RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206
File Name: 10a0215p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
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In re: DARRELL A. SIGGERS,
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Movant.
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No. 08-1214
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit.
No. 89-71175—Denise Page Hood, District Judge.
Argued: October 16, 2009
Decided and Filed: July 23, 2010
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Before: BOGGS, MOORE, and GIBSON, Circuit Judges.
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COUNSEL
ARGUED: Laura Kathleen Sutton, Manchester, Michigan, for Movant. Janet A. Van
Cleve, MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE, Lansing, Michigan, for
Respondent. ON BRIEF: Laura Kathleen Sutton, Manchester, Michigan, for Movant.
Debra M. Gagliardi, B. Eric Restuccia, MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
OFFICE, Lansing, Michigan, for Respondent.
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OPINION
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JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge. In 1984, Darrell Siggers was convicted of
first-degree murder in the shooting death of James Montgomery and was sentenced to
life imprisonment. Siggers now seeks authorization from this court, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), to file a second or successive habeas petition with the district court.
We deny his application.
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The Honorable John R. Gibson, Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
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No. 08-1214 In re Siggers Page 2
I.
In 1984, Darrell Siggers was convicted by a jury in the Recorder’s Court for the
City of Detroit, Michigan of first-degree murder in the shooting death of James
Montgomery. At sentencing, Siggers received a mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment. He was denied relief on direct appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals
on October 14, 1987, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied him leave to appeal on
June 29, 1988.
In 1989, Siggers filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court.
The district court denied the petition on the merits and this court affirmed the district
court’s order. In 1996, Siggers filed another petition for habeas corpus in the district
court and requested authorization from this court to allow the district court to consider
the petition. This court denied the request for authorization to file a second or successive
habeas petition, see In re Siggers, 132 F.3d 333 (6th Cir. 1997), and the Supreme Court
denied Siggers’s petition for certiorari. In 1998, Siggers made an additional federal
filing, which this court treated as a § 2244(b) application and denied in 1999. See In re
Siggers, No. 98-0192 (6th Cir. March 16, 1999) (unpublished order).
On March 14, 2004, Siggers filed a post-appeal motion in the Wayne County
Circuit Court alleging that newly discovered evidence established his innocence and
revealed violations of his constitutional rights. The original trial judge held an
evidentiary hearing and denied the motion. The Michigan Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court denied Siggers leave to appeal.
Siggers now brings this application, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A),
seeking authorization from this court to file a second or successive petition for writ of
habeas corpus with the district court. Siggers’s application alleges that certain newly
discovered evidence demonstrates his innocence and that the absence of this evidence
from his trial resulted in the violation of his constitutional rights.
No. 08-1214 In re Siggers Page 3
II.
“In order for this court to grant permission to file a second or successive habeas
petition, the applicant must make a prima facie showing that his application satisfies the
statutory requirements.” Bowling v. Haeberline (In re Bowling), 422 F.3d 434, 436 (6th
Cir. 2005); see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C). “‘Prima facie’ in this context means simply
sufficient allegations of fact together with some documentation that would ‘warrant a
fuller exploration in the district court.’” In re Lott, 366 F.3d 431, 433 (6th Cir. 2004).
Specifically, the statute requires that:
(b)(2) A claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus
application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior
application shall be dismissed unless
(A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review
by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or
(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been
discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and
(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed
in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for
constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have
found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).
Here, Siggers does not argue a new rule of constitutional law but rather relies on
the newly discovered evidence grounds found in § 2244(b)(2)(B). For this Court to
grant authorization based on newly discovered evidence, we must conclude that Siggers
has made a prima facie showing that: (1) the factual predicate of his claim could not
have been discovered previously through due diligence; (2) if true, the allegations
“would indeed constitute” a constitutional violation; and (3) clear and convincing
evidence that, absent that constitutional violation, and viewed in light of the evidence
as a whole, no reasonable fact-finder would have found Siggers guilty. See In re
McDonald, 514 F.3d 539, 544-45 (6th Cir. 2008).
No. 08-1214 In re Siggers Page 4
Siggers alleges that after his 1984 trial and his 1989 and 1996 habeas petitions,
he discovered the following evidence:
! Darryl Dulin gave sworn testimony that he witnessed an
individual named Toby Red shoot James Montgomery.
! Richard Braxton gave sworn testimony that he heard Toby Red
admit to murdering James Montgomery.
! Bruce Spearman came forward with an affidavit averring that his
cousin, Ranard Jackson, admitted to giving perjured testimony at
Siggers’s trial as a result of police coercion.
! Jack Fuqua, a prosecution witness, testified that he withheld
testimony at Siggers’s trial because of police intimidation. In
particular, Fuqua now claims that Toby Red came to his house
carrying a rifle and admitted to just having shot somebody.
! William Arnold, also a prosecution witness, gave sworn
testimony that he heard Toby Red come to Fuqua’s door on the
night of the murder and admit to having shot someone; Arnold
did not volunteer this evidence at the time of his trial testimony.
Arnold also averred that the police threatened to have public
benefits withheld from his sister and her children if she did not
cooperate with the investigation.
There is a circuit split, on which this circuit has yet to rule, concerning when the
factual predicate of an applicant’s claim must not have been “previously discoverable.”
McDonald, 514 F.3d at 545. Specifically, the circuits differ as to whether they require
that the evidence was not discoverable at the time of the applicant’s previous habeas
petition or at the time of the applicant’s latest federal filing. Id. We decline to decide
the issue here because it is not necessary to the outcome. In this case, Siggers’s latest
federal filing was his § 2244(b) application, which was denied in 1999. Siggers’s
current allegations rest on witness testimony he presented during an evidentiary hearing
held on his post-conviction relief motion in the Wayne County Circuit Court in 2004.
Although his brief fails to articulate precisely why this evidence was not discoverable
through due diligence at the time of his 1999 filing, the testimony at the hearing differed
from that given at Siggers’s trial and there is no indication that the new testimony was
No. 08-1214 In re Siggers Page 5
discoverable sooner. Accordingly, we will assume for purposes of argument that the
factual predicate of Siggers’s claim was not previously discoverable.
Next, Siggers must make a prima facie showing of a constitutional violation.
Siggers alleges constitutional error, namely Brady violations, as the reason that Jackson,
Fuqua, and Arnold allegedly gave perjured or incomplete testimony at his trial. See
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). To establish a Brady violation: “(1) the
evidence at issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory or
impeaching; (2) the state must have suppressed the evidence, whether wilfully or
inadvertently; and (3) prejudice must have resulted.” McDonald, 514 F.3d at 545
(quoting Butler v. Renico, 255 F.App’x 939, 943 (6th Cir. 2007)).
Here, the affidavit of Spearman, along with the testimony of Arnold and Fuqua,
if true, establishes a prima facie case of a Brady violation. First, with regard to Arnold
and Fuqua, the evidence is exculpatory because it centers on witness statements that
would help Siggers establish that someone else committed the murder. With regard to
Spearman’s affidavit, it provides a basis to impeach Jackson’s trial testimony. Second,
Siggers alleges police misconduct and coercion resulting in the introduction of perjured
testimony, which would satisfy the second Brady requirement. Finally, given the
materiality and exculpatory nature of the newly discovered evidence, its exclusion could
arguably have resulted in Brady prejudice. See McDonald, 514 F.3d at 545 (“one way
to establish the prejudice component of cause and prejudice is to establish Brady
materiality” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, regarding the evidence obtained
from Spearman, Fuqua, and Arnold, Siggers has made a prima facie showing of a
constitutional violation as required by § 2244(b)(3)(C).1
1
As to the evidence obtained from Darryl Dulin and Robert Braxton, Siggers vaguely asserts that
the absence of their testimony from his trial violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution. Siggers’s brief, however, fails to articulate how the statements were
suppressed or otherwise the product of constitutional error. At best, Siggers appears to argue that as long
as he can prove at least one constitutional violation, i.e., the alleged Brady violations, the court is then
allowed to consider all of his newly discovered evidence, even that unrelated to the alleged constitutional
error. Siggers cites no authority for this proposition, and we find it to be contrary to the plain meaning of
the statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).
No. 08-1214 In re Siggers Page 6
Finally, Siggers must make a prima facie showing “so as to require the district
court to engage in additional analysis”to determine whether, absent the alleged
constitutional error, and when viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, no reasonable
juror would have found him guilty. McDonald, 514 F.3d at 546-47 (“‘Prima facie’ in
this context means simply sufficient allegations of fact together with some
documentation that would ‘warrant a fuller exploration in the district court.’”). Here,
absent the alleged Brady violations discussed above, we are to assume that Fuqua and
Arnold would have testified that on the night of the murder Toby Red came to Fuqua’s
door and admitted to having shot someone. Also, Jackson may have been impeached
concerning whether his testimony was the result of police coercion. Although this
evidence may have introduced some doubt concerning who committed the crime, it must
be viewed in light of the other evidence presented by the government. See id.
At trial, the government produced testimony from two eyewitnesses stating that
Siggers was the shooter. In addition, the government presented physical evidence that
shell casings consistent with those used in the shooting were found outside of Siggers’s
apartment. This evidence is not contradicted by the newly discovered testimony of
Fuqua, Arnold, or Spearman. Considering the strength of the evidence presented by the
government at trial, Siggers’s allegations again fail to establish a prima facie showing
that “the constitutional errors he alleges probably resulted in the conviction of an
innocent person.” In re Siggers, 132 F.3d at 338 (6th Cir. 1997); see also McDonald,
514 F.3d at 547 (emphasizing the lack of eyewitness testimony and absence of direct
evidence placing the defendant at the scene as factors in granting authorization to file a
successive habeas petition).
In addition to his Brady claims, Siggers alleges claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel. However, those claims have previously been denied on the merits and are
not subject to further review. See § 2244(b)(1); see also Siggers, 132 F.3d at 337-38.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the application is denied.