United States v. Ortiz-Trejo

                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 8/16/96
                        FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
                                ______

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,           )
                                     )
     Plaintiff-Appellee,            )
                                     )
v.                                   )         No. 95-2287
                                     )    (D.C. No. CR 94-726)
VALENTIN ORTIZ-TREJO,               )     (Dist. of New Mexico)
                                     )
     Defendant-Appellant.           )
                               ______

                         ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                               ______

Before ANDERSON, BARRETT, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
                              ______

          After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this

panel has determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for

a decision on the briefs without oral argument.    See Fed. R. App.

P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9.      The case is therefore ordered

submitted without oral argument.

     Valentin Ortiz-Trejo (Ortiz-Trejo) appeals his conviction and

sentence following a jury trial wherein he was found guilty of

knowingly and intentionally possessing marijuana with the intent to

distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(D).

     On December 1, 1994, Jesus Bruno-Marquez (Bruno-Marquez) was

arrested at a United States Border Patrol checkpoint north of Las

     *
      This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except
under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation
of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may
be cited under the terms and conditions of Tenth Cir. R. 36.3.
Cruces, New Mexico, based on a quantity of marijuana discovered in

the Mercury Monarch he was driving.              Shortly after his arrest,

Bruno-Marquez      agreed,      in   cooperation    with   law       enforcement

officials, to transport the marijuana to Santa Fe, New Mexico, for

a controlled delivery.

        Bruno-Marquez      traveled with law enforcement officials to

Albuquerque, New Mexico, where he placed a tape-recorded phone call

to   Ortiz-Trejo     in    Santa Fe.     The conversation was conducted

entirely in Spanish and later translated and transcribed into

English.     After the phone conversation, Bruno-Marquez and law

enforcement officials traveled to Santa Fe where Bruno-Marquez

agreed to meet Ortiz-Trejo at a local motel.

        At the motel, Ortiz-Trejo got into the Mercury Monarch with

Bruno-Marquez and handed him $1,000 in $100 denominations for the

delivery of the vehicle.             After the money was delivered, law

enforcement officers arrested Ortiz-Trejo.

        On December 8, 1994, Ortiz-Trejo was indicted for knowingly

and intentionally possessing with intent to distribute less than

fifty    kilograms    of    marijuana,    in   violation   of   21    U.S.C.   §§

841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(D) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.

        At trial, both the tape of the recorded conversation between

Ortiz-Trejo and Bruno-Marquez and the written translation were

admitted into evidence without objection. (Appellant’s Appendix,

Tab 5, App. 0078).         The tape was then played for the jury and each


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juror received a copy of the written translation.

     The jury began deliberating after lunch on April 4, 1995.

Later that afternoon, the jurors asked if they could listen to the

tape of the conversation.         Although the district court expressed

some reservations, the court granted the jurors’ request and

instructed     the    courtroom    deputy       to   play   the    tape-recorded

conversation for the jury and then remove the tape player from the

jury room.    There were no objections to the arrangement.

     At the end of the day, the jury foreman informed the district

court that the jury had not reached a decision and was deadlocked.

After a supplemental Allen1 instruction and brief deliberation, the

jury recessed for the day.

     The     following     day,    the     jury      returned     and   continued

deliberations.       At mid-morning, the jury again requested that the

district     court     permit     the     playing     of    the    tape-recorded

conversation.        Over Ortiz-Trejo’s objection, the district court

allowed the jury to hear the tape again.              The district court found

that the jury was “entitled to hear it as many times as they want

to because they can obviously review the other exhibits as many

times as they want to.”         (Appellant’s Appendix, Tab 5 at 208).           A

short time later, the jury returned a verdict of guilty.

     On appeal, Ortiz-Trejo contends that the district court erred

in allowing the jury to rehear for a second time the tape-recorded


     1
             Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896).

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conversation between himself and Bruno-Marquez, which was conducted

in Spanish, with the English translation of the conversation which

was admitted into evidence by stipulation.          He argues that the

Spanish speaking members of the jury improperly influenced the

other jurors and that the jury placed undue and improper weight on

the tape-recorded conversation, as evidenced by the guilty verdict

shortly after the jury heard the tape-recorded conversation for the

second time.

     “The transmittal of exhibits to the jury is ordinarily a

matter within the discretion of the trial court and will not be

reversed in the absence of clear prejudice.”        United States v. De

Hernandez, 745 F.2d 1305, 1308 (10th Cir. 1984).        The tape of the

conversation and the written translation were both admitted into

evidence   without   objection   as   Government   Exhibits   7   and   10,

respectively. (Appellant’s Appendix, Tab 9 at 98-100). Therefore,

we review the district court’s decision for an abuse of discretion.

Under the abuse of discretion standard, the district court’s

decision will not be disturbed unless we have a definite and firm

conviction that the district court made a clear error of judgment

or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.

Moothart v. Bell, 21 F.3d 1499, 1504 (10th Cir. 1994).

     After careful consideration of the record, we hold that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the jury

to hear the tape-recorded conversation a second time.         It is true


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that the Spanish speaking jurors had the unique advantage of

understanding the conversation in Spanish and the opportunity to

relay and interpret the conversation during deliberation. However,

each juror had a transcript of the conversation in English which

could be examined.

     Individual jurors bring different skills and backgrounds to

the deliberations of juries and, without more, prejudice should not

be assumed.    See United States v. Rivera, 778 F.2d 591, 600 (10th

Cir. 1985) (no prejudice presumed in admission of tapes in Spanish

and transcripts in English), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1068 (1986).

“We ‘must not permit the integrity of the jury to be assailed by

mere suspicion and surmise; it is presumed that the jury will be

true to their oath and conscientiously observe the instructions and

admonitions of the court.’”        Id. (quoting Baker v. Hudspeth, 129

F.2d 779, 782 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 681 (1942)).

Here, the recorded tape conversation and the written translation

thereof, Exhibits 7 and 10, respectively, were admitted into

evidence without objection.         This court has held that the trial

court did not abuse its discretion even in permitting the jury to

view unadmitted evidence.         See United States v. Scott, 37 F.3d

1564, 1577 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ (1995)

(court   did   not   err   in   permitting   jury   to   have   copy   of   the

indictment in a complex tax fraud conspiracy case, particularly

considering the number of overt acts, after instructing that the


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indictment was only an accusation and not evidence); Johnston v.

Makowski, 823 F.2d 387, 390-91 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484

U.S. 1026 (1988) (defendant’s due process rights were not violated

by the presence of an unadmitted police report referring to an

unrelated attempted rape charge where jury did not consider the

report during the guilt phase).

     AFFIRMED.
                                        Entered for the Court:


                                        James E. Barrett,
                                        Senior United States
                                        Circuit Judge




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