PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 6/17/96
TENTH CIRCUIT
BETTY TEW, individually; BETTY
TEW and DENNIS SHOOK as co-
personal representatives of the estate No. 95-7050
of Robert Garriett Tew, deceased,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant - Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D. C. No. CV-94-299-S)
Steven N. Moran (Gregory G. Meier with him on the briefs), of Jones, Givens,
Gotcher & Bogan, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Matthew A. Connelly, Trial Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington,
DC, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, PORFILIO and TACHA, Circuit Judges.
TACHA, Circuit Judge.
Background
On June 6, 1992, Robert Tew drowned in the Illinois River when his raft
capsized after passing over an underwater structure near Tahlequah, Oklahoma. The
structure was a roadway and low-water dam constructed by a private citizen without
governmental approval. The Department of the Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”)
was aware of the structure, but neither it nor the United States Coast Guard (“Coast
Guard”) had placed any signs or markers on the river warning of the danger.
Tew’s mother and the representatives of his estate brought this action against
the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-
80, and the Suits in Admiralty Act (“SAA”), 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-52, alleging that the
Corps and the Coast Guard negligently failed to mark or remove the structure from
the river. The United States moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The district court converted the motion into a motion for summary judgment and then
granted it in favor of the United States. The district court dismissed the FTCA claim
because the alleged negligence fell under the discretionary function exception to the
FTCA. The court dismissed the SAA claim on the grounds that the Illinois River
was not navigable for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction and that, in any case, the
discretionary function exception also applies to the SAA.
The plaintiffs now appeal, arguing that the district court erred by (1)
improperly applying the FTCA’s discretionary function exception, (2) finding that
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the Illinois River was not navigable for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction, and (3)
creating a discretionary function exception to the SAA. We exercise jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We hold that the district court properly applied the
FTCA’s discretionary function exception and properly found and applied a
discretionary function exception to the SAA. Thus, without reaching the issue of
the navigability of the Illinois River for the purposes of admiralty jurisdiction, we
affirm.
Discussion
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Wolf v. Prudential Ins.
Co. of Am., 50 F.3d 793, 796 (10th Cir. 1995). The United States, as sovereign, is
immune from suit unless it consents to be sued. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S.
535, 538 (1980). Both the FTCA and the SAA are waivers of sovereign immunity.
The FTCA waives the United States’ sovereign immunity when federal employees
are negligent within the scope of their employment under circumstances in which
private individuals would be liable. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2674, 1346(b). However, the
discretionary function exception provides that the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign
immunity does not apply to claims “based upon the exercise or performance or the
failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the government . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
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The SAA waives the United States’ sovereign immunity for the purpose of
maintaining suits in admiralty. 46 U.S.C. § 742. In order to resolve the issues in this
case, we must initially consider whether the discretionary function exception to the
FTCA also applies to the SAA, a question of first impression before this court. The
discretionary function exception is grounded in the doctrine of the separation of
powers. The separation of powers is “a doctrine to which the courts must adhere
even in the absence of an explicit statutory command.” Canadian Transp. Co. v.
United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Were we not to find a
discretionary function exception to the SAA, we would subject “all administrative
and legislative decisions concerning the public interest in maritime matters . . . to
independent judicial review in the not unlikely event that the implementation of
those policy judgments were to cause private injuries.” Gercey v. United States, 540
F.2d 536, 539 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977). Because “[s]uch
an outcome is intolerable under our constitutional system of separation of powers,”
In re Joint E. and S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 891 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1989), we hold
that a discretionary function exception is implied in the SAA.
In finding a discretionary function exception to the SAA, we join the majority
of the circuits that have addressed this question. Chute v. United States, 610 F.2d
7, 11-13 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936 (1980); In re Asbestos Litigation,
891 F.2d at 35; Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. United States, 919 F.2d 888, 891 (3d Cir.
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1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 941 (1991); Wiggins v. United States, 799 F.2d 962,
966 (5th Cir. 1986); Gemp v. United States, 684 F.2d 404, 408 (6th Cir. 1982);
Bearce v. United States, 614 F.2d 556, 558-60 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 837
(1980); Earles v. United States, 935 F.2d 1028, 1030-32 (9th Cir. 1991); Williams
v. United States, 747 F.2d 700 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam), aff’g Williams ex rel.
Sharpley v. United States, 581 F. Supp. 847 (S.D. Ga. 1983); Canadian Transport,
663 F.2d at 1086. Contra Lane v. United States, 529 F.2d 175, 179 (4th Cir. 1975).
Although the Fourth Circuit took a contrary view in Lane, that case’s effect has been
narrowed by subsequent opinions. Tiffany v. United States, 931 F.2d 271, 277 (4th
Cir. 1991) (applying discretionary function exception to the SAA on constitutional
separation of powers grounds), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1030 (1992); Faust v. South
Carolina State Highway Dept., 721 F.2d 934, 938-40 (4th Cir. 1983) (applying
discretionary function exception analysis to a claim under the SAA), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1226 (1984).
In order to fall within the discretionary function exception, conduct must (1)
involve an element of judgment or choice and (2) be grounded in public policy
considerations. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536-37 (1988); Kiehn v.
United States, 984 F.2d 1100, 1102-03 (10th Cir. 1993). The conduct at issue here
is the United States’s failure to mark or remove the underwater structure. We must
determine whether these alleged governmental duties fulfill the two requirements of
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the discretionary function exception.
The plaintiffs argue that the Corps’s and Coast Guard’s duty to mark or
remove the underwater structure arises out of several statutory and regulatory
sources. They first contend that 14 U.S.C. § 86 requires the Corps and the Coast
Guard to mark the structure. We initially note that title 14 governs the Secretaries
of Transportation and Navy acting through the Coast Guard, not through the Corps
of Engineers, and the plaintiffs have failed to point to any authority that imposes a
duty on the Corps to mark underwater obstructions. As for the Coast Guard’s power
to mark obstructions under the statute, its authority clearly involves an element of
judgment or choice:
The Secretary may mark for the protection of navigation any sunken
vessel or other obstruction existing on the navigable waters or waters
above the continental shelf of the United States in such manner and for
so long as, in his judgment, the needs of maritime navigation require.
14 U.S.C. § 86 (emphasis added); Chute, 610 F.2d at 11-13; see also Indian Towing
Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955) (noting that the Coast Guard has
discretion to determine whether it will undertake the duty of establishing aids to
maritime navigation).
The Commandant of the Coast Guard delegated the authority to mark
obstructions to the Coast Guard’s District Commanders in 33 C.F.R. § 64 (1991).
This regulation affords each District Commander no less discretion in such matters
than the Secretary of Transportation:
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The District Commander may mark for the protection of maritime
navigation any structure, sunken vessel or other obstruction that is not
suitably marked by the owner.
33 C.F.R. § 64.30-3(a) (1991) (emphasis added). Thus, the Coast Guard has no duty
to mark the underwater structure.
The Coast Guard’s discretionary decision to leave the structure unmarked was
properly grounded in public policy considerations. Commander John Dejung, the
officer responsible for allocating Coast Guard resources in the region, stated that the
primary factor in determining the placement of limited Coast Guard resources was
whether there was substantial interstate commercial use of a waterway. He noted
that even if the Illinois River were a navigable waterway, it would not be
economically or operationally feasible to dedicate a Coast Guard river tender to mark
the river. Economic considerations such as these are a proper basis for the exercise
of discretion. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 323 (1991). Because the
Coast Guard’s decision to leave the structure unmarked was both discretionary and
properly grounded in public policy considerations, it falls within the discretionary
function exception.
The plaintiffs further maintain that 33 U.S.C. §§ 403, 409, 414, and 415
require the Corps to remove the underwater structure. Section 403 prohibits the
creation of any obstruction to the navigable capacity of United States waters unless
the work has been recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the
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Secretary of the Army. The regulations governing enforcement of this provision are
contained in 33 C.F.R. § 326 (1991). Nothing in the regulations requires the Corps
to remove obstructions; on the contrary, the regulations state that “[n]othing
contained in this Part shall establish a non-discretionary duty on the part of district
engineers nor shall deviation from these procedures give rise to a private right of
action against a district engineer.” 33 C.F.R. §326.1 (1991).
Sections 409, 414, and 415, along with sections 411 and 412, are collectively
known as the Wreck Act. Section 409 prohibits the obstruction of navigable waters
and places a duty on the owner of an obstruction to mark and remove it. Failure to
commence removal of an obstruction allows the Secretary of the Army to remove it
under either § 414 (generally) or § 415 (in emergencies). Nothing in the Wreck Act
requires the Secretary or the Corps to remove an obstruction. Indeed, § 414 makes
clear that an obstruction may be removed by the Secretary “at his discretion.”
Further, § 415 only provides that the Secretary “shall have the right” to remove an
obstruction--it does not mandate that he do so. Our reading of these statutes is
confirmed by the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the Wreck Act in Nunley v. M/V
Dauntless Colocotronis:
In statutory context, the Wreck Act provisions merely authorize the
United States to proceed either to mark or to remove the sunken vessel
when the owner fails to do so, but they do not impose a mandatory duty
on the government to remove the wreck, and, therefore, the United
States is not liable to a third party for its failure to do so.
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727 F.2d 455, 461 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 832 (1984); see also Wyandotte
Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 207 (1967) (noting that these sections
“are intended to protect the United States against liability for removing a sunken
vessel if it chooses to do so” (emphasis added)).
In addition, the regulation that governs enforcement of the Wreck Act, 33
C.F.R. § 245 (1991), does not impose a duty on the Corps to remove obstructions.
Every subsection of this regulation concerning removal states that District Engineers
“may” undertake removal of obstructions. 33 C.F.R. §§ 245.10(c), 245.15,
245.25(b), 245.35, 245.50(a) (1991). The plaintiffs contend that 33 C.F.R. §§
245.10(d) and 245.20 establish a non-discretionary duty on the Corps and the Coast
Guard to jointly determine whether an obstruction poses a hazard to navigation.
These regulations, however, are irrelevant: even if the regulations require the Corps
to consult with the Coast Guard, the Corps retains discretion under the regulations
to remove the obstruction. The plaintiffs also point to 33 C.F.R. §§ 245.10(b) and
245.30(b) to establish a non-discretionary duty on the Corps to send a notice to the
owner of the structure and to vigorously pursue removal by that party. These duties,
however, only apply when the Corps has already determined that marking or removal
are appropriate courses of action, and nothing in the regulations establishes a duty
on the Corps to make such a determination. Thus, neither the Wreck Act nor
attendant regulations establishes a non-discretionary duty on the Corps to remove the
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underwater structure in this case.
The Corps’s discretionary decision not to remove the structure was also
properly based on public policy considerations. The Corps’s Acting District
Engineer of the Tulsa District stated that the Corps concentrates on new structures
and permit applications because of its limited resources. As mentioned above, the
lack of adequate resources is a proper public policy consideration. Because the
Corps’s decision not to remove the structure was both discretionary and properly
grounded in public policy considerations, it falls within the discretionary function
exception.
Conclusion
Both the Federal Tort Claims Act and the Suits in Admiralty Act contain a
discretionary function exception to their waivers of sovereign immunity. Because
neither the Corps of Engineers nor the Coast Guard had a non-discretionary duty to
mark or remove the underwater structure that allegedly caused the death of Robert
Tew, the district court was without subject matter jurisdiction to review the claims
in this case. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
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