UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 9/17/96
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
LORRI J. HULL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 96-7004
(D.C. No. CV-95-118-S)
SHIRLEY S. CHATER, Commissioner (E.D. Okla.)
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, BARRETT, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff-appellant Lorrie J. Hull (claimant) appeals from the district court’s
decision upholding the Secretary’s denial of disability benefits and supplemental
security income. Claimant asserted that she was disabled due to the residual
effects of the amputation of her right leg above the knee, and back and hip pain.
Following the second of two hearings, the administrative law judge (ALJ)
determined, at the fifth step of the applicable five-step sequential analysis, 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-51
(10th Cir. 1988), that, while claimant could not return to her past work and could
not perform a full range of sedentary work, she remained capable of performing
sedentary jobs existing in the national economy. The Appeals Council denied
review, making the ALJ’s determination the final decision of the Secretary. 1
This court reviews the Secretary’s decision only to insure that the record
contains substantial evidence supporting the factual findings and that the
Secretary applied the law correctly. Bean v. Chater, 77 F.3d 1210, 1213 (10th
Cir. 1995). On appeal, claimant specifically argues that the ALJ improperly
discredited her complaints of disabling pain and used incomplete hypothetical
1
Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secretary of Health and
Human Services in social security cases were transferred to the Commissioner of
Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. In the text, however, we continue to refer to
the Secretary because she was the appropriate party at the time of the underlying
administrative decision.
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questions to elicit testimony from the vocational expert upon which the ALJ then
relied to deny benefits.
Upon careful review of the record, we determine that the ALJ properly
considered claimant’s complaints of disabling pain. See Kepler v. Chater, 68
F.3d 387, 390-91 (10th Cir. 1995)(discussing proper consideration of complaints
of disabling pain). Further, there is nothing in this record to cause this court to
question the ALJ’s pertinent credibility determinations. See Winfrey v. Chater,
No. 95-7139, 1996 WL 444144, at *2 (10th Cir. Aug. 7, 1996).
The ALJ’s hypothetical questions asked the vocational expert to consider
the job possibilities for an individual who could perform sedentary work, but who
was further limited by her need to stand for five minutes after sitting for thirty to
forty minutes. Claimant argues that the ALJ erred in not also including in those
questions her restrictions from working around moving machinery, heights, or
vibrations, or from climbing, stooping, kneeling, balancing, crouching or
crawling. Because these restrictions would not further restrict claimant’s ability
to do the sedentary work identified by the vocational expert, the ALJ did not err
in failing to include these limitations in his hypothetical questions. See, e.g.,
Robinson v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 836, 841 (8th Cir. 1992)(“person would not need
to crouch and would need to stoop only occasionally to perform substantially all
sedentary and light jobs, citing Soc. Sec. Ruling 83-14); id. (“relatively few jobs
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in the national economy require climbing or balancing,” citing Soc. Sec. Ruling
83-14); Armstrong v. Bowen, 648 F. Supp. 309, 311 (S.D. Tex. 1986)(restrictions
on bending, stooping and heights did not preclude claimant from performing
sedentary work); Soc. Sec. Ruling 83-10 (by its very nature, sedentary work,
which is performed primarily in seated position, entails no significant stooping);
Soc. Sec. Ruling 85-15 (limitations on crawling and kneeling are of little
significance in work world); id. (restrictions from working at unprotected heights
and around moving machinery due to seizure disorders would not significantly
affect work ability).
Claimant also argues that the ALJ failed to include the limitations resulting
from her need to use crutches when ambulating without her prosthesis and a cane
when using her prosthesis. While use of crutches may further limit an
individual’s ability to perform sedentary work, see, e.g., Johnson v. Bowen, 687
F. Supp. 1284, 1299 (W.D. Wis. 1988); Kellam v. Bowen, 663 F. Supp. 238, 243
(E.D. Pa. 1987), there is no indication that the use of a cane would prevent
claimant from performing the minimal standing, walking and carrying
requirements of sedentary work, 20 C.F. R. §§ 404.1567(a), 416.967(a), see, e.g.,
Gaffney v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 98, 101-02 (6th Cir. 1987)(upholding determination
that claimant who needed cane to ambulate could perform full range of sedentary
work).
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Therefore, because substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s factual
findings and because we find no legal error, we AFFIRM the denial of benefits.
Entered for the Court
Wade Brorby
Circuit Judge
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