United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
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No. 09-3297
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United States of America, *
*
Appellee, *
* Appeal from the United States
v. * District Court for the Eastern
* District of Missouri.
Michael Lee Knight, *
* [PUBLISHED]
Appellant. *
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Submitted: April 15, 2010
Filed: July 29, 2010
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Before RILEY, Chief Judge, COLLOTON and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Michael Lee Knight pled guilty to failure to pay child support under 18 U.S.C.
§ 228(a)(3). The district court1 sentenced him to 20 months’ imprisonment, and
ordered restitution of $78,565.85. He appeals the reasonableness of his sentence.
Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.
Knight failed to make $35,833.13 in child support payments, and pled guilty to
failure to pay child support, without the benefit of a plea agreement. After a two-level
1
The Honorable Henry E. Autrey, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Missouri.
reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Knight's total offense level 12 and criminal
history category VI yielded a Sentencing Guidelines range of 30-37 months
imprisonment. However, the statutory maximum of 24 months became the guideline
sentence under Guideline § 5G1.1(a).
This court reviews a district court's sentencing for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Blankenship, 552 F.3d 703, 704 (8th Cir. 2009); see United States v. Gall,
552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). "[A] district court's imposition of a sentence within the
advisory guidelines range is presumptively reasonable." United States v. Wallenfang,
568 F.3d 649, 662 (8th Cir. 2009).
Knight first argues that his 20-month sentence is unreasonable because the
district court did not address his poverty, history of sexual and physical abuse,
struggles with drug addiction and bipolar disorder, incarceration while he was to pay
child support, and efforts to care for his current wife, mother, children and
stepchildren. He cites United States v. Thomas, 498 F.3d 336, 341 (6th Cir. 2007), for
the proposition that a district court fails to adequately explain its sentence when
arguments in the sentencing memorandum go “unmentioned and unaddressed, save
the general statement by the district court that it had received, read, and understood
the sentencing memorandum.” However, in this case the district court specifically
addressed Knight’s lack of income, his “drug abuse issue,” his prior problems with the
law, and that he was “doing stuff to help out at home.” “[T]he [district] court need not
specifically respond to every argument made by the defendant, or mechanically recite
each § 3553(a) factor.” United States v. Struzik, 572 F.3d 484, 487 (8th Cir. 2009)
(internal citation omitted). “Rather, the district court must simply ‘set forth enough
to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties' arguments and has a
reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.’” Id., quoting
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). Here, although the district court did
not respond to each of Knight’s arguments, it considered them and had a reasoned
basis for imposing a 20-month sentence.
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Knight contends that the district court gave significant weight to the fact that
Knight and his family receive Social Security disability income, an allegedly
irrelevant factor. According to the sentencing transcript, the court noted the disability
income only when considering how Knight survived without a steady job for four
years. Nothing suggests that the district court gave this factor any weight in its
sentencing decision, and it did not abuse its discretion by mentioning the factor.
Knight asserts that his sentence reduces respect for the law because he could
have pled to a misdemeanor if he paid 10% of the loss amount. However, the district
court correctly noted that such a plea bargain is routinely offered because the ultimate
end is the welfare of the child. The possibility of such a deal is irrelevant to the
district court’s sentencing discretion. At sentencing, Knight had already pled guilty
to the felony change. The district court heard all the arguments, properly considered
the § 3553(a) factors, and in fact varied downward four months from the guideline
sentence. See United States v. Moore, 581 F.3d 681, 684 (8th Cir. 2009) ("where a
district court has sentenced a defendant below the advisory guidelines range, it is
nearly inconceivable that the court abused its discretion in not varying downward still
further" (internal quotation marks omitted)). The district court did not abuse its
discretion in sentencing Knight to 20 months’ imprisonment.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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