UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 2/16/96
TENTH CIRCUIT
VICKY GOOCH,
Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 95-3075
v. (D.C. No. 93-CV-1388)
MEADOWBROOK HEALTHCARE (District of Kansas)
SERVICES OF FLORIDA, INC.;
MEADOWBROOK MANAGEMENT
COMPANY, INC.; and DIANE
LANDRATH-SCHMIDT,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before ANDERSON, McKAY and JONES,** Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Vicky Gooch was employed by the Defendants Meadowbrook Healthcare
Services of Florida, Inc., and Meadowbrook Management Company, Inc., as the facility
administrator for their Sedgwick Convalescent Center. Defendant Diane Landrath-
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Honorable Nathaniel R. Jones, Senior Circuit Judge of the United States Court of
**
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Schmidt, a regional vice president, was Plaintiff’s supervisor during the time Plaintiff
worked for the Meadowbrook Defendants. Plaintiff was terminated by Defendants while
on maternity leave. Plaintiff filed suit alleging that the Defendants discriminated against
her on the basis of her gender and pregnancy in terminating her employment and that
Defendants breached an alleged employment contract. The district court granted the
Defendants summary judgment as to all of Plaintiff’s claims.
Plaintiff raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the Plaintiff presented a prima
facie case of gender or maternity discrimination and whether the Defendants’ reasons for
termination were pretextual; (2) whether the trial court improperly decided disputed facts
in favor of the moving party in granting summary judgment to the Defendants; and, (3)
whether Plaintiff had a contract with the Defendants.
Our review of summary judgment is de novo. Jensen v. Redevelopment Agency of
Sandy City, 998 F.2d 1550, 1555 (10th Cir. 1993). In our review, we “must view the
evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden.” Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate “if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
2
The party opposing summary judgment must identify sufficient evidence that would
require submission of the case to a jury. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. An issue of fact
is “genuine” if the evidence is significantly probative; an issue of fact is “material” if
proof of it might affect the outcome of the lawsuit. Id. at 248-49. The findings of the
trial judge in a Title VII case, however, are judged under a clearly erroneous standard.
Long v. Laramie County Community College Dist., 840 F.2d 743, 749 (10th Cir. 1988)
(citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)).
Plaintiff’s Discrimination Claims
A plaintiff may prove disparate treatment by using either direct or indirect
evidence. If indirect evidence is used, then we apply the burden-shifting analysis set forth
in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973), and Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56 (1981). The
plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination in
Title VII actions. Green, 411 U.S. at 802. A presumption of discrimination arises once
the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, but the defendant can rebut the presumption by
producing some evidence that it had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its action.
Id.; Sorensen v. City of Aurora, 984 F.2d 349, 352 (10th Cir. 1993). “At the summary
judgment stage, it then becomes the plaintiff’s burden to show that there is a genuine
dispute of material fact as to whether the employer’s proffered reason for the challenged
3
action is pretextual--i.e. unworthy of belief.” Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 451
(10th Cir. 1995). “[T]he Title VII plaintiff at all times bears the ‘ultimate burden of
persuasion.’” St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2749 (1993).
In establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment gender discrimination, Ms.
Gooch must show: (1) she belonged to the protected class; (2) she was adversely affected
by the employer’s action; (3) she was qualified for the position; and, (4) she was treated
less favorably than her male counterparts. Cole v. Ruidoso Mun. Schools, 43 F.3d 1373,
1380 (10th Cir. 1994). The district court found that Ms. Gooch failed to establish a prima
facie case of gender discrimination. We disagree. Ms. Gooch belongs to a protected
class by being female, and she was obviously adversely affected by being terminated.
She has provided sufficient evidence of her qualifications: she was licensed and she had
a favorable prior work history in the same position at another institution. To show
disparate treatment, Plaintiff points to the fact that she was replaced by a male. The
Supreme Court explained in Burdine, “The burden of establishing a prima facie case of
disparate treatment is not onerous.” 450 U.S. at 253. The district court was clearly
erroneous in failing to find that Plaintiff established a prima facie case of disparate
treatment gender discrimination.
The district court correctly found, however, that even if Plaintiff had presented a
4
prima facie case, the Defendants in this case rebutted the presumption of discrimination
by producing some evidence that it had legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reasons for
its treatment of Plaintiff. Defendants provided an affidavit stating that the job was
offered to and turned down by a female before it was offered to a male. [Appellees’ App.
at 269]. Defendants also provided evidence that they discharged Plaintiff because of her
mismanagement of the Defendants’ facility. [Appellees’ App. at 162]. The record is
replete with evidence of mismanagement, culminating with a threat by the State of
Kansas not to relicense the Defendants’ facility because of its deficiencies.
After the employer offers a facially nondiscriminatory reason for its employment
decision at the summary judgment stage, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that
there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the employer’s proffered reason
was pretextual. Randle, 69 F.3d at 451. Plaintiff did not rebut Defendants’ claim that a
female turned down the job; Plaintiff only stated that she has no knowledge as to whether
a female turned down the position. Plaintiff provided evidence that the deficiencies at
Defendants’ facility were beyond her control, but she failed to go the next step by
showing that a material fact exists as to whether Defendants’ reasons were pretextual.
While it is disputable whether the deficiencies were Plaintiff’s fault, she has not shown
that there is a genuine issue of material fact that the employer’s proffered reasons were
5
pretextual.1 Inherent in the allocation of Plaintiff’s burden is evidence demonstrating a
causal connection between the conduct for which Plaintiff seeks relief and her protected
status under Title VII. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. Plaintiff failed to come forward with
facts showing a genuine dispute of material fact by which a jury could find by a
preponderance of the evidence that she was treated differently because of her gender.
Plaintiff attempted to establish disparate treatment by showing how the Defendants
have treated a similarly situated male employee in another incident. Ms. Gooch has stated
in an affidavit that Iraj Alipour, a male administrator at a Meadowbrook facility in
Wichita, was not terminated in 1994 after being cited in a survey for deficiencies more
serious than those at the Sedgwick facility. [Appellant App. at 297]. Citing a hostile
work environment discrimination case, Purrington v. University of Utah, 996 F.2d 1025,
1029 (10th Cir. 1993), Plaintiff asserts that incidents involving other employees are
relevant to whether discrimination has occurred. In order to prove disparate treatment, a
plaintiff must show more than accidental or sporadic incidents of discrimination; she must
show that “discrimination was the company’s standard operating procedure--the regular
rather than the unusual practice.” International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431
1
As we noted in Randle, a plaintiff can rebut the defendant’s nondiscriminatory
reason on summary judgment by showing that the defendant’s reason is unworthy of
belief. 69 F.3d at 452 n.17.
6
U.S. 324, 336 & n.16 (1977). While Plaintiff is correct that other incidents of
discrimination are relevant, Plaintiff failed to show a genuine dispute of material fact
existed in regard to whether the Defendants’ regular practice was to treat women
disparately. Thus, the district court correctly granted the Defendants summary judgment.
Plaintiff claims the district court clearly erred in holding that she failed to set forth
a prima facie case for pregnancy discrimination. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act
amended Title VII to bring the condition of pregnancy within the definition of sex
discrimination. A pregnancy discrimination claim is analyzed the same as other Title VII
claims. EEOC v. Ackerman, Hood & McQueen, Inc., 956 F.2d 944, 947 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 817 (1992).
As with Plaintiff’s gender discrimination claim, Ms. Gooch can easily establish the
first three elements of a prima facie case for pregnancy discrimination: She belongs to a
protected class by being pregnant; she was obviously adversely affected by being
terminated; and, Ms. Gooch provided sufficient evidence of her qualifications. The fact
that Plaintiff was terminated while on maternity leave completed her prima facie case of
pregnancy discrimination.
As with Plaintiff’s gender discrimination claim, Defendants rebutted the
7
presumption of pregnancy discrimination by producing some evidence that they
discharged the Plaintiff because of her mismanagement. Plaintiff, who began her
maternity leave in mid-August 1992, bases her claim on the mere fact that she happened
to be on maternity leave when she was terminated. The decision to terminate Plaintiff
was the result of a meeting on September 24, 1992, between Mr. L. P. Herzog, President
and Chief Operations Officer of Meadowbrook, Mr. Jeff Pudwill, Meadowbrook director
of human resources, Ms. Maddy D’Heilly, director of professional resources, and Ms.
Landrath-Schmidt. At the meeting, they concluded that the continued employment of
Plaintiff posed an unacceptable risk to the health and safety of the residents and to the
license of the Sedgwick facility. Plaintiff was notified by letter dated September 24,
1992, of the termination of her employment. The letter stated that she was being
terminated based on “1) Condition of the facility on August 1, 1992; 2) State Survey
deficiencies of 1991; and 3) State survey results of 1992.” [Appellant’s Br. at 12].
Plaintiff failed to show that there is a genuine dispute of material fact that the
Defendants’ reasons were a pretext for discrimination. Plaintiff has provided no evidence
that she was treated less favorably than another, nonpregnant employee under similar
conditions.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court ignored the affidavit of the nurse at the
Sedgwick facility who alleges that she was denied a promotion because of her pregnancy.
8
Ms. Gooch was terminated in September 1992, while the pregnancy discrimination
alleged in the affidavit occurred in November 1994. The 1994 incident occurred so long
after Ms. Gooch’s termination that it is not relevant to the Defendants’ treatment of Ms.
Gooch. The decision to terminate Plaintiff was made by Mr. Herzog, Mr. Pudwill, Ms.
D’Heilly, and Ms. Landrath-Schmidt in 1992; whereas the 1994 incident of purported
pregnancy discrimination was at the hands of Plaintiff’s male replacement--a person who
was not employed by Defendants at the time of Plaintiff’s termination. Plaintiff did not
present evidence showing that a genuine dispute of material fact exists by which a jury
could find by a preponderance of the evidence that she was treated less favorably than a
nonpregnant employee under similar conditions.2
Disputed Facts Decided by the Trial Court
Plaintiff asserts that the trial court violated the standard for summary judgment by
deciding controverted facts in favor of the Defendants, instead of in favor of the party
opposing the motion.
2
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act “makes clear that it is discriminatory to treat
pregnancy-related conditions less favorably than other medical conditions.” Newport
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983). Plaintiff
provided no evidence that Defendants treated her differently from employees with other
medical conditions.
9
The standard for summary judgment is whether there exists a genuine issue as to
any material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Disputes over immaterial facts are insufficient to
withstand summary judgment. An issue of fact is “material” if proof of it might affect the
outcome of the lawsuit. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
First, Plaintiff claims the trial court ignored Plaintiff’s affidavits while using
language found in Defendants’ documents. This general complaint fails to explain how
this amounts to the court deciding material facts in dispute against the non-moving party.
Plaintiff asserts the trial court improperly decided facts concerning a meeting
between Plaintiff and Defendant Landrath-Schmidt on August 13, 1992. The court stated,
“When they arrived, Gooch, who was pregnant, told them that she was in pain and having
frequent contractions. Landrath-Schmidt asked Gooch if she should not be at home or in
the hospital.” [Appellant’s App. at 73-74 (Dist. Ct. Op. at 3-4)]. Plaintiff disputes this
fact, claiming that Defendant Landrath-Schmidt insisted on Plaintiff staying at work to
write up the budget. [Appellant’s Br. at 26]. Not only is Plaintiff’s assertion contradicted
by her own statements in her deposition, but she has never alleged that she asked to leave
work because of her pregnancy.3 Plaintiff has not linked her pregnancy to her claim that
3
Plaintiff testified in her deposition:
[M]y contractions were not that severe at that time. I would have stayed
10
Defendants forced her to stay at work. In short, Plaintiff does not explain how this fact is
material to her discrimination claim.
Next, Plaintiff claims the trial court accepted the Defendants’ allegations that fire
drills were not conducted, despite Plaintiff’s affidavits disputing this fact. Plaintiff has
only shown that this fact is disputed. Even if a genuine dispute exists, Plaintiff has not
explained how this fact would affect the outcome of Plaintiff’s gender or maternity
discrimination claims.
Plaintiff also claims the trial court ignored the affidavit of a nurse who was
allegedly discriminated against by Meadowbrook because of her pregnancy. In actuality,
the trial court stated that “Gooch cites the affidavit of a nurse at the Center who infers
that she was not allowed a promotion on the basis of her pregnancy. But this event
occurred several years after Gooch’s termination, and there is nothing linking it to the
action relating to Gooch.” [Appellant’s App. at 78 (Dist. Ct. Op. at 8)]. Plaintiff also
states that the trial court ignored evidence of a male administrator who was retained
home, but they were still very early, very mild, and it was very important to
me to meet my new supervisor and to find out where I stood and what to do.
And all I could get from her [Ms. Landrath-Schmidt] in any kind of
response was you should be home, you must be exhausted.
[Appellee’s App. at 346].
11
despite being cited for deficiencies more serious than those for which the Sedgwick
facility was cited. Incidents involving other employees are relevant. However, these two
purported instances of discrimination--occurring more than two years after Plaintiff’s
termination--were not material facts establishing gender or pregnancy discrimination.
It is the Plaintiff’s burden, in responding to Defendants’ summary judgment
motion, to go beyond the allegations in her complaint and designate specific facts which
would establish a genuine issue for trial concerning her allegations of disparate treatment.
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). While the district court may have
decided disputed facts against the nonmoving party, those facts were not shown to be
material to Plaintiff’s Title VII claims.
Plaintiff’s Employment Contract Claim
Plaintiff claims she had a contract of employment with the Meadowbrook
Defendants. In support of this contract theory, she cites to a letter offering her
employment as administrator for Meadowbrook Manor of Sedgwick, to Meadowbrook’s
maternity leave policy, and to Meadowbrook’s employee termination policy.
Plaintiff’s claim is based on supplemental jurisdiction, so it is controlled by Kansas
law. The letter cited by Plaintiff contains no statements regarding duration of
12
employment or limits on termination solely for cause. [Appellant’s App. at 21-22]. Thus,
no express contract of employment existed between the parties.
Under some circumstances, implied contracts of employment are recognized in
Kansas as an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. Brown v. United Methodist
Homes, 815 P.2d 72, 81 (Kan. 1991). In Morriss v. Coleman Co., the Kansas Supreme
Court explained:
“Where it is alleged that an employment contract is one to be based
upon the theory of ‘implied in fact,’ the understanding and intent of the
parties is to be ascertained from several factors which include written or
oral negotiations, the conduct of the parties from the commencement of the
employment relationship, the usages of the business, the situation and
objective of the parties giving rise to the relationship, the nature of the
employment, and any other circumstances surrounding the employment
relationship which would tend to explain or make clear the intention of the
parties at the time said employment commenced.”
738 P.2d 841, 848-49 (Kan. 1987) (quoting Allegri v. Providence-St. Margaret Health
Center, 684 P.2d 1031 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984) (syllabus ¶5)). In Brown, the Kansas
Supreme Court explained that Morriss “recognizes an implied obligation on the employer
to not terminate an employee arbitrarily where a policy or program of the employer, either
express or implied, restricts the employer’s right of termination at will.” 815 P.2d at 81.
The two policies cited by Plaintiff, however, were not promulgated until after Plaintiff’s
employment with the Meadowbrook Defendants was terminated. [Appellant’s App. at
284, 285]. Therefore, these policies cannot be the basis of an implied contract between
13
the parties since they were not in effect at the time of Plaintiff’s employment with the
Defendants. Additionally, the employee termination policy merely requires notification
of the regional vice president before an employee can be terminated; here, Defendant
Landrath-Schmidt, the regional vice president was involved in the termination decision.
Thus, even if this policy were in effect, it is readily apparent that the Defendants did not
violate the policy. Nor can it be said that the Defendants arbitrarily terminated Plaintiff’s
employment.
Plaintiff argues that it is improper to decide on summary judgment whether an
implied employment contract existed because it is a factual issue upon which reasonable
minds could easily reach different conclusions. [Appellant’s Br. at 34]. We reject this
argument here because the facts cut so clearly against the existence of an implied
employment contract under Kansas law. Accord Farthing v. City of Shawnee, Kan., 39
F.3d 1131, 1138 (10th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff has failed to show any evidence of an implied
contract through the conduct of the parties, or any intent or understanding on behalf of
the parties to enter into a contract of employment. Plaintiff even acknowledged that she
could have severed her employment relationship with the Meadowbrook Defendants at
any time. [Appellees’ App. at 261-64, 349]. Thus, the undisputed facts support the entry
of summary judgment as a matter of Kansas law for the Defendants in regard to
Plaintiff’s implied breach of contract claim.
14
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
15