UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 9/20/96
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 95-1471
(D. Colo.)
JESUS CARAVEO-LEDEZMA, (D.Ct. No. 95-CR-71-S)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, BALDOCK, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
On September 23, 1995, Jesus Caraveo-Ledezma was indicted with one
count of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The defendant filed a motion to suppress the cocaine based
upon an assertion that the defendant’s vehicle was stopped without probable cause
and without reasonable suspicion. After the district court denied the motion, the
defendant entered a guilty plea, conditioned upon his right to appeal the district
court’s denial of his motion to suppress. The defendant now appeals. We
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the citation of orders
and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions
of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On January 22, 1994, a white Dodge Spirit with Arizona license plates
passed Colorado State Trooper Russell Wise as he was traveling northbound on
Interstate 25 in El Paso County, Colorado. The Dodge carried the defendant and
one other man in front and one woman in back. After Trooper Wise observed the
car cross the center line on two occasions, he stopped the car and approached the
vehicle.
When Trooper Wise asked the driver for his license, the driver did not have
one but instead provided Trooper Wise with an identification card. Trooper Wise
then asked the female passenger and the defendant for identification. The
defendant provided a Mexican driver’s license and the female provided a
Colorado temporary driver’s permit.
Trooper Wise then asked a series of questions about the origin, destination,
and purpose of the trip. The defendant, who was the only person in the car who
spoke English, told Trooper Wise that they had been traveling all night from
Phoenix to Denver and planned to return to Phoenix in a few days. When the
defendant handed Trooper Wise a rental agreement, he noticed that none of the
occupants of the vehicle were authorized drivers. Trooper Wise then learned that
the person who rented the vehicle was the mother of the defendant’s wife.
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After returning to his car, Trooper Wise conducted a computer search
which indicated that the female passenger had a valid driving permit. Trooper
Wise asked the driver not to drive because he did not have a license. The female
passenger then assumed the driver’s seat because she had a valid license.
Because Trooper Wise decided the weaving was the result of fatigue, he only
issue a verbal warning to the trio.
After the occupants had switched places, Trooper Wise asked the male who
had been driving if they were carrying any drugs, cash, or weapons in the vehicle.
The defendant interceded and replied in the negative. When Trooper Wise asked
about the drugs, however, the defendant first turned away from the officer and
looked to the female driver before replying.
Throughout the questioning, Trooper Wise noticed that the defendant was
very nervous and tended to have quick and jerky physical movements. He also
thought that the trio’s story was atypical, especially because none of them were
authorized to drive the car. Accordingly, Wise asked if they would mind if he
searched the vehicle. The defendant answered “okay” while his male companion
nodded his head. The male who had been driving the car executed a Spanish
consent-to-search form.
When Trooper Wise searched the trunk, he observed a small shoe box
between the taillight and a cover used to protect the wiring. The box contained a
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brick of white powder wrapped in cellophane which the officer suspected was
cocaine.
Trooper Wise arrested the trio and then took them to the state highway
patrol office in Colorado Springs. After waiving his Miranda rights, the
defendant told the agents that he had borrowed the car from his wife’s mother in
Phoenix, Arizona. The mother had rented the car from Thrifty Car Rental. The
mother, however, did not know that the defendant had taken the car from Arizona
to Colorado. Apparently, his wife had only given the defendant permission to
take the car to get a six-pack of beer.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standing
In reviewing a defendant’s Fourth Amendment claims, the appellate court
should uphold the factual findings of the district court unless they are clearly
erroneous. United States v. Fernandez, 18 F.3d 874, 876 (10th Cir. 1994).
Whether a defendant has standing to challenge a search, however, is a legal
question subject to de novo review. United States v. Betancur, 24 F.3d 73, 76
(10th Cir. 1994).
1. Standing to Challenge the Search
The personal nature of Fourth Amendment rights imposes on the party
seeking to suppress evidence the burden of "’adducing facts at the suppression
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hearing indicating that [his] own [Fourth Amendment] rights were violated by the
challenged search.’" Eylicio-Montoya, 18 F.3d 845, 850 (10th Cir. 1994)
(quoting United States v. Skowronski, 827 F.2d 1414, 1417 (10th Cir.1987)).
Two factors are relevant: (1) whether a party has manifested a subjective
expectation of privacy in the area searched and (2) whether society is prepared to
recognize that expectation as reasonable. Id.; United States v. Erwin, 875 F.2d
268, 270 (10th Cir.1989).
We agree with the district court that the defendant failed to show that he
had either a subjective or reasonable expectation of privacy in the car. The mere
fact an individual has physical possession of a vehicle does not necessarily give
that person a reasonable expectation of privacy in it. United States v. Arango,
912 F.2d 441, 444 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 924 (1991). Rather, he
has no reasonable expectation of privacy unless he proves he had lawful
ownership or possession of the vehicle at the time of the search. Betancur, 24
F.3d at 76-77.
The defendant did not receive permission to drive the car from the owner or
the renter. He only had permission to use the car from the renter’s daughter.
Moreover, that permission was limited to picking up a six-pack of beer in
Phoenix. Thus, we conclude that the defendant had no standing to challenge the
search of the vehicle.
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2. Standing to Challenge the Arrest
Our conclusion that the defendant lacks standing to challenge the search of
the Dodge does not end our inquiry. In his motion to suppress, the defendant
challenged not only the search but also the initial stop and subsequent arrest.
Under our prior decisions, a passenger has standing to challenge a constitutionally
improper traffic stop, detention, or arrest on Fourth Amendment grounds even
though, when the seizure occurs, he has no possessory or ownership interest in
either the vehicle in which he is riding or in its contents. See United States v.
Eylicio-Montoya, 70 F.3d 1158, 1163-64 (10th Cir. 1995). A passenger does not
relinquish his Fourth Amendment protection from unlawful seizures merely
because he chooses to ride in a vehicle in which he has no possessory or
proprietary interest. See Erwin, 875 F.2d at 270. Thus, we must determine
whether the defendant was arrested in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
B. Merits of The Fourth Amendment Claim
In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept the district court's
factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v. McSwain, 29
F.3d 558, 560 (10th Cir. 1994). The credibility of witnesses and the weight given
to the evidence at the suppression hearing, as well as the resulting inferences and
conclusions, are matters for the trial judge. Moreover, we view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Id. at 560. The ultimate
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determination of whether the challenged conduct is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, however, is a legal question that we review de novo. Id. at 561.
We conclude that the defendant was not arrested in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. In this case, the defendant does not challenge the initial stop made
for the purpose of investigating a traveling violation. Instead, the defendant only
challenges the continued questioning and subsequent search after the initial
investigation was completed.
An investigative stop must be limited in duration to be reasonable. Once
the purpose of the stop has been accomplished, the occupants “must be allowed to
proceed on [their] way, without being subject to further delay by police for
additional questioning.” United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir.
1988). Questioning may continue, however, if the person voluntarily consents to
it, United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 540 (10th Cir. 1994), or when the
officer has reasonable suspicion that the person is engaging in illegal activity,
United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1554 (10th Cir. 1993).
In this case, the traffic stop developed into a consensual situation. Trooper
Wise gave back the identification materials of the defendant and the two other
occupants. He then asked the woman to drive. After all of the occupants changed
places, Trooper Wise gave them a verbal warning. The trooper moved to the
passenger side of the car. At that point, he asked about the drugs. There was no
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evidence of coercion or intimidation. When the officer received the defendant’s
verbal consent and his male companion’s written consent to search the vehicle,
neither individual limited the terms of the search in any way. We conclude that
based on all of the circumstances, a person in such a situation would reasonably
have believed that he was free to leave. United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404,
1407-10 (10th Cir. 1990). Thus, we hold that this was a valid voluntary
consensual encounter consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Questioning may
also continue when the officer has reasonable suspicion that the person is
engaging in an illegal activity. United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1554 (10th
Cir. 1993). The record reveals a number of suspicious events which together
support the questioning by Trooper Wise. The driver of the car did not have a
valid license, and the rental paperwork indicated that none of the occupants were
authorized to drive the car. Moreover, Trooper Wise thought that the defendant’s
nervousness, as opposed to the driver’s nervousness, was unusual. Finally, when
the Trooper asked the male who had been driving questions about drugs, the
defendant interjected after looking at his female companion. Thus, we hold that
Trooper Wise had reasonable suspicion to continue questioning the defendant and
his companions. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of the
motion to suppress.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
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Deanell Reece Tacha
Circuit Judge
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