PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 7/26/96
TENTH CIRCUIT
DONALD STEVEN ROGERS,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
No. 95-6092
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent - Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. No. CIV-92-2239-A)
Robert C. Jenkins (Charles D. Weisselberg, Dennis E. Curtis, and Carrie L. Hempel with
him on the brief), University of Southern California Law Center, Los Angeles, California,
for Defendant - Appellant.
Randel Sengel (Patrick M. Ryan and Leslie M. Maye were on the brief), U.S. Attorneys
Office, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff - Appellee.
Before HENRY, BRISCOE and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
LUCERO, Circuit Judge.
In sentencing Donald Rogers, a federal prisoner convicted of various drug related
crimes, the district court multiplied by seven the amount of heroin he delivered for
subsequent distribution. Rogers appeals the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to
vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence and argues that the district court improperly
enhanced the twenty-four ounces of pure heroin that he admitted delivering by the
number of times the drug was cut for resale. We affirm.
I
In 1988, a jury found Rogers guilty of engaging and conspiring to engage in
racketeering activities, possessing and conspiring to possess heroin with intent to
distribute, and traveling interstate to facilitate the conspiracy. According to the
presentence report, Rogers delivered heroin from California to Johnny Lee Sanders, who
allegedly operated a heroin distribution enterprise in Oklahoma City from 1978 to 1987.
Rogers admitted to the probation officer preparing the report that he was involved in the
heroin distribution conspiracy from January to November of 1987 and that during that
time he delivered a total of twenty-four ounces of pure heroin to Sanders.1
1
According to Rogers, trial testimony indicates that he delivered only five
ounces of heroin. Appellant’s Br. at 4; see also Appellant’s App. at 149. While the
record contains less than ten pages of the trial transcript, Appellant’s App. at 132-139,
those pages indicate that Rogers delivered more than five ounces to Evelyn Pitts’ house;
on one occasion, he delivered “five or six ounces of heroin” to Sanders at Evelyn Pitts’
house, id, at 134, and he returned to her house a second time to deliver more heroin, id. at
137.
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Applying the sentencing guidelines,2 which tie sentences for drug offenses to the
“total weight” of the drugs involved, the probation officer recommended that Rogers be
held liable for the subsequent cuts that were made to the pure heroin he delivered to
Sanders. The probation officer found that the “amount which was distributed by Mr.
Rogers to the conspiracy increased sevenfold from 24 ounces to approximately 168
ounces.” Appellant’s Supp. App. at 11. Accordingly, the probation officer used “168
ounces of diluted heroin” to calculate Rogers’ base offense level. See id. at 12.
Rogers objected to the recommendation. He urged the court to base the sentence
on the 24 ounces of heroin he admitted delivering to Sanders. Id. at 17; Appellant’s App.
at 39. The government, on the other hand, argued that Rogers’ sentence should be based
on the total quantity of heroin distributed by Sanders’ organization over the years, thirty
kilograms. Appellant’s App. at 40-43.
The district court refused to hold Rogers responsible for the entire thirty kilograms
of heroin that had been distributed by the conspiracy. See id. at 44. The court ruled,
however, that for purposes of determining the base offense level, it was appropriate to use
a multiplier to account for cuts that were made to the pure heroin Rogers supplied. Id. at
43-44. Relying on trial testimony, the court found that raw heroin was cut at least seven
2
The probation officer determined that Rogers should be sentenced pursuant
to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 because the offense conduct continued until after
November 1, 1987. Appellant’s Supp. App. at 9. Rogers does not argue that the
sentencing guidelines should not apply.
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times before reaching the street. Id. Thus, in accordance with the presentence report, the
court used 168 ounces of heroin to calculate the base offense level.
Rogers’ total offense level, after deducting two points for acceptance of
responsibility, was 32, which corresponded to a sentencing range of 151 - 181 months.
The court sentenced Rogers near the bottom of that range, to 156 months for each of the
racketeering and heroin distribution offenses. The court also sentenced Rogers to 60
months for traveling interstate to facilitate the conspiracy and ordered all sentences to run
concurrently. Rogers appealed. In a previous opinion, we affirmed his convictions. See
United States v. Rogers, 921 F.2d 975 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 839 (1990).
Rogers did not challenge on direct appeal the drug quantity upon which his sentence was
based. See id. at 977 n.5.
Rogers then filed this § 2255 motion challenging his sentence. He argued that the
district court erred in multiplying the heroin he delivered by the number of times it was
cut for resale and that his attorney’s ineffective assistance provides cause for not raising
this issue on direct appeal.3 In response, the government argued that the guidelines
permitted the conversion of the pure heroin to the street quantity at the retail level, to
reflect the scale of Rogers’ participation in the offenses. The government also submitted
3
Rogers also argued below that he was denied the right to counsel during the
presentence interview. The district court rejected that claim and Rogers does not appeal
that issue.
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an affidavit of Rogers’ appellate attorney,4 stating, “I did not raise the issue of the
‘Multiplier’ in the appeal of Donald Steven Rogers because I did not feel that the issue
had merit.” Appellant’s App. at 108.
Because Rogers did not challenge the drug quantity on direct appeal, the district
court ruled he was procedurally barred from raising that claim in his § 2255 motion unless
he showed cause and prejudice. The court determined that the attorney’s deliberate
decision to forgo the claim on direct appeal was not outside the range of professionally
competent assistance required under the Sixth Amendment, given that applicable
sentencing guidelines permit sentences for drug conspiracy offenses to be based on
conduct in furtherance of a conspiracy that was known or reasonably foreseeable to the
defendant. Therefore, the attorney’s conduct did not provide cause excusing the
procedural default.
II
A § 2255 motion cannot be used “to test the legality of matters which should have
been raised on appeal.” United States v. Khan, 835 F.2d 749, 753 (10th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 487 U.S. 1222 (1988). To obtain relief on new claims, a § 2255 petitioner must
show “cause excusing his . . . procedural default, and . . . actual prejudice resulting from
the errors of which he complains.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 168 (1982)
(quotations omitted).
4
The same attorney represented Rogers at trial and on direct appeal.
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An attorney’s error provides cause to excuse a procedural default only if the error
amounts to constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. See Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722, 753-54 (1991); see also United States v. Kissick, 69 F.3d 1048, 1054 (10th
Cir. 1995). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show (1) that
his attorney’s performance was deficient and (2) that the deficient performance
prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); United
States v. Cook, 49 F.3d 663, 665 (10th Cir. 1995).
Repentance born of a failed trial or sentencing strategy can often be turned against
defense counsel. We recognize that such criticism is often converted into a challenge
asserting inadequate assistance. Thus, we look for genuine -- rather than perceived --
ineffectiveness of counsel. Under Strickland we first examine whether “‘counsel made
errors so serious that [he] was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant
by the Sixth Amendment.’” Kissick, 69 F.3d at 1054 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687). “[A] defendant is entitled to the exercise [of] the skill, judgment and diligence of a
reasonably competent defense attorney.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted). “Judicial
scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
689. “A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s
challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”
Id. We “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide
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range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered
sound trial strategy.’” Id. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).
Under the prejudice aspect of Strickland we inquire whether “‘there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.’” Kissick, 69 F.3d at 1055 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
694). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “However, a court may not set aside a conviction
or a sentence solely because the outcome would have been different absent counsel’s
deficient performance.” Kissick, 69 F.3d at 1055. “Instead, in order to establish the
required prejudice, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s deficient performance
rendered the proceeding ‘fundamentally unfair or unreliable.’” Id. (quoting Lockhart v.
Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838, 842-43 (1993)).
“In a § 2255 action, we review the district court’s legal conclusions regarding
ineffective assistance of counsel claims de novo.” Cook, 49 F.3d at 665. We also review
the district court’s interpretation and application of the sentencing guidelines de novo. Id.
III
Rogers was sentenced in November 1988, barely one year after the sentencing
guidelines took effect. The 1988 guidelines required the district court to set Rogers’ base
offense level at the “level specified in the Drug Quantity Table.” USSG § 2D1.1(a)(3)
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(1988). Similar to the current guidelines, the 1988 Drug Quantity Table established
sixteen base offense levels, based on the “Controlled Substances and Quantity” involved
in the drug offense. Id., Drug Quantity Table. A footnote to the Drug Quantity Table
stated, in relevant part: “The scale amounts for all controlled substances refer to the total
weight of the controlled substance. Consistent with the provisions of the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act, if any mixture of a compound contains any detectable amount of a controlled
substance, the entire amount of the mixture or compound shall be considered in
measuring the quantity.” § 2D1.1, Drug Quantity Table, note * (1988).
At Rogers’ sentencing hearing, the district court grappled with the quantity of
heroin that should be used to determine the base offense level, and concluded that “the
street quantity is the quantity that the Court will use for purposes of resolving any
differences here and not the raw or uncut heroin, and there is ample testimony to the
effect that a cut of seven is a reasonable figure.” Sentencing Tr., Appellant’s App. at 43-
44. The district court added, however, “And I think that the street quantity is clearly what
is referred to, for example, in illustrative cases given in the commentary to the rules here,
some appear on page 241 of the version of the guidelines that I’m using, that street
quantity at the retail level is the reference.” Id. at 44.
Unclear about the district court’s reason for multiplying the pure heroin by the
number of times it was cut for resale, Rogers asked whether the court had made a specific
finding about the use of the multiplier. The district court answered, “Yes, that the street
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quantity is the pertinent amount for purposes of the [Drug Quantity] table. . . . And that
finding is based in part upon the examples given, which to me are quite clearly in
reference to street amounts.” Id. at 56.
The examples to which the court referred are those that follow application note 10,
in the commentary to § 2D1.1 of the 1988 guidelines. The examples show how to use the
Drug Equivalency Table to arrive at a base offense level. The Drug Equivalency Table
provides conversion factors to be used when two or more controlled substances must be
combined to arrive at a single base offense level, or when the offense involves a
controlled substance not listed in the Drug Quantity Table. Although one of the examples
involves cut controlled substances, and the others involve rather large quantities, none of
the examples indicate that pure drugs should be converted to the street quantity at the
retail level before selecting the base offense level from the Drug Quantity Table. The
district court appears to have incorrectly interpreted the examples to require conversion of
pure drugs to the street quantity at the retail level.
We are not convinced, however, that the sentence imposed by the district court was
erroneous under the facts of this case. In a drug conspiracy case, such as this one, “a
defendant’s sentence is not based merely upon the amount with which the defendant dealt
personally.” United States v. Edwards, 69 F.3d 419, 438 (10th Cir. 1995) (citations and
quotations omitted), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3821 (June 10, 1996). Instead, the
guidelines require the sentencing court to consider relevant conduct of co-conspirators in
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setting the base offense level. USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1), application note 1 (1988); USSG §
2D1.4, application note 1 (1988); USSG § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (1995). Thus, under certain
circumstances, the guidelines attribute a co-conspirator’s cuts to or conversion of a
controlled substance to a defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423,
1444 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2258, 115 S. Ct. 2259, 116 S. Ct. 133 (1995).
When Rogers was sentenced, the guidelines required the sentencing court to
account for “conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy that was known to or was
reasonably foreseeable by the defendant.” § 1B1.3, application note 1 (1988). Regarding
conspiracies to commit drug offenses, the 1988 guidelines also provided:
If the defendant is convicted of a conspiracy that includes transactions in
controlled substances in addition to those that are the subject of substantive
counts of conviction, each conspiracy transaction shall be included with
those of the substantive counts of conviction to determine scale. . . . If the
defendant is convicted of conspiracy, the sentence should be imposed only
on the basis of the defendant’s conduct or the conduct of co-conspirators in
furtherance of the conspiracy that was known to the defendant or was
reasonably foreseeable.
USSG § 2D1.4, application note 1 (1988).
Although the applicable guidelines sections required the district court to sentence
Rogers for reasonably foreseeable conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy, the district
court made no explicit findings in this regard. The court did imply, however, that it had
other reasons for multiplying the pure heroin by the number of times it was cut, other than
its determination that the examples in the guidelines referred to street quantities. See
Sentencing Tr., Appellant’s App. at 56 (stating that the finding that the street quantity is
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the pertinent amount for purposes of the Drug Quantity Table “is based in part upon the
examples given” (emphasis added)).
Ruling on Rogers’ § 2255 motion, the district court drew this conclusion from the
record: “Although [Rogers] may not have personally participated in cutting or selling the
heroin in its diluted ‘street quantity’ form, the later drug sales were a foreseeable result of
his drug sales and were well within the scope of [his] agreement to provide heroin for
subsequent distribution in multiplied form.” Appellant’s App. at 161. The district court
held that the attorney’s decision not to raise the multiplier argument on direct appeal was
not unreasonable, given that the guidelines “entitled” the sentencing court to base the
defendant’s sentence on the amount of drugs involved in foreseeable transactions in
furtherance of the conspiracy.
We agree. Although the sentencing court may have incorrectly read the examples
in the guidelines to require automatic conversion of pure drugs to street quantities, the
guidelines not only permitted, but required, the court to account for foreseeable cuts to the
heroin in furtherance of the conspiracy. The district court has now determined that the
record shows that all cuts to the heroin were foreseeable and within the scope of Rogers’
agreement to participate in the conspiracy. Under these circumstances, Rogers’ attorney
had little to gain by raising the multiplier issue on appeal. Thus, we conclude that
Rogers’ attorney did not provide constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to raise
this error on direct appeal.
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Rogers claims that the guidelines would not have allowed the sentencing court to
treat the co-conspirators’ cuts to the heroin as relevant conduct. He argues that although
the cuts were foreseeable, they were not within the scope of any activity he agreed to
jointly undertake. We cannot determine from the small part of the trial transcript that has
been included in the record on appeal whether the cuts were within the scope of Rogers’
agreement to participate in the conspiracy. Since Rogers challenges the district court’s
factual finding that “cutting or selling the heroin in its diluted ‘street quantity’ form . . .
[was] well within the scope of [his] agreement to provide heroin for subsequent
distribution in multiplied form,” it is not unreasonable to expect Rogers to have included
in the record on appeal all evidence relevant to that finding if he wishes to challenge it.
See Dikeman v. National Educators, Inc., 81 F.3d 949, 955 (10th Cir. 1996); Deines v.
Vermeer Mfg. Co., 969 F.2d 977, 978-79 (10th Cir. 1992). Without an adequate record,
we will not set aside the district court’s facially rational finding that the cuts to the heroin
were within the scope of Rogers’ agreement to participate in the drug distribution
conspiracy.
Affirmed.
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