UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 4/18/96
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Respondent-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 95-6372
) (D.C. No. CIV-95-1168-R)
RAYMOND TORRES, ) (W. Dist. of Okla.)
)
Petitioner-Appellant. )
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
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Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
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After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this
panel has determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for
a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App.
P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered
submitted without oral argument.
Raymond Torres (Torres), appearing pro se and having been
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except
under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation
of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may
be cited under the terms and conditions of Tenth Cir. R. 36.3.
granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, appeals the district
court’s denial of his Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct
Illegal Sentence filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
In March, 1994, Torres was convicted of multiple drug-related
offenses in connection with conspiracy to distribute
methamphetamine. On direct appeal, we affirmed Torres’ convictions
and sentences for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
methamphetamine (Count I) and distribution of methamphetamine
(Count IV). See United States v. Torres, 53 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (1995).
Thereafter, Torres filed a § 2255 motion alleging that: (1)
his sentence was based on the wrong guideline range; (2) his trial
counsel was ineffective in several ways relating to which isomer of
methamphetamine was involved in the case; (3) the district court
erred in sentencing him based on d- rather than l-methamphetamine;1
and (4) the district court erred by not “clearing away the jury’s
confusion, as to use of particular evidence” in response to a note
from the jury during deliberations.
On October 2, 1995, the district court denied Torres’ § 2255
motion and found/concluded that: Torres’ first, third, and fourth
1
At the time Torres was sentenced, the guidelines
distinguished between “methamphetamine,” which commonly refers to
d-methamphetamine, and “l-methamphetamine.” For purposes of
calculating the base offense level, 1 gram of methamphetamine was
equivalent to 1 kilogram of marijuana and 1 gram of
l-methamphetamine was equivalent to 40 grams of marijuana.
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, Drug Equivalency Tables.
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claims were procedurally defaulted for failure to raise them on
direct appeal; Torres failed to show cause for his failure to raise
claims one, three, and four on direct appeal; and the record was
clear that Torres was not and could not have been prejudiced by his
trial counsel’s allegedly unprofessional errors.
On appeal, Torres contends that the district court erred in
denying his § 2255 petition. He asserts that the district court
erred (1) in denying his ineffective assistance of counsel claim
when counsel admitted that he did not raise the issue of d- versus
l-methamphetamine at sentencing; and (2) when it held that his
first and third claims were procedurally barred when in fact he did
show a miscarriage of justice and that he had received ineffective
assistance of counsel.
In a § 2255 action, we review the district court’s legal
conclusions de novo, United States v. Cook, 49 F.3d 663, 665 (10th
Cir. 1995), although findings of fact underlying mixed questions of
law and fact are accorded the presumption of correctness. Manlove
v. Tansy, 981 F.2d 473, 476 (10th Cir. 1992).
Torres’ claims all relate to his trial counsel’s failure to
object to the presentence report’s calculation of his base offense
level on the basis of d-methamphetamine rather than l-
methamphetamine. Therefore, his claims may be consolidated with
and addressed through his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
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counsel, a defendant must show that: (1) his counsel’s performance
was constitutionally deficient, and (2) this deficient performance
was prejudicial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984); Cook, 49 F.3d at 665. Counsel’s performance is deficient
if the representation “falls below an objective standard of
reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Prejudice is
established when a defendant demonstrates “a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. “However, a
court may not set aside a conviction or a sentence solely because
the outcome would have been different absent counsel’s deficient
performance.” United States v. Kissick, 69 F.3d 1048, 1055 (10th
Cir. 1995) (citing Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369-70
(1993)). “Instead, in order to establish the required prejudice,
a defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s deficient performance
rendered the proceeding ‘fundamentally unfair or unreliable.’”
Kissick, 69 F.3d at 1055 (citing Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 369).
Assuming that Torres’ counsel’s performance in failing to
object to sentencing based on d- rather than l-methamphetamine was
constitutionally deficient, his claims nevertheless must fail
because he did not and cannot show actual prejudice. At
sentencing, it was established that Torres was accountable for
1,275.75 grams of methamphetamine. There was no discussion nor any
evidence introduced regarding whether the methamphetamine involved
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was d- or l-methamphetamine. See ROA, Vol. VI. However, our
record reveals a July 13, 1992, Report of Drug Property Collected,
Purchased or Seized which analyzes methamphetamine seized from
coconspirators on July 9, 1992, as 35% d-methamphetamine.2
Under the guidelines, “[i]f a mixture or substance contains
more than one controlled substance, the weight of the entire
mixture or substance is assigned to the controlled substance that
results in the greater offense level.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1.(c) note*.
See United States v. Decker, 55 F.3d 1509, 1513 (10th Cir. 1995).
Therefore, even assuming that counsel had an obligation to raise
the issue, the evidence demonstrates that Torres sentence would
have been the same and his sentence is neither “fundamentally
unfair” nor “unreliable.”
We AFFIRM substantially for the reasons set forth in the
district court’s Order of October 2, 1995. The mandate shall issue
forthwith.
Entered for the Court:
James E. Barrett,
Senior United States
Circuit Judge
2
It is unclear from the record if this evidence was
presented at trial. However, new evidence may be presented in a
§ 2255 proceeding.