FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL MITCHELL,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CB RICHARD ELLIS LONG TERM
DISABILITY PLAN,
Defendant-Appellant, No. 08-55277
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE D.C. No.
COMPANY, CV-05-00810-DDP
Defendant-cross-defendant-
Appellant,
UNUM LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF
AMERICA,
Defendant-cross-claimant-
Appellee.
10707
10708 MITCHELL v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS.
MICHAEL MITCHELL,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CB RICHARD ELLIS LONG TERM
DISABILITY PLAN, No. 08-55686
Defendant-Appellant,
D.C. No.
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
2:05-cv-00810-
DDP-RNB
Defendant-cross-defendant-
Appellant, OPINION
and
UNUM LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF
AMERICA,
Defendant-cross-claimant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dean D. Pregerson, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted
December 11, 2009—Pasadena, California
Filed July 26, 2010
Before: Stephen Reinhardt, Stephen S. Trott and
Kim McLane Wardlaw, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Wardlaw
MITCHELL v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. 10711
COUNSEL
Rebecca A. Hull, Esq., of Sedgwick, Detert, Moran & Arnold
LLP, San Francisco, California, for appellants Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company and CB Richard Ellis Long Term
Disability Plan.
Glenn R. Kantor, Esq., of Kantor & Kantor LLP, Northridge,
California, for appellee Michael Mitchell.
Michael B. Bernacchi and Keiko J. Kojima, of Burke, Wil-
liams & Sorensen, LLP, Los Angeles, California, for appellee
UNUM Life Insurance Company of America.
OPINION
WARDLAW, Circuit Judge:
The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“MetLife”)
appeals from the district court’s judgment awarding Michael
Mitchell long-term disability (“LTD”) benefits and attorneys’
fees, in an action arising under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001
et seq. MetLife is the current insurer and administrator for the
LTD benefits plan (“the Plan”) provided by Mitchell’s
employer, CB Richard Ellis, and it insured and administered
the Plan at the time that Mitchell filed his claim for benefits.
Unum Life Insurance Company of America (“UNUM”) was
the insurer and administrator of the Plan at the time of onset
of Mitchell’s claimed disability in October 2003.
10712 MITCHELL v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS.
Because we conclude that the district court correctly held
that Mitchell was eligible for benefits under MetLife’s policy,
and because MetLife failed to cross-claim for indemnification
from UNUM in the district court action, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Mitchell’s Employment and Disability
Since 1983, Mitchell has worked as a commercial real
estate broker at CB Richard Ellis. In February 2001, Mitchell
was first diagnosed with restless leg syndrome after he suf-
fered symptoms of fatigue. Over time, Mitchell’s condition
grew more severe. In October 2003, he was diagnosed with
major depression, chronic fatigue syndrome, restless leg syn-
drome, REM-related obstructive sleep apnea syndrome, and
hemochromatosis. Although Mitchell continued to work full
time hours, his physical condition deteriorated to the point
where he could not effectively perform in his job by March
2004. Because Mitchell’s disability reduced his capacity to
produce sales, his compensation, based entirely on commis-
sions and bonuses, decreased substantially over time as his
disability grew more severe: he earned $179,678 in 2001 and
$243,857 in 2002, but only $29,329 in 2003 and $12,585 in
2004.
B. The Plan
CB Richard Ellis provides LTD benefits to its employees
under an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA. From
January 1, 2000, until December 31, 2003, CB Richard Ellis
funded the Plan by purchasing insurance from UNUM, which
served as the insurer and administrator of the Plan. On Janu-
ary 1, 2004, MetLife replaced UNUM as the insurer and
administrator of the Plan. At that time, MetLife issued a new
insurance policy, which specified that it held discretionary
authority to determine a participant’s eligibility for benefits.
MITCHELL v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. 10713
The two insurers’ coverage provisions differed, particularly in
their definitions of “disability.”
1. UNUM’s Policy
The UNUM long term disability policy provided coverage
for disability when, in UNUM’s determination:
you are limited from performing the material and
substantial duties of your regular occupation due to
your sickness or injury; and
you have a 20% or more loss in your indexed
monthly earnings due to the same sickness or injury;
and
during the elimination period, you are unable to per-
form any of the material and substantial duties of
your regular occupation.
A beneficiary must be continuously disabled for an “elimina-
tion period” of 90 days before he becomes eligible for bene-
fits from UNUM. Coverage extends to the date that the policy
or plan is cancelled, but may end earlier if other eligibility
criteria are not met. UNUM’s insuring agreement includes
payable claims that occur while the employee is covered
under the policy or plan. UNUM acts as the claims adminis-
trator, and “has discretionary authority to determine eligibility
for benefits and to interpret the terms and provisions of the
policy.”
2. MetLife’s Policy
On January 1, 2004, MetLife replaced UNUM as the
insurer and administrator of the Plan. MetLife issued a new
policy, comprised of a “Certificate of Insurance,” or master
plan document, as well as a summary plan description.
MetLife’s policy defines the term “disability” differently in
10714 MITCHELL v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS.
three places: once in the Certificate of Insurance, and twice in
the summary plan description. The Certificate of Insurance
defines “disabled or disability” as:
due to sickness or as a direct result of accidental
injury:
• You are receiving Appropriate Care and Treat-
ment and complying with the requirements of
such treatment; and
• You are unable to earn:
• during the Elimination period and the next 24
months of Sickness or accidental injury, more
than 80% of Your Predisability Earnings at Your
Own Occupation from any employer in Your
Local Economy; and
• after such period, more than 80% of your Predi-
sability Earnings from any employer in Your
Local Economy at any gainful occupation for
which You are reasonably qualified taking into
account Your training, education and experience.
MetLife’s summary plan sets forth two additional definitions
of disability. First, the summary plan’s “Plan Benefits”
description specifies that a participant is considered “dis-
abled” when determined to be “unable to perform your regu-
lar job functions due to sickness, or as a direct result of
accidental injury the employee [sic] is receiving appropriate
care and treatment and complying with the requirements of
such treatment.” The summary plan’s “Definitions” section,
however, defines “disability” as “a condition in which a per-
son is unable to perform the material and substantial duties of
his/her regular occupation due to illness or injury.”
MetLife’s Certificate of Insurance includes a clause speci-
fying “Rules for When Insurance Takes Effect if You were
MITCHELL v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. 10715
insured Under the Prior Plan on the Day Before the Replace-
ment Date,” which states:
• If You are Actively at Work on the day before
the Replacement Date, You will become insured
for Disability Income Insurance under this certifi-
cate on the Replacement Date.
• If You are not Actively at Work on the day
before the Replacement Date, You will become
insured for Disability Income Insurance under
this Certificate on the date You return to Active
Work.
MetLife’s policy, however, also includes two differing defini-
tions of “Actively at Work.” The Certificate of Insurance
defines “Actively at Work” or “Active Work” to mean “You
are performing all of the usual and customary duties of Your
job on a Full-Time basis.” The summary plan defines “Ac-
tively at Work” or “Active Work” to mean “Being on the job
as required of an employee or Independent Contractor of CB
Richard Ellis.”
C. Mitchell’s Claims for LTD Benefits with MetLife
On April 15, 2004, Mitchell applied for LTD benefits by
completing and submitting a long-term disability claim
request form with MetLife. In “Section 2: Claim Informa-
tion,” the request form includes three boxes to be completed
concerning the onset of disability. The first box asks for the
“Date of first treatment for this condition”; Mitchell supplied
“10/2003.” The second box seeks “Date last worked MUST
ANSWER”; Mitchell answered “still working.” The third box
asks for “Date Disability Began”; Mitchell responded
“10/2003.”On April 23, 2004, MetLife denied Mitchell’s
claim on the ground that he was ineligible for benefits
because he did not meet the definition of “disability” or “dis-
abled” under the Certificate of Insurance definition because
10716 MITCHELL v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS.
he was capable of performing his work as “VP of Sales,”
which is classified as sedentary. It based this conclusion on
the Attending Physician’s Statement, which indicated that
Mitchell received treatment for osteoarthritis of the knee and
that Mitchell was “working now.” The denial was also explic-
itly based on Mitchell’s statement on the claim form that he
was “still working.” The letter also advised Mitchell of his
right to appeal this adverse determination. Mitchell then
availed himself of MetLife’s administrative review process as
outlined in the April 23, 2004 letter. In December 2004, he
filed an appeal and submitted additional medical records, sup-
porting letters from examining physicians, and colleagues at
CB Richard Ellis.
On January 18, 2005, MetLife upheld its original decision
to deny LTD benefits to Mitchell, this time finding that he did
not meet its summary plan definition of disability. Under this
definition, a plan participant must be “unable to perform the
material and substantial duties of his/her regular occupation.”
MetLife further stated that an independent physician’s review
of the medical documentation did not support a finding that
Mitchell’s condition was severe enough to prevent him from
performing his own occupation, and concluded that Mitchell
did not meet the summary plan definition of disability. During
the initial claim and the administrative review processes,
MetLife never specified as a reason for denial that it was not
the provider of LTD benefits at the claimed onset of Mitch-
ell’s disability in October 2003.
D. District Court Proceedings and Mitchell’s Second
Claim for LTD Benefits
On February 2, 2005, Mitchell sued MetLife and the CB
Richard Ellis Long Term Disability Plan in the Central Dis-
trict of California, seeking LTD benefits pursuant to 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).1MetLife asserted a date of onset cov-
1
Mitchell’s complaint also named the CB Richard Ellis Medical Plan,
CB Richard Ellis Life Insurance Plan, and CB Richard Ellis Pen-
sion/Retirement Plan as defendants. On March 17, 2008, the district court
dismissed these defendants without prejudice.
MITCHELL v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. 10717
erage defense for the first time in its answer to Mitchell’s
complaint. MetLife argued that it was not required to provide
coverage to Mitchell because it was not the provider of LTD
benefits at the onset of Mitchell’s disability in October 2003,
and that Mitchell should have submitted his claim to UNUM,
which was the insurer and administrator for CB Richard
Ellis’s LTD benefits plan at that time.
After MetLife raised its new coverage defense in district
court, Mitchell filed an administrative claim for LTD benefits
with UNUM on October 3, 2005. Mitchell requested that
UNUM review his claim for LTD benefits. On November 6,
2006, UNUM denied Mitchell’s claim, finding insufficient
information to support a disability claim and prejudice due to
his delay in filing. UNUM noted that under the provisions of
its policy, a timely claim had to be filed before April 29,
2005, and added as a second basis for the denial that a physi-
cian’s review of the claim had determined that Mitchell’s
medical records did not adequately establish the level of
impairment necessary to be considered “disabled” under its
policy. Mitchell requested review of this decision on Novem-
ber 13, 2006. On January 11, 2007, UNUM denied Mitchell’s
appeal, finding that Mitchell had continued to work beyond
the claimed onset date of his disability, performing the “mate-
rial and substantial duties of his occupation,” thus rendering
him ineligible for benefits under the UNUM policy’s defini-
tion of disability.
After UNUM rejected his claim, Mitchell amended his
complaint on January 5, 2007, naming UNUM as an addi-
tional defendant. On January 31, 2007, UNUM filed a cross-
complaint against MetLife, requesting a declaratory judgment
that it did not owe LTD benefits to Mitchell, and seeking
indemnification from MetLife for any sums recovered by
Mitchell from UNUM. MetLife, however, did not similarly
file a cross-complaint against UNUM for full or partial
indemnification.
10718 MITCHELL v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS.
Following a bench trial, the district court issued thorough
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Mitchell v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 523 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2007). The dis-
trict court concluded that MetLife’s LTD benefits policy
included conflicting definitions of “disability” in its Certifi-
cate of Insurance and summary plan descriptions; that
MetLife had abused its discretion in applying the more limit-
ing summary plan definition to deny Mitchell’s claim on
review; and that Mitchell was eligible for LTD benefits under
MetLife’s definition of “disability” in the Certificate of Insur-
ance. Id. at 1144-45 (citing Bergt v. Ret. Plan for Pilots
Employed by MarkAir, Inc., 293 F.3d 1139, 1145 (9th Cir.
2002). The district court also concluded that MetLife had
abused its discretion in denying Mitchell’s appeal based on a
lack of objective evidence that his medical condition was
severe enough to warrant a finding of disability, because this
standard was not included in its policy. Id. at 1146-47.
The district court further rejected MetLife’s argument that
it was not responsible for Mitchell’s claim because it did not
provide coverage at the time of onset of symptoms in October
2003, on the basis of waiver. The court reasoned that MetLife
could “not disavow that it was the administrator and insurer
for Mitchell’s claim when it never raised that reason during
administrative review.” Id. at 1149. Holding that Mitchell was
entitled to LTD benefits from MetLife for the 24-month
period from October 2003 to September 2005, the district
court also directed MetLife to pay Mitchell costs and interest,
to consider Mitchell’s claim for continued benefits under the
Plan after September 30, 2005, and then awarded attorneys’
fees to Mitchell. The district court also granted UNUM’s
request for a declaration that it was not the responsible party
for any LTD benefits payable to Mitchell and, therefore, con-
cluded that UNUM’s claim for indemnity against MetLife
was moot.
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
the district court’s factual findings for clear error. Abatie v.
MITCHELL v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. 10719
Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 458 F.3d 955, 962 (9th Cir. 2006)
(en banc) (citing Friedrich v. Intel Corp., 181 F.3d 1105,
1109 (9th Cir. 1999)). Where an ERISA plan grants discretion
to the plan administrator, we review for abuse of discretion.
Id. at 963 (citing Kearney v. Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.3d
1084, 1090 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc)). This inquiry is “in-
formed by the nature, extent, and effect on the decision-
making process of any conflict of interest that may appear in
the record.” Id. at 967. “The level of skepticism” with which
we view a conflicted administrator’s decision is low where a
conflict of interest is unaccompanied “by any evidence of
malice, of self-dealing, or of a parsimonious claims-granting
history.” Id. at 968. We weigh a conflict of interest more
heavily where “the administrator provides inconsistent rea-
sons for denial; fails adequately to investigate a claim or ask
the plaintiff for necessary evidence; fails to credit a claimant’s
reliable evidence; or has repeatedly denied benefits to deserv-
ing participants by interpreting plan terms incorrectly or by
making decisions against the weight of evidence in the
record.” Id. at 968-69 (citations omitted). We review de novo
a district court’s choice and application of the standard of
review to decisions by plan administrators, id. at 963, as well
as a district court’s conclusion that the ERISA plan adminis-
trator abused its discretion. Grosz-Salomon v. Paul Revere
Life Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2001).
III. DISCUSSION
A. MetLife’s Plan Covers Mitchell’s LTD Benefits Claim
[1] The district court correctly concluded that MetLife
abused its discretion by denying Mitchell LTD benefits in its
administrative review process. As the district court found,
Mitchell had a “disability” as defined in MetLife’s Certificate
of Insurance when he submitted his claim. At that time,
Mitchell was receiving appropriate treatment and was unable
to earn 80% of his predisability earnings during the elimina-
tion period and the next 24 months, and was impaired in his
10720 MITCHELL v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS.
capacity to work, despite working full-time hours. Mitchell,
524 F. Supp. 2d at 1148. Therefore, MetLife abused its discre-
tion in denying Mitchell’s disability claim by determining that
he was not disabled, and on the basis of “an unwritten and
unexplained objective evidence requirement” not specified
within its policy. Id. at 1146 (citing Canseco v. Constr.
Laborers Pension Trust for So. Cal., 93 F.3d 600, 608 (9th
Cir. 1996)).2
MetLife agrees that because it acts both as plan administra-
tor and the funding source for benefits, it operates under a
structural conflict of interest. Abatie, 458 F.3d at 967. We
thus view its inconsistent bases of denial, culminating in its
latest coverage defense based on Mitchell’s claimed date of
2
Although MetLife expends almost its entire opening brief arguing that
the district court erred in deeming its claimed date of onset coverage
defense waived because it did not raise it during the administrative review
process, but only after it was sued, we need not reach this argument.
MetLife was the responsible insurer at the time Mitchell submitted his
claim under the plain language of its policy. In any event, we are not per-
suaded that the district court erred in concluding that MetLife waived its
date of onset coverage defense. The purpose of ERISA’s requirement that
plan administrators provide claimants with the specific reasons for denial
is undermined “where plan administrators have available sufficient infor-
mation to assert a basis for denial of benefits, but choose to hold that basis
in reserve rather than communicate it to the beneficiary.” Glista v. UNUM
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 378 F.3d 113, 129 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Juliano v.
Health Maint. Org. of New Jersey, Inc., 221 F.3d 279, 288 (2d. Cir. 2000);
see 29 U.S.C. § 1133, 29 C.F. R. §§ 2560.503-1(g), 2560.503-1(j). These
provisions “ ‘afford the beneficiary an explanation of the denial of benefits
that is adequate to ensure meaningful review of that denial.’ ” Glista, 378
F.3d at 129 (quoting Halpin v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 962 F.2d 685, 689
(7th Cir. 1992)). Requiring that plan administrators provide a participant
with specific reasons for denial “enable[s] the claimant to prepare ade-
quately for any further administrative review, as well as appeal to the fed-
eral courts.” Halpin, 962 F.2d at 689. “[A] contrary rule would allow
claimants, who are entitled to sue once a claim had been ‘deemed denied,’
to be ‘sandbagged’ by a rationale the plan administrator adduces only after
the suit has commenced.” Jebian v. Hewlett-Packard Co. Employee Bene-
fits Org. Income Prot. Plan, 349 F.3d 1098, 1104 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing
Marolt v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 146 F.3d 617, 620 (8th Cir. 1998)).
MITCHELL v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. 10721
onset, with some fair amount of skepticism. On appeal,
MetLife argues that the district court erred by concluding it
waived its date of onset coverage defense by raising it for the
first time in its answer. As best as we can discern, MetLife
contends that the district court violated ERISA law by in
effect extending its term of coverage back to October 2003,
when its coverage was not in effect until January 1, 2004.
Waiver aside, this argument lacks factual support, given that
Mitchell was covered by MetLife’s policy under at least one
of its three definitions of disability and its “Rules for When
Insurance Takes Effect.”
[2] When evaluating whether a plan administrator abused
its discretion in the ERISA context, we review only the
administrative record. Abatie, 458 F.3d at 970. Nothing in the
voluminous record, however, supports MetLife’s effort to
exclude Mitchell from coverage due to his claimed onset date
of October 2003. In support of its argument that the “onset”
of a disability must occur after the Plan’s effective date,
MetLife points to a single line in its policy, the first clause of
which states “If you become Disabled while insured.”
MetLife would have us read this phrase out of context and
without regard to its policy definitions of “disabled” set forth
in the remainder of the Plan documents. The sentence, in its
entirety, states “If You Become Disabled while insured, proof
of disability must be sent to Us.” Thus, read in context, the
clause upon which MetLife relies does not provide that cover-
age takes effect only if disability begins after the policy’s
effective date. Rather, it stipulates the requirement for submit-
ting a claim if an individual is “disabled” while insured.
[3] MetLife also argues that the district court erroneously
expanded coverage because he was covered only if he was
“actively at work” on the date its policy replaced UNUM’s.
The district court, however, correctly found that Mitchell was
covered because he was “actively at work” as defined by
MetLife’s policy on that date. MetLife’s Certificate of Insur-
ance provides that a participant is “actively at work” when
10722 MITCHELL v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS.
“You are performing all of the usual and customary duties of
Your job on a Full-Time basis,” and requires that full-time
work be at least 30 hours a week. The summary plan descrip-
tion also defines “Actively at Work” or “Active Work” to
mean “Being on the job as required of an employee or Inde-
pendent Contractor of CB Richard Ellis.” As CB Richard Ellis
reported to both MetLife and UNUM, Mitchell was never put
on leave and never stopped working as a full-time employee.
Mitchell’s disability, however, reduced his capacity to gener-
ate sales, which, in turn, directly reduced his commission-
driven income. Mitchell thus met the requirements that he be
unable to earn less than 80% of his pre-disability income, as
specified in MetLife’s Certificate of Insurance.
[4] Moreover, because Mitchell stated on his claim form
that the date of onset was October 2003, MetLife had ample
opportunity to assert this coverage defense, had it believed it
was meritorious. Indeed, the policy required MetLife to “state
the reason why [his] claim was denied and reference the spe-
cific Plan Provision(s) on which the denial is based.” It also
provided that “[i]f MetLife denies the claim on appeal,
MetLife will send you a final written decision that states the
reason(s) why the claim you appealed is being denied and ref-
erences any specific Plan provision(s) on which the denial is
based.” MetLife failed to meet these requirements and offers
no explanation for this failure. Under these circumstances,
MetLife “could hardly be caught by surprise by an insistence
that it comply with its own plan.” Glista, 378 F.3d at 132. We
therefore agree with the district court that MetLife abused its
discretion in denying Mitchell LTD benefits.
B. UNUM’s Cross-Complaint for Declaratory Relief and
Indemnification Against MetLife.
The district court properly granted declaratory judgment in
favor of UNUM. Because MetLife failed to assert a cross-
claim against UNUM for indemnification, the district court
did not err by failing to address such a claim.
MITCHELL v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. 10723
[5] After Mitchell amended his complaint to include
UNUM as an additional defendant, UNUM filed a cross-claim
against MetLife requesting a declaratory judgment that it was
not the responsible party for any LTD benefits to Mitchell,
and indemnification for any sums recovered by Mitchell
against UNUM. MetLife, however, failed to file a cross-
complaint against UNUM in the district court, where its claim
for indemnification or for a determination of the respective
rights and responsibilities between the two insurers should
have been asserted. Any claim by MetLife for indemnification
against UNUM would have been compulsory under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a), which provides:
A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim
which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader
has against any opposing party, if the claim (A)
arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party’s claim; and (B)
does not require adding another party over whom the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
Fed R. Civ. P. 13(a). The purpose of Rule 13(a) is to prevent
multiplicity of litigation and to promptly bring about resolu-
tion of disputes before the court. Rule 13(a), moreover is
“ ‘particularly directed against one who failed to assert a
counterclaim in one action and then instituted a second action
in which that counterclaim became the basis of the com-
plaint.’ ” Local Union No. 11, Int’l Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers v. G.P. Thompson Electric, Inc., 363 F.2d 181, 184
(9th Cir. 1966). We therefore concluded in Local Union that
where a party has failed to plead a compulsory counterclaim,
the claim is waived and the party is precluded by principles
of res judicata from raising it again. Id.
[6] Here, UNUM’s cross-complaint requesting declaratory
relief and indemnification arose out of the same transaction as
Mitchell’s amended complaint against MetLife and UNUM.
MetLife, however, failed to file a cross-complaint against
10724 MITCHELL v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INS.
UNUM in district court. It cannot now complain that the dis-
trict court failed to resolve a claim that was not even before
it. MetLife, moreover, failed to even appeal the district court’s
grant of declaratory judgment in favor of UNUM, so neither
claim is properly before us on appeal.
IV. CONCLUSION
The district court correctly held that MetLife abused its dis-
cretion in denying Mitchell long-term disability benefits.
MetLife was the responsible insurer under the terms of its pol-
icy. MetLife’s policy contained no exclusion or preclusion of
coverage where the date of onset of disability occurred before
the effective date of the plan. Rather, the critical issue for
determining coverage once the policy took effect is whether
Mitchell was “disabled” as defined in the plan documents.
Because MetLife failed to raise a compulsory counterclaim
requesting that the district court determine the respective
rights and responsibilities between UNUM and MetLife, the
district court did not err by declining to reach the issue. In
light of the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s judgment,
including the award of attorneys’ fees and costs of suit against
MetLife in favor of Mitchell.
AFFIRMED.