United States v. Hawley

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 8/19/96
TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) No. 95-3061
v. )
)
VICTOR LYN HAWLEY, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas
(D.C. No. 94-CR-40039)

Submitted on the briefs: *

David J. Phillips, Federal Public Defender and Marilyn M. Trubey, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, Topeka, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellant.

*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties' request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Randall K. Rathbun, United States Attorney and Gregory G. Hough, Assistant
United States Attorney, Topeka, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Before BALDOCK, EBEL, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.

EBEL, Circuit Judge.

On August 4, 1994, a grand jury returned a two-count indictment against

Defendant-Appellant Victor Lyn Hawley and James Lopez Guardado, charging

that on or about the 25th day of July, 1994, through the 28th day of July, 1994,

they conspired to possess with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of

methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §

846; and that they possessed with the intent to distribute 100 grams or more of

methamphetamine, to wit: approximately 440 grams of methamphetamine, a

Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On

November 3, 1994, Hawley entered a plea of guilty to Count I for conspiracy and

agreed to cooperate with law enforcement. In exchange, the government dropped

Count II. Hawley was sentenced on February 6, 1995. His sentence included a

term of incarceration of 97 months. Hawley now appeals, alleging that the

government breached its plea agreement “not to oppose” certain sentencing

adjustments favorable to the Defendant and to file a motion for downward

-2-
adjustment for substantial assistance “if appropriate.” Hawley also claims that

enhancing his offense level by two points for obstruction of justice constituted

double jeopardy because judgment previously was entered against him on the

same conduct when he violated his appearance bond. We exercise jurisdiction

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm in part, reverse in part and remand for

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

On July 29, 1994, Hawley and Guardado had their first appearances before

United States Magistrate Judge Ronald C. Newman relating to the above

mentioned charges. At Hawley's detention hearing on August 1, 1994, Judge

Newman released Hawley on a $50,000 unsecured bond payable to the United

States upon failure to appear as ordered. In the appearance bond, Hawley agreed

to appear at all scheduled appearances in the case. Judge Newman also advised

Hawley that his next appearance date was August 16, 1994, at 9:00 a.m. at the

U.S. District Court in Topeka, Kansas for arraignment.

On August 16, 1994, Hawley failed to appear at his arraignment. On that

same day, Judge Newman signed an order forfeiting Hawley's bond and directing

issuance of a bench warrant for Hawley's arrest. On August 24, 1994, United

States District Court Judge Sam Crow signed an order granting the United States'

-3-
motion for judgment on bond forfeiture in the Hawley matter. Hawley was

eventually arrested again on September 9, 1994, in Arkansas, and he was

arraigned on September 30, 1994, before Judge Newman. After a hearing on the

United States' motion for revocation of Hawley's pretrial release, on October 6,

1994, Judge Newman revoked Hawley's pretrial release and entered an order of

detention.

On November 3, 1994, Hawley, as part of a plea agreement with the United

States Attorney’s office, entered a plea of guilty to Count I of the indictment. At

that time, Hawley stipulated to facts sufficient to prove him guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt of the offense charged in Count I of the indictment. 1 In addition

to pleading guilty to Count I of the indictment, Hawley agreed to provide

information about the matters charged in the indictment in this case and to submit

to a polygraph examination on the information provided. In exchange for

Hawley's plea, the government agreed to dismiss Count II of the indictment; "to

not oppose that [Hawley] receive a three level reduction" for acceptance of

responsibility; "to not oppose that [Hawley] not receive a two level enhancement

for obstruction of justice;" and "if appropriate, prior to sentencing," to file a

1
Those facts were summarized as follows: On July 28, 1994, Hawley and
Guardado were detained during a routine traffic stop by a Kansas State Highway
Trooper. The trooper discovered 440 grams of methamphetamine in the car and
Hawley ultimately acknowledged participation in a conspiracy to distribute that
methamphetamine.

-4-
motion pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 for any substantial assistance provided

pursuant to the agreement.

Prior to sentencing, Hawley learned that the government did not intend to

file a motion for a downward departure based on substantial assistance. He then

filed a motion to enforce the plea agreement because he had provided information

to law enforcement. In addition, he filed a motion to continue the sentencing

hearing scheduled for January 20, 1995. The district court, in chambers, held a

hearing concerning matters that were relevant to Hawley's ability to provide

information pursuant to the plea agreement. Hawley argued that he had been

debriefed by the DEA subsequent to his entering a plea, and that he had provided

information regarding drug activities in California and Arkansas. He further

argued that, notwithstanding assurances from certain law enforcement officials in

Arkansas that Hawley was still valuable to investigations there, his ability to

provide information regarding drug activities in Arkansas had been compromised

by law enforcement, and he suggested there was reason to suspect that law

enforcement themselves were involved in the drug activities. Hawley requested

that the court order an investigation to determine whether his "attempted"

cooperation had been undermined by law enforcement in any way.

The court denied the motion to enforce the plea agreement on the

government’s representation that no assistance had been provided to date that

-5-
would be deemed substantial. However, the court continued the sentencing

hearing to allow for an investigation into whether federal agents and/or local law

enforcement agents in Arkansas were engaged in any misconduct which precluded

Hawley's cooperation.

The matter proceeded to sentencing on February 6, 1995. Hawley again

filed a motion to continue the sentencing hearing because reports from the earlier

investigation had not been completed. In addition, he filed a renewed motion to

enforce the plea agreement, incorporating the arguments from the earlier motion

and stating in addition that he was now willing to provide the government with

any information it desired, including information concerning his brother's drug

activities which he had declined to provide earlier. The government responded

that the investigation by the FBI had preliminarily indicated that the allegations

made at the previous hearing were unsubstantiated. The government questioned

Hawley’s good faith claim of cooperation and stated that the information he had

provided was not substantial and did not merit a downward departure motion.

The court denied both of the motions made on behalf of Hawley.

The court then determined the total offense level applicable to Hawley to

be 30. In calculating this base offense level, the court determined that a two-

point enhancement for obstruction of justice was merited due to Hawley's failure

to appear at a prior court hearing. Further, the court concluded that Hawley was

-6-
not entitled to a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. Hawley

argued that the obstruction enhancement was precluded under the Double

Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because judgment in the amount of

$50,000 had been taken against him on his appearance bond based on conduct

also used to apply the enhancement. Further, Hawley argued that he was entitled

to an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility because he had cooperated with

authorities subsequent to his arrest and had timely entered a plea of guilty.

The government acknowledged its obligations under the plea agreement not

to oppose an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility and not to argue in favor

of an obstruction of justice enhancement. However, the government went on to

note that it was not aware of certain facts contained in the presentence report at

the time of the plea agreement, and that the record did not indicate that this was a

"circumstance meriting any extraordinary credit." In light of the government's

position, Hawley requested that he be allowed to withdraw his plea due to the

government's violation of the terms of the plea agreement. The court denied that

request, concluded that the base offense level was accurately calculated at 30, and

sentenced Hawley to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for a term of 97

months.

On appeal, Hawley argues that: (1) He was subjected to double punishment

for the same offense in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause when the district

-7-
court enhanced his base offense level by two levels for obstruction of justice after

previously entering judgment against him on his appearance bond for the same

conduct; (2) The district court erred in not granting him a reduction in his base

offense level for acceptance of responsibility; (3) The district court erred in

denying his Motion To Enforce The Plea Agreement; and (4) The district court

erred in denying his Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Plea.

DISCUSSION

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a two-point increase in the base

offense level "[i]f the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to

obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation,

prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense." U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The district

court assessed this enhancement against Hawley because he failed to appear for

arraignment as ordered. Hawley contends this constitutes double punishment in

violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause because judgment previously was entered

against him on his $50,000 appearance bond as a result of the same conduct. We

review the district court's factual findings as to the obstruction of justice under

the clearly erroneous standard, and review de novo the district court's legal

interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Janus Industries, 48

-8-
F.3d 1548, 1559-60 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 87 (1995). We also

review de novo the district court's legal conclusion regarding double jeopardy.

United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 665 (10th Cir. 1989).

The Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy protects against a

second prosecution for the same offense and against multiple punishments for the

same offense. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). Hawley's

double jeopardy argument is based solely upon the latter protection against

multiple punishments for the same offense. We have recognized that the

forfeiture of a bail bond is a civil proceeding arising from a criminal one. United

States v. Brouillet, 736 F.2d 1414, 1415 (10th Cir. 1984). However, the fact that

a sanction is fairly characterized as "civil" does not mean that it can never

constitute punishment for the purposes of double jeopardy analysis. The Supreme

Court in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989), stated that:

[T]he labels "criminal" and "civil" are not of paramount importance.
It is commonly understood that civil proceedings may advance
punitive as well as remedial goals, and, conversely, that both may be
served by criminal penalties . . . . [T]he determination of whether a
given civil sanction constitutes punishment in the relevant sense
requires a particularized assessment of the penalty imposed and the
purposes that the penalty may fairly be said to serve. Simply put, a
civil as well as a criminal sanction constitutes punishment when the
sanction as applied in the individual case serves the goals of
punishment.

-9-
The rule announced in Halper is that a civil sanction may be considered punitive

when it subjects the offender to a “sanction overwhelmingly disproportionate to

the damages he has caused . . . [and when] the civil penalty . . . bears no rational

relation to the goal of compensating the Government for its loss . . . .” Id. at 449;

see also Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1947-48 (1994)

(relying on Halper to conclude that a state tax on illegally grown marijuana

exacted punishment and not merely revenue). 2

The government argues that Hawley's bail bond was a form of contract

between the government on the one hand and Hawley and his surety on the other.

When Hawley violated the terms of his pretrial release he breached the contract

with the government and the judgment entered in the government’s favor on the

appearance bond was the government's remedy under the contract. The

government argues that this civil sanction served a "remedial purpose," and was

reasonably related to the government’s damages. We agree.

The Court in Halper stated that courts should undertake a "particularized

assessment" of the civil penalty imposed and the purposes that the penalty may

2
The recent Supreme Court case of United States v. Ursery, ___ U.S. ___,
No. 95-345, 1996 WL 340815, *16 (June 24, 1996), is not directly dispositive
because it held that in rem civil forfeitures do not implicate the Double Jeopardy
Clause. Here, there was no in rem forfeiture because Hawley’s appearance bond
was unsecured; rather upon his breach of the terms of the bond an in personam
judgment in the $50,000 face amount of the bond was entered against him.

-10-
fairly be said to serve when determining whether a given civil sanction constitutes

punishment. 490 U.S. at 448. In making such an assessment, we note that not

every monetary penalty exceeding actual financial loss is per se punitive. "[T]he

government is entitled to rough remedial justice, that is, it may demand

compensation according to somewhat imprecise formulas, such as reasonable

liquidated damages or a fixed sum plus double damages, without being deemed to

have imposed a second punishment for the purpose of double jeopardy analysis."

Id. at 446.

In this case, Hawley's failure to appear for a scheduled court proceeding

delayed the timely disposition of this case. A warrant had to be issued for

Hawley's arrest in order to bring him back to the District of Kansas. Based on

these facts, we conclude that the $50,000 judgment for violating the appearance

bond was not overly disproportionate to the government's anticipated costs

associated with being forced to delay Hawley's criminal proceeding and hunt him

down. Therefore, that judgment was remedial and not punitive, posing no double

jeopardy bar to the enhancement of Hawley's sentence under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.

Cf. United States v. Barger, 458 F.2d 396, 396-97 (9th Cir. 1972) (forfeiting bail

compensates for damages and is deemed civil, not criminal in nature; hence, it

does not implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause when the defendant is also

convicted of the crime of jumping bail); United States v. Garcia-Trevino, 843 F.

-11-
Supp. 1134, 1134-35 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (applying Halper and concluding that “the

entry of a civil judgment forfeiting a bond for failure to appear at trial solely

serves a remedial purpose, not punishment of the defendant, and therefore is not a

bar to subsequent criminal prosecution for failure to appear based on the same

conduct”).

Furthermore, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Witte v. United

States, 115 S.Ct. 2199 (1995), we are compelled to conclude that the enhancement

for obstruction of justice was not punishment for any conduct other than the

conduct to which Hawley pleaded guilty. In Witte, the defendant pleaded guilty

to a federal marijuana charge. 115 S.Ct. at 2203. The presentence report

calculated the base offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines by aggregating

the total quantity of drugs involved, including drugs relating to uncharged

criminal conduct, in this case, cocaine. Id. Under the Guidelines, the sentencing

range for an offense is calculated on the basis of all “relevant conduct” in which

the defendant was engaged and is not limited to the conduct underlying the

offense of conviction. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3. When the defendant was subsequently

indicted for offenses relating to his involvement with cocaine, he moved to

dismiss the charges, arguing that he had already been punished for the offenses

because the cocaine had been considered as “relevant conduct” at his marijuana

-12-
sentencing. Witte, 115 S.Ct. at 2203-04. Thus, defendant argued, the subsequent

prosecution on cocaine charges violated the Double Jeopardy Clause.

The Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that “use of evidence of

related criminal conduct to enhance a defendant’s sentence for a separate crime

within the authorized statutory limits does not constitute punishment for that

conduct within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause.” Id. at 2206.

Furthermore, “it makes no difference . . . whether the enhancement occurred in

the first or second sentencing proceeding.” Id.

The relevant conduct provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines, like
their criminal history counterparts and the recidivism statutes . . ., are
sentencing enhancement regimes evincing the judgment that a
particular offense should receive a more serious sentence within the
authorized range if it was either accompanied by or preceded by
additional criminal activity . . . . We hold that, where the legislature
has authorized such a particular punishment range for a given crime,
the resulting sentence within that range constitutes punishment only
for the offense of conviction for purposes of the double jeopardy
inquiry.

Id. at 2208. We conclude that the facts of this case are governed by Witte. The

enhancement of Hawley’s sentence under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 was punishment for

the underlying offense to which he pleaded guilty, not punishment for failing to

appear. See also United States v. Carey, 943 F.2d 44, 46-47 (11th Cir. 1991)

(citing several other circuits and holding that a two level increase for obstruction

of justice in first case relating to credit card fraud does not constitute punishment

-13-
for failure to appear and does not bar a later prosecution for failing to appear),

cert. denied, 503 U.S. 987 (1992).

ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY

Hawley next argues that the district court erred in not granting him a

reduction in his base offense level for acceptance of responsibility. We review

for clear error the district court's refusal to grant a reduction in offense level for

acceptance of responsibility. United States v. Grey, 56 F.3d 1219, 1223 n.1 (10th

Cir. 1995). "We recognize that ’[t]he sentencing judge is in a unique position to

evaluate a defendant's acceptance of responsibility. For this reason, the

determination of the sentencing judge is entitled to great deference on review.’"

United States v. Gacnik, 50 F.3d 848, 853 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting U.S.S.G. §

3E1.1, comment. (n.5)) (alteration in original).

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 provides in relevant part as follows: “(a) If the defendant

clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense, decrease the

offense level by 2 levels.” Application Note 3 to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 provides that

entry of a plea of guilty prior to the commencement of trial combined with

admission of the conduct of the offense of conviction and any other additional

relevant conduct constitutes significant evidence of acceptance of responsibility.

Application Note 3 goes on to say, however, that this evidence may be

-14-
“outweighed by conduct of the defendant that is inconsistent with such acceptance

of responsibility,” and that the guilty plea does not entitle the defendant to an

adjustment as a matter of right. Application Note 4 then advises that "[c]onduct

resulting in an enhancement under § 3C1.1 (Obstructing or Impeding the

Administration of Justice) ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not accepted

responsibility for his criminal conduct. There may, however, be extraordinary

cases in which adjustments under both §§ 3C1.1 and 3E1.1 may apply."

The district court denied the § 3E1.1 downward adjustment for acceptance

of responsibility on the basis of Application Note 4, concluding that there were no

exceptional circumstances warranting a § 3E1.1 adjustment in light of Hawley’s

conduct of flight that gave rise to an upward enhancement for obstructing justice

under § 3C1.1. Hawley argues that, if he loses his double jeopardy challenge to

the upward adjustment for obstructing justice (as he has), this is nevertheless one

of those "extraordinary cases" where an adjustment under both §§ 3C1.1 and

3E1.1 is appropriate. He relies principally on United States v. Hopper, 27 F.3d

378, 383 (9th Cir. 1994), where the Ninth Circuit held that an enhancement for

obstruction of justice is not inconsistent with an acceptance of responsibility

adjustment "when a defendant, although initially attempting to conceal the crime,

eventually accepts responsibility for the crime and abandons all attempts to

obstruct justice." Hawley contends that the conduct constituting obstruction of

-15-
justice did not continue after he was received back into custody in September,

1994, and that upon his return to Kansas in late September, 1994, he immediately

entered into negotiations with the government to provide information concerning

other criminal activity and entered his plea of guilty. Thus, the conduct forming

the basis for the obstruction of justice enhancement ceased and was replaced by

conduct indicating a clear acceptance of responsibility.

In determining whether a defendant has "accepted responsibility," we have

held that "the sentencing court can consider if there has been a 'voluntary

termination or withdrawal from criminal conduct or associations.’" United States

v. Amos, 984 F.2d 1067, 1073 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1,

Application Note 1(b)). In this case, assuming arguendo that Hawley accurately

characterizes his conduct after being returned to Kansas, there still remains the

question as to whether his "good conduct" was in fact voluntary. Hawley fails to

appreciate the fact that he had been arrested, released on an appearance bond, and

then violated his appearance bond. He had to be returned to Kansas by law

enforcement; he did not return on his own. Conduct amounting to escape or

violation of an appearance bond is certainly evidence of failure to accept

responsibility, and this fact alone provides adequate foundation for the district

court's decision. See id. at 1072-73 (concluding that defendant’s attempted

escape from jail while awaiting sentencing supported application of enhancement

-16-
for obstruction of justice and provided adequate grounds for denial of downward

adjustment for acceptance of responsibility). Thus, notwithstanding Hawley's

emphasis on Hopper and his conduct after returning to Kansas, the district court

did not clearly err in its conclusion that Hawley failed to "clearly demonstrate[]

acceptance of responsibility" entitling him to a reduction in his sentence under §

3E1.1. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). 3

3
Hawley also claims that he qualifies for the additional one-point downward
adjustment under subsection (b), which authorizes such an adjustment in the
following situation:

(b) If the defendant qualifies for a decrease under
subsection (a), the offense level determined prior to the
operation of subsection (a) is level 16 or greater, and the
defendant has assisted authorities in the investigation or
prosecution of his own misconduct by taking one or
more of the following steps:

(1) timely providing complete information to the
government concerning his own involvement in
the offense; or

(2) timely notifying authorities of his intention to
enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the
government to avoid preparing for trial and
permitting the court to allocate its resources
efficiently.

Because Hawley's entitlement to an adjustment under subsection (b) turns on
whether he first meets the requirements of subsection (a), which he has not done,
we reject this argument as well.

-17-
MOTION TO ENFORCE THE PLEA AGREEMENT

Hawley asserts that he was entitled to a motion pursuant to U.S.S.G. §

5K1.1 (substantial assistance), 4 and also that the government was required to file

such motion pursuant to the plea agreement. He alleges that the government acted

in bad faith in not filing the motion. Whether government conduct has violated a

plea agreement is a question of law which we review de novo. United States v.

Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1442 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 133 (1995).

"[P]lea bargains are governed by contract principles, and if any ambiguities are

present, they will be resolved against the drafter.” United States v. Massey, 997

F.2d 823, 824 (10th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted) (alteration in original).

In exchange for Hawley's plea of guilty to Count I of the indictment, the

government made certain concessions. The concession at issue here is found at

paragraph 7(D) of the Plea Agreement. In paragraph 7(D) the government agreed:

If appropriate, prior to sentencing, to file a motion pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, to reduce [Hawley's] sentence to reflect his
substantial assistance, if any, in the investigation and/or prosecution
of another person(s) involved in this offense or other offenses . . . .

4
U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 provides in part: "Upon motion of the government
stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation
or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the court may
depart from the guidelines."

-18-
Paragraph 8, however, states that "[t]he defendant acknowledges and understands

that the decision, whether to file this motion, and whether he has provided

substantial assistance, is a matter that resides in the sole and exclusive discretion

of the United States Attorney for the District of Kansas."

Hawley contends that he did "substantially assist" the government by: (1)

providing information concerning the activities which formed the basis of the

Indictment, both in California and Arkansas; (2) providing information to the

court regarding conduct in Arkansas which interfered with his ability to

cooperate; and (3) expressing his willingness to provide information about his

brother's drug activities. Hawley further contends that the government took no

steps to have a polygraph examination administered to him concerning the

information he provided and that the government conducted a "less than

enthusiastic investigation" into his claims regarding interference with his ability

to cooperate before concluding them to be meritless. The government responds

that Hawley did not substantially assist its investigations, and that after Hawley

was returned to custody, he "further obstructed justice by making false

allegations of law enforcement corruption in Arkansas," which, upon

investigation, turned out to be fictitious. 5

5
At the sentencing hearing the government also informed the court that
"there is evidence that indicates that during the period of time that [Hawley] was
at-large between the time that he failed to appear and subsequently was arrested,
(continued...)

-19-
 The district court concluded that "the government has demonstrated it has

abided by the terms of the plea agreement and the government has reasonably and

apparently in good faith concluded that the information provided by the defendant

is not sufficient to warrant the filing of a motion pursuant to § 5K1.1, and the

defendant's failure to -- failure and inability to provide information that would

substantially assist the government in its investigation of criminal activities

clearly justify the government decision not to file a motion for a reduction of

sentence for substantial assistance, and therefore, a motion to enforce the plea

agreement is again denied."

As with other decisions made by prosecutors, "federal district courts have

authority to review a prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial-assistance motion

and to grant a remedy if they find that the refusal was based on an

unconstitutional motive." Wade v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1840, 1843-44

(1992) (stating as an example of an unconstitutional motive a situation where a

prosecutor refuses to file a substantial-assistance motion because of the

defendant's race or religion). "It follows that a claim that a defendant merely

provided substantial assistance will not entitle a defendant to a remedy or even to

5
(...continued)
knowing that the codefendant was providing information, the defendant provided
information to others, particularly his brother, indicating the codefendant was
providing information, and in that manner obstructed the assistance of the
codefendant."

-20-
discovery or an evidentiary hearing. Nor would additional but generalized

allegations of improper motive." Id. at 1844. "[A]bsent an unconstitutional

motive for refusing to do so, the prosecution enjoys complete discretion in

determining whether to file a substantial assistance motion, and . . . a claim

seeking to compel a motion based on a defendant's view of what he or she deems

to have been 'substantial assistance' will not be entertained." Massey, 997 F.2d at

824 (citing Wade, 112 S. Ct. at 1844).

We have stated that "Congress wisely or unwisely left the matter of

substantial assistance to the prosecutor, unless there's a formal agreement which

would bind the prosecutor." Massey, 997 F.2d at 824 (internal quotation marks

omitted). Under Hawley’s Plea Agreement the decision whether to file a motion

for substantial assistance resides within the "sole and exclusive discretion" of the

prosecutor. Hawley does not allege that the government in this case had an

unconstitutional motive for its refusal to file a motion for substantial assistance

on his behalf. Thus, we lack jurisdiction to consider this claim further. See

United States v. Gerber, 24 F.3d 93, 95 (10th Cir. 1994) (exercising jurisdiction

to review “alleged constitutional infirmities arising from the prosecutor’s

discretionary refusal to file a § 5K1.1 motion”).

MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA

-21-
 In exchange for Hawley entering a plea of guilty to Count I of the

Indictment, the government also agreed, inter alia, not to oppose that Hawley

receive a three level reduction for acceptance of responsibility and not to oppose

that Hawley not receive a two level enhancement for obstruction of justice. The

presentence report recommended that Hawley should receive a two-level

enhancement for obstruction of justice and that, pursuant to Application Note 4 of

U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, Hawley be denied a downward adjustment for acceptance of

responsibility. In the government's written response to the presentence report, the

government made the following comments:

The government responds in acknowledging its obligation under the
plea agreement not to advocate such an enhancement but agrees with
the facts related to the presentence report.

The government acknowledges its obligation under the plea
agreement to not oppose a three-level reduction for acceptance of
responsibility. Further, the government agrees with the facts related
in the presentence report and states there is no evidence that this is
"an extraordinary case" allowing for both an enhancement pursuant
to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 and a reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.

At the sentencing hearing the government made the following additional

comments to the judge:

May it please the court, your honor, regarding the defendant’s
objections, we have filed a formal response to the formal objections.
They are considered in the presentence investigation report. They
accurately reflect the government’s position. Pursuant to plea
agreement, our position was that, at the time that the agreement was
signed, to not oppose that no enhancement for obstruction occur, and

-22-
 not oppose that exception -- acceptance of responsibility credit be
given; however, we note for the record the facts contained in the
presentence investigation report that we were not aware of at the time
of the agreement. We also note the facts regarding the defendant’s
debriefing that -- or lack thereof that were unknown to us at the time
that we entered into the plea agreement. We believe that in spite of
our absence of opposition to the defendant’s not getting the
obstruction and getting acceptance that the facts are accurately
recited in the PSIR.

As it relates to this, however, being an extraordinary circumstance
meriting any extraordinary credit, we believe the record is completely
devoid of that and that the record would be in the PSIR, and we
believe that the court, upon reflection of the facts contained therein,
should come to a similar conclusion. There is just nothing
extraordinary about this matter as it relates to the role in the offense,
the defendant’s role in the offense between him and Mr. Guardado.
He would have been above Mr. Guardado, and in fact, it appears that
through his relationship with his brother would have had a
substantially superior role to others involved in this matter as a
purely factual matter, and for that reason, largely for that reason, he
was unwilling to give up any information whatsoever in a timely
fashion regarding his brother, in a fashion where anything regarding
the allegations in this indictment could have been reasonably linked
to his brother, so for those reasons, we would ask the court to
consider the plea agreement and to consider the facts contained in the
PSIR that were considered in responding to the defendant’s
objections in light of those facts that were unknown to the
government at the time that the plea agreement was entered. Thank
you.

Immediately following the government's comments during the sentencing hearing,

Hawley made the following motion:

Your Honor, the government, by the comments that it has just made,
has completely violated every term of the plea agreement that was
entered into herein; therefore we move to withdraw the plea.

-23-
The district court denied the motion.

"[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of

the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration,

such promise must be fulfilled." Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262

(1971). Furthermore, "[i]n order to comply with the plea agreement, the

government cannot rely upon a 'rigidly literal construction of the language' of the

agreement, nor may it accomplish 'through indirect means what it promised not to

do directly.'" United States v. Hand, 913 F.2d 854, 856 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting

United States v. Shorteeth, 887 F.2d 253, 256 (10th Cir. 1989)). We review de

novo whether government conduct has violated a plea agreement. Allen v.

Hadden, 57 F.3d 1529, 1534 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 544 (1995).

Plea agreements are governed by contract principles, Massey, 997 F.2d at

824, and we must construe the Plea Agreement according to what Hawley

"reasonably understood" when he entered his plea, Shorteeth, 887 F.2d at 256.

After review of the Plea Agreement in this case, and the governments statements

to the court during sentencing, we conclude that the Agreement can reasonably be

interpreted as proscribing the comments made by the government at the

sentencing hearing. Furthermore, we conclude that the comments accomplished

by indirect means what the government promised not to do directly. The

government argues that it was only fulfilling its obligation to apprise the court of

-24-
"information which protects the sentencing decision from the taint of incomplete

and inaccurate information." The government further contends that provision of

such information does not violate a plea agreement where the prosecutor does not

attempt to characterize or argue its effect to the sentencing judge.

However, here the government was not responding to "inaccurate

information." See Hand, 913 F.2d at 856 (indicating that the prosecutor has a

responsibility to inform the court so that its decision will not be "tainted by

incomplete and inaccurate information"). To the contrary, the government merely

underscored the facts recited in the PSIR and argued that such facts did not show

that Hawley had presented an extraordinary situation that would entitle him to a

reduction in his sentence given the finding that he had obstructed justice. Taken

as a whole, the prosecutor’s comments here appear to be a thinly disguised, if

disguised at all, effort to persuade the court in a way that the government had

promised it would not do. In Hand, the government agreed in a plea agreement to

recommend a two-level reduction for the defendant's role as a minor participant in

the offense. 913 F.2d at 855. At the defendant's sentencing hearing, the

defendant personally testified concerning his role in the offense and called

witness to support his position. Id. The government cross-examined these

witnesses, and in doing so elicited certain factual clarifications which tended to

undermine the defendant's position that he played a minor role in the offense. Id.

-25-
The government ultimately did recommend that the defendant receive a reduction

for having a minor role in the offense, stating to the court that "the court's well

aware of the facts in this case and can make its own conclusion." Id. at 856. The

defendant argued that the government violated the plea agreement by eliciting

unfavorable facts on cross examination during the sentencing hearing and by the

prosecutor's comments that the court was free to reach its own conclusion based

on the facts before it. Id. We rejected defendant's claim, holding that "[a]

promise to 'recommend a reduction' is not a promise to stand mute in the face of

incorrect or misleading testimony offered before the trial court." Id. We did,

however, suggest that if the prosecutor had attempted to "characterize the

evidence elicited on cross examination," or to "argue the effect of such evidence

to the sentencing judge," the result might have been different. Id. & n.3.

Here, the government's comments do characterize the facts and do argue a

conclusion to the sentencing judge. The government's negative comments with

regard to whether this case was "extraordinary" could only have the effect of

opposing Hawley's receipt of an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. As

discussed earlier, the only way Hawley could have received a reduction for

acceptance of responsibility after having received an enhancement for obstruction

of justice would have been if he qualified as an "extraordinary" case. U.S.S.G. §

3E1.1, Application Note 4. Furthermore, the government was not correcting

-26-
inaccurate information when it asserted that the record is "devoid" of facts

indicating that this is an extraordinary case, and stating that "we believe that the

court, upon reflection of the facts contained therein, should come to a similar

conclusion." These statements do more than merely state facts or simply validate

those facts found in the Presentence Report; they provide a legal

"characterization" of those facts and "argue the effect" of those facts to the

sentencing judge.

Finally, the fact that the government may not have been aware of certain

facts in the Presentence Report at the time it entered into the Agreement with

Hawley does not excuse or justify its conduct at the sentencing hearing. When

plea agreements are made with "full knowledge of the facts at hand," those

agreements must be adhered to by the prosecution in order to maintain the

integrity of the plea. United States v. Cooper, 70 F.3d 563, 567 (10th Cir. 1995)

(emphasis added).

If at a later date the government discovers facts that cause it to
believe that its prosecutorial discretion was not properly exercised, it
has the ethical obligation to withdraw from the plea agreement and
advise the defendant so that he or she may prepare for trial or
renegotiate. It is certainly not proper for the government to wait
until the sentencing hearing then breach the terms of the plea
agreement, shielding its behavior by claiming its obligation to be an
ethical officer of the court.

-27-
Id. The government breached its plea agreement with Hawley, and Hawley is

entitled to relief regardless of whether the government's conduct actually affected

the sentencing judge. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262-63 (holding that whether or not

the prosecutor's conduct actually influenced the judge's decision or not, "the

interests of justice and appropriate recognition of the duties of the prosecution in

relation to promises made in the negotiation of pleas of guilty will be best served

by remanding the case to the state courts for further consideration").

The Court in Santobello remanded the case back to the state courts to

determine the defendant's ultimate relief because the state court was "in a better

position to decide whether the circumstances of [the] case require only that there

be specific performance of the agreement on the plea, in which case [defendant]

should be resentenced by a different judge, or whether, in the view of the state

court, the circumstances require granting the relief sought by [defendant], i.e., the

opportunity to withdraw his plea of guilty." Santobello, 404 U.S. at 263 (footnote

omitted). Providing this type of latitude for the district court on remand is

preferable in light of the district court's position with respect to the case. See

Allen, 57 F.3d at 1534 (citing Santobello and stating that "[i]f the court finds that

the government breached the plea agreement, the court must remand the case

either for specific performance or withdrawal of the defendant's guilty plea").

Compare Cooper, 70 F.3d at 567 (when it is clear from the appellate record that

-28-
the government’s breach of the plea agreement is intentional or egregious, the

appellate court may conclude that resentencing is not an adequate remedy and it

may order that defendant be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea). Here, we

believe it is appropriate to remand this matter to the district court for its

determination of whether the defendant should be permitted to withdraw his guilty

plea or whether he should simply be resentenced by another judge under

conditions where the government fulfills the promises it made in the Plea

Agreement to not oppose that Hawley receive a three level reduction for

acceptance of responsibility and to not oppose that Hawley not receive a two level

enhancement for obstruction of justice.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing discussion, we AFFIRM the district court's rulings

in this case in all respects, with the exception of it's denial of Hawley's Motion to

Withdraw Guilty Plea. We REMAND with instructions that the district court

determine whether Hawley’s plea should be vacated, allowing him to replead, or

whether Hawley should be resentenced by a different judge.

-29-