F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 18 1997
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
RANDY D. PRUITT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 96-5128
(D.C. No. CV-94-915-W)
SHIRLEY S. CHATER, (N.D. Okla.)
Commissioner, Social Security
Administration, *
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT **
Before ANDERSON, KELLY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
*
Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secretary of Health and
Human Services in social security cases were transferred to the Commissioner of
Social Security. P.L. No. 103-296. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d)(1), the
district court substituted Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, for
Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of Health and Human Services, as the defendant in
this action. In the text we continue to refer to the Secretary because she was the
appropriate party at the time of the underlying administrative decision.
**
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Randy D. Pruitt appeals from an order of the district court affirming the
Secretary’s decision denying his application for Supplemental Security Income
benefits (SSI). Mr. Pruitt filed for SSI on January 13, 1992. In his application,
he alleged disability due to a back injury. Other problems, including abdominal
pain with hernia surgery, generalized pain including joint pain, carpal tunnel
syndrome, mental retardation, pancreatitis, and depression surfaced during the
administrative process. Mr. Pruitt’s requests were denied initially and on
reconsideration. Following a de novo hearing on October 14, 1993, an
administrative law judge (ALJ) determined that he was not disabled within the
meaning of the Social Security Act. Mr. Pruitt thereafter filed a complaint in
district court, and the case was assigned to a magistrate judge for final disposition
by consent of the parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). The magistrate judge
affirmed the Secretary’s decision, and Mr. Pruitt appealed to this court.
We review the Secretary’s decision to determine whether the factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record viewed as a whole
and whether the correct legal standards were applied. Andrade v. Secretary of
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Health & Human Servs., 985 F.2d 1045, 1047 (10th Cir. 1993). Substantial
evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion." Fowler v. Bowen, 876 F.2d 1451, 1453 (10th
Cir. 1989)(quotation omitted).
The Secretary has established a five-step evaluation process for
determining whether a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the Social
Security Act. See Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir.
1988)(discussing five-step disability test). When the analysis reaches step five,
the Secretary bears the burden of showing that a claimant retains the capacity to
perform other work and that such work exists in the national economy. Id. at 751.
The ALJ determined that Mr. Pruitt retained the residual functional
capacity (RFC) to perform medium work, subject to certain exertional and
non-exertional limitations. Given his RFC, the ALJ further determined that Mr.
Pruitt could not return to his past relevant work. Reaching step five, however, he
found that there were jobs within the national economy which Mr. Pruitt could
perform. The ALJ applied the Medical-Vocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. § 404,
Subpt. P, App. 2 (the grids) as a framework, considered testimony from a
vocational expert, and concluded that Mr. Pruitt was not disabled.
Mr. Pruitt contends that the ALJ failed to develop the record concerning his
depression, which resulted in a decision lacking in substantial evidence. Where
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objective evidence of depression appears in the record, the ALJ must develop the
record concerning depression and its effect on the claimant’s ability to work.
See Carter v. Chater, 73 F.3d 1019, 1022 (10th Cir. 1996).
The ALJ carefully questioned both Mr. Pruitt and his wife at the hearing
concerning his depression. Mr. Pruitt testified that he underwent counseling for
depression at Grand Lake Mental Health Center (Grand Lake) in February through
July 1993. He attended counseling sessions once a week. At the time of the
October hearing, Mr. Pruitt indicated that he was still depressed, and that his
depression stemmed from lack of funds and from his physical limitations. His
wife testified that Mr. Pruitt was subject to explosive outbursts, that depression
led him to suicidal ideation, and that he went on a shooting spree in January or
February 1993 and was placed in jail.
There is objective corroboration in the record for Mr. Pruitt’s claim that he
is depressed, in the form of a letter from Sandra Dover, a counselor at Grand
Lake. Ms. Dover indicated that Mr. Pruitt obtained outpatient counseling at
Grand Lake. She described his condition as follows:
The current diagnosis for Mr. Pruitt is Depressive Disorder Not
Otherwise Specified. This means that Mr. Pruitt reports symptoms of
depression which are recurrent, but which do not meet the criteria for
any specific mood disorder. In my opinion, this appears to be a
chronic state for Mr. Pruitt. Psychosocial stressors such as
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inadequate finances and chronic pain can complicate or exacerbate
the depressive symptoms.
R., Vol. II at 350.
The ALJ found this description of Mr. Pruitt’s depression, though
expressed by a counselor with a bachelor’s degree, sufficiently credible that he
factored the depression into his analysis all the way to step five. Although he did
not find the depression to be so severe to meet or equal a listing, he concluded
that Mr. Pruitt’s depression, along with his borderline intellectual functioning and
hostile and avoidant feelings, “often” results in “Deficiencies of Concentration,
Persistence or Pace Resulting in Failure to Complete Tasks in a Timely Manner.”
Id. at 32; see also id. at 23. The ALJ also found that his depression and other
mental problems had only “slight” effect on his activities of daily living, and on
his ability to maintain social functioning, and “never” resulted in episodes of
deterioration or decompensation in a work-like setting. Id. at 23-24, 32. Based
on these findings, the ALJ concluded that Mr. Pruitt’s mental impairments
imposed only moderate limitations in his ability to maintain attention and
concentration.
These findings, to the extent they evaluated the limitations imposed by Mr.
Pruitt’s depression on his mental RFC, are unsupported by any medical evidence
in the record. 1 The ALJ must base his evaluation of a claimant’s mental
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impairments on “evidence from qualified mental health professionals.” See
Bishop v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 1259, 1263 (8th Cir. 1990). By statute, the
Secretary is required to make every reasonable effort to ensure that a qualified
psychiatrist or psychologist assesses the claimant’s mental RFC. 42 U.S.C.
§ 421(h). If the ALJ completes the PRT form himself, the record must contain
substantial, competent evidence to support his conclusions. See Cruse v. United
States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 49 F.3d 614, 617-18 (10th Cir. 1995).
The counselor’s one-page summary statement, which contains no discussion of the
effect of Mr. Pruitt’s depression on his ability to work, is not substantial,
competent evidence of Mr. Pruitt’s ability to work. The ALJ should have
developed the record further by obtaining such evidence.
The prejudicial effect of the ALJ’s failure to develop the record is
particularly evident in the questions he posed to the vocational expert (VE)
concerning Mr. Pruitt’s depression. He asked the VE whether “moderate
depression” or unspecified “depressive symptoms” could affect Mr. Pruitt’s
ability to do other work. R. Vol. II at 93. This question does not incorporate any
1
The Secretary argues that since a counselor with a bachelor’s degree is not
an “acceptable source” of medical evidence, see 20 C.F.R. § 416.913(a), the ALJ
had no duty to accept her diagnosis of depression or to inquire further. We need
not decide this point, since the ALJ did accept the diagnosis of depression and
concluded that depression had an effect on the claimant’s mental RFC. Once he
made that determination, it was his responsibility to ensure that the record was
fully developed, with appropriate medical evidence concerning the depression.
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specific, functional restriction. The Secretary has recognized that the reaction of
persons with mental impairments to the demands of work is highly individualized.
See S.S.R. 85-15. A proper examination of Mr. Pruitt might have assisted the
ALJ in posing a more specific hypothetical to the VE.
The ALJ, in a further hypothetical, incorporated the restrictions described
by Mr. Pruitt and his wife during the hearing. The VE replied that Mr. Pruitt’s
ability to do other work would depend on the degree to which his concentration
had been affected. The ALJ responded by asking the VE to measure Mr. Pruitt’s
ability to concentrate at work by assuming that he could not watch television for
an hour. R., Vol. II at 94-95. It is unclear what relevance this question had to the
performance of actual job duties. Specific medical evidence would have assisted
the ALJ in better expressing Mr. Pruitt’s nonexertional capacity in terms of work-
related functions. See S.S.R. 96-8p.
The ALJ’s failure to develop the record is particularly egregious, because
this is a step five case. In step five cases, the burden is on the Secretary to show
that the claimant can do other work in the national economy, based on substantial
evidence in the record. See Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1491 (10th
Cir. 1993) (Secretary must order consultative examination, if necessary to
determine RFC at step five). Substantial evidence is missing here.
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Mr. Pruitt argues that further development should include a consultative
examination. We agree. The Secretary has broad latitude in deciding whether to
order consultative examinations. See Diaz v. Secretary of Health & Human
Servs., 898 F.2d 774, 778 (10th Cir. 1990). Here, however, Mr. Pruitt has shown
objective evidence of a condition which requires further development, see Howell
v. Sullivan, 950 F.2d 343, 348-49 (7th Cir. 1991), and that a final determination
cannot be made because the evidence as a whole is insufficient to support a
decision, see 20 C.F.R. § 416.919a(b). Under these circumstances, a consultative
examination is required.
Mr. Pruitt also complains that the Appeals Council should have developed
the record further after his representative informed it that he had been court-
committed to a mental hospital. While this issue technically has been waived by
Mr. Pruitt’s failure to raise it before the district court, see Crow v. Shalala, 40
F.3d 323, 324 (10th Cir. 1994), since we remand based on the record before the
ALJ, the Secretary on remand should also take all necessary steps to obtain any
pertinent, available medical records connected with the alleged hospitalization.
Finally, Mr. Pruitt complains of various documents missing from the
administrative record presented to the district court and this court. 2 There is no
2
The Secretary does not argue that the missing documents, had they been
present in the record, would demonstrate that she fulfilled her duty to develop.
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indication that his counsel brought this problem to the attention of the district
court. Although the Secretary has the responsibility to assemble the record for
purposes of review, see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), counsel for the claimant cannot
simply remain silent in the district court proceedings concerning deficiencies in
the record, and then assert those deficiencies as further support for reversal in this
court. In the event of further court review of this and other cases, we admonish
Mr. Pruitt’s counsel to bring any deficiencies in the assembed administrative
record to the attention of the district court.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Oklahoma is REVERSED, and this case is REMANDED, with instructions to
the district court to REMAND this case to the Secretary for further proceedings in
accordance with this order and judgment.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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