[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-16569 JULY 15, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar JOHN LEY
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 08-60152-CV-CMA
WANDA KRUPSKI,
a single person,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COSTA CRUISE LINES, N.V., LLC,
d.b.a. Costa Cruise Lines,
a foreign corporation (Netherland Antilles),
Defendant,
COSTA CROCIERE, SPA,
a foreign corporation (Italy),
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(July 15, 2010)
ON REMAND FROM THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Before CARNES, WILSON and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In Krupski v. Costa Cruise Lines, N.V., LLC, 330 F. App’x 892, 895 (11th
Cir. 2009) (per curiam), we affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of Defendant Costa Crociere, S.p.A., finding that Plaintiff
Wanda Krupski’s amended complaint did not relate back under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15(c), and was therefore untimely. Specifically, we found that
under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii),1 Krupski knew or should have known that Costa
Crociere was a potential party because Krupski’s passenger ticket identified Costa
Crociere as the carrier. Id. Accordingly, we held that there was no “mistake”
because “Krupski chose to sue one potential party and not another even though the
identity of both was known to her.” Id. Alternatively, we held, Krupski’s delay in
seeking leave to amend her original complaint and in filing an amended complaint
demonstrated that the district court did not abuse its discretion in applying Rule
15(c). Id.
The Supreme Court, in Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., ___ U.S. ___, slip
op. at *1 (No. 09-337, June 7, 2010), reversed our decision and held that the proper
1
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) states that in order to permit relation
back, the newly named defendant must have “[known] or should have known that the action
would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.”
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inquiry for relation back under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C)(ii)
“depends on what the party to be added knew or should have known, not on the
amending party’s knowledge or its timeliness in seeking to amend the pleading.”
Thus, the question is “whether Costa Crociere knew or should have known that it
would have been named as a defendant but for an error.” Id. at *8. The Supreme
Court made clear that a plaintiff’s knowledge of a party’s existence does not
automatically equate to absence of mistake. Id. at *9.
Here, the Supreme Court found that the requirements of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) were met because “Costa Crociere should have
known that Krupski’s failure to name it as a defendant in her original complaint
was due to a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.” Id. at *18.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court granting summary
judgment to Defendant Costa Crociere, and remand for further proceedings
consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion .
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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