FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 9, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 10-7021
v. (D.C. No. 09-CV-00366-RAW)
(E.D. Okla.)
ANTHONY WAYNE SELLS,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER
DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before KELLY, EBEL, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Anthony Wayne Sells, a federal inmate appearing pro se, seeks a certificate
of appealability (“COA”) so that he may challenge the district court’s denial of
his 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. Mr.
Sells has not made “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Therefore, we deny his request for a COA and dismiss
the appeal.
We recounted the facts underlying Mr. Sells’s case on direct appeal and
need not restate them here. See United States v. Sells, 477 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir.
2007). Mr. Sells was convicted on various counts relating to his participation in a
large-scale methamphetamine conspiracy. Id. at 1234. The district court
sentenced to him to 300 months’ imprisonment. Id. His convictions and
sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. Id. at 1242. On September 24, 2009,
Mr. Sells filed his § 2255 motion, arguing, inter alia, excessive sentence and
ineffective assistance of counsel. R. 45-63. Although Mr. Sells conceded that his
motion was filed after the one-year statute of limitations expired on May 30,
2008, R. 89-90, he argued that he was entitled to equitable tolling because he
believed his direct appeal counsel was preparing and timely filing his § 2255
motion, R. 90-91. Mr. Sells learned that the motion had not been filed when he
called the court to check the status of his motion on June 4, 2009 — more than a
year after the statute of limitations had expired. R. 68.
Mr. Sells and his mother claim that they had discussed filing a § 2255
motion with counsel who had agree to do so in a timely manner. R. 64-69.
Counsel disputed these allegations, stating that he had not been retained or
appointed to represent Mr. Sells on collateral review and had not discussed filing
such a motion with either Mr. Sells or his mother. R. 80-82. After considering
affidavits from Mr. Sells, his mother, and counsel, the district court found that
counsel was not Mr. Sells’s attorney for post-conviction purposes. R. 96. The
district court concluded that Mr. Sells’s motion was time-barred and denied his
request for an evidentiary hearing. R. 95-97. The district court further
determined that equitable tolling did not apply because Mr. Sells failed to show
the due diligence necessary to justify equitable tolling. R. 96.
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Equitable tolling applies to the timeliness provision in the federal habeas
statute. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010). Mr. Sells must show
“(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some
extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Id. at
2562 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Clark v. Oklahoma, 468
F.3d 711, 714 (10th Cir. 2006). As there is no right to counsel in collateral
proceedings, Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987), it would take
truly extraordinary circumstances to demonstrate equitable tolling on this basis.
Accord United States v. Sanders, 175 F. App’x 977, 977-78 (10th Cir. 2006). Mr.
Sells argues that the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing so he
could demonstrate that he sought to have counsel file a § 2255 motion and
counsel failed to follow through. Aplt. Br. 2. We need not reach this issue,
however, because we agree that Mr. Sells has not shown that he diligently
pursued his claims. Waiting over a year past the limitations deadline to determine
whether counsel filed a motion does not support diligence.
Where a district court dismisses a § 2255 motion on procedural grounds, a
COA requires the movant to demonstrate that it is reasonably debatable whether
(1) the motion states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right, and (2)
the district court’s procedural ruling is correct. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.
322, 327 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). The district
court’s procedural ruling concerning the time bar is not reasonably debatable. We
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need not address whether Mr. Sells’s substantive claims pose reasonably
debatable issues. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
We DENY a COA and DISMISS the appeal.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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