[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-10120 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar JULY 27, 2010
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cr-00150-WS-N-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
STACY PARKER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
________________________
(July 27, 2010)
Before TJOFLAT, BARKETT and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Stacy Parker pled guilty to two counts of an
eight-count indictment: Count 5, bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1344, and
Count 8, possession of counterfeit securities in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 513(a).
The presentence investigation report (“PSI”), as to which neither party objected
and the district court adopted, fixed Parker’s offense level at 11 and her criminal
history category at III. This yielded a Guidelines sentencing range of 12 to 18
months’ imprisonment. The district court found that category III seriously under
represented Parker’s criminal history—which is extensive and spans a period of 19
years—and found that sentences substantially in excess of the prescribed
sentencing range were required to protect the public from Parker’s propensity to
commit crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (the district court “shall consider . .
. the need for the sentence imposed . . . (C) to protect the public from further
crimes of the defendant.”)1 The court therefore sentenced Parker to concurrent
prison sentences of 60 months each, with the proviso that they be served
consecutively to a federal prison sentence Parker was serving for tax fraud.
Parker now appeals her sentences, contending that they are unreasonable. We
affirm.
We review a sentence the district court imposes under the abuse-of-
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597,
1
The district court found, in addition, that sentences in excess of the sentencing range
were necessary to provide just punishment for the offenses and deterrence to criminal conduct.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) & (B).
2
169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). As noted above, Parker did not object to the PSI. Nor
did she object—on any ground—to the court’s imposition of the sentences at
issue. Had Parker objected, the district court would have had an opportunity to
address her objection(s) and correct any error it may have made. We could hardly
hold that the district court abused its discretion in imposing sentences without
objection, and we do not so hold in this appeal.
AFFIRMED.
3