F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 1 1997
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
vs. No. 96-4092
(D.C. No. 96-CV-94-J)
RONALD LEE GORECKI, (D. Utah)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before BRORBY, EBEL, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.**
Defendant Ronald Lee Gorecki appeals the district court’s denial of his second
28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion challenging his convictions for possession of a controlled
substance with the intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(D),
and for carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
§ 924(c)(1). Mr. Gorecki raises four issues in his motion, however, he has waived three
of the four—that the testimony of Wesley James Long should not have been permitted at
trial, that his right to due process and a fair and impartial trial were violated, and that he
was denied the right to cross-examine witnesses—because he failed to raise these issues
in his first § 2255 motion. See United States v. Gorecki, 83 F.3d 434 (table), 1996 WL
211740 (10th Cir. Apr. 30, 1996). Furthermore, Mr. Gorecki has shown neither “cause
for failing to raise [these issues] and prejudice therefrom” nor that a “fundamental
miscarriage of justice would result from failure to entertain the claim[s].” United States
v. Richards, 5 F.3d 1369, 1370 (10th Cir. 1993) (quotation omitted).
As the government concedes, Mr. Gorecki may raise in this motion his fourth
issue, which challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1) conviction. United States v. Barnhardt, 93 F.3d 706, 709 (10th Cir. 1996)
(Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995), applies retroactively to cases on collateral
review).
A person violates § 924(c)(1) by using or carrying a firearm during a drug
trafficking offense. The indictment alleged that Mr. Gorecki used and carried a firearm
during the predicate offense. Bailey has confined the definition of use under § 924(c) to
“active employment” of a firearm. 116 S. Ct. at 505. Bailey did not disturb the case-law
definition of carry, United States v. Ruth, 100 F.3d 111, 113 (10th Cir. 1996), which
requires that the defendant “simultaneously possessed, through dominion and control, and
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transported a firearm.” Id. (quotation omitted). The government concedes that the jury
instruction regarding “use and carry” given at Mr. Gorecki’s trial was erroneous as we
now understand those terms.1 Despite overwhelming evidence that Mr. Gorecki’s
involvement with firearms during his drug-trafficking offense amounted to carrying those
weapons, we are constrained by circuit precedent. We have held that, under these
circumstances, we must reverse “unless we can determine with absolute certainty that the
jury based its verdict on the ground on which it was correctly instructed.” United States
v. Miller, 84 F.3d 1244, 1257 (10th Cir. 1996). We note that this standard seems
impossible to meet. Under the instructions given, the jury might have found Mr. Gorecki
guilty of using a firearm without finding that he actively employed it. Given this
uncertainty, we must reverse. United States v. DeSantiago-Flores, 1997 WL 85000, at *4
(10th Cir. Feb. 28, 1997).
REVERSED and REMANDED for a new trial on the § 924(c) count. Mr. Gorecki
Jury Instruction No. 34 stated:
1
In order for the government to sustain its burden of proof that the
defendant used or carried one or more firearm(s), it is not necessary to
prove that the defendant fired the weapon or even showed the weapon
during the alleged drug trafficking crime. It is sufficient to prove that the
firearm was a means of safeguarding and facilitating the possession of the
controlled substance with the intent to distribute the controlled substance.
A firearm is “used” when a defendant had ready access to it and the
firearm was an integral part of his criminal undertaking and its availability
increased the likelihood that the criminal undertaking would succeed. A
defendant had ready access to a firearm if it was available to the defendant
in the vicinity where the drug trafficking offense took place.
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is granted a certificate of appealability under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1).
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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