UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-4861
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LEVANDER BERNARD JACOBS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,
District Judge. (7:08-cr-00108-D-1)
Submitted: July 14, 2010 Decided: July 29, 2010
Before WILKINSON and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mark A. Yurachek, THE LAW OFFICES OF MARK ALLEN YURACHEK, LLC,
Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United
States Attorney, Anne M. Hayes, Jennifer P. May-Parker,
Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Levander Jacobs appeals his fifty-seven month sentence
following his guilty plea to one count of possession with intent
to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) (2006). For the following reasons, we affirm.
On appeal, Jacobs first contends that the district
court erroneously calculated the drug quantity attributable to
him for sentencing purposes. The calculation of an amount of
drugs to establish a base offense level is a factual
determination we review for clear error. United States v.
Kellam, 568 F.3d 125, 147 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
657 (2009). When the amount of drugs “seized does not reflect
the scale of the offense, the court shall approximate the
quantity of the controlled substance.” U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 2D1.1, cmt. n.12 (2008).
Conversion of seized currency to drug amount for the purpose of
setting an offense level is permissible. United States v.
Hicks, 948 F.2d 877, 881-82 (4th Cir. 1991); USSG § 2D1.1, cmt.
n.12.
Contrary to Jacobs’ argument, the sentencing court
acted within its discretion by converting currency found in
Jacobs’ possession upon his arrest into its drug equivalency.
We have carefully reviewed the record and conclude that the
Government satisfied its burden of demonstrating by a
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preponderance of the evidence the connection between the money
seized and Jacobs’ drug-related activity. See United States v.
Gonzalez-Sanchez, 953 F.2d 1184, 1187 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus,
the district court did not err by converting the seized money
into its drug equivalency for sentencing purposes under USSG
§ 2D1.1.
Jacobs also alleges that the district court’s
valuation of the powder cocaine was erroneous. However, because
Jacobs’ counsel acquiesced in the district court’s valuation,
Jacobs has waived any claim of error on this issue. See United
States v. David, 83 F.3d 638, 641 n.5 (4th Cir. 1996). In any
event, Jacobs fails to establish error, as he offered no
persuasive evidence that the district court’s valuation of crack
cocaine was inaccurate.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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