NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT AUG 09 2010
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 09-50397
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 09-cr-00059-MMM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
COREY DAVID BROWN,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Margaret M. Morrow, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted July 15, 2010
Pasadena, California
Before: FARRIS and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges, and CAMP, Senior District
Judge.**
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The Honorable Jack J. Camp, Senior United States District Judge for
the Northern District of Georgia, sitting by designation.
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The Government appeals the district court’s order granting Defendant Corey
Brown’s motion to suppress evidence seized from his home and car. The district
court determined that the emergency exception to the warrant requirement of the
Fourth Amendment did not apply. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
3731. We reverse.
We review de novo the lawfulness of a search under the Fourth Amendment,
United States v. Snipe, 515 F.3d 947, 950 (9th Cir. 2008), but review for clear
error the district court’s factual determinations, United States v. Martinez, 406 F.3d
1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 2005). Neither party, however, disputes the factual findings
of the district court.
“The emergency doctrine allows law enforcement officers to enter and
secure premises without a warrant when they are responding to a perceived
emergency.” United States v. Stafford, 416 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2005); see
also Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (“[L]aw enforcement
officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an
injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.”). For the
emergency exception to apply, the Government must show that: “(1) considering
the totality of the circumstances, law enforcement had an objectively reasonable
basis for concluding that there was an immediate need to protect others or
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themselves from serious harm; and (2) the search’s scope and manner were
reasonable to meet the need.” Snipe, 515 F.3d at 952; see also United States v.
Reyes-Bosque, 596 F.3d 1017, 1029 (9th Cir. 2010). “In determining whether
such an entry is objectively reasonable, the Supreme Court has ‘consistently
eschewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the
reasonableness inquiry,’ and looked to the totality of the circumstances.” Snipe,
515 F.3d at 953 (quoting Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996)).
The undisputed facts show that, as a result of two 911 calls, the Garden
Grove Police Department dispatched officers to investigate a domestic dispute at
4:40 a.m. The first 911 call was from the victim, and the individual taking the call
heard in the background a large disturbance, including a man screaming threats and
profanities. The second 911 call was from a neighbor who reported that he heard
two males and a female fighting in the courtyard area of the apartment complex.
Responding officers saw a male and female exit the gate when they arrived at the
apartment complex, but there was no indication at the time that the male and
female were involved in the domestic dispute. Upon entering the courtyard, the
officers found Defendant shirtless, intoxicated, and aggressively approaching them
screaming profanities. The officers then saw the victim exit the front door of one
of the apartments. She was crying and upset. Through the apartment’s open front
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door, the officers could see a shattered glass table with glass scattered across the
living room floor.
Under the totality of the circumstances, it was objectively reasonable for the
officers to enter the open apartment to make sure that no one seriously injured or
potentially dangerous remained inside the apartment. See Snipe, 515 F.3d at 952.
The officers need not have assumed that the couple seen leaving the apartment
complex were the other individuals reported by the second 911 caller, and, thus,
that all of the individuals reportedly involved in the dispute were accounted for.
Moreover, the scope and manner of the search was reasonable under the
circumstances to meet the needs of the situation, see Snipe, 515 F.3d at 952;
Defendant does not dispute this on appeal. In sum, because the first search fell
within the emergency exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement,
the search was lawful. The district court therefore erred by suppressing the gun
found in the apartment, as well as other evidence uncovered as a result of the gun’s
discovery.
Likewise, the evidence discovered as a result of Officer Kovacs’s
subsequent entry and search of the apartment is admissible because that search was
also lawful under the emergency exception. A reasonable officer in Officer
Kovacs’s shoes would have had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that two
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minor children were inside the apartment and potentially in danger, in light of
Defendant Brown’s statements to that effect. The officers who first entered the
apartment did not know of the possible presence of children, nor could they verify
that they had searched every possible location for potential victims. It is irrelevant
that Officer Kovacs said he did not enter the apartment out of concern that two
minors might be inside. See Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 404 (“An action is
‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer’s
state of mind. . . .”)
REVERSED.