PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 9/4/96
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 95-2222
vs.
KENNEDY DENETCLAW,
Defendant - Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D.C. No. CR 94-734-01)
Thomas B. Jameson, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for
Defendant-Appellant.
Tara C. Neda, Assistant United States Attorney (John J. Kelly, United States Attorney,
with her on the brief), Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before KELLY, BRISCOE and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
KELLY, Circuit Judge.
Defendant-Appellant Kennedy Denetclaw was convicted of assault with a
dangerous weapon, 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(c) and 1153; assault resulting in serious bodily
injury, 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(f) and 1153; and maiming, 18 U.S.C. §§ 114 and 1153, and
sentenced to sixty-three months imprisonment. Mr. Denetclaw alleges that the district
court improperly admitted impeachment evidence against him and improperly enhanced
his sentence. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
Background
On November 22, 1994, Kennedy Denetclaw, 34, a member of the Navajo Indian
Tribe, appeared in the Navajo Nation tribal court and pled guilty1 to the tribal
misdemeanor offense of aggravated battery on both Mike Hernandez and Leyandrew Joe.
On December 8, 1994, a federal grand jury indicted Kennedy Denetclaw on two counts of
assault with a dangerous weapon (Hernandez and Joe), one count of assault resulting in
serious bodily injury (Hernandez), and one count of maiming (Hernandez), all arising
from the same incidents that were the subject of his tribal court convictions.
A jury trial was held in federal court, and the trial testimony revealed the following
facts: On April 28, 1994, Travis Dez, 15, Daleric Dez, 15, and Roderick Joe, 14, were
playing near the Denetclaw home. 3 R. at 34-35, 56-57, 82. William Denetclaw,
Kennedy Denetclaw’s 25-year-old brother, came outside and shouted at the boys. 3 R. at
58, 84. The boys ran away, but William began chasing Travis, who ran toward the Yazzie
1
Mr. Denetclaw claims that he pled “no contest,” but he acknowledges that the
tribal court judgment states that he “changed plea to guilty.” 4 R. at 255-57. Mr. Denetclaw’s
tribal advocate stated in an affidavit, “I believe [] no contest is considered as a guilty plea.” 1 R.
doc. 61.
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home. 3 R. at 35-36, 59, 229. William caught Travis and began kicking him. 3 R. at 37.
Darrell Yazzie, 23, managed to stop William’s attack on Travis, but when Kennedy
Denetclaw arrived the attack resumed. 3 R. at 36-37, 47, 51-52. Darrell testified that
Kennedy attacked him from behind with a knife, but he managed to escape serious injury.
3 R. at 47-48.
Mike Hernandez, 23, and Leyandrew Joe, 19, were playing Nintendo when a
neighbor boy informed them that Travis was being attacked. Leyandrew and Mike went
out, unarmed, to investigate, later joined by Roderick. 3 R. at 85, 100. Leyandrew
observed William kicking Travis with Kennedy watching. 3 R. at 99. Mike could not see
the attack on Travis because he is legally blind. 3 R. at 126-28. Upon seeing Mike and
Leyandrew approach, William left Travis and ran up to them. 3 R. at 100. William
attacked Mike, and Kennedy attacked Leyandrew, cutting him on the chin. 3 R. at 88,
102. Leyandrew and Roderick fled, and the Denetclaws turned their full attention to
Mike. 3 R. at 50, 62, 105. Kennedy repeatedly cut Mike with his knife, causing five cuts
to his face requiring 30-40 stitches. 3 R. at 132, 134-35, 138.
Kennedy Denetclaw testified that he and William had been drinking alcohol on
their way home that day. 3 R. at 223-24. He and his brother saw the boys outside, and
William went out to talk to them. Kennedy claimed that he watched William take Travis
down, and that he went out to help his brother after seeing Darrell Yazzie come out of his
house and strike William with an object. 3 R. at 229. Kennedy claimed that he calmed
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his brother down, and they walked away. 3 R. at 230. As they were leaving, they noticed
the three men approaching, and a scuffle broke out. 3 R. at 231-32. Kennedy testified
that Mike Hernandez was armed with a knife and that he pulled out his “pocketknife” to
protect William from Mike. 3 R. at 232. He admitted that he cut Michael’s hand during
the struggle but claimed that he then lost his knife. 3 R. at 232-33; 4 R. at 253. He
testified that he did not cut Leyandrew Joe and did not know how he got injured, 3 R. at
233; 4 R. at 257, and he speculated that Mike’s facial wounds may have been self-
inflicted, 4 R. at 255.
The jury convicted Kennedy Denetclaw of two counts of assault on Hernandez and
one count of maiming but acquitted him of assaulting Joe. The district court imposed a
two-level increase to the offense level for obstruction of justice pursuant to U.S.S.G. §
3C1.1 and sentenced Mr. Denetclaw to a total of sixty-three months imprisonment. This
appeal followed.
Discussion
I. Tribal Court Pleas
Mr. Denetclaw contends that the trial court erred in allowing the tribal court pleas
to be admitted as impeachment evidence. A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude
evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Harmon, 918 F.2d 115,
117 (10th Cir. 1990). The issue of whether tribal court pleas may be admitted in federal
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court is a question of law which we review de novo. United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389,
1395-96 (9th Cir. 1989).
The trial court permitted the prosecution to impeach Mr. Denetclaw with the tribal
court pleas under the rationale of Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). 4 R. at 246.
In Harris, the Supreme Court held that statements elicited in violation of Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), may be admitted to impeach the credibility of a defendant
who testifies on his own behalf, even if such statements are not admissible in the
prosecution’s case-in-chief. Harris, 401 U.S. at 224-26. The Court stated, “Every
criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so. But
that privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury.” Id. at 225.
Mr. Denetclaw challenges the trustworthiness of his tribal convictions, pointing to
the lack of constitutional protections in tribal court, specifically the right to counsel. He
claims that he did not realize that his tribal pleas could be used against him in federal
court. 4 R. at 264; Aplt. Br. at 22-23. However, this is beside the point. Even assuming
that Mr. Denetclaw was not afforded a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at his tribal
court hearing, his tribal court pleas still remain admissible for the purpose of
impeachment. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 345-46 (1990). In Harvey, the
Supreme Court held that a statement taken in violation of the right to counsel could be
used to “impeach a defendant’s false or inconsistent testimony.” Id. at 346.
The fact that Mr. Denetclaw may not have had full constitutional protections at his
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tribal hearing, nor understood the consequences of his statements, does not alter the fact
that he made such statements at that hearing. The fact remains that Mr. Denetclaw’s
pleas at the hearing were inconsistent with his story at trial, and the district court properly
allowed the prosecution to explore this during its cross-examination of Mr. Denetclaw.
Mr. Denetclaw’s tribal pleas were only allowed for the limited purpose of impeachment,
not as substantive evidence, and thus we focus not on the truthfulness of his pleas but
rather on the fact that his pleas differ from his later testimony. The pleas are no different
from any other inconsistent statements made by Mr. Denetclaw to a third person which
could be used to impeach him. See Harris, 401 U.S. at 225-26.
Our holding is entirely consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in United States
v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1989), on which defendant relies. In Ant, the Ninth
Circuit held that the government could not use a defendant’s tribal court guilty plea as
substantive evidence of guilt in his federal trial arising from the same incident because his
tribal plea lacked constitutional protections. Id. at 1395-96. However, in this case, the
district court did not allow the use of the tribal pleas as substantive evidence, but only for
impeachment purposes. Thus, the constitutional concerns underlying Ant are not present
in this case.
Mr. Denetclaw’s claim that his pleas were used against him as a confession distorts
the issue. So too does Mr. Denetclaw’s argument regarding the requirements for a guilty
plea in federal court. These arguments ignore the fact that the tribal pleas were only
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admitted for the limited purpose of impeachment. Regardless of how Mr. Denetclaw
attempts to characterize the facts, the pleas were not construed as guilty pleas in federal
court, nor as a confession. The fact that the pleas might fail to meet constitutional
requirements for a federal guilty plea or a confession is irrelevant.
Mr. Denetclaw contends that his tribal court pleas were not statements nor were
they inconsistent with his trial testimony. We disagree. A tribal court plea clearly
qualifies as a “statement;” indeed, silence may qualify as a “statement” in certain
circumstances. United States v. Strother, 49 F.3d 869, 874 (2d Cir. 1995). Mr.
Denetclaw claims that he did not expressly admit guilt in the tribal court proceeding.
However, “‘statements need not be diametrically opposed to be inconsistent.’” Id.
(quoting United States v. Agajanian, 852 F.2d 56, 58 (2d Cir. 1988)). During Mr.
Denetclaw’s testimony at trial, he claimed self-defense and that he lost his knife early in
the struggle. 3 R. at 232-33. These statements could be understood as a denial of
culpability as well as a denial that he inflicted the knife wounds on Hernandez and thus
fair game for impeachment. Accord United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 628 (1980).
The inconsistency between “no contest” or guilty pleas to aggravated battery charges and
Mr. Denetclaw’s later claim of innocence is apparent; moreover, we note that Mr.
Denetclaw was given the opportunity to explain his prior inconsistent statements, 4 R. at
262-65.
Mr. Denetclaw claims that the tribal court convictions were inadmissible to
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impeach him under Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a). This position is without merit
because the convictions were not introduced under Rule 609(a). Rule 609(a) pertains to
the use of a conviction for the purpose of character impeachment--the conviction itself as
an indication of lack of trustworthiness. See Fed. R. Evid. 609(a) advisory committee
notes (“There is little dissent from the general proposition that at least some crimes are
relevant to credibility”). However, as we have previously indicated, the tribal court pleas
were introduced for direct impeachment as statements inconsistent with Mr. Denetclaw’s
trial testimony, not as prior convictions under Rule 609(a). For this reason, Loper v.
Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972), cited by Mr. Denetclaw, is inapposite. In Loper, a Supreme
Court plurality held that the use of a constitutionally invalid conviction to impeach a
defendant’s general character and credibility deprives him of due process of law but
expressly distinguished this situation:
[Loper] is not a case where the record of a prior conviction was used for the
purpose of directly rebutting a specific false statement made from the
witness stand. The previous convictions were used, rather, simply in an
effort to convict [the defendant] by blackening his character and thus
damaging his general credibility in the eyes of the jury.
Id. at 482 n.11 (citations omitted). Unlike in Loper, the tribal court pleas in this case
were used to directly rebut statements made from the witness stand.
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II. Sentence Enhancement
Mr. Denetclaw claims that the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence under the
Sentencing Guidelines by two offense levels for obstruction of justice. We review the
district court’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard and the application of
the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. United States v. Pelliere, 57 F.3d 936, 940 (10th Cir.
1995).
The district court enhanced Mr. Denetclaw’s sentence because it determined that
he had committed perjury. Mr. Denetclaw claims that the district court failed to
sufficiently identify the statement(s) that it found perjurious. See United States v.
Massey, 48 F.3d 1560, 1573 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2628 (1995). We
disagree.
The Sentencing Guidelines allow the court to increase the defendant’s offense
level by two levels for obstruction of justice. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Under United States v.
Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993), the district court should make “separate and clear
finding[s]” regarding the alleged perjury. Id. at 95. “Following Dunnigan, we have
continued to require that sentencing judges specifically identify or describe the perjurious
testimony before applying the enhancement under § 3C1.1.” Massey, 48 F.3d at 1573.
“We recognize, however, highly specific findings may not be possible in every case.”
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United States v. Owens, 70 F.3d 1118, 1132 (10th Cir. 1995). As we explained in
Massey:
The district court may generally identify the testimony at issue . . . and it is
sufficient if such testimony is merely described in substance so that when
we review the transcript we can evaluate the Dunnigan findings of the
elements of perjury against an identified line of questions and answers
without having simply to speculate on what the district court might have
believed was the perjurious testimony.
Massey, 48 F.3d at 1574.
The district court in this case adequately identified the statements it believed were
false by adopting the findings of the presentence report. See 4 R. at 362; accord United
States v. Ballard, 16 F.3d 1110, 1113 (10th Cir.) (district court adopted findings from the
presentence report), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2762 (1994). The presentence report
specifically identified Mr. Denetclaw’s statements regarding his tribal pleas and his self-
defense claim as perjurious, as well as his testimony that Mike Hernandez had a knife. 2
R. at ¶ 23, 29, 35 (Presentence Report). As was the case in Ballard, “[t]he sentencing
judge’s adoption of . . . the presentence report provided the Appellant and this court with
a clear understanding of the information upon which the district court relied when it
determined defendant’s sentence.” Ballard, 16 F.3d at 1113.
AFFIRMED.
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No. 95-2222, United States v. Kennedy Denetclaw
LUCERO, Circuit Judge, concurring.
I concur with my colleagues as to the result, but write separately to note my
concern regarding one aspect of the case. As the majority notes, on cross examination of
the defendant, the government used the defendant’s tribal court plea to the underlying
misdemeanor offense2 to impeach his testimony that he acted in self-defense. It is the use
of the tribal court judgment -- which, though never offered into evidence, apparently
contains an assertion that the defendant pleaded either guilty or no contest to a
misdemeanor charge arising from the same set of facts -- that causes me concern.
Use of the misdemeanor plea by the government was proffered, not under Rule
609, but rather under Rule 613. At that time, the defendant made an objection under Rule
403. The record does not reveal whether the trial court gave express consideration to the
prejudicial effect under Rule 403 to the use of the plea; however, I excerpt a portion of
the record that indicates that the court may have been aware of the potential prejudice:
THE COURT: I find the documents to be trustworthy under the self-
authentication rule, and therefore you can ask questions about his plea in
the tribal court.
MS. NEDA: I understand, Your Honor.
MR. JAMESON: Your Honor, if I could --
2
In tribal court, Denetclaw was charged with aggravated assault, which is defined
as “[u]nlawfully assault[ing] or strik[ing] at another with a deadly weapon.” Navajo
Nation Code tit. 17, § 315(A)(1). In federal court, one of the charges Denetclaw faced
was for “[a]ssault with a dangerous weapon, with intent to do bodily harm, and without
just cause or excuse.” 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(3), formerly 18 U.S.C. § 113(c).
THE COURT: However, I’ll point out to you that if I’m wrong, this
will probably get me reversed, and sometimes prosecutors overkill in a case.
Tr. Trans. at 246.
Had defense counsel objected to the use of the tribal court judgment under Fed. R.
Evid. 803(22), which excludes as hearsay, for certain purposes, any judgment of
conviction of a misdemeanor, or any judgment entered after a plea of nolo contendere, the
use of the judgment here likely would have been precluded in its entirety. The advisory
committee’s notes to Rule 803(22) state: “Practical considerations require exclusion of
convictions of minor offenses, not because the administration of justice in its lower
echelons must be inferior, but because motivation to defend at this level is often minimal
or nonexistent.” Id., advisory committee’s notes. Such an objection was not made below
nor did counsel argue it on appeal. Nevertheless, the commentary to Rule 803(22)
cautions us as to the highly prejudicial nature of the use of a misdemeanor judgment in a
case such as this.
A similar caution signal exists in Fed. R. Evid. 609. While the heightened
prejudice standard of Rule 609 is not imported into a Rule 403 analysis, nonetheless, the
common law history of Rule 609 cautions us to take care that a defendant is not
improperly prejudiced by admission of a judgment. Rule 609 recognizes that in “virtually
every case in which prior convictions are used to impeach the testifying defendant, the
defendant faces a unique risk of prejudice -- i.e., the danger that convictions that would
be excluded under Fed. R. Evid. 404 will be misused by a jury as propensity evidence
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despite their introduction solely for impeachment purposes.” Fed. R. Evid. 609, advisory
committee’s notes. Here, the risk is even greater: that a jury will consider the evidence
not as probative of credibility, but as proof of ultimate guilt. See United States v.
Martinez, 555 F.2d 1273, 1276 (5th Cir. 1977) (court could “hardly conceive of a more
prejudicial prior conviction” than one arising from same set of facts; introduction of
conviction as impeachment evidence under Rule 609 deprived defendant of right to have
jury determine whether elements of crime were proven beyond reasonable doubt).
It is difficult on the record before us to determine whether the trial court engaged
in a proper weighing of probative value and prejudice under Rule 403. Had the defendant
objected under Rule 803(22), or had the defendant properly raised and argued the Rule
403 issues on appeal, I might be persuaded that a reversal is warranted. Neither was
done. I concur in the result.
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