Parker v. Guzik

           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 10/28/96
                    TENTH CIRCUIT



 ROGER LEE PARKER,

          Petitioner,
                                                        No. 96-6062
 v.
                                                 (D.C. No. CIV-95-1955-R)
                                                      (W. Dist. Okla.)
 BOB GUZIK and UNITED STATES
 PAROLE COMMISSION,

          Respondents.




                         ORDER AND JUDGMENT *


Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, KELLY and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.



      After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of

this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is

therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

      Roger Lee Parker, a federal prisoner, filed this pro se habeas corpus

      *
       This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 alleging that a parole violator warrant was

improperly issued and that his original sentence was illegally altered. The matter

was referred to a magistrate judge, who recommended that Mr. Parker’s petition

be denied for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The district court

adopted the report and recommendation in its entirety on the basis of Mr. Parker’s

failure to object to it.

       On appeal, Mr Parker asserts that even though he informed the court of his

change of address, the report was sent to his old address. A review of the district

court docket sheet reveals that Mr. Parker’s change-of-address notice and the

report crossed in the mail, and that he did not receive the report in time to make

timely objections to it. While this court has a firm waiver rule under which the

failure to make timely objection to the magistrate’s findings or recommendation

waives appellate review of both legal and factual issues, we need not apply the

rule when the interests of justice dictate. See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d

656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991). We believe the interests-of-justice exception is

applicable here, and accordingly we turn to Mr. Parker’s other argument on

appeal

       Mr. Parker contends he offered evidence in the form of his belated written

objections and the attachments thereto that he had in fact exhausted his

administrative remedies and that the magistrate judge therefore improperly


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recommended dismissal of his petition. However, the record on appeal does not

contain the material upon which Mr. Parker relies, and the district court docket

sheet does not show that it was ever filed. Moreover, in his petition in district

court, Mr. Parker stated that he did not exhaust his administrative remedies

because administrative relief does not apply in this case. He does not make that

argument on appeal, contending only that he has in fact exhausted. Because he

has failed to establish that he has done so, however, we affirm the dismissal of his

petition.

      AFFIRMED.


                                       ENTERED FOR THE COURT


                                       Stephanie K. Seymour
                                       Chief Judge




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