United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
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No. 09-3004
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United States of America, *
*
Appellee, *
* Appeal from the United States
v. * District Court for the
* Western District of Missouri.
Charles E. Winston, *
* [PUBLISHED]
Appellant. *
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Submitted: June 14, 2010
Filed: July 19, 2010
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Before MELLOY, HANSEN, and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, Charles Winston was convicted of one count of
conspiracy with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine, in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846. The United States Probation Office then
prepared a presentence investigation report (PSR), which calculated a base offense
level of 34, a two-level increase because the offense involved two firearms, and a
criminal history category of IV. This resulted in an advisory sentencing guidelines
range of 262 to 327 months' imprisonment. On November 16, 2005, the district court1
held a sentencing hearing, adopted the findings of the PSR, and sentenced Winston
to 262 months' imprisonment, a sentence at the bottom of the advisory sentencing
guidelines range. Winston appealed, and we affirmed his conviction and sentence.
See United States v. Winston, 456 F.3d 861 (8th Cir. 2006).
On June 23, 2009, Winston filed a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) to
reduce his sentence pursuant to Amendment 706 of the sentencing guidelines.
Amendment 706 revised the drug quantity table set forth in United States Sentencing
Guideline § 2D1.1. The district court granted Winston's § 3582(c)(2) motion and
reduced the offense level by two levels pursuant to Amendment 706. With the
reduced total offense level, Winston's advisory guidelines range was 210 to 262
months' imprisonment. The district court imposed a sentence of 210 months to run
consecutive to his state court sentence. In its order reducing the sentence, the district
court additionally noted that it had considered the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a).
On July 23, 2009, Winston filed a motion for reconsideration, asking the court
to reduce the sentence to 120 months, the statutory mandatory minimum, based on the
length of the state sentence, the length of the federal sentence, and Winston's lack of
serious conduct violations while in custody. The district court denied Winston's
motion, explaining that the we had previously held that a § 3582(c)(2) sentence
reduction is not a full resentencing. See, e.g., United States v. Starks, 551 F.3d 839,
842-43 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that § 3582(c) did not permit a full resentencing).
The district court further explained that it did not have the authority to reconsider
whether Winston's federal sentence should run concurrently with his state sentence
because it was not a new sentencing proceeding. The district court stated that it was
1
The Honorable Ortrie D. Smith, United States District Judge for the Western
District of Missouri.
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limited to considering how much Winston's sentence should be reduced in light of
Amendment 706, and it did so in reducing the total offense level and reducing the
sentence to 210 months' imprisonment.
Winston appeals, arguing that, contrary to our holding in Starks, under United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), when a defendant's sentence is modified under
§ 3582, the district court has the discretion to fully resentence the defendant rather
than merely modify the sentence to comport with the sentencing guidelines. He also
argues that § 3582 requires a district court to consider § 3553(a) factors.
The Supreme Court recently addressed this issue in Dillon v. United States, 560
U.S. ---, 2010 WL 2400109 (June 17, 2010). Generally a district court may not
modify a final judgment that includes a sentence of imprisonment except "'in the case
of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a
sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission'"
and made retroactive. Id. at *5 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)). In those
circumstances, "Congress has authorized courts to 'reduce the term of imprisonment,
after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are
applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued
by the Sentencing Commission.'" Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)).
The Supreme Court noted that the language of § 3582 "does not authorize a
sentencing or resentencing proceeding" but merely "provides for the 'modif[ication of]
a term of imprisonment' by giving courts the power to 'reduce' an otherwise final
sentence in circumstances specified by the Commission." Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2)). Thus, a proceeding under § 3582 is neither a partial nor full
resentencing; rather, it is merely a modification of the prior sentence.
The Supreme Court also explained that "[g]iven the limited scope and purpose
of § 3582(c)(2), we conclude that proceedings under that section do not implicate the
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interests identified in Booker." Id. at *7. The Constitution does not require that a
sentence be modified retroactively; "[r]ather, § 3582(c)(2) represents a congressional
act of lenity intended to give prisoners the benefit of later enacted adjustments to the
judgments reflected in the Guidelines." Id. Therefore, "proceedings under §
3582(c)(2) do not implicate the Sixth Amendment right to have essential facts found
by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt," and Booker does not compel us to find that
Winston is entitled to a full resentencing. Id.
Winston argues that the district court erred in failing to consider the § 3553(a)
factors in modifying his sentence under § 3582 because there was no individualized
assessment and the district court "felt compelled to forfeit its sentencing discretion to
a mandatory Guidelines scheme." (Appellant's Br. at 23.) In Dillon, the Supreme
Court explained that "[s]ection 3582(c)(2) instructs a district court to 'conside[r] the
factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable,' but it
authorizes a reduction on that basis only 'if such a reduction is consistent with
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission'—namely,
§ 1B1.10." Dillon, 2010 WL 2400109, at *6. The Court explained that a district court
must perform a two-step inquiry: first, determining whether a defendant is eligible for
a sentence modification and the extent of the reduction authorized under § 3582, and
second, considering any applicable § 3553(a) factors and determining whether the
reduction authorized in step one "is warranted in whole or in part under the particular
circumstances of the case." Id. at *7. Here, the district court determined that Winston
was eligible for a sentencing modification under § 3582(c)(2) and the extent of the
reduction for which he was eligible, and then it considered the § 3553(a) factors, as
noted in its order. It therefore followed the guidelines the Supreme Court set forth in
Dillon, and Winston's argument regarding the § 3553(a) factors is unpersuasive.
Finally, Winston argues that the purpose of Amendment 706 was to reduce
sentencing disparities between powder and crack cocaine, but sentencing disparities
remain. However, there is no indication that any remaining disparity is unacceptable.
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In Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 91 (2007), the Supreme Court held that
a district court may vary from the advisory sentencing guidelines range based solely
on the basis of a disagreement with the extent of the crack/powder disparity, but it did
not eliminate the disparity altogether nor require a district court to vary from the
advisory sentencing guidelines based on the disparity.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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