UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 1/7/97
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
JOHNIE STUBBLEFIELD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 96-5051
(D.C. No. CV-94-992)
SHIRLEY S. CHATER, * (N.D. Okla.)
Commissioner, Social Security
Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT **
Before EBEL and HENRY, Circuit Judges, and DOWNES, *** District Judge.
*
Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secretary of Health and
Human Services in social security cases were transferred to the Commissioner of
Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. In the text we continue to refer to the
Secretary because she was the appropriate party at the time of the underlying
decision.
**
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
***
Honorable William F. Downes, District Judge, United States District Court
for the District of Wyoming, sitting by designation.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Johnie Stubblefield appeals from an order of the district court that
affirms the decision of the Secretary of Health & Human Services to deny him
social security disability and supplemental security income benefits. We have
jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Plaintiff claims he is disabled due to back problems, pain, depression,
limited work experience, and advancing age. He filed applications for benefits in
1987 and 1988, which were denied. He filed this application on August 9, 1990.
Because the administrative law judge (ALJ) found no good cause for reopening
plaintiff’s previous applications, the ALJ considered his current application from
July 7, 1989, the day after his last most recent application was denied.
On this application, the ALJ denied benefits both initially and on remand
from the Appeals Council, ultimately deciding at step five of the evaluation
process, see Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988), that
although plaintiff cannot return to his past work, he retains the residual functional
capacity (RFC) to perform a significant number of jobs that exist in the national
economy. The ALJ found that plaintiff did not acquire transferable skills from
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his past work, but can nevertheless perform certain sedentary, unskilled jobs. The
Appeals Council denied review from this determination, making it the final
decision of the Secretary. The magistrate judge 1 determined that the ALJ’s
finding that plaintiff lacks transferable skills was not supported by substantial
evidence, that plaintiff has transferable skills, and that the record supports the
ALJ’s conclusion that significant numbers of jobs exist that plaintiff can perform.
On appeal, plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s finding that he retains the RFC
to perform a significant number of jobs existing in the national economy is based
on an error of law and is otherwise not supported by substantial evidence.
Specifically, plaintiff argues that: (1) the ALJ’s failure to make a precise finding
as to plaintiff’s need to alternate sitting and standing tainted the hypothetical
question the ALJ posed to the vocational expert (VE); (2) the ALJ should not
have relied on the Medical-Vocational Guidelines since plaintiff alleged a
nonexertional impairment, pain; (3) the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff had no
transferable skills is supported by substantial evidence, contrary to the conclusion
of the magistrate judge; and (4) the ALJ found plaintiff’s testimony concerning
his sitting limitations to be not credible, without giving a valid reason for
rejecting it. After reviewing the ALJ’s decision in light of the whole record, we
1
The parties consented to proceed before the magistrate judge. See
28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
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agree that the ALJ made a number of legal and evidentiary errors. We therefore
remand for additional proceedings.
At step five, after the claimant has demonstrated that he cannot return to
his past work, “the burden shifts to the Secretary to show that the claimant retains
the residual functional capacity (RFC) to do other work that exists in the national
economy.” Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1993). “‘The
Secretary meets this burden if the decision is supported by substantial evidence.’”
Id. (quoting Gossett v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 802, 804 (10th Cir. 1988)). We therefore
review the Secretary's decision to determine whether it is supported by substantial
evidence and whether the correct legal standards were applied. Miller v. Chater,
99 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 1996). Substantial evidence is “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)(quotation and citation omitted).
Evidence is not substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence or is mere
conclusion. Musgrave v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1371, 1374 (10th Cir. 1992). We
may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the Secretary.
Kelley v. Chater, 62 F.3d 335, 337 (10th Cir. 1995).
As indicated above, plaintiff claims he is disabled due to back problems,
pain, depression, limited work experience, and advancing age. The ALJ found
that plaintiff retains the RFC for sedentary work, II Appellant’s App. at 24
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(finding 5), but that his capacity for the full range of sedentary work is limited by
his need to “change positions to relieve his symptoms,” id. (finding 7). At the
hearing, the ALJ asked the VE what jobs would be available to a 48-year-old man
with a high school education, the RFC for sedentary work, chronic pain, and the
need to “change position from time to time to relieve this symptomatology.” Id.
at 81. Although the VE testified that plaintiff acquired transferable work skills
from his past work assembling prefabricated steel buildings, the ALJ concluded
that plaintiff has no transferable skills, id. at 25 (finding 10), and that plaintiff
can perform such jobs as “dispatcher clerk, 1,046 [jobs in] Oklahoma, 95,432
nationally, inventory stock clerk, 4,101 Oklahoma, 36,059 nationally, assembly,
1,835 Oklahoma, 140,113 nationally, and cashier, 2,154 Oklahoma, 772,370
nationally,” id. at 23.
There are a number of problems with these findings. First, because the ALJ
failed to make a precise finding as to plaintiff’s sitting limitations, the
hypothetical he posed to the VE was faulty and the response it elicited cannot
constitute substantial evidence. Hargis v. Sullivan, 945 F.2d 1482, 1492
(10th Cir. 1991)(“Testimony elicited by hypothetical questions that do not relate
with precision all of a claimant’s impairments cannot constitute substantial
evidence to support the Secretary’s decision.” (quotation omitted)). Considering
the vague wording used by the ALJ, we cannot tell what assumptions about
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plaintiff’s sitting limitations the VE might have made and whether they mesh with
the medical evidence.
Second, even assuming the ALJ’s hypothetical was legitimate, he
misconstrued the VE’s testimony in response to it. She plainly stated that there
are no unskilled, sedentary jobs which would allow plaintiff to alternate sitting
and standing. II Appellant’s App. at 85. This eliminates the assembly and
cashier jobs from the pool of jobs which plaintiff can still perform--they are
unskilled, sedentary jobs. See id. at 84.
The VE did not specify the numerical code in the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles (DOT) for the “stock and inventory clerk” job she said
plaintiff can perform, see id. at 82, and we do not find an exact match for that
title in the DOT. The clerical stock- or inventory-type jobs that are included,
however, are all described as requiring at least light exertion. Therefore, since
the ALJ found that plaintiff was limited to sedentary work, expressly rejecting the
prior assessment by the State that plaintiff can perform light work, id. at 22, these
stock and inventory jobs are also eliminated from plaintiff’s occupational base.
Moreover, even if we could find a sedentary stock or inventory job in the DOT to
match the VE’s testimony on that point, the VE stated that “[t]he stock and
inventory clerk would not have as much liberty” to sit and stand at will as a
dispatcher clerk, id. at 86, again raising the question of what unstated
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assumptions about plaintiff’s sitting limitations the VE was making in response to
the ALJ’s vague hypothetical, and precluding the possibility that this evidence is
substantial evidence.
The one remaining job named by the VE is dispatcher clerk, and it also
must be eliminated from the occupational base for lack of substantial evidence to
support it. Because the VE identified the dispatcher clerk job based on her belief
that plaintiff has transferable skills, to consider it contradicts the ALJ’s express
finding that plaintiff lacks transferable skills. Id. at 25 (finding 10).
Moreover, even assuming plaintiff has transferable work skills, the VE
testified that plaintiff can perform a dispatcher clerk job only if he remains in the
steel or building industries. See id. at 82, 87, 89. Although the VE said there
were 1,046 dispatcher clerk jobs in Oklahoma and 95,532 nationally, see id., she
estimated that only ten to twenty percent of these jobs are in the relevant
industries, but that, in any event, she could “not give . . . an accurate figure
without doing an actual labor market survey,” id. at 90. When asked if she
thought there were 200 steel building companies in Oklahoma that would need a
dispatcher, she replied: “As I say, I would have to do an actual labor market
survey.” Id. Thus, the VE herself put into question her own ten to twenty percent
estimate, basically saying she did not know how many dispatcher clerk jobs there
were in the relevant industries. Therefore, there is no substantial evidence to
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support any particular number of dispatcher clerks jobs supposedly available to
plaintiff. Even assuming plaintiff has transferable work skills and plaintiff can
perform a dispatcher clerk job, we cannot determine whether the number of
dispatcher clerk jobs supposedly available to plaintiff is significant. See Trimiar
v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1326, 1330 (10th Cir. 1992)(holding 650 to 900 jobs in
Oklahoma is significant when factors relevant to the determination have been
addressed). Therefore, for all the above reasons, the ALJ’s conclusion that
plaintiff can perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy is not supported by substantial evidence.
The magistrate judge determined that there was no substantial evidence to
support the ALJ’s finding that plaintiff does not possess transferable work skills
and found, based on the VE’s testimony, that he has transferable skills. Plaintiff
argues there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding because the VE
mischaracterized plaintiff’s past relevant work as a high-level semi-skilled
“assembler, metal building (construction),” see DOT 801.381-010, instead of an
unskilled construction worker II, which includes the job of “laborer, steel
handling (construction),” see DOT 869.687-026. Plaintiff correctly points out
that unskilled jobs produce no transferable skills. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1568(a),
416.968(a); S.S.R. 82-41, 1982 WL 31389, at *2. After carefully reviewing the
record, we conclude there is insufficient evidence to determine which DOT job
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description best fits plaintiff’s past work assembling prefabricated steel
buildings. 2 Plaintiff’s testimony describing this past work was quite brief, see II
Appellant’s App. at 68-69, and his application forms provide even less detail
about it, see id. at 99, 117-18, 226-27, 232-33, 242. The ALJ did not ask him
whether the VE’s characterization of his past work was accurate. This issue will
therefore require further development on remand.
Finally, we note that the ALJ failed to address the factors generally
required to make the step-five determination under Trimiar. See
966 F.2d at 1330. Although this legal error is not a ground for our reversal
because plaintiff did not raise it, we note the error for correction on remand.
We reject plaintiff’s claim that the ALJ inappropriately relied on the
Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the “grids”), 20 C.F.R., Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2,
Rule 201.21, in making his determination that plaintiff was not disabled. The
ALJ clearly accepted plaintiff’s pain as a nonexertional impairment, and correctly
used the grids only as a framework for making his decision. II Appellant’s App.
at 25 (finding 12); see also Thompson, 987 F.2d at 1488.
2
In response to the Secretary’s argument that this issue is untimely raised
because it was not presented to the magistrate judge, we point out that plaintiff
had no occasion to raise it in the district court. The ALJ’s finding that plaintiff
had acquired no transferable skills was in plaintiff’s favor.
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In light of our remand for additional proceedings, we do not reach
plaintiff’s claim that the ALJ improperly rejected as not credible his contention
that he can sit for only fifteen minutes before he must change positions due to his
back pain. Because we decide that the ALJ must make a precise finding as to
plaintiff’s sitting limitations, his testimony, as well as all of the relevant medical
evidence, will have to be reconsidered on remand.
Plaintiff claims he reached advanced age in 1995, and that his building
assembly job also became vocationally irrelevant in 1995 due to the passage of
time since he last worked in that field. He therefore claims he is now disabled
and requests an immediate award of benefits. We reject this request. Our holding
that the ALJ failed to marshal substantial evidence to support his conclusion that
there is a significant number of jobs in the national economy that plaintiff can
perform does not presuppose a view that adequate evidence cannot be developed
on remand. We need not and do not decide whether plaintiff became disabled in
1995, but leave that decision for the Secretary in the first instance. We note,
moreover, that even if plaintiff became disabled in 1995, that would not compel a
finding that plaintiff was disabled before then.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Oklahoma is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED with directions to
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remand to the agency for further proceedings not inconsistent with this order and
judgment.
Entered for the Court
William F. Downes
District Judge
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