NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_________
No. 09-3800
DIANE M. WILLIAMS; KEITH M. WILLIAMS;
AUDREY KNIGHT, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF
OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED,
Appellants
v.
CYBERONICS, INC.
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D. C. No. 2-06-cv-05361)
District Judge: Hon. Anita B. Brody
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on May 11, 2010
Before: BARRY and ROTH, Circuit Judges
and HAYDEN*, District Judge
(Opinion filed: July 30, 2010)
*Honorable Katharine S. Hayden, United States District Judge for the District of New
Jersey, sitting by designation.
OPINION
ROTH, Circuit Judge:
This products liability case involves the malfunctioning of a medical device used
to treat depression by electronically stimulating a nerve in the neck. Diane Williams,
Keith Williams, and Audrey Knight appeal the District Court’s order, granting
manufacturer Cyberonics, Inc.’s, motion for summary judgment.1 We exercise plenary
review over a grant of summary judgment and apply the same standard as the District
Court, drawing all inferences and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163, 165-66 (3d Cir. 2004). We
assume the parties’ familiarity with the factual and procedural history, which we describe
only as necessary to explain our decision. We will affirm the District Court’s order.
The device at issue here is the Vagus Nerve Stimulation (VNS) Therapy System
manufactured by Cyberonics. The VNS Therapy System is a Class III medical device that
was given premarket approval (PMA) after a rigorous review by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), as required by the Medical Device Amendments (MDA) to the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477
(1996) (manufacturers of Class III medical devices must submit voluminous material to
1
The appellants appeal only the District Court’s ruling that the Riegel decision preempted
state-based claims founded on alleged malfunction of Cyberonics’ Class III medical device.”
2
the FDA, which the FDA spends over 1,000 hours reviewing in depth and grants PMA
only if the device is found to be safe and effective). The MDA contains an express
preemption provision providing that “no State or political subdivision of a State may
establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any
requirement – (1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable
under this chapter to the device, and (2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the
device.” 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a). In Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., the Supreme Court held that
state-imposed requirements are preempted by the MDA if (1) the Federal Government has
established requirements applicable to the device and (2) the plaintiff’s claims are based
on state requirements related to safety and effectiveness that are “different from, or in
addition to” the federal requirements. 552 U.S. 312, 321-22 (2008). Only the second
prong is at issue here.
Appellants’ allegations of strict products liability based on manufacturing defect
and breach of warranty are pre-empted by the MDA. Generalized common law theories
of liability, such as those advanced in appellants’ complaint, are precisely the type of
claims the MDA sought to preempt. See id. at 325 (“tort law, applied by juries under a
negligence or strict-liability standard,” is pre-empted by the MDA); Horn, 376 F.3d at
173 (“[I]t is firmly established that a ‘requirement’ under § 360k(a) can include legal
requirements that arise out of state common-law damages actions.”). Success on
appellants’ breach of warranty claims would require them to show that the VNS Therapy
3
System device was unsafe or ineffective despite the PMA process, thereby interfering
with the requirements already established by the MDA, which has preempted safety and
effectiveness determinations for a device. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a); see Riegel, 552 U.S. at
325 (holding that state law that requires a manufacturer’s devices “to be safer, but hence
less effective, than the model the FDA has approved disrupts the federal scheme”).
Appellants also advance a strict products liability claim for a manufacturing defect
based on the malfunction theory, which allows the trier-of-fact to infer a defect from the
fact that the device malfunctioned. See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 255 (3d
Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1734 (2010) (stating that the malfunction theory
permits a plaintiff to base a products liability claim on “circumstantial evidence of a
manufacturing defect.”). Although it is alleged that the VNS Therapy System stopped
working for the Williamses and malfunctioned for Knight, appellants fail to explain how
the device deviated from the FDA requirements. See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 330 (holding
that strict liability claims under § 360k are not preempted if “premised on a violation of
FDA regulations”); Horn, 376 F.3d at 179 (rejecting plaintiff’s manufacturing defect
claim because she did “not assert[] that [defendant] has in any way failed to conform with
the FDA requirements prescribed by its PMA – nor that it deviated from, or violated, any
of the FDA’s federal statutes or regulations”). Rather, appellants seek to ground
Cyberonics’ liability on requirements that go beyond those established by the MDA.
Accordingly, appellants’ claims are preempted.
4
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court granting
summary judgment in favor of Cyberonics.
5