
plaintiffs’ experts, have said: that the market has grown
competitive to the point that De Beers cannot control the market
price.
21
The objectors alternatively challenge the substantive
provisions of the injunction as inadequate to ensure that
competitive forces continue to prevail in the market for rough
gem diamonds. As we conclude that plaintiffs lack standing to
pursue injunctive relief, we need not decide whether the terms
of the injunction are sufficient to safeguard competitive market
forces.

55
IV. Conclusion

Though the District Court brought skill, experience, and
much labor to its handling of this matter,22 we are compelled to
conclude, for the reasons stated, that it abused its discretion in
certifying the settlement classes under Rules 23(b)(2) and
23(b)(3). Accordingly, we will vacate its judgment and remand
the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.23

22
The concurrence observes that, after years of proceedings,
hundreds of pages of recommendations by the special master,
and a lengthy opinion by the District Court considering over
thirty timely objections, the objection of one person has become
the undoing of a class certification. In our colleague’s eyes, we
have wielded “a sword rather than a scapel.” (Concurring Op.
at 2 n.1.) The concurrence thus seems to imply that our decision
is an overreaction to a minor problem and evidences a lack of
appreciation for the labor involved in achieving a settlement.
That is not the case. We acknowledge with gratitude, as does
the concurrence, the intense effort invested by the District Court
in addressing this litigation. Nonetheless, the objection
regarding the lack of predominance of class issues in this case
raises an insurmountable hurdle to certification of the indirect
purchaser class, as already described. As we have said, two
plaintiffs cannot be joined in a single class to adjudicate the
same set of facts when those facts give only one of them a
legally cognizable claim. That a single objector raised this
problem makes it no less salient than if all of the remaining class
members had pointed it out.
23
The objectors have also appealed two orders that awarded
attorney’s fees and approved payment of certain expenses to the
settlement administrator. Those challenges are necessarily
vacated in light of our conclusion that the class as currently
defined was not amenable to certification. We express no

56
opinion regarding the reasonableness of the fee award or the
expenses incurred by the settlement administrator, and those
issues are subject to reconsideration by the District Court at an
appropriate time.

57
RENDELL, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment.

I agree with the disposition chosen by the majority,
namely remand, because the District Court failed to analyze the
issues of commonality and predominance. However, I believe
that the majority’s opinion suffers from two overarching flaws.
First, the majority dismisses out of hand our previous
precedential opinion, In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litigation,
391 F.3d 516 (3d Cir. 2004) (“Warfarin II”), a case that
concerned remarkably similar claims and issues. Second, the
majority undertakes its own analyses of predominance and
plaintiffs’ entitlement to injunctive relief, rather than allowing
the District Court on remand to evaluate these issues in the first
instance. The majority’s approach is thus inconsistent with both
our precedent and our role as a reviewing court.

I.

The majority opinion conflates two distinct inquiries:
“Do common questions predominate?” and “Who should be
included in the class?” Our court addressed each of these issues
in Warfarin II. Curiously, the majority attempts to distinguish
Warfarin II in a footnote. To my mind, Warfarin II binds us and
should control our mode of analysis, if not the ultimate ruling on
the issue of predominance as well. If we were to follow
Warfarin II, I suggest that the District Court on remand could

1
revisit the two inquiries noted above and “tweak” the class and
its definition rather than “gut” it as the majority suggests.1

1
The proceedings leading up to the approval of the class
and the proposed settlement required considerable judicial time
and attention. The litigation began nine years ago and involved
seven class actions that were ultimately consolidated before the
District Court. The parties reached a preliminary settlement in
2005, and the District Court conditionally certified the class and
appointed retired District Judge Alfred Wolin as a Special
Master to review issues related to the settlement agreement.
After two years of proceedings, Judge Wolin wrote a 175-page
Report and Recommendation regarding notice to class members
and the distribution of settlement funds, an 87-page Report and
Recommendation regarding the award of attorneys’ fees and
reimbursement of costs, and two supplemental reports. Of the
tens of millions of class members, thirty-four filed timely
objections. The District Court considered these objections in a
lengthy opinion, and ultimately decided to grant final class
certification and approval of the settlement. Only one of these
objections is the subject of the majority’s opinion.
Although the fact that the District Court conducted such
intricate proceedings is not controlling, it is clear that the
settlement was welcomed by nearly all affected, and that the
alleged flaws form the basis for only a few complaints. As
noted in an amicus brief filed by a trade association of jewelry
manufacturers and retailers urging affirmance, “a small number
of consumers with modest claims and little financial interest in
the outcome of the appeal” are being allowed to prevent “[a]n
industry in financial straits” from recovering some of what it

2
 In Warfarin II we were called upon to determine whether
the certification of a settlement class was proper in a case
arising out of DuPont Pharmaceuticals’ alleged dissemination of
misleading information about a competitor’s product. 391 F.3d
at 522. The Warfarin plaintiffs alleged that DuPont had
engaged in conduct that allowed it to maintain a 67% market
share and charge “supracompetitive” prices. Id. at 523. The
specific claims asserted were remarkably similar to the claims
asserted here. The plaintiffs alleged that DuPont had violated
federal antitrust law, the antitrust statutes of the so-called
“indirect purchaser” states, the consumer fraud and deceptive
practices statutes of all fifty states and the District of Columbia,
and the prohibitions on tortious interference and unjust
enrichment contained in the common law of every state. Id. at
524-25. Here, plaintiffs allege that De Beers controlled most of
the world’s supply of diamonds, and imposed rigid constraints
on the purchase and resale of those diamonds. According to
plaintiffs, De Beers has artificially limited the supply of rough
diamonds, controlled who can purchase them and when they can
be purchased, and influenced the prices at which the diamonds
can be resold. These activities allowed De Beers to inflate
diamond prices and achieve a market share of 65% by 2000.
Plaintiffs claim that De Beers’s conduct violated federal

lost as a result of De Beers’s conduct. Amicus Br. at 4. I
submit that the wholesale rejection of what the District Court
accomplished, based on the concerns raised by just one objector
among tens of millions of class members, uses a sword rather
than a scalpel and is uncalled for.

3
antitrust law and the antitrust, consumer protection, or unjust
enrichment laws of every state and the District of Columbia.

Moreover, the threshold issue in Warfarin II was the
same as it is here: did common issues predominate? In
addressing the predominance issue, we engaged in an extensive
discussion as to commonality and predominance:

As the Supreme Court noted in
[Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591 (1997)], “[p]redominance
is a test readily met in certain cases
alleging consumer[] fraud or violations
of the antitrust laws.” This case falls
squarely into that category: plaintiffs
have alleged that DuPont engaged in a
broad-based campaign, in violation of
federal and state consumer fraud and
antitrust laws, to deceive consumers,
[third-party payors], health care
professionals, and regulatory bodies
into believing that generic warfarin
sodium was not an equivalent
alternative to Coumadin. These
allegations naturally raise several
questions of law and fact common to
the entire class and which predominate
over any issues related to individual
class m e mbe rs, including the
unlawfulness of DuPont’s conduct
under federal antitrust laws as well as

4
state law, the causal linkage between
DuPont’s conduct and the injury
suffered by the class members, and the
nature of the relief to which class
members are entitled.
Moreover, proof of liability for
DuPont’s conduct under § 2 of the
Sherman Act and the Delaware
Consumer Fraud statute depends on
evidence which is common to the class
members, such as evidence that
DuPont made misrepresentations about
Coumadin and generic warfarin
so dium permitting D uP ont to
monopolize the market for warfarin
sodium and charge supracompetitive
prices for Coumadin, while
discouraging class members to
purchase the lower-priced generic
competitor. In other words, while
liability depends on the conduct of
DuPont, and whether it conducted a
nationwide campaign of
misrepresentation and deception, it
does not depend on the conduct of
individual class members. Similarly,
proof of liability does not depend on
evidence that DuPont made deceptive
communications to individual class
members or of class members’ reliance
on those communications; to the

5
 contrary, DuPont’s alleged deceptive
conduct arose from a broad-based,
national campaign conducted by and
directed from corporate headquarters,
and individual reliance on the
misrepresentations was irrelevant to
liability. Finally, the fact that plaintiffs
allege purely an economic injury as a
result of DuPont’s conduct (i.e.,
overpayment for warfarin sodium), and
not any physical injury, further
supports a finding of commonality and
predominance because there are little
or no individual proof problems in this
case otherwise commonly associated
with physical injury claims.
Id. at 527-29 (citations and footnote omitted).

We then considered the objection that “variations in and
inconsistencies between the state consumer fraud and antitrust
laws of the fifty states defeat the commonality and
predominance requirements of Rule 23.” Id. at 529. We
described concerns as to manageability that may arise in class
certifications for purposes of litigation, but commented that
these concerns did not apply to the Warfarin class, which was
certified “solely for purposes of settlement.” Id. We noted that
this was “key.” Id. We then stated that, leaving case
management issues aside, “there may be situations where
variations in state laws are so significant so as to defeat
commonality and predominance even in a settlement class

6
certification,” but concluded that “this is not such a case.” Id.
at 529-30.2 On this issue, we said:

We agree with the District Court that
the fact that there may be variations in
the rights and remedies available to
injured class members under the
various laws of the fifty states in this
matter does not defeat commonality
and predominance. In [In re
Prudential Insurance Co. America
Sales Practice Litigation Agent
Actions, 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 1998)],
we noted that a “finding of
commonality does not require that all
class members share identical claims,”
and we rejected an objector’s
contention that predominance was

2
In Amchem, the Supreme Court cautioned that the
requirements of Rule 23 (other than manageability) “demand
undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settlement context,”
in part because settlements deprive courts of “the opportunity,
present when a case is litigated, to adjust the class, informed by
the proceedings as they unfold.” 521 U.S. at 620. However, the
Amchem Court also recognized that “[p]redominance is a test
readily met in certain cases alleging consumer or securities fraud
or violations of the antitrust laws.” Id. at 625. We determined
that Warfarin II fell “squarely into that category.” 391 F.3d at
528.

7
 defeated because claims were subject
to the laws of fifty states. . . . In
certifying a nationwide settlement
class, the District Court was well
within its discretion in determining that
variations between the laws of
different states were insufficient to
defeat the requirements of Rule 23.
Id. at 530 (citations omitted).

Accordingly, we affirmed the District Court’s ruling that
common questions predominated. Id. at 528.3

3
The majority distinguishes this case from Warfarin II on
the basis that the Warfarin plaintiffs “shared a common claim
under the Delaware Consumer Fraud Act.” Maj. Op. at 42 n.15.
However, we did not even address the Delaware statute in
analyzing predominance; indeed, we acknowledged that “that
there may be variations in the rights and remedies available to
injured class members under the various laws of the fifty states.”
391 F.3d at 530. Our discussion of the Delaware statute was
limited to the issue of commonality; we referred to it as one of
several reasons why commonality existed in the class. Id. at
528-29.
The majority also distinguishes Warfarin II on the basis
that its “nationwide consumer protection claims . . . were
founded upon deceptive marketing practices, which were
properly cognizable under the laws of all fifty states.” Maj. Op.
at 43 n.15. Yet our analysis in Warfarin was much broader than
the majority suggests. Rather than engaging in an independent

8
 While the claims here, and the state laws implicated, are
similar to those in Warfarin II, the District Court did not engage
in a meaningful analysis or discussion of the issue of
predominance. The Court acknowledged that “variations exist
between the antitrust and consumer protection laws of different
states.” App. 279. However, the Court then indicated that it
would be inappropriate to “weigh” claims for a variety of

analysis of whether every state’s consumer protection law
permits claims based on deceptive marketing practices, we
considered the “consumer fraud and antitrust laws of the fifty
states” as a whole, and concluded that “the fact that there may
be variations in the rights and remedies available to injured class
members under the various laws of the fifty states in this matter
does not defeat commonality and predominance.” 391 F.3d at
529-30 (emphases added).
Finally, the majority appears to distinguish Warfarin II as
not having “included indirect purchasers from all states in a
single class.” Maj. Op. at 43 n.15. However, Warfarin II made
no such distinction; to the contrary, we specifically noted that
indirect purchasers were included in the class, and the class was
defined as “[a]ll consumers or Third Party Payors in the United
States who purchased and/or paid all or part of the purchase
price of Coumadin dispensed during the period March 1, 1997
through and including August 1, 2001.” 391 F.3d at 525.
Although it may be true, as the majority contends, that there are
potential class members who do not have a right to recover
against De Beers, the District Court should be allowed to make
that determination on remand, and then adjust the class
definition if necessary.

9
reasons,4 and concluded, without any analysis whatsoever, that,

4
The District Court determined that
[w ]eig h ing claim s, particularly
Consumer claims, by different state
laws would not be appropriate in this
case for the following reasons:
a) De Beers, in the pursuit of a
global settlement, demanded a
release of potential damage
claims in all 50 states; without
class member releases from all
50 states, the settlement amount
likely would have been less.
b) A nationwide class of
consumers had been certified in
the Null case.
c) All class members benefit from
the additional value of the
injunctive relief obtained.
d) Weighting class member claims
based on the relative strength of
different state law claims would
be imprecise at best, would
greatly add to the cost and
com plexity of processing
claims, and would diminish the
funds available for claimant
recovery.
e) A nationwide antitrust class

10
as in Warfarin II, the variations were insufficient to defeat
commonality and predominance. App. 280.

I agree with the majority that more should have been
done by the District Court than merely citing Warfarin II. The
concern with “weighing” claims does not do away with the need
to address “predominance” in the process of class certification,
and the District Court has an obligation to satisfy itself that it is
not presented with a case where the “variations in state laws are
so significant so as to defeat commonality and predominance
even in a settlement class certification.” Warfarin II, 391 F.3d
at 529-30. Although the Court is free to conclude that the
predominance requirement is “readily met” here, see Amchem,
521 U.S. at 625, because any differences in state law are
“relatively minor” or can be addressed “by grouping similar
state laws together and applying them as a unit,” see Prudential,
148 F.3d at 315, its analysis must demonstrate that it has
actually considered the scope and effect of any such differences,
as well as the effect of any choice-of-law considerations, see In
re LifeUSA Holding Inc., 242 F.3d 136, 147 (3d Cir. 2001). The
District Court’s opinion does not assure us that the Court
considered these issues, and it does not provide us with any
reasoning that would allow us to review the Court’s conclusion

action is an expedient vehicle to
resolve the disparate claims of
the Direct Purchasers and the
Indirect Purchaser Subclasses.
App. 279.

11
that none of the differences in state law “are sufficient to defeat
commonality and predominance.” App. 280.

Nonetheless, it is for the District Court on remand to
review the claims, the relevant state laws, and the choice-of-law
issues in reaching the conclusion as to predominance. I submit
that all we must do is to tell the District Court to perform this
analysis. It is for that Court, not our court, see Maj. Op. at 27-
40, to conduct this analysis in the first instance.5

In conducting that analysis, the District Court need not
survey state law on a claim-by-claim basis. While purporting to
“review” the District Court’s analysis, the majority engages in
such a survey. This is not only a departure from our role as an
appellate court, it is inconsistent with our analyses in both
Warfarin II and Prudential. In Warfarin II, we never attempted
to address the specific nuances of “the substantive laws of the
fifty states” ourselves. See 391 F.3d at 529-30. Nor did we
require the district court to explore the “variations among state
antitrust statutes” without regard to whether such variations
were mitigated by the other causes of action asserted by
plaintiffs, as the majority does here, see Maj. Op. at 27. Rather,

5
It could be that the claims and laws here are sufficiently
similar to those set forth and implicated in Warfarin II, thereby
making the analysis fairly simple. There are, for instance,
overlapping issues regarding “indirect purchasers” in both cases.
See Maj. Op. at 14; Warfarin II, 391 F.3d at 525. But the
District Court must analyze these issues to provide us with a
basis for review.

12
we reached the straightforward conclusion that “the fact that
there may be variations in the rights and remedies available to
injured class members under the various laws of the fifty states
in this matter does not defeat commonality and predominance.”
Warfarin II, 391 F.3d at 530. Similarly, in Prudential, the
plaintiffs alleged violations of federal securities law, “common
law fraud, breach of contract, bad faith, negligent
misrepresentation, negligence, unjust enrichment, and breach of
state consumer fraud statutes.” 148 F.3d at 292. Although we
acknowledged that “the class claims are subject to the laws of
the fifty states,” we approved the district court’s approach of
finding predominance “by grouping similar state laws together
and applying them as a unit” in order to overcome “relatively
minor differences in state law.” Id. at 315. We did not require
the district court to determine whether consumer protection or
unjust enrichment laws, for instance, were “uniform among the
fifty states,” as the majority attempts to do here. Maj. Op. at 33.

Moreover, the majority sets forth discrete surveys of state
antitrust law, unjust enrichment law, and consumer protection
law, without ever addressing the salient issue of whether every
class member might have some valid claim under state or federal
law.6 If every class member does have a valid claim of some

6
I agree with the majority’s statement that De Beers’s
price-fixing and monopolization conduct is at the core of
plaintiffs’ claims. See Majority Op. at 36 n.14. However,
plaintiffs challenge that conduct under a variety of laws, not just
antitrust laws, and it is for the District Court to determine, in the
first instance, whether those other laws provide the plaintiffs

13
kind, then the next question is whether those claims can be
grouped in such a way that common issues predominate. Thus,
the majority misstates the focus of our inquiry when it proclaims
that we must decide, as a matter of first impression, “whether
variations among state antitrust statutes” defeat predominance,
Maj. Op. at 27, and whether there is an “overriding common
cause of action under a common body of law,” Maj. Op. at 32.
Rather, the question is whether the liability of De Beers is
“capable of proof on a class-wide basis.” In re Ins. Brokerage
Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 269 (3d Cir. 2009). The salient
issue, therefore, is whether the common issues of fact and law
presented by plaintiffs’ claims, when examined together,
outweigh any individual issues, such that a nationwide class of
indirect purchasers can be certified. Although I agree with the
majority that Rule 23 “presupposes that everyone in the class at
least has a cause of action,” Maj. Op. at 35, nothing in Rule 23,
nothing in Amchem, and nothing in our decisions requires that
everyone in the class have precisely the same cause of action.7

with valid causes of action.
7
For the same reason, I disagree with the majority’s
claim that its approach serves the interests of federalism and
ensures compliance with the Rules Enabling Act by preventing
class actions from “extend[ing] recovery to a state law plaintiff
when state courts would not recognize the plaintiff’s harm as
grounds for relief.” Maj. Op. at 40. Our approach in Warfarin
II and Prudential is premised upon the understanding that if a
defendant’s conduct gives rise to one cause of action in one
state, and a different cause of action in another state, then it can

14
If De Beers’s conduct gave rise to different types of claims,
predominance can be satisfied as long as those claims can be
grouped together in a way that allows them to be proven on a
class-wide basis.8

The majority also concludes that predominance is not
satisfied if the class includes certain members who may have no
claim at all under the applicable state or federal law. But that
fact should not affect predominance; rather, these people simply
should not be included in the class that is certified. If, for
instance (as the majority suggests), neither state nor federal law
provides a New Jersey resident with a right to relief, then the
class should be redefined so that it does not include persons
whose right to relief is governed by New Jersey law. Issues

be appropriate to hear both claims in a single class action. This
approach respects the states’ recognition of different causes of
action, and does not “enlarge . . . any substantive right” in
violation of the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
8
At the same time, however, we have never required
district courts, as part of the class certification process, to
evaluate every nuance of each potential class member’s claims.
That type of inquiry would only mire district courts in endless
class certification proceedings while failing to address the actual
requirements of Rule 23. To the extent that there is a question
about whether a specific class member is entitled to recover
from the defendant, it should be addressed as part of the claims
process, not the certification proceeding.

15
regarding what the applicable law would be, including choice of
law, can be decided on briefs.

Warfarin II is instructive on this point as well, for, after
concluding that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that variations in state law did not affect
predominance, we addressed arguments that certain
perso ns— fixed co-pay consumers and third-p arty
payors—should be “excluded” from the class because they,
respectively, lacked “viable” claims or “standing.” Id. at 530-
31. However, we concluded that each group suffered direct,
cognizable injury and was properly included. Id. Here, if the
District Court determines that there are persons without any
“viable” claims, the class simply should not include them. The
issue is not one of predominance. Rather, it is one of an
entitlement, or a right, to be in the class in the first place, and the
resulting definition of the class can be tailored accordingly. The
District Court has the duty to ensure that the class includes only
those with real “claims.” Id.

Thus, Warfarin II provides a road map, if not controlling
reasoning, that should be our guide. The majority fails to afford
it the respect it is due, and embarks on its own analysis. I
suggest that it errs on both counts.

II.

The majority also vacates the certification of a class for
injunctive relief based on a belief that the diamond market has
become competitive. I suggest that this issue should be
addressed on remand as well.

16
 In Warfarin I, we laid out three straightforward
requirements for plaintiffs to show that they are entitled to
injunctive relief under section 16 of the Clayton Act. They must
show “a threat of loss”; “that the injury in question is injury of
the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent”; and that
“there is a significant threat of injury from a violation of the
antitrust laws.” In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig.
(“Warfarin I”), 214 F.3d 395, 399 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal
quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted).

The majority opines that De Beers’s market share of 45%
(as of 2008) is so small as to preclude any significant threat of
future injury from its conduct. Yet the District Court never
addressed this argument, see App. 284-86, and the majority
relies for its independent analysis on expert reports written in
2008 for a very different purpose: the parties’ attempt to
identify a valid methodology for calculating damages. Although
the opinions do indicate that the experts believed that “De Beers
has lost its dominant share” of the market, App. 4321, and that
“the market for rough diamonds has become much more
competitive since mid-2006,” App. 4323, the experts did not
opine, as the majority suggests, that “[p]laintiffs face no
significant threat of future antitrust harm.” Maj. Op. at 54. The
District Court should have the opportunity to consider on
remand whether De Beers continues to possess enough market
power to pose a significant threat of harm to plaintiffs, rather

17
than having that inquiry foreclosed by the majority’s reliance on
expert reports that addressed a different issue.9

9
I am also unpersuaded by the majority’s disagreement
with the propriety of accepting De Beers’s stipulation to a risk
of future harm. On this issue, the majority invokes Amchem’s
caution that the “specifications of [Rule 23]—those designed to
protect absentees by blocking unwarranted or overbroad class
definitions—demand undiluted, even heightened, attention in
the settlement context.” 521 U.S. at 620. But De Beers is not
stipulating that Rule 23(b)(2) is satisfied; indeed, the majority
does not even address whether this case satisfies the Rule’s
requirement that “the party opposing the class has acted or
refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so
that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is
appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(2). Rather, De Beers’s stipulation addresses the question
of whether plaintiffs face “threatened loss or damage by a
violation of the antitrust laws,” as they must in order to satisfy
section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26. Nothing in
Amchem, Warfarin I, or the Clayton Act itself prevents De Beers
from stipulating that such a threat exists.

18