UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 11/2/95
TENTH CIRCUIT
MELVIN L. MILLS, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
) No. 95-7071
v. ) (D.C. No. CV-94-287-B)
) (E. Dist. Okla.)
SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Commissioner, )
Social Security Administration, )
)
Defendant-Appellee. )
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, McKAY and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel
has determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a
decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App.
P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered
submitted without oral argument.
Melvin L. Mills appeals the district court’s order denying
his claim for Supplemental Security Income and disability
insurance benefits. He maintains that the Commissioner’s
decision is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except
under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation
of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may
be cited under the terms and conditions of the court’s General
Order filed November 29, 1993. 151 F.R.D. 470.
Mr. Mills is 44 years old. In the last fifteen years, he
has held a variety of jobs in oil field construction; he has also
worked as a heavy equipment operator and in asbestos removal. In
May, 1985, Mr. Mills fractured his sixth vertebra in a diving
accident. He claims that ensuing pain in his neck and numbness
in his right arm, as well as depression and anxiety, prevent him
from engaging in substantial gainful activity.
We may only set aside the ALJ’s findings if they are not
supported by substantial evidence. Nieto v. Heckler, 750 F.2d
59, 61 (10th Cir. 1984). A decision is subject to reversal if it
is overwhelmed by other evidence, represents a mere conclusion,
or is based on an improper legal standard. Ellison v. Sullivan,
929 F.2d 534, 536 (10th Cir. 1990); Frey v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 508,
512 (10th Cir. 1987).
“The Secretary uses a five-step process to evaluate
disability claims for supplemental security income.” Reyes v.
Bowen, 845 F.2d 242, 243 (10th Cir. 1988); see also 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520 (disability); § 416.920 (Supplemental Security Income
disability). The ALJ found that Mr. Mills did not establish that
he met or equaled one of the impairments listed in the
regulations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). Applying the
fifth step of the evaluation process, and considering Mr. Mills’
age, education, part work experience, and residual functional
capacity (RFC), the ALJ found that he could perform other work.
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Id. at §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). The ALJ found that Mr. Mills
“has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of
sedentary and light work . . . of an unskilled and semi-skilled
nature . . . .” Rec., vol. II, at 18.
On appeal, Mr. Mills offers two challenges to the ALJ’s
application of the fifth step of this process.1 First, he
contends that the ALJ’s assessment of his residual functional
capacity (RFC) was not supported by substantial evidence because
the ALJ failed to properly consider evidence of his manipulative
and mental impairments. Second, he contends that the ALJ’s
determination that alternative work was available was not
supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ improperly
questioned the vocational expert.
As Mr. Mills maintains, the record reflects considerable
evidence that Mr. Mills’ manual dexterity is impaired. Mr. and
Mrs. Mills both testified to this effect, and Mr. Mills also
introduced compelling medical reports. However, there is also
1
Mr. Mills also suggests that his constitutional right to
due process was violated by the ALJ’s reliance on a report of a
medical examination after his hearing; he contends that he was
denied effective cross-examination. See Allison v. Heckler, 711
F.2d 145, 147 (10th Cir. 1983). We need not reach this argument
because Mr. Mills did not raise it below. See In re Lynde, 922
F.2d 1448, 1455 (10th Cir. 1991). Moreover, the record reveals
that Mr. Mills was notified of the ALJ’s intent to rely on this
report, received a copy of the report, and was afforded the
opportunity to respond to it with a written statement, additional
evidence, and questions to be given to the author of the report.
Thus the ALJ’s compliance with the requirements of Allison
renders Mr. Mills’ due process argument meritless.
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substantial support for the ALJ’s findings. Dr. McGovern
observed that Mr. Mills had normal hand function and dexterity.
Dr. McGovern also stated that although Mr. Mills exhibited
weakness in a number of areas, in his opinion this was due to
poor cooperation by Mr. Mills. Dr. McGovern’s report generally
supports the ALJ’s findings with regard to Mr. Mills’
manipulative impairments.
The ALJ also found that Mr. Mills “does not have a mental
impairment which has had more than a minimal effect on his
ability to engage in work activity and that he does not have a
mental impairment which has reduced his functional capacity for
sedentary and light work.” Id. at 17. Mr. Mills contends that
this finding was without sufficient support and that the ALJ
failed to point to legitimate reasons to reject his medical
evidence. However, the ALJ completed a standard Psychiatric
Review Technique Form, which was appended to his decision. In
the PRTF, the ALJ found that Mr. Mills’ activities of daily
living were not restricted, and that he faced only slight
difficulties in maintaining social functioning. These findings
are supported by Mr. Mills’ testimony. The ALJ also found no
evidence of deficiencies resulting in failure to complete tasks
in a timely manner, and no episodes of deterioration or
decompensation. These findings are congruent with the reports of
Dr. Nguyen and Dr. Das. We must conclude that the ALJ’s findings
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with regard to Mr. Mills’ mental impairments are substantially
supported by the evidence.
Mr. Mills also challenges the ALJ’s questioning of the
vocational expert. He contends that the ALJ posed hypothetical
questions to the vocational expert which did not accurately
describe Mr. Mills’ characteristics, thus leading the expert to
supply inapposite testimony. Indeed, the ALJ did not include
manipulative or mental impairments in the hypothetical questions.
As a result, Mr. Mills argues that the ALJ’s findings concerning
the availability of alternative work are not supported by
substantial evidence. Because the ALJ’s findings concerning Mr.
Mills’ RFC were supported by substantial evidence, there is no
need for the answers to the hypothetical questions which Mr.
Mills now urges us to require. The testimony of the vocational
expert constitutes substantial support for the ALJ’s finding that
“there exist occupations in the national economy in significant
numbers that [Mr. Mills] can perform regardless of [his]
impairments, and therefore [Mr. Mills] is not disabled.” Id. at
19.
We AFFIRM the decision of the district court. The mandate
shall issue forthwith.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Chief Judge
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