In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
No. 09-1319
M ARSHALL JOINT S CHOOL D ISTRICT N O . 2,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
C.D., by and through his parents,
B RIAN AND T RACI D.,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 09-2499
T RACI and B RIAN D., as parents of and
on behalf of their minor child C.D.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
M ARSHALL JOINT S CHOOL D ISTRICT N O . 2,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Wisconsin.
Nos. 08 CV 00187 & 08 CV 00189—Barbara B. Crabb, Judge.
A RGUED N OVEMBER 12, 2009—D ECIDED A UGUST 2, 2010
2 Nos. 09-1319 & 09-2499
Before C UDAHY, M ANION, and W ILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
M ANION, Circuit Judge. The Appellee C.D. is now a fifth-
grade student in the Marshall Joint School District. In
kindergarten he was diagnosed with a rare genetic
disease, and since then the school district has provided
him with additional resources in his academic classes
and special education in gym. When he was in second
grade the school district reevaluated his eligibility for
special education, and a team of educational professionals
determined that he no longer met the criteria. His
parents disagreed and sought administrative review; the
administrative law judge (“ALJ”) conducted a lengthy
hearing, concluded that the school district had erred, and
found that C.D. was still eligible for special education.
The school district appealed to the district court, which
affirmed, and now it appeals to this court. Because the
ALJ applied the wrong legal standard in the eligibility
analysis and there is not substantial evidence to sup-
port her findings, we reverse.
I.
In 2004, C.D. was diagnosed with Ehlers-Danlos Syn-
drome (“EDS”), hypermobile type, which is a genetic
disease that causes joint hypermobility, commonly called
double-jointedness. In C.D.’s case the symptoms are
serious: he has poor upper body strength and poor pos-
tural and trunk stability, and he suffers from chronic
Nos. 09-1319 & 09-2499 3
and intermittent pain. 1 In 2006, he was also diagnosed
with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, inattentive
type.
After the EDS diagnosis, C.D. was evaluated and
deemed eligible for special education services under the
Individuals with Disability Education Act, 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400, et seq. (“IDEA” or “Act”). As part of the process,
the school district assembled a team of educational pro-
fessionals to develop an Individualized Education Program
(“IEP”) for him. Under the IEP, he received adaptive
physical education six times a month, physical therapy,
occupational therapy, assistive technology, supplemental
aids and services, and program modifications in his
academic classes. Specifically, his first IEP included
providing C.D. with frequent bathroom breaks; positioning
aids; extra time to complete academics; motor and self-help
tasks; and fine motor adaptations (tape recorder, dictation
and limited writing assignments). In the classroom, he
used a floor rocker to conserve energy, a special chair at
work tables, and a slant board. And when he moved
around the school, he could ride in a wagon if walking
made him too fatigued. C.D., 592 F. Supp. 2d at 1063.
1
There is an extensive record in this case with many actors,
opinions, and reports. The district court compiled a detailed
and comprehensive factual history of this case which can be
accessed at Marshall Joint School Dist. No. 2 v. C.D. ex rel. Brian
and Traci D., 592 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (W.D. Wis. 2009). For the
sake of brevity, we recount only those facts that are pertinent
to our analysis and holding.
4 Nos. 09-1319 & 09-2499
In January 2006, when C.D. was in first grade, a second
IEP was created that contained new goals and strictures
for his participation in gym class. Among other mea-
sures, the IEP called for a periodic consultation between
C.D.’s adaptive gym teacher, Stefanie Pingel, and his
regular gym teacher before each class and at least fifteen
minutes of consultation each month between Pingel and
his physical therapist and occupational therapist. C.D.,
592 F. Supp. 2d at 1063. A year later, as prescribed by the
Act, the team began a periodic reevaluation of C.D.’s
eligibility for special education. At the time, C.D. was
engaging in regular gym class with certain limits placed
on his participation to avoid injury; he also met six times
a month with Pingel for adaptive physical education,
which is simply another name for special education
in gym—we use the terms interchangeably here. The
adaptive physical education consisted of providing
alternative activities for C.D., so instead of regular push-
ups, C.D. would do wall pushups; instead of regular
jumping jacks, he would do “snow angels” or do the
jumping jacks on a mat. All of this reduced the impact
on his joints. In addition, the rules for some of the
games the students played were tweaked to allow him
to safely participate.2 These modifications were in place
2
These included keeping C.D. from crawling under other
children’s legs during “wizard tag,” “playing goalie to
conserve C.D.’s energy during soccer or hockey, reducing his
need to run during ‘alien dodge ball’ by having the teacher
intervene in the game periodically, and letting his partner
(continued...)
Nos. 09-1319 & 09-2499 5
when C.D. was in second grade; now he has finished
fifth grade, and the school is operating under the same
IEP, and providing the same exact services, as mandated
by law, until this suit is resolved. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j).
Under the Act, schools must follow a two-step process
to determine whether a student is a “child with a disa-
bility” and thereby eligible for special education services.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A). First, the student must have one
of the ailments listed in the statute. Although EDS
is not listed, there is a catch-all category titled “other
health impairment.” Id. § 1401(3)(A)(i). For a health
condition to qualify as an “other health impairment,” it
must manifest itself in one of a variety of ways, and it
must “[a]dversely affect[] the child’s educational per-
formance.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(9)(ii). Second, if the
child’s condition does adversely affect his educational
performance, then the team must determine whether
as a result he “needs special education.” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1401(3)(A)(ii).
During the reevaluation, the team found that C.D. was
performing at grade level in his classes. He had met
many of his specific IEP goals for gym, and he no
longer had many of the original problems that prompted
his need for special education in gym. After considering
all the evidence, the team concluded that the EDS did not
adversely affect his educational performance.
2
(...continued)
run during relay races or the treasure island game and having
him sit down if he became fatigued.” C.D., 592 F. Supp. 2d
at 1065.
6 Nos. 09-1319 & 09-2499
Although this finding alone disqualified C.D. as a “child
with a disability,” the team also addressed the second
step in the analysis: whether “by reason thereof, [he]
needs special education and related services.” Id. It found
that C.D. did not need special education because his
needs could be met in a regular education setting with
some slight modifications for his medical and safety
needs. These modifications included providing rest
breaks and monitoring his progress through the day
using an activity log. Concerning his safety needs, the
team recommended that a health plan be drafted by his
physicians and the school nurse, setting out precise
restrictions on his participation in gym class. This health
plan would limit his repetitions in certain activities and
provide alternative means for completing others.
C.D.’s parents disagreed with the team’s conclusions.
They maintained that because he cannot safely perform
all of the activities in gym class, he is entitled to special
education. They sought and obtained administrative
review of the team’s decision. Following eight days of
hearings, the ALJ found that when the team evaluated
his eligibility it committed several errors. Ultimately, the
ALJ credited the opinion of one of C.D.’s physicians,
Dr. Pamela Trapane, that the EDS causes him pain and
fatigue and when he experiences that “it can affect his
educational performance.” Id. at 10. Based on that, the
ALJ found that C.D.’s “ability to fully and safely
perform and participate in certain physical activities at
school, including regular PE class and recess, is ad-
versely affected by his EDS.” Id.
Nos. 09-1319 & 09-2499 7
The ALJ also rejected the team’s alternative finding
that C.D. did not need special education. She dismissed
the testimony of Stefanie Pingel, C.D.’s adaptive gym
teacher, as unreliable. Id. at 12. And she specifically
credited the opinion of Dr. Trapane over the team,
finding that he “cannot safely engage in unrestricted
participation in various activities of the regular PE pro-
gram and that he requires special education, particularly
specially designed PE and related services to meet his
unique needs.” Id. at 11.
The school district sought review by the district court.
The district court did not receive any new evidence but
instead relied on the record developed before the ALJ.
It upheld the ALJ’s findings. Specifically, on the issue of
whether C.D. needed special education, the district
court noted that “[a]lthough the school district makes
convincing arguments and another fact finder might have
reached a different conclusion, I cannot say that the
administrative law judge clearly erred in deciding that
C.D. needed special education.” Id. at 1084.
II.
Under the Act, the party challenging the outcome of
the administrative hearing bears the burden of persuasion
in the district court. Alex R. v. Forrestville Valley County
Sch. Dist., 375 F.3d 603, 611 (7th Cir. 2004). When that
court reviews the administrative decision it gives no
deference to the ALJ’s legal conclusions. Id. (“On issues of
law, the hearing officer is entitled to no deference.”). But
on issues of fact, it must give the ALJ’s findings due
8 Nos. 09-1319 & 09-2499
weight. Id. at 612. When the district court receives no
new evidence and relies solely on the administrative
record, it owes considerable deference to the ALJ’s factual
findings. Id. In such instances, as it did in this case, the
district court is essentially sitting as a reviewing court.
Morton Cmty. Unit Sch. v. J.M., 152 F.3d 583, 587 (7th Cir.
1998). And when it sits in this manner, no matter how
its rulings are characterized, they “are necessarily rulings
of law, which we indeed review de novo, just as we
review a grant of summary judgment de novo.” Id. Thus,
we review the ALJ’s order directly, giving her findings
the same degree of deference as the district court did:
due weight on the factual issues and plenary review on
legal issues. Sch. Dist. of WI Dells v. Z.S., 295 F.3d 671,
675 (7th Cir. 2002); Dale M. v. Bd. of Educ. of Bradley-
Bourbonnais High Sch., 237 F.3d 813, 816-17 (7th Cir. 2001).
III.
This is a complicated case. The record spans thousands
of pages with many exhibits, and the district court’s sixty-
two-page order reflects how involved the hearing was.
A large part of the IEP meeting, the hearing, and the
ALJ’s report centers on C.D. and his performance in his
academic classes. In his classes, the ALJ noted he was
at “grade level” or “only an average student.” And this
was after many modifications and accommodations
were made for him. ALJ Op. at 8. The discussion of his
academic performance, however, obscures the issue at
hand: C.D. only received special education in gym, and
the ALJ’s findings only concerned whether the EDS
Nos. 09-1319 & 09-2499 9
adversely affects his educational performance in gym
and his need for special education in gym. ALJ Op. at.
10 (“Based on the record as a whole, I find that the Stu-
dent’s ability to fully and safely perform and participate in
certain physical activities at school, including regular
PE class and recess, is adversely affected by EDS.”); id. at
12 (“I find that the Student needs special education,
particularly specially designed PE, and related services
to meet his unique needs.”). Therefore, the precise ques-
tion before us is whether the ALJ erred when she
found that C.D.’s educational performance is adversely
affected and because of that, he needs special education
in gym.
A.
Special education under the Act is limited to those
students classified as a “child with a disability.” 20 U.S.C.
§ 1401(3)(A). For C.D. to qualify, his health condition
must adversely affect his educational performance
and as a result he must need special education. Id.
§ 1401(3)(A)(ii). Based on a variety of data and factors,
the team found that the EDS did not adversely affect
C.D.’s educational performance.3 C.D., 592 F. Supp. 2d
3
The phrase “adversely affects a child’s educational perfor-
mance” is not defined in either the Federal or Wisconsin
Regulations. See Mr. I v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 55, 480 F.3d
1, 11 (1st Cir. 2007); Wis. Stat. § 115.76; Wis. Admin. Code
§§ PI 11.35, 11.36. And we express no opinion on how that
(continued...)
10 Nos. 09-1319 & 09-2499
at 1081. The ALJ disagreed. She found that the EDS ad-
versely affects C.D.’s educational performance. The
school district challenges this finding. This presents a
mixed question of law and fact; therefore, we review the
legal standard applied by the ALJ de novo and her
factual findings for clear error. Alex R., 375 F.3d at 611-12.
In her report, the ALJ concluded that the EDS ad-
versely affects C.D.’s educational performance because
it causes him to experience pain and fatigue and that
when he does “experience[] pain and/or fatigue at
school, it can affect his educational performance.” ALJ
Op. at 10. This is an incorrect formulation of the test. It is
not whether something, when considered in the abstract,
can adversely affect a student’s educational performance,
but whether in reality it does. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(C)(9)(ii);
see also A.J. v. Bd. of Educ., 679 F. Supp. 2d 299, 310
(E.D.N.Y. 2010).
And it is clear from the record that this misstatement
of the law affected the ALJ’s finding. The misstatement
reflected the scant evidence on this point: little of the
testimony and few of the exhibits cited by the ALJ stated
or even suggested that C.D.’s educational performance
was adversely affected by the EDS. Rather, the evidence
cited either mirrored the improper recitation of law, was
inconsistent with prior findings and testimony, or was
entirely discredited during cross-examination.
3
(...continued)
term should be defined. Our review is limited to whether the
ALJ applied the correct legal standard in rejecting the
team’s finding.
Nos. 09-1319 & 09-2499 11
Concerning the last point, Dr. Trapane was the main
source of evidence cited for the proposition that the EDS
adversely affects C.D.’s educational performance. And
the sole basis of her information was C.D.’s mother.
Dr. Trapane evaluated C.D. for 15 minutes; she did not
do any testing or observation of C.D. and his educational
performance. In fact, “Dr. Trapane admitted that
she has no experience or training in special educa-
tion and never observed C.D. in the classroom.” C.D., 592
F. Supp. 2d at 1073. Her only familiarity with school
curricula was with her own children. Such a cursory
and conclusory pronouncement does not constitute
substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding.
In short, the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard
in determining whether the EDS adversely affected C.D.’s
educational performance, and while there is evidence
that the EDS can affect C.D.’s educational performance,
there is no substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s
finding that it has an adverse affect. Rather, as the
district court noted, the evidence is that the prior IEP’s
remedies have substantially improved his performance:
“all of the school district members of the team, including
the school therapists, agreed that C.D.’s average perfor-
mance and overall improvement showed that his health
condition did not have an adverse affect on his educa-
tional performance.” C.D., 592 F. Supp. 2d at 1080. Thus,
we find that the ALJ erred in the legal standard
she applied and committed clear error in her factual
findings.
12 Nos. 09-1319 & 09-2499
IV.
Even if the ALJ had not erred in her finding that the
EDS had adversely affected C.D.’s educational perfor-
mance, that would not have ended the inquiry. As ex-
plained above, if an IEP team determines that a child’s
medical condition adversely affects his educational per-
formance, the team must also determine whether
that student requires special education. 20 U.S.C.
§ 401(3)(A)(ii) (the second step in the analysis is whether
the child “needs special education and related services.”).
In this case, the team concluded that such services were
not needed: all of C.D.’s safety needs could be met
through a health plan implemented in his regular gym
class. The school felt it could address his needs by
simply limiting his repetitions and ameliorating the
potentially harmful aspects of gym.
In rejecting that decision the ALJ found that the testi-
mony of Stefanie Pingel, C.D.’s adaptive gym teacher,
“lacked reliability.” ALJ Op. at 12. The ALJ also overrode
the team’s finding and instead credited the testimony of
C.D.’s physician about his need for special education.
Relying primarily on the reports of Drs. Nathan Rudin
and Trapane and the testimony of Dr. Trapane, the ALJ
found that C.D. needed special education because of
safety concerns in gym class. It was the team’s position
throughout these proceedings that physicians cannot
simply prescribe special education for a student.
Rather, that designation lies within the team’s discretion,
governed by the applicable rules and regulations.
We agree.
Nos. 09-1319 & 09-2499 13
A.
The sole reason cited by the ALJ for rejecting the team’s
position was that Pingel’s “testimony lacked reliability.”
ALJ Op. at 12. We review credibility determinations for
clear error. Alex R., 375 F.3d at 612. And we rarely
reverse a fact finder on a credibility determination. Getch
v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 473, 483 (7th Cir. 2008). But we will
when the reason stated for rejecting the testimony is
unreasonable or unsupported; in other words, “[w]e
overturn it only if patently wrong.” Prochaska v. Barnhart,
454 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted).
Because the reason for designating special education
for C.D. was his need for special training and protection
in gym class, Pingel was the key individual in the pro-
cess. She was among those responsible for formu-
lating C.D.’s prior IEPs, and she was the most important
person in implementing them: she was his adaptive
gym teacher. As such, she was the one who could
testify best concerning whether he needed special educa-
tion to participate in the gym curriculum and meet the
goals for children in his grade level.
Despite Pingel’s expertise and unique position in this
whole process, the ALJ rejected her testimony as lacking
“reliability.” The reason given was that although Pingel
testified that C.D. did not need special education, her
behavior in conducting his activities in gym class contra-
dicted that testimony. ALJ Op. at 4, 12. In support of this,
the ALJ specifically noted that Pingel “testified in detail
about many adaptations and modifications that she
made for the Student to enable him to participate in PE
14 Nos. 09-1319 & 09-2499
class,” and that Pingel “frequently conferred with the
physical therapist and the regular physical education
teacher about how to modify activities for [C.D.] to meet
his needs.” Id. at 12.
The problem with rejecting Pingel’s testimony on this
basis is that the referred-to behavior that supposedly
contradicted her testimony was mandated under C.D.’s
2006 IEP. As the district court noted, that IEP prescribed
“consultation between the adaptive physical education
teacher and the regular physical education teacher before
each physical education class; and consultation between
the occupational therapist, physical therapist and special
area teachers at least 15 minutes a month.” C.D., 592
F. Supp. 2d at 1063. Pingel simply followed the directives
set out in the IEP, which is precisely what the law de-
manded of her, even though she may have thought it
was unnecessary.
It is unclear what the ALJ would have had Pingel do
to assure that her opinion was reliable. Pingel can only
do as the law provides: call or wait for another IEP to
reevaluate C.D., and then express her belief that he
no longer needs to have special education services. 20
U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(A)(i). No matter how deeply held
her belief that it was unnecessary, Pingel could not unilat-
erally stop performing any services mandated under the
IEP. Id. § 1415(j). Discounting an educator’s testimony be-
cause she complied with the law is unreasonable, and
it was clear error for the ALJ to do so. Sims v. Barnhart,
442 F.3d 536, 538 (7th Cir. 2006).
Nos. 09-1319 & 09-2499 15
B.
Beyond impermissibly rejecting Pingel’s testimony,
the ALJ also found that C.D. needs special education
because of the EDS. We review that finding for clear error
and will only set aside the order if we are “strongly
convinced that [it] is erroneous.” Z.S., 295 F.3d at 675.
Again, it is necessary to re-focus the issue before us.
Although C.D.’s performance in classes other than gym
was vaguely discussed in the ALJ’s report, there are
no findings about his need for special education outside
of gym. The most inclusive statement in the ALJ’s report
that could include special education outside of gym
comes in the conclusion where she states: “I find that
[C.D.] needs special education, particularly specially
designed PE, and related services to meet his unique
needs.” ALJ Op. at 12. That is not a finding that we
would give any credence as extending beyond gym class.
Without a specific finding and reasoning in support,
that statement alone cannot be a basis for finding he is
entitled to special education beyond gym class. Thus, the
ALJ’s decision is pivoted on the need for special educa-
tion in gym; therefore, our review is limited to whether
because of his EDS, C.D. needs special education in gym.
The only support for the finding that he needed special
education was the reports of his physicians and the
testimony of Dr. Trapane. Her position was clear: C.D.
could not safely engage in unrestricted participation in
various activities of the regular gym program because
his joints could be injured, causing him severe pain. C.D.,
592 F. Supp. 2d at 1066. The team felt that given the
16 Nos. 09-1319 & 09-2499
limitations already prescribed by C.D.’s physicians and
the demands of the curriculum, his needs could be ad-
dressed by allowing him to participate in regular gym
with a health plan. He was, at that time, already engaged
in regular gym class; he was only meeting with Pingel
in adaptive physical education six times a month.
Dr. Rudin was comfortable with the health plan, but
Dr. Trapane and C.D.’s mother were adamant that he
needed special education.
But C.D. did not need special education in gym. He
was, as the district court noted, performing at grade
level and had made huge personal gains over previous
years: “C.D. had made huge gains, was able to do
things he had not been able to do previously and could
coordinate his body and perform local motor and object
control skills in the average range.” C.D., 592 F. Supp. 2d
at 1065-66. The initial difficulties that mandated special
education had been overcome; what remained were
C.D.’s safety needs. And the team thought that the
school could meet these needs by giving him a health
plan that communicated his limitations between his
physicians, the school nurse, and his teachers.
This health plan would allow C.D. to participate in
regular gym and avoid the harmful activities or at least
reduce the threat of injury during certain exercises. So, he
did and would continue to do jumping jacks on a mat
and pushups against the wall; he would walk instead of
run in a game of tag; and if he was fatigued his repeti-
tions were reduced or he took a break. As Pingel testified
concerning her belief that C.D. did not need special
education:
Nos. 09-1319 & 09-2499 17
As far as decreasing the number of reps that a child
can do, decreasing how much, the amount of time
that a child can run, those are all things that a regular
P.E. teacher can say to a child, “You’re only allowed
to do five sit-ups, you’re only allowed to walk five
laps.” It’s not something that needs one-on-one
direct service.
Allowing C.D. to participate fully in regular gym class with
a health plan would not mean that he was sitting in a
corner for the class. He was and would be participating
with the class. He would simply do so in a manner that
protected his joints.
By being provided with this sort of health plan, C.D.
can access the general curriculum and make the gains
that he needs to make to progress with the other students
in the skills and abilities that the school aims to teach in
its curriculum. See Alvin Ind. Sch. Dist. v. A.D., 503 F.3d
378, 384 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting student’s performance
demonstrated that he did not need special education).
That is what the law requires and the Act strives for:
giving students access to the general curriculum and
keeping them from being labeled special education. 20
U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5); see id. § 1400(c)(5)(F). The team’s
decision was reasoned and based on his safety needs
and the school’s curriculum.
This brings us to a key point in this case: a physician’s
diagnosis and input on a child’s medical condition is
important and bears on the team’s informed decision on a
student’s needs. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(c)(1)(A)(iii). But a
physician cannot simply prescribe special education;
18 Nos. 09-1319 & 09-2499
rather, the Act dictates a full review by an IEP team
composed of parents, regular education teachers, special
education teachers, and a representative of the local
educational agency. Id. § 1414(d)(3)(C) (detailing what
the IEP must consider); id. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(i)-(vii) (de-
tailing the members that must compose a valid IEP team).
Although it appears that the ALJ applied substantial
weight to Dr. Trapane’s opinion, nothing in the law
mandates or even suggests such a requirement. To be
clear, the physicians’ opinions were given careful atten-
tion by the team. They considered Dr. Trapane’s com-
ments, and Dr. Rudin, in fact, agreed that a health plan
would be appropriate. The only indication that there
was a need for special education came from C.D.’s
mother and Dr. Trapane—after a 15-minute examination.
The cursory examination aside, Dr. Trapane is not a
trained educational professional and had no knowledge
of the subtle distinctions that affect classifications under
the Act and warrant the designation of a child with a
disability and special education. See Schaffer v. Weast, 546
U.S. 49, 62-63 (2005) (“I believe that we should presume
that public school officials are properly performing their
difficult responsibilities under this important statute.”)
(Stevens, J., concurring). Nor was Dr. Trapane familiar
with the curriculum and what C.D. needed to do in gym.
In sum, her conclusory testimony and reports making
an adamant demand for the “special education” classifica-
tion are not substantial evidence and do not provide a
reasoned basis for finding that C.D. needs special educa-
tion. And it was clear error for the ALJ to find that it was.
Nos. 09-1319 & 09-2499 19
As a concluding note and to provide some context to
this case and our holding, no one suggests that C.D. would
not benefit from or need continued physical and occupa-
tional therapy. The record is clear that he would benefit
from those services: “All of C.D.’s therapists agreed
that even though he did not need special education, he
needed physical therapy.” C.D., 592 F. Supp. 2d at 1083.
But his need for such therapy is not what the school is
charged with considering when it evaluates his eligibility
for special education. Rather, “physical therapy” and
“occupational therapy” are both related services used
to give a student the full benefit of special education
instruction. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1406, 1401(26) (related services
are meant to “assist a child with a disability to benefit
from special education.”); see also Wis. Stat. § 115.76(14)(a).
Under the IDEA, they do not stand alone as services
the school must provide apart from special education.
The law is perfectly clear on this point: if a child has a
health problem “but only needs a related service and
not special education, the child is not a child with a
disability.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(a)(2)(i); see also Yankton Sch.
Dist. v. Schramm, 93 F.3d 1369, 1378, n.1 (8th Cir. 1996)
(Magill, J., dissenting) (citing 34 C.F.R. § 300.17 n.1 (1995),
amended in 1999 by 64 Fed. Reg. 12425).
V.
Therefore, we find that the ALJ’s finding that C.D.’s
educational performance was adversely affected by the
EDS was undermined by a misapplication of the gov-
erning standard and was not supported by substantial
20 Nos. 09-1319 & 09-2499
evidence in the record. Further, the ALJ impermissibly
discounted the testimony of Stefanie Pingel, and there
is not substantial evidence in the record to support the
finding that C.D. needed special education because of his
health condition. Accordingly, we R EVERSE the judgment
of the district court and R EMAND with instructions to
enter judgment in favor of the school district. The fee
award below is also V ACATED .
C UDAHY, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment.
This is an extraordinarily close case. We have before us
a careful and searching opinion by an experienced ALJ
based on an extensive hearing and affirmed by a district
judge of broad experience and proven judgment. These
circumstances may generate a spirit of deference,
whether technically required or not.
I write separately only because, although the majority
opinion has discovered enough flaws to justify reversal,
I suggest future caution in such matters as overruling
the conclusions of the finder of fact about the reliability
of witnesses. We must also be balanced in the respective
weight to be attributed to the opinions of educational
professionals in contrast to medical experts in evaluating
issues such as that of safety. Both these questions play
Nos. 09-1319 & 09-2499 21
a significant part in the majority analysis, but I would
emphasize that both ought generally to be treated in
the future with appropriate discretion.
In spite of these reservations, since the issue here is
so close and the majority critique so careful, I join in the
result indicated by the majority.
8-2-10