IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 97-51072
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MARGARITA CARRILLO-HERNANDEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. EP-97-CR-563-H
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June 19, 1998
Before REAVLEY, KING and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Margarita Carrillo-Hernandez (“Carrillo”) appeals her
conviction for importing marijuana and possession of marijuana
with intent to distribute. She argues that the evidence was
insufficient to support the inference that she knew the
automobile she was driving contained marijuana.
Because Carrillo renewed her motion for directed verdict at
the close of all evidence, we review the sufficiency of the
evidence to determine whether “a rational trier of fact could
have found that the evidence established the essential elements
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
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of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.
Lopez, 74 F.3d 575, 577 (5th Cir. 1996). Based on evidence of
Carrillo’s sole control over the automobile, nervous behavior,
inconsistent statements, and implausible explanations for her
actions, we hold that sufficient evidence exists to support the
inference that she had knowledge of the hidden marijuana. See
United States v. Pineda-Ortuno, 952 F.2d 98, 102 (5th Cir. 1992)
(defendant’s guilty knowledge inferred from control over vehicle,
nervous behavior, conflicting statements, and implausible
explanation); United States v. Diaz-Carreon, 915 F.2d 951, 954-55
(5th Cir. 1990)(same); United States v. Anchondo-Sandoval, 910
F.2d 1234, 1237 (5th Cir. 1990) (defendant’s guilty knowledge
inferred from control over vehicle, conflicting statements, and
implausible explanations).
Carrillo also argues that the district court committed
reversible error by refusing to give her requested jury
instruction, which defined the term “knowingly.” As Carrillo
objected to the district court’s refusal at trial, we review the
district court’s decision for abuse of discretion. United States
v. Sanchez-Sotelo, 8 F.3d 202, 212 (5th Cir. 1993).
When confronted with the identical issue in Sanchez-Sotelo,
this court held that “knowingly,” as used in 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), is used in its common meaning and, therefore, it was
not an abuse of discretion to refuse to include a definition of
“knowingly” in the jury instructions. Id. Accordingly, we hold
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that the district court in this case also did not abuse its
discretion.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.