UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4032
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
RONALD R. BROADNAX,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior
District Judge. (3:01-cr-00225-REP-1)
Submitted: July 15, 2010 Decided: July 27, 2010
Before SHEDD and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Paul G. Gill,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Patrick L. Bryant, Research
and Writing Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. John
Donley Adams, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Following a hearing, the district court revoked Ronald
R. Broadnax’s supervised release and sentenced him to twenty-
four months in prison. Broadnax now appeals. His attorney has
filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal
but claiming that the district court erroneously found Broadnax
guilty of violating the terms of his release and that the
sentence is unreasonable. Broadnax has filed a pro se brief,
also arguing that the sentence is unreasonable. We affirm.
At the revocation hearing, the United States dismissed
two of the charged supervised release violations. A written
stipulation, in which Broadnax admitted that he had committed
the remaining violations, was admitted into evidence. After
hearing testimony, the district court found Broadnax guilty of
the violations by a preponderance of the evidence.
We review the district court’s decision to revoke
supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Armstrong, 187 F.3d 392, 394 (4th Cir. 1999). In light of the
stipulation and testimony, we conclude that revocation of
release was not an abuse of discretion.
Counsel and Broadnax argue in their respective briefs
that the sentence is unreasonable. A sentence imposed following
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revocation of supervised release will be affirmed if it is
within the applicable statutory maximum and is not plainly
unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-40
(4th Cir 2006). Here, our review of the record reveals that the
sentence falls within the statutory maximum of twenty-four
months. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2006). Further, the
sentence is procedurally reasonable: in sentencing Broadnax, the
district court considered both the Chapter 7 policy statements
and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors that it is permitted
to consider. See Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-40. Finally, the
sentence is substantively reasonable, for the court adequately
explained its reasons for imposing the sentence. See id. at
440. In this regard, the court mentioned the need to protect
the community and to deter similar conduct, as well as
Broadnax’s demonstrated lack of respect for the judicial
process.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm. This court requires that counsel
inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the
client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
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Counsel’s motion must state that a copy of the motion was served
on his client. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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