UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 10/22/96
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 96-6108
(D.C. No. CIV-94-1428-C)
CHARLES MICHAEL KISSICK, (W.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE and MURPHY, Circuit Judges, and VAN BEBBER, ** District
Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The parties’ requests
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
Honorable G. Thomas Van Bebber, Chief Judge, United States District
Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation.
to submit the case on the briefs are granted, and the case is ordered submitted
without oral argument.
This case returns to this court following our remand in United States v.
Kissick, 69 F.3d 1048 (10th Cir. 1995)(Kissick). In Kissick, defendant-appellant
Charles Michael Kissick appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to
vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. This court
vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings.
The facts in this case were set forth fully in Kissick, and only those
necessary to this decision will be repeated here. In 1989, Mr. Kissick was
convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and thirteen counts of possession
with intent to distribute and the distribution of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1) and 846. Finding an offense level of thirty-six and a criminal
history category of VI, the trial court sentenced Mr. Kissick to 328 months’
imprisonment for count one and counts four through fourteen. On counts two and
three the court sentenced him to ten-years’ imprisonment to run concurrently with
the sentences on the other counts. Mr. Kissick’s conviction was affirmed on
appeal, and a subsequent motion to reduce sentence was denied.
In 1994, Mr. Kissick filed his § 2255 motion alleging that (1) he should be
resentenced under United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG) Amendment 487
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which became effective on November 1, 1993; 1 and (2) the trial court erred in
sentencing him as a career offender. The district court denied the motion, and
Mr. Kissick appealed.
This court concluded that Amendment 487 was not listed in USSG
§ 1B1.10, listing specific amendments which may be applied retroactively to
reduce a defendant’s sentence. Kissick, 69 F.3d at 1053. In order for an
amendment not listed in USSG § 1B1.10 to be considered for retroactive
application the amendment must be “‘clarifying’” and not substantive. Kissick,
69 F.3d at 1052 (quoting United States v. Capers, 61 F.3d 1100, 1109 (4th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1830 (1996)). Because Amendment 487 was not
listed in USSG § 1B1.10, we applied certain factors to determine that the
amendment was substantive and not subject to retroactive application. See
Kissick, 69 F.3d at 1052-53.
As to the trial court’s classification of Mr. Kissick as a career offender
under USSG §§ 4B1.1 and 4B1.2, we determined that it was unclear whether a
1986 Florida conviction for possession of cocaine constituted a “controlled
substance offense” as defined in USSG § 4B1.2. Kissick, 69 F.3d at 1056-57.
This court thus held that counsel’s failure to challenge the Florida conviction at
1
Amendment 487 amended USSG § 2D1.1(c) to clarify the definition of
“cocaine base.” See Kissick, 69 F.3d at 1051-52.
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Mr. Kissick’s sentencing constituted constitutionally deficient representation.
Further, when this deficient representation was coupled with the prejudice
resulting from the enhanced sentence, we held that Mr. Kissick met the Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) standard for establishing ineffective
assistance of counsel. Kissick, 69 F.3d at 1055-56.
Because the record on appeal was lacking in evidence concerning Mr.
Kissick’s Florida conviction, and because this conviction had a significant impact
on Mr. Kissick’s sentence, we remanded to the district court for a determination
of “whether the Florida conviction was for mere possession of cocaine or whether
it involved the additional elements required under USSG § 4B1.2 to constitute a
‘controlled substance offense.’” Kissick, 69 F.3d at 1057. 2 We directed that if
the Florida conviction was for simple possession, counsel’s ineffective assistance
in failing to challenge the use of the conviction at Mr. Kissick’s sentencing
hearing satisfied the cause and prejudice standard for procedural default, and Mr.
Kissick would be entitled to resentencing. Id. We noted that “[a]s to any
resentencing, . . . the district court ‘will be governed by the guidelines in effect at
2
USSG § 4B1.2(2) defines a “controlled substance offense” as “an offense
under a federal or state law prohibiting the manufacture, import, export,
distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance)
or the possession of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent
to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.” The definition does not
include simple possession. See Kissick, 69 F.3d at 1053-54 and n.3.
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the time of resentence.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Ziegler, 39 F.3d 1058,
1063-64 (10th Cir. 1994)).
On remand, the district court determined that the Florida offense was one
for simple possession and should not have been used to sentence Mr. Kissick as a
career offender. At resentencing, counsel for Mr. Kissick argued that, in spite of
this court’s ruling that Amendment 487 should not be applied retroactively, the
remand decision stated that the district court should apply current guidelines at
the time of resentencing and, therefore, the district court should apply
Amendment 487. The district court disagreed, interpreting the mandate in Kissick
as a remand on the career offender issue only. Accordingly, the court resentenced
Mr. Kissick to 262 months imprisonment on counts one and four through fourteen
and 120 months on counts two and three to run concurrently.
On appeal, Mr. Kissick asserts that the district court erred in refusing to
apply the guidelines in effect at the time he was resentenced. In addition to his
contention that Kissick should be interpreted to require the district court to apply
Amendment 487, he also contends that the district court should have considered
his claims that twenty-eight grams of the cocaine were double counted at the
original sentencing, and that his original sentence should not have been enhanced
on a finding that he was a leader or an organizer of a criminal activity involving
five or more participants, see USSG § 3B1.1(a).
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The threshold and ultimately dispositive question here concerns the proper
interpretation of this court’s order vacating the district court’s denial of Mr.
Kissick’s § 2255 motion and remanding “for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.” Kissick, 69 F.3d at 1057.
When the district court originally sentenced Mr. Kissick, he was classified
as a career offender under USSG §§ 4B1.1 and 4B1.2. One of the prior felony
convictions used to enhance his sentence as a career offender was a 1986 Florida
conviction for possession of cocaine. “‘Simple possession, as defined by 18
U.S.C. § 844 [sic], is not included in the list of crimes that constitute a controlled
substance offense under the Career Offender provision’” Kissick, 69 F.3d at 1054
(quoting Hansen v. United States Parole Comm’n, 904 F.2d 306, 310 (5th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1052 (1991)); see also United States v. Galloway,
937 F.2d 542, 549 (10th Cir. 1991).
In Kissick the record did not provide the basis for a definitive conclusion
regarding the elements of the Florida conviction. Kissick, 69 F.3d at 1056-57. If
in fact the Florida conviction was for simple possession, Mr. Kissick should not
have been sentenced as a career offender. It was on this basis alone that we
vacated the district court’s order and remanded. See id. at 1057.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4), a sentencing court is generally required to
apply the guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing, unless to do so would run
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afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause. United States v. Gerber, 24 F.3d 93, 95 (10th
Cir. 1994). We have held this to apply to resentencing as well. See Ziegler, 39
F.3d at 1063-64; United States v. Smith, 930 F.2d 1450, 1456 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 879 (1991). In United States v. Moore, 83 F.3d 1231, 1234
(10th Cir. 1996), this court held that “when a defendant’s sentence is vacated on
appeal and remanded for new sentencing, the lower court must begin anew with
de novo proceedings.” See also United States v. Ortiz, 25 F.3d 934, 935 (10th
Cir. 1994). The Moore court held that “the mandate rule” 3 gives the district court
discretion on remand to expand the scope of the resentencing to issues that were
not the subject of the remand. 83 F.3d at 1234-35 (holding that the vacation of a
defendant’s sentence requires “the district court to exercise its inherent discretion
to determine the appropriate scope of the resentencing proceedings”).
Our remand in Kissick, however, did not vacate Mr. Kissick’s sentence.
We vacated the district court’s order denying his § 2255 motion as to the career
offender issue and remanded for a decision by the district court as to whether Mr.
Kissick’s sentence should be vacated and he should be resentenced. Although the
Kissick opinion did not explicitly limit the district court’s authority on remand,
3
“‘[T]he mandate rule’: where the appellate court has not specifically
limited the scope of the remand, the district court generally has discretion to
expand the resentencing beyond the sentencing error causing the reversal.”
Moore, 83 F.3d at 1234 (citing United States v. Moored, 38 F.3d 1419, 1421 (6th
Cir. 1994); United States v. Cornelius, 968 F.2d 703, 705 (8th Cir. 1992)).
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“[t]he trial court must implement both the letter and the spirit of the mandate,
taking into account the appellate court’s opinion and the circumstances it
embraces.” United States v. Moored, 38 F.3d 1419, 1421 (6th Cir.
1994)(quotation omitted).
The district court, construing our mandate narrowly, concluded that all
other aspects of the district court’s order had been affirmed, including the issue of
the retroactive application of Amendment 487, and therefore considered it
improper to revisit any other sentencing issues. In interpreting its resentencing
limitations, the district court considered the circumstances embraced by the
remand opinion, and properly implemented “the letter and the spirit of the
mandate.” Id. (quotation omitted). Accordingly, after careful review of our
decision in Kissick, we conclude that the district court’s construction of our
mandate was correct.
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The judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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