In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 09-3537
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
JEOVANTE JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Wisconsin.
No. 3:09-cr-00023-bbc-1—Barbara B. Crabb, Judge.
A RGUED A PRIL 23, 2010—D ECIDED JULY 30, 2010
Before M ANION and R OVNER, Circuit Judges, and
H IBBLER, District Judge.
R OVNER, Circuit Judge. Jeovante Jones was arrested on
July 18, 2008, and indicted on charges of possession of
5 grams or more of a mixture containing cocaine base
The Honorable William J. Hibbler, United States District
Court Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by
designation.
2 No. 09-3537
with the intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1). The amount of the drugs charged included the
drugs found in the course of a search of Jones’ residence
following his arrest. Jones filed a motion to suppress
both the evidence found at his residence and his subse-
quent confession as the fruit of an illegal search. After
conducting an evidentiary hearing on the matter, the
magistrate judge recommended denial of that motion.
Jones then entered a conditional guilty plea which re-
served his right to challenge the denial of the motion
to suppress. The district court subsequently issued its
Opinion and Order denying his motion to suppress.
The arrest was the culmination of a drug unit investiga-
tion targeting Jones, in which a confidential informant
made a number of controlled purchases of crack cocaine
from him. Prior to that date, the informant had completed
controlled purchases of crack from Jones on three occa-
sions, each at locations in the City of Beloit. The July 18
transaction was set up as a “buy-bust” operation, in
which the police were positioned to arrest Jones during
the drug sale. The transaction was to take place in the
parking lot of the apartments at 1993 Colony Court in
Beloit. That address corresponded with one that Jones
had provided to the police as his residence in an arrest
weeks earlier. He indicated at that time that he resided
at 1993 Colony Court Apartment #2, and the informant
had also informed the police that Jones stayed with a
woman living at that residence.
Jones arrived at the parking lot at the scheduled time,
exited a Dodge Durango driven by his girlfriend Ethlyn
No. 09-3537 3
Joseph, and proceeded toward the informant’s vehicle
parked a few spaces away. As Jones reached the infor-
mant’s vehicle, the police pulled their undercover van
behind that vehicle, at which time Jones fled on foot. All
of the officers except Officer Halvorsen pursued Jones,
capturing him within minutes. Halvorsen confronted
Joseph who was still parked in the Dodge Durango. With
his gun drawn and pointed downward in the ready
position, he ordered her from the car and handcuffed
her. Three children were also in the Durango. They re-
mained in their seats throughout this time.
Joseph was then escorted to the side of the van and
was placed in a seated position in the van with her
feet outside the van. Within a few minutes a female
officer arrived and searched Joseph for weapons. Officer
Arnold then returned from the chase of Jones, and pro-
ceeded to speak with Joseph. At that time, the officers
intended to pursue a search of Jones’ residence. They
intended to seek a warrant for the search if necessary,
but first sought to obtain consent for the search from
Joseph, who resided at the same apartment.
In order to build rapport with Joseph and obtain her
voluntary consent, Arnold removed her handcuffs. He
explained that the police intended to obtain a warrant
to search the residence, that it would take some time to
do so, and that the process would be faster if she chose
to consent to the search. Joseph agreed to consent and
signed a consent-to-search form that on its face ap-
prised her of her right to refuse such consent. The entire
conversation between Arnold and Joseph lasted no
4 No. 09-3537
more than 10 minutes by Joseph’s own account. The
police then searched the apartment and discovered the
drugs which Jones now argues should have been sup-
pressed.
Jones’ arguments on appeal largely are attempts to
overturn the credibility determinations made by the
magistrate following the evidentiary hearing, which
were adopted by the district court, finding that Joseph
voluntarily consented to the search of the residence.
That is an uphill battle. We will reverse a district court’s
finding of voluntary consent only if it is clearly erroneous.
United States v. Dickerson, 975 F.2d 1245, 1249 (7th Cir.
1992). It is not sufficient to demonstrate that two dif-
ferent versions of events were presented at the hearing,
because “ ‘[w]here there are two permissible views of the
evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot
be clearly erroneous.’ ” United States v. McGraw, 571 F.3d
624, 629 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Anderson v. City of
Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)). Therefore,
we examine only whether the district court’s account of
facts is plausible in light of the record viewed in its en-
tirety. McGraw, 571 F.3d at 629.
Jones argues that the court erred in concluding that
Arnold removed Joseph’s handcuffs prior to the con-
sent. His argument hinges on the inconsistencies in the
officers’ testimony. According to Jones, the court found
that Joseph was handcuffed behind her back, but Arnold
testified that he removed cuffs from her hands that
were in front of her. Jones also points out that no officer
memorialized the removal of her handcuffs in the
police reports.
No. 09-3537 5
None of those alleged inconsistencies would cause us
to conclude that the district court’s finding of facts
was not plausible in light of the record as a whole. Incon-
sistencies in witness testimony such as those are
weighed by a court in assessing credibility, but they
do not render the credibility determination clearly er-
roneous. Numerous officers testified that they ob-
served Arnold remove the handcuffs and/or observed
him speaking with Joseph and noted that she was not in
handcuffs at that time. There is sufficient basis to sup-
port the finding that Joseph was not in handcuffs at the
time that consent to search was sought or granted.
In addition, Jones argues that Joseph was coerced into
consenting based on Arnold’s “empty threat” that a
search warrant would eventually be obtained. Jones is
correct in asserting that baseless threats to obtain a
search warrant may indeed render a consent to search
involuntary. United States v. Hicks, 539 F.3d 566, 571 (7th
Cir. 2008); United States v. White, 979 F.2d 539, 542 (7th
Cir. 1992). The appropriate focus, then, is on whether
the police had a genuine intention to seek such a war-
rant, and more specifically, whether they had a rea-
sonable factual basis to believe they had probable cause
to obtain a warrant. Hicks, 539 F.3d at 572.
The officers in this case had a reasonable factual basis
to believe that there was sufficient probable cause to
obtain a warrant. We have recognized that a court, in
determining whether to issue a search warrant, may
draw reasonable inferences, based on the nature of the
evidence and offense, about where evidence is likely to
6 No. 09-3537
be kept. United States v. Lamon, 930 F.2d 1183, 1188 (7th
Cir. 1991). Furthermore, we have repeatedly found that
“participation in drug trafficking activities can create
probable cause to search a participant’s residence, even
without direct evidence that drug-related activity is
occurring there, because ‘[i]n the case of drug dealers,
evidence is likely to be found where the dealers live.’ ”
United States v. Hoffman, 519 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Lamon, 930 F.2d at 1188).
Jones had engaged in three prior crack deals with
the informant, and therefore was engaged in drug dealing.
He had identified the Colony Court apartment as
his residence to police just weeks earlier when he was
arrested on an unrelated matter. The informant had
also identified the apartment as the place where Jones
stayed. The final transaction was to occur in the parking
lot of that residence. Because a heat source is necessary
to cook cocaine and form crack cocaine, there is further
reason to suspect a connection between transactions
involving crack cocaine and the dealer’s residence. The
officers testified that they had in fact obtained search
warrants based on such a factual predicate. As a whole,
those facts were sufficient for the officers to possess
a reasonable factual basis to believe that there was suf-
ficient probable cause to obtain a warrant.
The remainder of the attacks on voluntariness center
on the court’s credibility determination which found the
police more credible than Joseph. In reviewing the
denial of a motion to suppress, however, we review all
factual determinations for clear error, with special defer-
No. 09-3537 7
ence to the district court’s credibility determinations.
United States v. Villalpando, 588 F.3d 1124, 1127 (7th Cir.
2009). Jones argues that the court erred in finding the
police more credible, but presents nothing more than the
assertions made by Joseph as to the events of the day, and
occasional differences in the testimony by the officers.
Jones has provided no basis for this court to conclude
that the credibility determination was clear error. The
decision of the district court is A FFIRMED.
7-30-10