UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4892
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RICHARD LEON PINCKNEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior
District Judge. (2:08-cr-00145-PMD-1)
Submitted: July 14, 2010 Decided: July 22, 2010
Before KING, DUNCAN, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Cameron J. Blazer, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. Sean Kittrell,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Richard Pinckney appeals from his conviction and
226-month sentence following his guilty plea to one count of
being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), (e) (2006). Pinckney’s counsel
filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,
744 (1967), stating that there were no meritorious issues for
appeal, but questioning whether the district court complied with
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting Pinckney’s guilty plea, and
whether Pinckney’s sentence is reasonable. Pinckney was advised
of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief but did not do
so. We affirm.
During Pinckney’s plea hearing, in compliance with
Rule 11, the district court properly informed Pinckney of the
nature of the charges and penalties he faced and the rights he
was forfeiting with his guilty plea, found that Pinckney was
competent and entering his plea voluntarily, and determined
there was a sufficient factual basis for the plea. Therefore,
the record establishes Pinckney knowingly and voluntarily
entered into his guilty plea with a full understanding of the
consequences and there was no error in the district court’s
acceptance of his plea.
Pinckney also questions whether his sentence is
reasonable. This court reviews a sentence for procedural and
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substantive reasonablenes, applying an abuse of discretion
standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In
determining whether a sentence is procedurally reasonable, we
must assess whether the district court properly calculated the
guidelines range, considered the § 3553(a) factors, analyzed any
arguments presented by the parties, and sufficiently explained
the selected sentence. Id. See also United States v. Lynn, 592
F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (“[A]n individualized explanation
must accompany every sentence.”); United States v. Carter, 564
F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (same). Finally, we review the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence, “examin[ing] the
totality of the circumstances to see whether the sentencing
court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it
chose satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” United
States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2010).
The district court followed the necessary procedural
steps in sentencing Pinckney, appropriately treating the
guidelines as advisory, properly calculating and considering the
applicable guidelines range, applying the § 3553(a) factors to
the facts of the case, and offering an individualized
explanation of the sentence. Moreover, the court granted the
Government’s motion for downward departure based on Pinckney’s
substantial assistance and sentenced Pinckney below the
applicable advisory guidelines range. Thus, we conclude that
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the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the
chosen sentence.
As required by Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform her client, in writing, of his
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If the client requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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