UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 12/20/96
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
MAXINE PUMPKIN-WILSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 95-7175
(D.C. No. CV-94-658-P)
JANICE M. SHEETS, in her official (E.D. Okla.)
capacity as superintendent of the
Tahlequah Public Schools,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before PORFILIO, ALARCON, ** and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
Honorable Arthur L. Alarcon, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff, a Native American, commenced this action alleging wrongful
discharge from employment based on race discrimination under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981 and 2000e-2(a) and reprisal under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). At the close
of plaintiff’s presentation of evidence at trial before a jury, the district court
granted defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). The sole issue before us on appeal is whether the district
court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of defendant. We
affirm.
In the fall of 1990, plaintiff applied for the position of Indian Education
Coordinator with the Tahlequah Public School District. She interviewed for the
position with an Indian Education Parent Committee, which was composed of
parents of Indian students. The Parent Committee did not submit her name to the
then superintendent of the school district, Dr. Barbara Staggs, as one of the two
finalists for the position. The Parent Committee changed the requirements for the
position, and the person selected to be coordinator was Georgia Dick, a Native
American, whom plaintiff alleged was not as qualified for the position as
plaintiff.
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Subsequently, plaintiff’s application for the coordinator postion was
submitted for a counselor position. The counselor reported to the coordinator.
Plaintiff was hired for that position and was rehired for the following two school
years. In November 1992, she received a negative evaluation and plan for
improvement. After plaintiff filed two grievances, one for having a noncertified
individual, Ms. Dick, participate in her evaluation and one for being given a pre-
prepared plan for improvement, the evaluation and plan for improvement were
withdrawn, and plaintiff was reevaluated properly with a more favorable
evaluation.
Also, in November 1992, she was docked a days’ pay for failing to report
for work on the first day of the new school year. Plaintiff filed a grievance
requesting that she be paid. The grievance was resolved by allowing her an
opportunity to make up the time she missed.
Thereafter, there was a disagreement between plaintiff and Dr. Staggs
concerning whether plaintiff misrepresented her employment history and
secondary counselor certification at the time she interviewed for the counselor
position. Dr. Staggs apparently asked plaintiff to resign due to the alleged
misrepresentations.
In April 1993, plaintiff was notified by the school board that she would not
be rehired as a counselor for the next school year. The school board’s decision
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was made after the Parent Committee recommended, based on the results of a
needs assessment survey, that plaintiff’s contract not be renewed and that the
counselor position be replaced by three noncertified assistants.
Plaintiff testified that she was subjected to racial discrimination because
the school district did not want highly qualified Native Americans advancing
within the school system. As specific incidents of discrimination, she pointed to
the hiring of a less qualified Native American for the coordinator position, the
downgrading of the former Director of Indian Education, 1 Lucinde Horsechief, to
keep her from advancing in the school district, the pay docking and improper
evaluation, and her failure to reach career teacher status due to defendant’s
actions.
In moving for judgment as a matter of law, defendant argued both that
plaintiff did not present a prima facie case of discrimination and that the
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for defendant’s actions were not proven by
plaintiff to be a pretext for discrimination. The district court granted judgment as
a matter of law stating only the following:
The Court finds there’s no legally sufficient evidence--eviden[t]iary
basis for a reasonable jury to find for the plaintiff on any alleged
cause of action. The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff points but one way and is susceptible to no reasonable
inferences supporting the plaintiff . . . .
1
The director title was later changed to coordinator.
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IV R. at 620.
Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when “a party has been fully
heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a
reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue . . . .” Rule 50(a)(1). We
review the grant of judgment as a matter of law de novo, applying the same
standards applied by the district court. Thompson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
34 F.3d 932, 941 (10th Cir. 1994). We view the evidence and all reasonable
inferences drawn from it in favor of the nonmoving party without weighing the
evidence, passing on the credibility of the witnesses, or substituting our judgment
for that of a jury. Greene v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 554, 557, 560 (10th
Cir. 1996).
Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only where the evidence
and all inferences to be drawn therefrom are so clear that reasonable
minds could not differ on the conclusion. Unless the proof is all one
way or so overwhelmingly preponderant in favor of the movant as to
permit no other rational conclusion, judgment as a matter of law is
improper.
Id. at *3 (citations and quotation omitted). Also, we are “mindful that a ruling
which deprives a party of a determination of the facts by a jury ‘should be
cautiously and sparingly granted.’” Id. at 560 (quoting Cockrell v. Boise Cascade
Corp., 781 F.2d 173, 177 (10th Cir. 1986)).
Plaintiff argues that the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law
on her discrimination and reprisal claims was in error because she presented a
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prima facie case of each and because she presented substantial evidence showing
defendant’s justification for the elimination of her position was pretextual.
Because plaintiff relied on circumstantial rather than direct evidence of
intentional discrimination, we apply the burden shifting scheme set forth in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973), to evaluate
whether plaintiff demonstrated circumstantial discriminatory intent as to her Title
VII and § 1981 claims. See Reynolds v. School Dist. No. l, 69 F.3d 1523, 1533
(10th Cir. 1995). First, plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. Id. To do so, she must show that she (1) “belongs to a protected
class;” (2) “was qualified and satisfactorily performing her job;” and (3) “was
terminated under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination.”
Martin v. Nannie & Newborns, Inc., 3 F.3d 1410, 1417 (10th Cir. 1993).
Establishing a prima facie case effectively creates a presumption of unlawful
discrimination by an employer against an employee. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993). If the plaintiff makes this showing, the burden
shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for
the challenged employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If the
defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that
the proffered reason was pretextual. Id. at 804. The ultimate burden of proving
discrimination always remains with the plaintiff, and the McDonnell Douglas
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“burden shifting analysis need not be strictly applied.” Murray v. City of
Sapulpa, 45 F.3d 1417, 1421 n.2 (10th Cir. 1995).
Plaintiff argues that she met the test for a prima facie case of race
discrimination. 2 It is undisputed that she is a member of a protected class, Native
Americans. Defendant disputes plaintiff’s assertion that she was qualified and
satisfactorily performing her job. Because plaintiff’s most recent, proper
evaluation was favorable and she was qualified at the time of the alleged
discriminatory action, it appears, and therefore we must assume, that plaintiff was
qualified and satisfactorily performing her job. Defendant also disputes
plaintiff’s argument that she was terminated under circumstances giving rise to an
inference of discrimination. Plaintiff maintains that discrimination can be
inferred from the facts that she would have been a career teacher after three years
if she had not been terminated, Ms. Horsechief was prevented from advancing in
the school district, plaintiff was docked a days’ pay and improperly evaluated, and
defendant allegedly attempted to coerce her into resigning by falsely accusing her
of misrepresenting her counselor certification status at the time she applied for
2
We agree with plaintiff that elimination of her position did not end the
discrimination inquiry, because the elimination of a position for racially
motivated reasons can form the basis of a discrimination claim. Reynolds,
69 F.3d at 1535.
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the counselor position. Plaintiff believes her position was eliminated only after
she failed to resign.
“As the very name ‘prima facie case’ suggests, there must be at least a
logical connection between each element of the prima facie case and the illegal
discrimination for which it establishes a ‘legally mandatory, rebuttable
presumption[.]’” Green, 98 F.3d at 558 (quoting Texas Dep’t of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 n.7 (1981)). Plaintiff failed to establish
any connection between the elimination of her position before she was classified
as a career teacher and the alleged racial motivation of defendant. Ms.
Horsechief voluntarily resigned because she did not feel she had administrative
support, not due to racial discrimination. Also, Ms. Horsechief stated that she
had no personal knowledge of any racial discrimination against plaintiff. No
evidence was presented establishing that Native Americans were hindered or
precluded from advancing within the school district. Because her grievances
relating to her evaluation were resolved to her satisfaction, no discriminatory
intent can be inferred from the improper evaluation. Nothing, other than
plaintiff’s bare assertion, indicates the pay docking and accusations regarding her
certification status were related to her race. We conclude plaintiff did not make a
prima facie showing of race discrimination.
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Plaintiff argues that she presented a prima facie case of reprisal. To
establish a prima facie case of reprisal, a plaintiff must show (1) protected
employee action; (2) adverse action by an employer either after or
contemporaneous to the employee’s protected action; and (3) a causal connection
between the employee’s action and the employer’s adverse action. See Berry v.
Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 985 (10th Cir. 1996). Plaintiff claims the
following show reprisal: she filed grievances concerning the reduction in pay and
improper evaluation, defendant took adverse action by eliminating her position
shortly after she filed the grievances, and defendant’s action was causally related
to her filing the grievances. It is undisputed that plaintiff engaged in protected
actions by filing her grievances and that defendant eliminated the counselor
position. We do not agree with plaintiff, however, that she established the
requisite discriminatory causal connection. Nothing indicates the counselor
position was eliminated due to the grievances she filed. Rather, it appeared that
the position was eliminated for wholly independent reasons. We conclude
plaintiff did not make a prima facie showing of reprisal.
Even if we assume that plaintiff made a prima facie case, defendant met her
burden of establishing a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for eliminating
plaintiff’s position. The Parent Committee recommended that the counselor
position be eliminated based on the results of a needs assessment survey,
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evaluating academic, cultural and direct service needs, which was completed by
Indian parents and children in the school district. Thus, we conclude defendant
presented a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the elimination of the
counselor position.
Because defendant met her burden, plaintiff is required to show that
defendant’s proffered reason was pretextual. “Pretext requires a showing that the
tendered reason for the employment decision was not the genuine motivating
reason, but rather was a disingenuous or sham reason.” Reynolds, 69 F.3d at
1535. To establish pretext, plaintiff states the needs assessment survey did not
discuss or recommend abolition of the counselor position, the deposition
testimony of David Cornsilk, which was contrary to his trial testimony, indicated
that the needs assessment survey requested a counselor position, and Dr. Staggs’
testimony was not credible. According to plaintiff the docked pay and improper
evaluation suggest defendant was interested in forcing plaintiff to resign even
before the Parent Committee considered the needs assessment survey and
recommended the counselor position be eliminated. Cf. III R. at 334-35 (plaintiff
testified that Dr. Staggs requested her resignation after plaintiff learned her
position was being eliminated). Even though the needs assessment survey did not
specifically address the counselor position, its failure to do so does not rebut
defendant’s reason for eliminating the position. Even if Dr. Staggs tried to force
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plaintiff to resign, plaintiff failed to prove this was based upon race. Irrespective
of Dr. Staggs credibility, plaintiff failed to meet her burden of proving pretext.
The docked pay and improper evaluations also do not, as plaintiff argues,
establish pretext for racial discrimination, since her pay was docked because she
failed to report to work or make up missed time and the evaluation grievances
were resolved in her favor.
None of the evidence suggests that plaintiff’s position was eliminated based
upon race or that she was a victim of reprisal. Plaintiff provides only her own
unsupported assertions that the reasons given by defendant for the elimination of
the counselor position are merely pretext for racial discrimination. Because
plaintiff did not offer evidence suggesting defendant was not concerned with best
meeting the needs for Indian education and instead was discriminating against her
on the basis of race, she did not meet her burden of calling defendant’s facially
nondiscriminatory explanation into doubt as pretextual. See Reynolds, 69 F.3d at
1536. Because plaintiff did not prove a prima facie case or show that defendant’s
alleged nondiscriminatory reasons for eliminating her position were pretextual,
the district court correctly granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of
defendant.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
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Entered for the Court
John C. Porfilio
Circuit Judge
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