UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-7390
RICKY B. CAMPBELL,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Beckley, West Virginia,
Party-in-Interest - Appellee,
v.
BECKLEY POLICE DEPARTMENT; BILLY COLE, Former Chief of
Police, 340 Prince Street, Beckley, WV 25801; GANT
MONTGOMERY, Beckley Police Officer; REGINALD BAILEY, Beckley
Police Officer; WILLIAM REYNOLDS, Beckley Police Officer;
THE CITY OF BECKLEY, WEST VIRGINIA; EMMETT S. PUGH, Mayor of
Beckley, WV; TIM SWEENY, Beckley Police Officer; STANLEY
SWEENY, Beckley Police Officer; DOE DEFENDANTS 1 THROUGH 50;
BRITNEY D. SMITH, Administratrix of the Estate of Charles
“Chuck” Smith II; A. K. MINTER, JR., Councilman; ANN W.
WORLEY, Councilwoman; STEVEN B. NICKELL, Councilman; TIM R.
BERRY; HOWARD L. MOLLOHAN, Councilman; ROBERT R. RAPPOLD; A.
LEE LEFTWICH, Councilman,
Defendants – Appellees,
and
CHUCK SMITH, Beckley Police Officer,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Beckley. Thomas E. Johnston,
District Judge. (5:06-cv-00659)
Submitted: November 16, 2009 Decided: August 5, 2010
Before MICHAEL and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Reversed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael Thane Clifford, Charleston, West Virginia, for
Appellant. Charles T. Miller, United States Attorney, Stephen
Michael Horn, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West
Virginia; Michael Lloyd Graves, Jr., Chip E. Williams, Ashley L.
Justice, PULLIN, FOWLER, FLANAGAN, BROWN & POE, PLLC, Beckley,
West Virginia, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Ricky B. Campbell appeals the district court’s order
granting summary judgment on his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2006). Campbell’s claims arose from a search of his home
pursuant to a search warrant, during which officers seized large
amounts of marijuana and numerous marijuana plants. After the
search, Campbell discovered a radio transmitter left by the
officers under his dresser.
Campbell was subsequently prosecuted for possession
with intent to distribute marijuana as well as the cultivation
of marijuana plants, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
(2006). Campbell pled guilty to cultivation, and was sentenced
on July 14, 2005. Though Campbell does not assert that any of
his conversations were intercepted by the transmitter, he seeks
damages for injuries allegedly suffered during sentencing when
one of the officers involved in the search denied placing the
transmitter in Campbell’s home. * Campbell asserted that based on
this testimony, the sentencing court concluded he had obstructed
justice and enhanced his sentence by two and a half years after
finding that Campbell falsified his claims regarding the
planting of the transmitter. The district court granted summary
*
Though Campbell raised a variety of causes of action in
his Complaint, this appeal relates only to the officer’s
testimony at sentencing.
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judgment as to this claim, finding that a § 1983 action was not
the proper vehicle to challenge the impropriety of his sentence.
Campbell filed a timely appeal, asserting that the
district court erred in finding that his § 1983 claim was not
the proper vehicle for challenging his sentence. Campbell
contends that he has already served his enhanced sentence, and
that there is no other means by which he could receive
compensation for the false testimony of one of the Defendants
during Campbell’s sentencing. Thus, because Campbell is not
seeking to set aside his sentence, but is instead seeking
financial redress for the enhanced time, Campbell contends that
the district court erred in granting summary judgment on this
basis. We agree that the district court erred and reverse the
judgment of the district court as to this issue.
We review a district court’s order granting summary
judgment de novo, drawing reasonable inferences in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. See Nader v. Blair, 549
F.3d 953, 958 (4th Cir. 2008). Summary judgment may be granted
only when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
. . . the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). However, “[c]onclusory or speculative
allegations do not suffice, nor does a mere scintilla of
evidence in support of his case.” Thompson v. Potomac Elec.
Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation
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marks and citation omitted). Summary judgment will be granted
unless a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party on the evidence presented. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). We may affirm
a district court’s judgment on any ground supported by the
record. Suter v. United States, 441 F.3d 306, 310 (4th Cir.
2006).
Generally, under the doctrine established by Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), if a state prisoner’s successful
claim for damages under § 1983 “‘would necessarily imply the
invalidity of his conviction or sentence,’” such a claim is not
cognizable under § 1983 unless the prisoner can demonstrate that
his conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.
Young v. Nickols, 413 F.3d 416, 418-19 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Heck, 512 U.S. at 487). However, when a former prisoner is
challenging the validity of his past confinement, and due to his
release “would be left without any access to federal court if
his § 1983 claim was barred[,]” this court has allowed the
former prisoner’s § 1983 claim to proceed. Wilson v. Johnson,
535 F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir. 2008).
Here, the district court cites to Nelson v. Campbell,
541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004), for the premise that claims “fall[ing]
within the ‘core’ of habeas corpus . . . [are] not cognizable
when brought pursuant to § 1983.” However, this holding is
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limited in Nelson to actions filed by prisoners. Id. Nelson is
silent as to the applicability of this issue to non-prisoner
litigants challenging the validity of their confinement, and
under this court’s subsequent precedent in Wilson, such claims
may proceed. See 535 F.3d at 268. Campbell has served his
sentence and therefore cannot bring a habeas challenge. Because
he would otherwise be left without access to federal court, his
§ 1983 claim may proceed, and the district court committed
reversible error in finding to the contrary. See id.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district
court as to this issue and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately expressed
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
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