UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 8/23/96
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
WILLIAM E. PASCHALL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 95-7171
(D.C. No. CV-94-584-B)
SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Secretary of (E.D. Okla. )
Health and Human Services, *
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT **
Before TACHA, ALDISERT, *** and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges. ****
*
Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secretary of Health and
Human Services in social security cases were transferred to the Commissioner of
Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c), Shirley S.
Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted for Donna E. Shalala,
Secretary of Health and Human Services, as the defendant in this action.
Although we have substituted the Commissioner for the Secretary in the caption,
in the text we continue to refer to the Secretary because she was the appropriate
party at the time of the underlying decision.
**
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
***
Honorable Ruggero J. Aldisert, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
****
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
(continued...)
Plaintiff appeals the district court’s affirmance of the Secretary’s decision
denying plaintiff’s applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental
security income. After two hearings and a de novo review of the record, the
administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that plaintiff retained the residual
functional capacity (RFC) to perform light work, limited to jobs with routine
repetitive tasks. Because plaintiff’s past relevant work was performed at a higher
exertional level, the ALJ concluded at step four of the sequential analysis, see
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920, that plaintiff could not return to his past work.
Using the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (grids) as a framework, and relying on
testimony from a vocational expert (VE), the ALJ concluded at step five,
however, that plaintiff could perform a significant number of other jobs in the
national economy and, therefore, was not disabled. When the Appeals Council
subsequently denied review of the ALJ’s decision, that decision became the final
decision of the Secretary.
(...continued)
****
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
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We review the Secretary’s decision to determine whether she applied the
correct legal standards and whether her decision is supported by substantial
evidence. Washington v. Shalala, 37 F.3d 1437, 1439 (10th Cir. 1994). Although
“we must meticulously examine the record to determine whether the evidence in
support of the Secretary’s decision is substantial,” id. (quotation and citation
omitted), we may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of
the Secretary, Broadbent v. Harris, 698 F.2d 407, 414 (10th Cir. 1983).
On appeal, plaintiff contends that neither the ALJ’s determination that
plaintiff retains the RFC to perform light jobs with repetitive tasks, nor his
determination that plaintiff can perform a significant number of jobs in the
national economy, is supported by substantial evidence. Based upon our careful
review of the record, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
RFC determination. We further conclude, however, that the ALJ’s finding at step
five that plaintiff can perform a significant number of jobs in the economy is not
supported by substantial evidence.
At step five of the sequential analysis, the Secretary bears the burden of
establishing that, given the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience,
a significant number of jobs exist in the national economy that the claimant can
perform. Ragland v. Shalala, 992 F.2d 1056, 1057 (10th Cir. 1993). Both when
he applied for benefits and when the ALJ issued his decision, plaintiff was a
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person closely approaching advanced age. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App.
2, § 201.00(g)(age 50-54). Plaintiff had a high school education and, according
to the VE, he had no transferrable skills. Given plaintiff’s age, education, and
work experience, the grids would dictate a finding of disabled if plaintiff were
limited to sedentary work, id. at Table 1, Rule 201.14, but not if he could perform
a full range of light work, id. at Table 2, Rule 202.13. See also id. at
§§ 201.00(g), 202.00(b).
Due to plaintiff’s depression and resulting deficiencies in concentration, the
ALJ found that plaintiff’s ability to perform light work was limited to jobs
involving routine repetitive tasks. Because plaintiff could not perform a full
range of light work, the Secretary could not rely on the grids conclusively to
sustain her burden at step five. Ragland, 992 F.2d at 1058. Instead, the Secretary
had to “produc[e] expert vocational testimony or other similar evidence to
establish the existence of significant work within [plaintiff’s] capabilities.” Id.
The ALJ did elicit testimony from a VE but, unfortunately, asked the VE
only whether there were sedentary jobs with repetitive tasks that plaintiff could
perform. The ALJ did not inquire about light jobs. Therefore, all the jobs that
the VE identified, and upon which the ALJ subsequently relied, were sedentary.
Because plaintiff’s ability to perform sedentary jobs is “immaterial given his age,
education, and work experience,” DeFrancesco v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1040, 1045
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(7th Cir. 1989), the VE’s testimony about available sedentary jobs does not
support a finding that plaintiff is not disabled. See Distasio v. Shalala, 47 F.3d
348, 350 (9th Cir. 1995)(concluding that “[b]ecause the Secretary failed to
produce evidence that any job categorized as light work was available to [the
claimant], but only produced evidence of sedentary work available to him,”
substantial evidence did not support the Secretary’s finding that the claimant, who
was closely approaching advanced age and capable of performing only a limited
range of light work, was not disabled).
Absent evidence of the existence of a significant number of light jobs that
plaintiff can perform despite his impairments, substantial evidence does not
support the ALJ’s determination at step five that plaintiff is not disabled.
Therefore, we must reverse the denial of benefits and remand for further
proceedings. On remand, the Secretary should elicit vocational testimony or other
similar evidence about the existence of light jobs that plaintiff can perform.
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The judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Oklahoma is REVERSED, and the matter is REMANDED with directions to
remand the action to the Secretary for further proceedings.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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