UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 10/28/96
TENTH CIRCUIT
JULIAN ROGER SANCHEZ,
Petitioner - Appellant,
No. 95-1404
v.
(D.C. No. 95-S-344)
(District of Colorado)
WILLIAM PERRILL, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before PORFILIO, LOGAN and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
On February 10, 1995, petitioner Julian Roger Sanchez, proceeding pro se,
filed a post-conviction motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. He sought to vacate, set
aside, or correct the sentence imposed for his 1989 conviction on charges of
possession with intent to distribute, distribution of, and conspiracy to distribute
*
At the parties’ request, the case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral
argument pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. This order and
judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res
judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
marijuana. See United States v. Sanchez, Nos. 91-1188, 91-1267, 961 F.2d 221,
1992 WL 83528, at *1 (10th Cir.) (table), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 897 (1992).
The district court construed the request as a motion filed under 28 U.S.C. §
2255, and dismissed the case as a successive motion and an abuse of the § 2255
remedy. Petitioner agrees that his motion was properly construed as seeking
relief available under § 2255, not § 2241. Proceeding pro se, he appeals the
district court’s dismissal of his motion.
I. Jurisdiction
The government challenges our jurisdiction to entertain this motion. We
must consider the issue even though it is raised for the first time on appeal.
United States v. Bustillos, 31 F.3d 931, 933 (10th Cir. 1994). The government
maintains that Mr. Sanchez is no longer “in custody” for § 2255 purposes, arguing
that he completed service of his sentence for the subject marijuana convictions on
August 7, 1995. Aplee. Br. at 6-7. We note that Mr. Sanchez is currently serving
a five-year term of “supervised release.”
In order to be properly before us, a § 2255 petitioner must have been “in
custody at the time of initiating the petition.” Bustillos 31 F.3d at 933 (emphasis
supplied). Plainly, given that Mr. Sanchez was actually incarcerated at the time
he filed his petition on February 10, 1995, the government’s jurisdictional
challenge must fail.
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II. The Merits
Petitioner claims his convictions are constitutionally infirm on the
following grounds: (1) his due process rights were violated because he was unable
to assist in his defense at trial due to the influence of psychotropic drugs
prescribed by prison officials; (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel
when his attorneys failed to pursue properly an issue regarding the suppression of
evidence, (3) no exigent circumstances existed to support the warrantless search,
and (4) there was no probable cause for his arrest. Mr. Sanchez also characterizes
his probable cause argument as a challenge to the district court’s jurisdiction over
him.
Petitioner’s claim that he was unable to assist in his defense is arguably a
new claim. But see Sanchez, 961 F.2d 221, 1992 WL 83528 at *2 (petitioner
alleged his “due process rights were violated by the district court’s failure to hold
a competency hearing”). The remaining issues were raised and rejected in
petitioner’s previous § 2255 proceedings. Id. This court has rejected petitioner’s
attempts to raise these claims and additional claims as successive and abusive.
United States v. Sanchez, No. 94-1116, 30 F.3d 142, 1994 WL 379314 (10th Cir.
1994) (table); United States v. Sanchez, No. 93-1130, 9 F.3d 118, 1993 WL
436828 (10th Cir. 1993) (table). 1
Petitioner has also filed the following appeals with this court: United States v.
1
(continued...)
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For this court to consider the merits of these claims, petitioner must show
“cause and prejudice” sufficient to excuse his failure to present evidence in
support of a claim that was previously denied, or demonstrate that a
redetermination of a claim is necessary to avoid a fundamental miscarriage of
justice. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a); Rule 9(b) of the Rules Governing § 2255
Proceedings; Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851, 861 (1995).
Petitioner maintains he can show cause and prejudice. He asserts that his
use of medication prescribed by prison officials rendered him unable to present all
of his claims and arguments in his previous petitions, thus demonstrating cause.
“‘[C]ause . . . requires a showing of some external impediment preventing counsel
from constructing or raising the claim.’ For cause to exist, the external
impediment, whether it be government interference or the reasonable
unavailability of the factual basis for the claim, must have prevented petitioner
from raising the claim.” McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 497 (1991) (quoting
(...continued)
1
Sanchez, 907 F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding arrest warrant for probation revocation
was timely issued); United States v. Sanchez, No. 94-1415, 52 F.3d 339, 1995 WL
238309 (10th Cir. 1995) (table) (affirming sentence imposed for probation violation;
dismissing as successive claim that probation violation warrant was not timely issued);
Sanchez v. Perrill, No. 94-1541, 52 F.3d 338, 1995 WL 238350 (10th Cir. 1995) (table)
(affirming order dismissing claims of due process violations in medical treatment and
prison disciplinary proceedings); Sanchez v. Perrill, 73 F.3d 296 (10th Cir. 1996)
(addressing calculation of prison time after reincarceration following probation violation);
Sanchez v. Perrill, No. 95-1403, 77 F.3d 493, 1996 WL 78125 (10th Cir. 1996) (table)
(summarily affirming district court’s disposition).
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Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 492 (1986)). In this case, petitioner’s use of
prescription medication was not an unknown circumstance external to his defense.
Cf. Jones v. Whitley, 938 F.2d 536, 541-42 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1267
(1991). Moreover, petitioner does not claim that he is innocent of the crimes of
which he was convicted. See Schlup, 115 S. Ct. at 861. Construing liberally his
pro se pleadings, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), we conclude
that the district court correctly dismissed Mr. Sanchez’s petition as successive and
an abuse of the writ.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, was signed into law on April 24, 1996, while this appeal
was pending. However, we need not discuss the amendments at length because
“we determine that even under the more expansive scope of review prior to the
Act, [petitioner] was not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief.” United States
v. Hernandez, 94 F.3d 606, 613 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Stone v. Farley, 86 F.3d
712, 716 n.3 (7th Cir. 1996)).
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
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Circuit Judge
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