UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 12/17/96
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
CARLOTTA MITCHELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 96-2023
(D.C. No. CIV-86-1184 MV/DJS)
ALBUQUERQUE BOARD OF (D.N.M.)
EDUCATION, doing business as
Albuquerque Public Schools;
LILLIAN BARNA; JOE GROOM,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BALDOCK and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges, and LUNGSTRUM, ** District
Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
Honorable John W. Lungstrum, District Judge, United States District Court
for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation.
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff brought this action in connection with her 1985 termination from
employment by the Albuquerque public schools. Plaintiff alleged that her
termination was motivated by racial discrimination and was in retaliation for
exercising her First Amendment right to free speech. This is the second time this
case has come before us.
Previously, plaintiff appealed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendants on her Title VII and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985
claims. We agreed with the district court that plaintiff’s racial discrimination
claims were barred by collateral estoppel and affirmed its grant of summary
judgment on and dismissal of those claims. As to plaintiff’s First Amendment
claim, however, we held that the record then before us did not show that claim
had been actually litigated or necessarily decided, and we remanded the case to
the district court for further proceedings. With regard to the First Amendment
claim, we stated as follows: “For purposes of clarity we observe that Plaintiff’s
complaint filed in state court [and later removed to federal court] incorrectly
cited 42 U.S.C. § 1983, rather than § 1986, as applying to her First Amendment
claim that she was retaliated against for opposing mainstreaming at her school,
but we will treat her claim as properly pled.” Mitchell v. Albuquerque Bd. of
Educ., No. 91-2294, 1993 WL 307904, at **6 (10th Cir. Aug. 13, 1993). No
petition for rehearing was filed following our disposition. Plaintiff filed a
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petition for writ of certiorari, and the United States Supreme Court denied that
petition. Mitchell v. Albuquerque Bd. of Educ., 510 U.S. 1045 (1994).
Upon remand, defendants moved for summary judgment on plaintiff’s First
Amendment claim. The district court granted the motion, finding that the claim
was time-barred. Noting that this court had identified § 1986 as the proper statute
under which the First Amendment claim must be brought, the district court
applied the one-year statute of limitations contained in that statute. Plaintiff has
once again appealed the district court’s decision and now argues that this court
was wrong in its holding that her First Amendment claim was properly pled under
§ 1986, thereby dooming her cause to a one-year limitations period, instead of the
three-year period applicable to § 1983 claims.
Significantly, this is the first juncture in these proceedings at which
plaintiff has taken issue with this court's characterization of her claim as being
properly pled under § 1986. She filed no petition for rehearing after our 1993
decision, her petition for writ of certiorari makes no mention of the holding, and
she did not raise the issue before the district court on remand, even after
defendants asserted in their summary judgment motion that plaintiff’s § 1986
claim was time-barred. In fact, plaintiff states in her appellate brief that she “did
not below recognize nor raise the inapplicability and inappropriateness of the
Tenth Circuit’s substitution of Sec. 1986 for her Sec. 1983 count.” Appellant’s
Br. at 9. 1
1
In making that statement, plaintiff refers to herself as pro se. We note for
(continued...)
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Because plaintiff neglected to raise this issue in the district court, we will
not consider it on appeal. See Walker v. Mather (In re Walker), 959 F.2d 894,
896 (10th Cir. 1992). Additionally,
[u]nder the doctrine of law of the case, “a legal decision made at one
stage of litigation, unchallenged in a subsequent appeal when the
opportunity to do so existed, becomes the law of the case for future
stages of the same litigation, and the parties are deemed to have
waived the right to challenge that decision at a later time.”
Martinez v. Roscoe, 100 F.3d 121, 123 (10th Cir. 1996)(quoting Capps v.
Sullivan, 13 F.3d 350, 353 (10th Cir. 1993)). Plaintiff was presented with several
opportunities in the history of this case to take issue with this court’s
characterization of her claim as under § 1986, and she failed at every point to do
so. This court’s heretofore unchallenged holding that plaintiff’s First Amendment
claim was properly pled under § 1986 and its treatment as such became the law of
the case and cannot be challenged at this belated point in this case.
Finally, we cannot say that circumstances are such that departure from the
general waiver rule or law of the case doctrine is warranted. The expanded record
now before us shows that plaintiff’s First Amendment claim was actually litigated
at the administrative hearing before the local school board, and the board's
rejection of this claim was affirmed by both the state board and the New Mexico
Court of Appeals. Therefore, plaintiff's First Amendment claim in federal court,
like her racial discrimination claims, is barred by collateral estoppel.
1
(...continued)
purposes of clarity that plaintiff had counsel at every juncture of the proceedings
up to the point of this appeal. The appeal now before us is the first point at which
plaintiff has appeared pro se.
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Consequently, this court’s characterization of plaintiff’s First Amendment claim
as properly brought under § 1986 and the resulting application of that statute’s
one-year limitation do not result in a manifest injustice. See Doelle v. Mountain
States Tel. & Tel., 872 F.2d 942, 944 n.4 (10th Cir. 1989)(noting manifest
injustice exception to general waiver rule); Wilson v. Meeks, 98 F.3d 1247, 1250
(10th Cir. 1996)(noting manifest injustice and clear error exception to law of the
case doctrine).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue
forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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