UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 4/18/96
TENTH CIRCUIT
ALLEN JAMES STARKS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 95-1376
v. (D.C. No. 95-K-375)
(Dist. Colo.)
PATRICK WHALEN, Warden,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, McKAY and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel
has determined unanimously that oral argument would not
materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R.
App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Mr. Allen James Starks filed this pro se petition for writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging federal
prison officials denied him due process when they found him
guilty of prison regulation charges. The district court adopted
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except
under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation
of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may
be cited under the terms and conditions 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
the magistrate’s recommendation to dismiss the petition on the
grounds that Mr. Starks did not have a protected liberty interest
in remaining free from disciplinary segregation or in being
confined in any particular institution. Mr. Starks appeals, and
we affirm.
We review a district court’s order denying a petition for
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus de novo. Bowser v. Boggs, 20
F.3d 1060, 1062 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 313 (1994).
The Due Process Clause requires Mr. Starks to first assert the
infringement of a protected liberty interest. Kentucky Dep’t. of
Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). A protected
liberty interest may arise from either the Due Process Clause
itself or from the laws of a State. Id. Disciplinary
segregation does not implicate a protected liberty interest under
the Due Process Clause itself. Sandin v. Conner, 115 S. Ct.
2293, 2302 (1995). Nor does the Due Process Clause itself create
a protected liberty interest in Mr. Starks’ being “placed in any
particular prison.” Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976).
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that generally a prisoner’s
“discipline in segregated confinement [does] not present the type
of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might
conceivably create a liberty interest.” Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at
2300-01.
Mr. Starks raises additional factual and legal issues for
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the first time on appeal which we decline to consider. See Oyler
v. Allenbrand, 23 F.3d 292, 299 n.8 (10th Cir. 1994).
Accordingly, we AFFIRM substantially for the reasons given
by the magistrate and adopted by the district court. The mandate
shall issue forthwith.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Chief Judge
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