UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 12/6/96
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICIA LOPKOFF, VINCENT C.
TODD,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
No. 95-1454
v. (D.C. No. 95-D-879)
(D. Colo.)
GREGG SLATER, PATRICK
WILSON, MARY SUTTON, STEVE
EVANS,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
CITY OF LAKEWOOD,
Defendant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BALDOCK and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges, and LUNGSTRUM, ** District
Judge.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
Honorable John W. Lungstrum, District Judge, United States District Court
for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Defendants-appellants, officers with the City of Lakewood police
department, appeal the district court’s order denying their motion for summary
judgment based on the defense of qualified immunity. Plaintiffs claim that
defendants violated their rights secured by the First and Fourth Amendments
when they entered plaintiff Lopkoff’s apartment on two occasions. Defendants
contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity because they entered
Lopkoff’s apartment only to ensure that her children were safe, and did not charge
her with any crime.
I.
Plaintiffs’ claims are based on two incidents occurring in 1993 in which
defendants entered Lopkoff’s apartment pursuant to complaints that she was not
caring for her children properly. The undisputed facts establish that on April 21,
1993, defendant Slater and another officer arrived at Lopkoff’s apartment in
response to a telephone report from her sister that she was intoxicated and unable
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to care for her three-year-old son. The child opened the apartment door, thus
permitting the officers to see into the apartment and observe that it was cluttered
with clothing, boxes, papers and bags. Lopkoff met the officers just inside the
door and replied “O.K.” to the officers’ advisement that they were there to
investigate the welfare of her son. Lopkoff, who is hearing impaired, then
requested permission to call an interpreter and her attorney. Slater informed her
that she could do so, to which Lopkoff replied, “no.” Slater smelled alcohol on
Lopkoff’s breath. Slater followed Lopkoff around her apartment, for reasons of
officer safety. At some point another officer arrived and took photographs of the
inside of Lopkoff’s apartment. The officers also searched the inside of Lopkoff’s
refrigerator. During the search, Lopkoff’s attorney, plaintiff Todd, arrived. He
informed defendants of his opinion that the search of Lopkoff’s apartment was
improper absent a search warrant. Defendants dispute Todd’s statement that the
officers informed him that they were investigating the scene of a child abuse
crime.
The next incident occurred on May 11, 1993, pursuant to a telephone call to
the police by Lopkoff’s sister or daughter alleging that Lopkoff was abusing her
children. When defendants Slater and Wilson arrived at the apartment building,
Lopkoff’s daughter was in the parking lot. She stated that her mother had been
drinking, and had hit her on the shoulder and forearm. Slater and Wilson then
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went to Lopkoff’s apartment where she was meeting with Todd. Lopkoff
instructed Todd not to let the officers into her apartment. Todd informed the
officers that they could not talk with Lopkoff until an interpreter arrived. The
officers then left, but returned shortly, stating that they could wait no longer to
speak with Lopkoff. Lopkoff’s brother was present, and the children were with
him outside the apartment. At some point defendants Sutton and Evans came on
the scene. According to Todd, he was threatened with arrest if he did not step
aside to permit the officers to enter the apartment to pursue their criminal
investigation. Defendants’ version is that Todd was informed that if he did not
stop interfering with their efforts to speak with Lopkoff, he would be charged
with interference. Thereafter, defendants Slater, Wilson, Sutton and Evans
entered Lopkoff’s apartment, at which point Lopkoff left the apartment. The
officers then left, closing and locking the front door. Plaintiffs were locked out
for three hours until a professional locksmith unlocked the door.
II.
We first examine our jurisdiction to consider this appeal. We requested
briefs from the parties to address the recent decision of Johnson v. Jones, 115
S. Ct. 2151 (1995), holding that interlocutory jurisdiction does not lie to review a
denial of qualified immunity when the denial is based on the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact. 115 S. Ct. at 2156, 2159. “Johnson reaffirmed
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that summary-judgment determinations are appealable when they resolve a dispute
concerning an ‘abstract issu[e] of law’ relating to qualified immunity, typically,
the issue whether the federal right allegedly infringed was ‘clearly established.’”
Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 842 (1996)(citations omitted). Accordingly,
we have jurisdiction to review the district court’s determinations regarding
whether the law was clearly established. Mick v. Brewer, 76 F.3d 1127, 1133
(10th Cir. 1996). “We lack jurisdiction, however, to the extent that [defendants]
seek interlocutory review of the district court’s ruling that genuine disputes of
fact precluded summary judgment based on qualified immunity.” Id.
Accordingly, to the extent that defendants claim that Lopkoff consented to the
first search, 1 we are without jurisdiction to review the district court’s conclusion
that material disputed facts exist regarding whether Lopkoff consented.
Further, we do not have the benefit of defendants’ affidavits because they
were not included in appellants’ appendix. See Rios v. Bigler, 67 F.3d 1543,
1553 (10th Cir. 1995)(appellant has responsibility to provide proper record on
appeal). Therefore, we do not address the claim that the evidence establishes that
defendants Sutton and Evans remained outside Lopkoff’s apartment.
1
Defendants suggest in their jurisdictional brief that they relied on consent
or exigent circumstances as authority for their entry into Lopkoff’s apartment. In
their opening brief, defendants do not argue that consent or exigent circumstances
provided justification to enter the apartment. They do, however, claim in their
reply brief that they could have believed they had consent.
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Plaintiff Todd’s claims are not before us in this appeal. The district court
granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Todd’s First Amendment
claim, and held that Todd’s Fourth Amendment claim was not presented for its
determination. Todd did not file a cross appeal. See Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d
673, 676 (10th Cir. 1990). We therefore address Lopkoff’s claims that her Fourth
Amendment rights were violated, as those rights are enforced against the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment.
III.
A government official is entitled to qualified immunity from civil damages
for performing discretionary functions when his “conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). We review de
novo the district court’s qualified immunity holding at the summary judgment
stage. Mick, 76 F.3d at 1134-35.
Defendants raised the defense of qualified immunity, thus placing on
plaintiffs the “heavy burden” to demonstrate that defendants violated clearly
established law. Hannula v. City of Lakewood, 907 F.2d 129, 130-31 (10th Cir.
1990). To meet this burden, plaintiffs must “demonstrate a substantial
correspondence between the conduct in question and prior law allegedly
establishing that the defendant’s actions were clearly prohibited. The ‘contours
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of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand
that what he is doing violates that right.’” Id. at 131 (quoting Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)(further citation omitted)). The official’s
specific actions need not have been previously held unlawful, but the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the unlawfulness of the conduct in question is apparent in
light of preexisting law. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. If the plaintiffs satisfy this
burden, the defendants must show “that no material issues of fact remain as to
whether the defendant[s’] actions were objectively reasonable in light of the law
and the information the defendant[s] possessed at the time of [their] actions.”
Salmon v. Schwarz, 948 F.2d 1131, 1136 (10th Cir. 1991)(citations omitted).
IV.
“The boundary for [defendants’] conduct establishing the ‘contours of the
right’ involved is the Fourth Amendment, which proscribes unreasonable
searches.” Franz v. Lytle, 997 F.2d 784, 787 (10th Cir. 1993). “[O]ne governing
principle, justified by history and by current experience, has consistently been
followed: except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private
property without proper consent is ‘unreasonable’ unless is has been authorized
by a valid search warrant.” Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29
(1967). The privacy of the dwelling has consistently been protected over the
years. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 316 (1971).
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Defendants do not dispute that the law was clearly established that a
warrantless search of a private residence is per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment unless one of “a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions” applies. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971).
Rather, they claim that “a reasonable officer could have believed [defendants’]
warrantless search[es] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the
information the searching officers possessed.” Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641.
Defendants maintain that because they had “received specific information
questioning the safety of children,” e.g., appellants’ opening brief at 1, they acted
in an objectively reasonable manner when they entered Lopkoff’s private
residence.
Defendants argue that their subjective intent is relevant to the inquiry.
Appellants’ opening brief at 13. It is not relevant. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641.
Defendants emphasize that Lopkoff was never charged with a criminal offense as
a result of their investigation. “It is surely anomalous to say that the individual
and [her] private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only
when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.” Camara, 387 U.S. at 530
(footnote omitted).
We are not persuaded by defendants’ argument that the case law permitting
police officers to safeguard persons in custody serves to establish that police
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officers may disregard the warrant requirement where child welfare is concerned,
absent exigent circumstances. We do not discount the importance of children’s
safety, but we reject defendants’ unwarranted attempt to invoke it to justify their
actions under the circumstances presented here.
Defendants assume, without supporting case authority, that it has been
established that social workers are authorized to make warrantless entries into
private residences. Generally, the actions of social workers, as well as those of
police officers, are evaluated under a traditional Fourth Amendment analysis,
even in cases involving child abuse and neglect. See Parkhurst v. Trapp, 77 F.3d
707, 711 (3d Cir. 1996)(qualified immunity denied to police officers for
warrantless search of residence to locate missing child where no showing of
imminent danger); Lenz v. Winburn, 51 F.3d 1540, 1551-52 (11th Cir.
1995)(qualified immunity granted to social worker for entry into private residence
as objectively reasonable under the circumstances); Snell, 920 F.2d at 691, 700
(child welfare workers not entitled to absolute immunity in cases involving claims
of child abuse; qualified immunity not available to child welfare workers who
gained entry into residence based on known false allegations); Good v. Dauphin
County Social Servs., 891 F.2d 1087, 1095 (3d Cir. 1989)(qualified immunity
denied to social worker and police officer for forced entry into residence for strip
search of child where no emergency existed); Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893,
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908 (7th Cir. 1986)(social workers entitled to qualified immunity because they
acted pursuant to departmental guidelines and could not have been expected to
know that following the guidelines violated clearly established constitutional
rights); White ex rel. White v. Pierce County, 797 F.2d 812, 816 (9th Cir.
1986)(qualified immunity granted to police officers for entry into private
residence in child abuse investigation where exigent circumstances were present);
see also Wildauer v. Frederick County, 993 F.2d 369, 373 (4th Cir.
1993)(“Individuals who investigate child abuse or neglect enjoy at least qualified
immunity;” entry into private residence was consensual, and state’s interest in
medical examination of foster children “outweighed any attenuated privacy
interest of [plaintiff].”).
To the extent defendants rely on Wyman v. James for the proposition that a
social worker does not need a search warrant to enter a private residence, that
reliance is misplaced. Wyman involved a challenge to the requirement that a
social worker conduct a home visit as a prerequisite to the receipt of welfare
benefits. The Court delineated eleven factors supporting the conclusion that a
home visit was not an unreasonable requirement. 400 U.S. at 318-24. The Court
emphasized that the plaintiff had the choice to refuse the home visit and thus
forfeit the benefits, id. at 324, a choice not available to Lopkoff.
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Defendants argue that Tenth Circuit authority was confusing or
contradictory, citing Franz, 997 F.2d 784, and Snell, 920 F.2d 673. They
maintain that those cases demonstrate the confusion about whether defendants
should have known that they were not authorized to enter and search Lopkoff’s
apartment. Defendants have misapprehended the facts and holding of Franz. In
both cases, this court concluded that the respective police officers did not act in
an objectively reasonable manner and were not entitled to qualified immunity.
Franz, 997 F.2d at 793, Snell, 920 F.2d at 700. Neither case addressed the precise
issue raised here, however.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, see Mick, 76
F.3d at 1134-35, we conclude that no reasonable officer would consider the
searches lawful. There was no evidence that the three-year-old boy was neglected
at the first visit, the children were not present in the apartment during the second
visit, and defendants identified no circumstances to justify a search based on
officer safety, see United States v. Tisdale, 921 F.2d 1095, 1097 (10th Cir.
1990)(protective sweep of home by officer executing arrest warrant justified by
defendant’s history of firearm violations, possibility that defendant was armed,
sight of defendant fleeing out window and sound of two gunshots). Moreover,
defendants do not claim exigent circumstances existed. A reasonable police
officer trained in the law of search and seizure would not have believed that a
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warrantless entry into Lopkoff’s private residence under these circumstances was
lawful. Cf. Franz, 997 F.2d at 793 (“[P]olice officers, functioning as police
officers, must conduct themselves by the constitutional norms that embrace their
training.”). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that defendants
were not entitled to qualified immunity from Lopkoff’s Fourth Amendment
claims.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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